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In its most common usage in the artistic context, collaboration refers to a practice of 
creation in which two artists work together to produce a single artwork or object. Collaboration 
Revisited: The Performative Art of Claude Cahun and Hannah Weiner focuses on the nexus of 
photography, writing, and performance in the work of six female avant-garde artists from the 
transatlantic twentieth century, informed by the important place of surrealism in that history, to 
reconsider this understanding of collaboration. Instead of the notion of collaboration as founded 
in the experience of two artists working together in each others’ presence, I examine and theorize 
a novel form of collaboration between artists and their audiences that privileges the separation 
and absence of collaborative partners from one another. I call this novel form “performative 
collaboration,” borrowing the term from linguist J.L. Austin’s theory of language that enacts the 
action it names (as in the “I do” of the wedding ceremony’s marital contract).    
Part one of this dissertation juxtaposes the work of multimedia artists Claude Cahun 
(French, 1894-1954) and Hannah Weiner (U.S. American, 1928-1997). Moving in turn through 
critical frames including the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and theories of 
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narcissism, theories of affect proposed by Rei Terada and Brian Massumi, and conversations 
around theories of performance, photography, and performative language, the three chapters of 
part one reveal the ways in which Cahun and Weiner inscribe a performance into the artwork and 
stage a direct address to future reader-viewers in order to inspire the repetition of those 
performances. The arguments advanced in these chapters account for my theory of “performative 
collaboration.” Part two turns to the work of Meret Oppenheim (Swiss, 1913-1985), Unica Zürn 
(German, 1916-1970), Bernadette Mayer (U.S. American, born 1945), and Adrian Piper (U.S. 
American, born 1948) to explore the role of the reader-viewer and critic in similar works that 
create instances of “performative collaboration.” I conclude the dissertation by turning to linguist 
Émile Benveniste’s theory of subjectivity in language, which makes its own account of linguistic 
performatives, to suggest that the reader-viewer or critic who participates in the “performative 
collaboration” of these works occupies a unique subjective position that evades the typical 
subject positions of “I” or “you.” In short, such a rich form of artistic collaboration involving 
audiences as participants poses a fruitful methodological challenge for scholars who become in 
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The Critic as Collaborator, and Swimmer 
 
After several years of work on this project, I begin with a question of and for myself. In 
all of this collaboration, where lies the critic? Where am I in the text? 
As a kid, I swam, in the summers and then, briefly, for all twelve months of the year. 
Between the ages of ten and twelve, I competed year-round in meets hosting hundreds (or so it 
seemed to me at the time) of other adolescent swimmers. A swim team is always somewhat in 
crisis as a team (or so I was, as a member of the Dynamo Swim Club in suburban Atlanta, 
Georgia, where my parents had relocated our family from North Carolina in the early 1990s). So 
much of a swim team’s activity splits amongst the very individual struggles of its members alone 
in their lanes for the time of a race, so that the experience of belonging to the team can become a 
solitary one, not unlike the model of collaboration I explore in this project.  
My coach, for one meet in Atlanta sometime in the middle of the decade, had assigned 
me to two events: the first, two laps of freestyle, and the second, two laps of backstroke. I 
approached the pool for warm-up, as far as I can remember, with trepidation, shy and left to a 
lane already teeming with strangers. By the time my first event arrived, the release of the 
headlong dive into the water was welcome, but by the end of my heat, I had climbed out of the 
pool humiliated, having attempted a flip turn too early at the end of my first lap, kicking 
desperately for the absent wall coming out of my somersault, and finishing the race, knowing I 
had been disqualified.  
The second event, the two laps of backstroke, sharpened my humiliation. Nearing the end 
of the lane, I counted my strokes from the signal flags, ready to turn at the right moment, 
relieved when I made solid contact with the wall. My feet must have landed on the wall off 
kilter, however, for when I pushed off, into the second lap with a dolphin kick, I propelled 
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myself under the rope separating lanes and swimmers into my neighbor-opponent’s track of pool. 
Worse, I did not realize I had left my own territory, and so continued to swim. At the end of my 
second lap, I pulled myself out of the pool, hauling my weight upward against the starting block, 
aware that something was wrong and so not waiting, as was customary, for the end of the race to 
exit the pool. My father stood there pretending not to laugh. But no one else was in the lane, I 
insisted; I hadn’t seen or collided with anyone. He assured me, trying to reassure me at the same 
time, that yes, there had been someone else there.  
In the pool, even teammates become opponents during a race, competing for the higher 
place, the faster time. Each swimmer moves parallel to the others, staggered at different speeds, 
different points in space and time, separated by the invisible fluid barrier between lanes marked 
only on the pool surface by the lane rope. My incursion into my opponent’s lane had breached 
one of these barriers and threatened contact (for the second time that day, of course, I had been 
disqualified). What would have happened if I had caught up to my opponent, or he to me, after I 
intruded into his lane? Would we both have stopped, left to tread water, bewildered by the 
unexpected experience of encounter in the pool? Or would we have kept swimming, the one 
making room for the other beside him in the lane, the rhythm of our strokes flowing into one 
rhythm in the water, at least for the transitory time of that race? 
At the beginning of this project, I discovered Barthes’ “fantasy” of Living-Together 
(Vivre-ensemble), of a communal way of life that allows its participants to live alone while 
together, out of respect for their individual moods and life rhythms, as signified by his term 
“idiorrrhythmy.” One of Barthes’ architectural models for this concept is the monastery and the 
monk’s cell, a room. In French, the word for a lane of pool is un couloir, a hallway.  
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In How to Live Together, the published lecture notes from the Collège de France course 
in which he developed this notion of idiorrhythmy, Barthes defines a fantasy as “a resurgence of 
certain desires, certain images that lurk within you, that want to be identified by you, sometimes 
your whole life, and often only assume concrete form thanks to a particular word” (6). Like poet 
Brian Blanchfield (also a native North Carolinian), who writes about idiorrhythmy in his essay 
“On Dossiers,” I share this fantasy and relate to it the possibility of a collaborative artistic 
encounter founded not in the presence of partners to one another, but in their absence.1 Barthes 
refers to the notes for his Collège de France course not as a completed work of theory but as a 
dossier on his subject, one that collects “discontinuous traits,” like notes that he might scribble 
on index cards (19-20). (In some ways, it seems to me, the work of fantasy that Barthes proposes 
challenges the autonomy of the work of criticism, similar to the avant-garde challenge of the 
autonomy of the artwork.) In Blanchfield’s gloss, “A dossier then is a repository of otherwise 
loose relevant material, a file, on a subject” (97).  
I present more than a dossier here; this is a dissertation. But, it began as a collection of 
notes and observations, attractions to certain texts and works, of blind intrusions into realms 
already occupied by Claude Cahun, Hannah Weiner, and the other artists I study. I have made 
the choice of where and when to intrude by a feeling of affinity, which challenges the discrete 
certainty of a “choice” as such in its arrival or its draw so much as an intuition, and then a 
compulsion. So, I let artists and artworks collect in my own dossier of affinity, and found ways 
                                                
1 Blanchfield discovers an idiorrhythmic space in the faculty offices at Rice University when he 
travels there for a job interview. He imagines, “Each scholar in her private quarters with a 
singular concentration, and a trade of ideas in the common areas” (107). His essay is, however, 
an avowed dossier on disappointment with academia. See Blanchfield 99.  
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to bring them together in an act of critical curation, through the couloirs that connect each of the 
rooms they inhabit.  
These hallways exist, I contend and aim to show, but I have, in some part, at some point, 
imagined them, performed them as my own collaboration with these artists. In the idiosyncratic 
and autobiographical encyclopedia that Barthes entitled Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, the 
critic draws a distinction between dream and fantasy, reworking the terms of Surrealism to his 
own ends.2 “The dream,” he writes,  
displeases me because one is entirely absorbed within it: the dream is monologic; 
and the fantasy pleases me because it remains concomitant to the consciousness of 
reality (that of the place where I am); hence is created a double space, 
disconnected, layered, at the heart of which a voice (I could never say which one, 
that of the café or that of the internal fable), as in the movement of a fugue, 
assumes a position of indirection: something is woven, braided—without pen or 
paper, there is an initiation of writing. (87-88)  
 
My daydream of swimming in unison with my trespassed-upon opponent, as well as that of a 
mode of collaboration crossing borders of space and time, might be a fantasy. (And both entail 
antagonism, a contest of wills. Strife might cause the fantasy to evaporate.) But what is criticism 
if not a fantasy, bound up in the unverifiability of the literary as Gayatri Spivak points out (Death 
34), an imagined set of terms assiduously performed for the work, for my reader, for myself?  
Whatever the answer to that question, I am in the work, performing the work of affinity 
and collaboration in the temporal and spatial missed encounters affinity reveals. Michel Foucault 
lauds the contribution of André Breton to the cultural field for his connection of two figures: 
writing and knowledge. In the liaison that he forms between the two, Breton finds, according to 
Foucault, that “imagination is not so much what is born in the obscure heart of man as it is what 
                                                
2 Rosalind Krauss assigns Barthes’ Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes to a category she calls the 
“paraliterary,” in which the text is received as one by neither the critic nor the not-critic, but 
rather as one by the writer. See Krauss “Postructuralism and the ‘Paraliterary’.”   
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arises in the luminous thickness of discourse” (“A Swimmer” 173). Foucault’s sense of the 
Bretonian imagination, like Barthes’ understanding of fantasy, eschews the monologic in favor 
of a relation, necessarily collaborative, in discourse. Like Breton, in Foucault’s description, I am, 
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Introduction.  
The Time of Collaboration 
 
“Si l’aventurière a supprimé ici tout ‘l’attirail des faits,’ s’est faite homme et femme 
invisibles, c’est que la collaboration du lecteur est indispensable” (Cahun Écrits 770). So avers 
the Surrealist photographer and writer Claude Cahun in a handwritten note in the front cover of 
an edition of Aveux non avenus, a 1930 text with photomontages that she composed with her 
partner, Marcel Moore. The text subverts the codes of autobiography while presenting, according 
to its title, a collection of confessions. Like the “attirail des faits [autobiographiques]” that the 
text and its aventurière-author refuses, these confessions are, too, suppressed (“non avenus”). 
Instead of a memoir written in a realist style, the reader encounters the Aveux on a shifting terrain 
of memory, dream, and identity – a confusion of the pronouns “je” and “tu” as Cahun says 
elsewhere in her note. The game – one of several tropes favored by Cahun for the artistic venture 
– is set, and the reader has an equal part in the rules of engagement.  
 Collaboration Revisited: The Performative Art of Claude Cahun and Hannah Weiner is 
an investigation into a specific mode of collaboration. What I propose is a mode of art making 
particular to avant-garde experimentation in which artists inscribe their own performances into 
texts and images to future, performative effect. In other words, each of the artists whose works I 
examine imagines, and makes accommodation for, a future collaborator who will continue the 
performance of her work. As found in the tradition of linguistic performatives first theorized by 
J.L. Austin, the performativity inherent in the work by these artists recasts the ontological and 
epistemological stakes of the collaborative endeavor. Collaboration, though typically imagined 
as foregrounding a type of presence, arises from the very absence of collaborative partners from 
one another in the model I propose.   
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In his lectures in linguistics, How to Do Things with Words, Austin challenged the 
attention that linguistics and philosophers reserved for constative, or descriptive, utterances by 
proposing a new category. Austin identifies the difficulty of assessing the truth-value of a 
specific class of utterances. These utterances, which Austin names performative utterances, are 
not simply true or false but rather perform the action they announce given a correct set of 
conventional conditions to allow for the performance.  As examples, Austin offers the marriage 
ceremony (“I do take this man/woman”) and the conferral of names (“I name this ship”) (4-6). 
Outside the discipline of linguistics, Austin’s performatives have offered insight into the 
construction of gender, as in Judith Butler’s work, into rereadings of Barthes’ theory of the 
photographic punctum, as in Margaret Olin’s work, and into the afterlives of certain performance 
artworks, as in Peggy Phelan and Kathy O’Dell’s work on performance. David Herd argues for 
the importance of the conventions of performativity, that is those conditions that make an 
occasion the proper context for the use of a performative utterance, to understanding the avant-
garde, whose groups and movements necessarily respond to a specific historical occasion or 
disruption (42). In this study, performativity accounts for the space between text, image, and 
performance that each of the artists under question explores in turn.  
Whereas Austin’s theory delimits the conditions under which a performative utterance 
might succeed or fail, Emile Benveniste’s work on pronouns offers a more general linguistic 
convention responsible for no less than the emergence of subjectivity in language. In an essay of 
that name, Benveniste asserts that subjectivity arises when a speaker assumes the personal 
pronoun “I,” positing him or herself as the subject (224). This discourse, or “language in action” 
as Benveniste defines it, is inherently dialogic as the “I” necessitate the you in the structure of 
address that it establishes. Further, the speaker who utters the “I” establishes what Benveniste 
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calls the instance of discourse in the essay “The Nature of Pronouns,” or the present tense 
situation in which the I is both referent, or speaking subject, and referee, or subject of speech 
(218). Instead of the conventions that allow a performative utterance to succeed or that cause it 
to fail, Benveniste asserts that it is the subjectivity of discourse that makes the performative 
utterance possible. The utterance “I swear” seals a legal agreement in court precisely because the 
speaker assumes the status of “person” by speaking “I” (229), because the utterance arrives in the 
instance of discourse.  
The recurrence of performance, as documented in texts and photographs, in the work of 
these artists provides proof of their engagements with a mode of collaboration defined by its 
absence. For Peggy Phelan, disappearance is the particular ontological condition of performance 
as she describes it in her influential text Unmarked: The Politics of Performance. There, she 
writes, “Performance occurs over a time which will not be repeated. It can be performed again, 
but this repetition itself marks it as ‘different.’ The document of a performance then is only a 
spur to memory, an encouragement of memory to become present” (159). Phelan, thus, touches 
on the performative power of the performance document to act as a spur to memory, or as a spur 
to a new performance. In so doing, she does not eschew the responsibility of the critic to write 
about performance, and so to alter it in writing, but affirms the challenge to write toward this 
disappearance and to make language more performative (148). As Amelia Jones explains of her 
decision to study performances she did not witness, “[W]hile the experience of viewing a 
photograph and reading a text is clearly different from that of sitting in a small room watching an 
artist perform, neither has a privileged relationship to the historical ‘truth’ of the performance” 
(“‘Presence’” 11). Jones points to the kind of intersubjective exchange that can occur between 
the reader or viewer and the document that I privilege in this project (12). Indeed, the mode of 
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collaboration that I pursue herein is performative in its own structure, flickering between the I 
and the you of Benveniste’s linguistic model. As Kaja Silverman sums up Benveniste’s model of 
subjectivity, subjectivity falls into “abeyance” in the discursive gaps between I and you. Thus 
she claims that “Benveniste emphasizes the radical discontinuity which characterizes the 
condition of subjectivity, its starts and stops” (45). Phelan makes this observation, as well, in 
relation to the performance. “For,” as she writes, “to acknowledge the Other’s (always partial) 




I offer the French photographer, writer, and performer Claude Cahun (1894-1954) and 
the American performance artist and poet Hannah Weiner (1928-1997) as two exemplary artists 
working to such collaborative ends, and I bring them together in my own work of critical 
collaborative performance. This critical work is one of curation, and from these two artists, a sort 
of coterie reminiscent of what Katharine Conley calls the “Surrealist conversation” (or the 
circulation and recycling of ideas and images amongst those artists) emerges,3 including Meret 
Oppenheim, Unica Zürn, Bernadette Mayer, and Adrian Piper, as well. Though encompassing 
these six artists, my interest coalesced first around the connections I made between Cahun and 
Weiner. I take these two to represent a collaborative pairing that I convene, and so they act as 
two poles or lodestars for the constellation of works I examine in the pages that follow. My first 
                                                
3 In addition to Conley’s privileging of conversation as a figure for understanding Surrealism, 
Breton makes a liberated dialogue, free from the constraints of “politesse,” one of the aims of 
Surrealism in his first manifesto of 1924. See Conley “Women” i and Robert Desnos 5, and 
Breton Manifestes du Surréalisme 47.  
 
 5 
section places them in dialogue in a series of three chapters that each deals with aspects of both 
Cahun and Weiner’s works. Part two introduces the four remaining artists to my study. By way 
of Cahun’s biography, I enter into the world of Surrealist Paris, welcoming the Swiss artist Meret 
Oppenheim (1913-1985) and the German artist Unica Zürn (1916-1970) to the conversation. In 
Weiner’s New York City of the 1960s and 1970s, I open this conversation to Weiner’s close 
friend, the poet Bernadette Mayer (b. 1945), and conceptual and performance artist and 
philosopher Adrian Piper (b. 1948).  
In a photograph from 1920, Claude Cahun sits in profile, cross-legged, her hair shaved, 
and wearing pants and an oversized sweater, perhaps a robe. The self-portrait presents an 
androgynous subject, as does the artist’s name, chosen for that gender-bending effect by Lucy 
Schwob around 1915. Born in Nantes in 1894 to George Schwob and Marie-Antoinette 
Courbebaisse, Cahun was an inheritor to a literary heritage that included the management of the 
Nantes newspaper La Phare de la Loire, acquired by her grandfather George Schwob, and the 
Symbolist writings of her uncle, Marcel Schwob. The 1920 self-portrait evokes the pose of an 
ascetic, a young scholar, perhaps a monk in training (Fig. i.1). A later series of persona self-
portraits from 1927 plays with the idea of training, as well (Fig. i.2). Cahun coyly vamps for the 
camera in these photographs. She wears dark shorts and tights and a long-sleeve shirt adorned 
with drawn designs of hearts and lips, echoed by the shape of her rouged lips and two hearts 
painted on her cheeks. She holds in her lap a set of dumbbells and her shirt reads, “I AM IN 
TRAINING DON’T KISS ME.” Cahun’s first important works, Les Jeux uraniens (or Amor 
amicitiae, begun in 1913 and unpublished) and Vues et visions (1914, published 1918), had 
appeared under the influence of her family’s Symbolist heritage. The hearts and lips that 
decorate Cahun’s costume in this photograph recall, however, the typographical symbols that 
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punctuate her later text, Aveux non avenus (1930), which marked a break from this Symbolist 
and familial influence. If the training evoked by the 1920 portrait seems familial, as if Cahun 
searches for her own place amongst her male forebears, the 1927 portrait presents Cahun in 
training for a gender pageant more overtly androgynous, in which Cahun plays a part somewhere 
between a clown, silent film damsel, and muscle man. 
The divide in Cahun’s work marked by these two portraits and Vues et visions and the 
Aveux corresponds to a shift in Cahun’s personal life during the same period. In 1909, Cahun met 
a classmate at her lycée, the daughter of a doctor from Nantes and his second wife, named 
Suzanne Malherbe. The two became close friends, and after Malherbe began publishing under 
the androgynous pseudonym Marcel Moore in 1913, Cahun followed suit by first choosing the 
name Claude Courlis. The relationship between the two friends became increasingly intense and 
romantic throughout the decade, and in 1917 Cahun’s widowed father married Moore’s widowed 
mother. As lovers, artistic partners, and after 1917 as step-sisters, Cahun and Moore formed a 
collaborative duo who embarked on a work of what Tirza True Latimer calls “coproduction,” 
expressed in their photographic output as the work of a performer and a director (“Narcissus” 
69). As Latimer brings to light, Cahun designed an ex libris “duogram” around 1919 that 
combined a melding of the step-sisters’ intials joined by the common S of Schwob and Suzanne 
(L.S.M) with symbols familiar to Cahun’s work (disembodied foot, eye, lips, and hand) (69-70).  
In 1922, the couple moved to Montparnasse, into an apartment at 70bis rue Notre-Dame-
des-Champs. They first became involved in the Paris theatre world, working with the director 
Pierre Albert-Birot, and befriended Adrienne Monnier and Sylvia Beach, prominent members of 
the lesbian literary and artistic community in the capital. In the first decades of the twentieth-
century, the legendary figure of Sappho, indicative of a resurgence of Classical tropes and 
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themes that later merged with the inter-war French rappel à l’ordre, had come to serve as a 
rallying figure for lesbians in Paris, thanks to the work of Renée Vivien and Natalie Barney 
(Latimer “Narcissus” 77). For Susan Gubar, the efforts to recover and connect with the figure of 
Sappho represent the desires of these women writers and artists to reach outside of their 
marginalization as women and lesbian artists. As Gubar writes, “Precisely because so many of 
her original Greek texts were destroyed, the modern woman poet could write ‘for’ or ‘as’ Sappho 
and thereby invent a classical inheritance of her own” (46-7). Gubar calls this link between a 
Classical inheritance and the creation of a new image for the woman artist a “fantastic 
collaboration” with Sappho (47).4 Such a cultural zeitgeist amongst women and lesbian artists 
certainly had an effect on Moore and Cahun, who combined this concern for a literary 
inheritance amongst women generally with her own entanglement in the Schwob family’s 
literary heritage. In her Héroïnes (1925), a collection of short stories and monologues in the 
voice of legendary women published in Le Mercure de France and Le Journal littéraire in 1925, 
Cahun devotes an important chapter to the legend of Sappho, who she calls “l’incomprise.”  
In 1930, Cahun published “Frontière humaine,” the only photograph to appear in public 
during her lifetime (apart from the photographic material used for the photomontages in the 
Aveux), on the cover of the journal Bifur. The image is a portrait of Cahun, again with shaved 
head, though in this portrait her head is elongated beyond human proportions. The manipulation 
of the image displays the interest she shared with other surrealist photographers in subverting the 
conventions of straight photography. In the 1930s, following the publication of this photograph 
and the success of the Aveux, Cahun and Moore joined the collective enterprises of André 
Breton’s Surrealist group. The two became increasingly involved in politics, as well. They 
                                                
4 For more on the influence of the cult of Sappho in the first decades of the twentieth century in 
Paris, see Dean “The Making of Lesbian Subjectivity” 202.  
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signed anti-fascist and anti-capitalist declarations with the groups Association des Écrivains et 
des Artistes Révolutionnaires (AEAR) and Contre-Attaque, founded by Breton. Cahun began to 
construct surrealist assemblages designed to be photographed around 1935 and exhibited in the 
Exposition Surréaliste d’objets in Paris in 1936. At the end of 1937, she traveled to London 
where her work appeared in the Exposition internationale du surréalisme in January and 
February of 1938.   
1937 was also the year Cahun and Moore left Paris to live on the Isle of Jersey, where 
they had spent vacations in their adolescence. The two bought a medieval farmstead, La 
Rocquaise, that Cahun dubbed the “Ferme sans nom,” and began life on the island under their 
birth names, all while continuing to stage Cahun’s portraits in their garden and elsewhere on the 
island. The occupation of Jersey by the Nazi forces from July 1, 1940 until May 9, 1945 
interrupted the quiet lives the two led, and compelled by their political convictions, they began a 
resistance campaign against the occupying army. The two dressed as country women and 
dropped leaflets designed by Cahun and written in German by Moore where officers would find 
them – at funerals, in soldier’s coat pockets, on automobiles. Cahun and Moore’s successes with 
their tracts convinced the local Kommandantur that a much larger operation was targeting the 
German forces with a campaign of demoralization. But, on July 25, 1944, the Gestapo arrested 
the couple at their home. For their four years of resistance work, Cahun and Moore were 
condemned to death on November 16, 1944 but survived until the Liberation on May 8, 1945. In 
the years following the war, Cahun worked on two autobiographical texts about her experiences 
during the Occupation, and imagined moving back to Paris and reconnecting with her old 
friends. A trip to the French capital in June 1953, however, was her last. Cahun’s poor health 
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made a return impossible. Weakened by the term of her imprisonment, Cahun died on December 
8, 1954. Moore survived her partner until her own death on February 19, 1972.   
On the other side of the Atlantic, Hannah Weiner was born in Providence, Rhode Island, 
in 1928, and attended Radcliffe College, graduating in 1950. As a young woman in the early 
1950s, she moved to New York, married, and divorced soon after. Weiner worked as a lingerie 
designer while pursuing her work as a poet. She took classes at the New School with Kenneth 
Koch in 1964 and 1965, composing The Magritte Poems (published as a chapbook in 1970), 
before abandoning poetry for a brief period, exasperated by her perceived inability to write in the 
style of the New York School. During her hiatus as a poet, Weiner began working at the 
intersection of conceptual art, performance, and the kinds of poetic experimentation that would 
eventually bring her back to writing. Weiner’s performance and conceptual art period includes 
her discovery of the maritime semaphore flag signals that sailors use to communicate with other 
ships at sea. As Weiner recounts in “Hannah Weiner    Silent Teacher,” a concluding 
autobiographical section to her 1994 silent teachers remembered sequel, composing poems from 
these signals freed her from the injunctive to write her own words (69). The various iterations of 
the Code Poems performances also included ephemera, such as ribbons of fabric tape printed 
with the flag signals and a round viewfinder-reader to help decipher the codes. Weiner organized 
a performance of the poems in 1968 in Central Park with the aid of coast guard officers who 
communicated the poems with flag and flashing light signals.  
In the 1960s, Weiner also published in Bernadette Mayer and Vito Acconci’s conceptual 
art journal 0 to 9 with artists including Sol LeWitt, Dan Graham, and Adrian Piper, and 
organized street actions and happenings. Her street actions and happenings included a giveaway 
of hot dog wieners, in a pun on her name, and an open house series she organized, which invited 
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the public into her home and the homes of other artists. Weiner hosted another happening, 
“Hannah Weiner at Her Job,” at her workplace, A.H. Schreiber Co., Inc. Other street actions 
were published in 0 to 9’s 1969 special section on Street Works edited by John Perreault, and 
Weiner worked with Perreault to organize other art events, including The Fashion Show Poetry 
Event (also with Eduardo Costa) and The Saturday Afternoon Show at the bar-restaurant hot spot, 
Max’s Kansas City. Her work from these events and happenings exhibits the influence of Fluxus 
on her work from the 1960s, especially in her exploration of the modes of instruction and 
ownership as conduits for the creation of an artwork. For example, a telegram displayed as part 
of the 1970 Art in the Mind exhibition at Oberlin College instructed viewers to “overcome a 
fear” during the period of the show from April 17 to May 12.5 In later writings, she often 
mentioned artists associated with Fluxus, like Jackson Mac Low and Carolee Schneemann, who 
were also her close friends. As Kaplan Harris points out, Weiner’s work from this period is 
collaborative, dialogic, and polyvocal in its content and concerns, before the innovation of the 
intensely polyvocal “clairvoyant” poetry that follows in Weiner’s next decade (“On Weiner”).  
Despite this rich, if poorly documented,6 period of engagement with the New York art 
world in the 1960s, Weiner’s artistic breakthrough arrived in 1970 with the simultaneous onset 
of hallucinatory psychic phenomena. In the autobiographical poem that concludes silent teachers 
remembered sequel, Weiner tracks the successive stages of that innovation and its aftermath. She 
                                                
5 For a reproduction of the telegram, see Durgin “Witness My Own: Forget Gadget.”  
 
6 Weiner’s archives are sadly depleted preceding 1970. In a recent article on the contemporary 
poetics website Jacket2, Kaplan Harris reports Weiner may have burned her papers and records 
from this period. Patrick Durgin, the editor of a selected edition of Weiner’s work, suggests that 
her brother may have destroyed large parts of her personal archive and library after her death. 




writes of its beginning and the period that preceded it, “all this glory ended in 1970 when she 
became extremely psychic / and hiding out in a cheap apartment wrote about nothing else in / 
almost 100 notebooks       see the fast […]” (69). The Fast, Weiner’s account of the onset of 
visual and sensory hallucinations while trapped by the phenomena in her apartment, records the 
struggle and psychic and physical pain of these first hallucinations. By 1972, Weiner’s visions 
had progressed and she had begun to receive what she called “clairvoyant” messages in language 
that she perceived visually, out of which she developed her “clairvoyant style,” or “clair-style,” 
poetry. From this evolved experience of her professed psychic ability, Weiner composed her 
masterwork, Clairvoyant Journal, “a three voice / performance poetry book about learning     
explaining instructions / and the counter voice […]” (69). Weiner’s description of her 
compositional practice in this quotation illustrates her debt to conceptual and performance art in 
the resistance of the work to be defined by its medium, existing at the nexus of performance, 
document (poem considered as performance score) and even recordings of the performances.  
Weiner’s “clair-style” poetry represents a variation on the idea of poetry as dictation. 
More precisely, as Patrick Durgin notes, the “clair-style” is a transcription of words Weiner saw 
projected on the world around her or, through a psychic inversion, on her own forehead (“BIG 
SENSIBLE”). Though her experiences are possibly attributable to a psychotic break brought on 
by her use of psychedelic drugs, Weiner insisted on her clairvoyance and devised a complex 
compositional practice that combined concerns from her earlier conceptual work with the 
exigencies of her psychic condition. In her poetics statement, “Mostly about the Sentence,” for 
example, Weiner asserts that her idea to use multiple voices in a text pre-dated her hallucinatory 
experiences, originating in the dialogic nature of the Code Poems themselves (126). In 
Clairvoyant Journal, however, Weiner experimented with medium by manipulating both the 
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page and the typewriter. She wrote her own words in regular lower and upper case script and 
received, or “seen,” words from two other “voices” in italics or all in capitals (127). Over the 
course of her experiences as a clairvoyant poet, Weiner received messages from leaders of the 
American Indian Movement, of which she was an activist proponent, her relatives (especially her 
grandparents and mother after her death in 1984), other poets, artists, and friends, and finally a 
polar bear spirit guide named Paw in We Speak Silent (1996), published the year before her 
death. Weiner imagined a collective function for her clair-style poetry, offering the messages she 
received as those from “silent teachers,” the same title she takes on in the autobiographical 
conclusion to silent teachers remembered sequel. As she writes in the last line of We Speak 
Silent, “the search for a teacher is always beneficial to both student and teacher” (66). Weiner 
died on September 11, 1997 in New York City. 
In the collaborative circle that the artists in this study represent, each artist might be said 
to contribute to the conversation by a similar work of “silent” teaching. Oppenheim and Zürn 
occupied shifting, marginal positions on the edges of the Surrealist movement – Oppenheim for 
her expressed displeasure with and periods of rejection of the group, Zürn for her late arrival in 
Paris in the 1950s and her frequent stays in mental hospitals. Their marginality is not unlike 
Cahun’s who, though a proponent of Surrealist politics and aesthetics, also arrived belatedly to 
the movement before choosing her own exile from Paris. Mayer and Piper resist group 
classification in New York City in their own ways, as well. Mayer edited the conceptual art 
magazine 0 to 9 with her brother-in-law Vito Acconci from 1967 to 1969 before becoming an 
important poet in the development of Language poetry. Despite her contributions to the nascent 
Language movement through her influential writing workshops at the Poetry Project in the East 
Village of Manhattan, later work by Mayer deemed too traditional estranged her for a certain 
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period of time from those same writers she had taught and worked with at the Project. Piper’s 
work challenges classification in her opening of conceptualism to the biography and body of the 
artist, in her case to the specificity of a light-skinned black woman’s body. Her work forged new 
collaborative and participatory encounters with art through her fusion of conceptual and 
performance forms, innovation that continues in her work today. 
 
Collaboration in Surrealism and After 
 
Collaboration plays an important role in the development of the twentieth century’s 
avant-garde projects. Writing of collaborative practice amongst poets in the French nineteenth 
century, Seth Whidden proposes a useful taxonomy for the classification of two models of 
collaboration, what he terms collaboration in praesentia and collaboration in absentia. The 
former model emphasizes the typical arrangement brought to mind by the term collaboration: 
two artists work together, in the same time and space, their hands perhaps touching as they trade 
turns with the pen, to create a single work (5-6). The latter model – the one more fascinating to 
me – challenges this traditional understanding of the practice: in this configuration, one partner is 
absent from, and perhaps unknown to, the other in the process of creation (7). Whidden carefully 
distinguishes this model of absence from Julia Kristeva’s notion of intertextuality by 
emphasizing the process of collaboration (the relation between two or more actors working to 
create a text) versus the product of a multi-voiced text (the relation between two or more texts). 
Though my project does not draw such a sharp distinction between the process and products of 
collaboration, the clear challenge to the sovereign place of the author or artist that Whidden 
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sketches from these models of collaboration recalls the aesthetic upheaval of Rimbaud’s “Je est 
un autre” and sets the stage for the collaborative experimentation of the twentieth century.  
The surrealist response to Rimbaud’s challenge to create a poetry that would have the 
effect of the “dérèglement de tous les sens” begins in collaboration. In Paris in 1919, at the Hôtel 
des Grands Hommes in the Place du Panthéon, André Breton and Philippe Soupault invented the 
Surrealist practice of écriture automatique by collaborating on Les Champs magnétiques. From 
this first moment of collaborative intensity, Breton and the surrealists created a collaborative 
endeavor of other aleatory games and procedures, including the cadavre exquis and the séance-
like automatic writing sessions of the “époque des sommeils” as Breton calls it in Nadja (35). 
Robert Desnos was the star of these sleeps, in which he wrote while in a slumber with the others 
gathered around to read and help record the words of the poet, as immortalized in Man Ray’s 
photograph Séance de rêve éveillé: Groupe Surréaliste (1924). In the roll call of names attached 
as signatories to Breton’s first Manifeste du Surréalisme (1924), we find a preliminary list of 
these collaborative partners: Breton, Soupault, Desnos, as well as Louis Aragon, René Crevel, 
Paul Éluard, and others (though no women, yet) (36-7). Desnos’s early contributions to 
Surrealism and surrealist collaboration included his participation in the creation of Marcel 
Duchamp’s alter ego Rrose Sélavy, a persona for whom Duchamp also collaborated with his 
friend Man Ray on photographic portraits.7 In the voice of Sélavy, Desnos wrote brief, one-line 
poems based on Duchampian puns and homophony. In these poems, two surrealist confrères 
became a third persona, the lady of the “Belle Haleine.”  
                                                




The literary and art historical prominence of the names associated with Surrealism speak 
to contradictions within surrealist collaboration. Though early scholarship focused on the men 
who comprised the “heroic” period of surrealism, feminist critics of the 1980s and 1990s both 
critiqued the male-dominated history of surrealism and illuminated the role played by women 
artists in surrealism. Renée Riese Hubert’s Magnifying Mirrors: Women, Surrealism, & 
Partnership returned this focus to the contributions of female artists by presenting the women at 
work in romantic duos whose male partners traditionally eclipsed their female counterparts in 
reputation. Collaboration, though historically allowing for the erasure of a female partner in 
practice, has served as one critical framework for revising a gender-biased history of surrealism. 
Additionally, and at the same time that collaboration serves as one method for achieving 
a way of thinking freed from the control of reason advocated by the Manifeste, the individualism 
of the participants involved threatens the revolutionary group ethos of Breton’s movement. As 
Katharine Conley asserts in her study of Desnos, Breton’s status as the “pope” of Surrealism 
should not go uncontested; in addition to the Bataillean branch of Surrealism, she suggests that 
Desnos, in his virtuoso sleep-performances, stands out as the exemplary figure for understanding 
the movement (Robert Desnos 3).8 As Mary Ann Caws points out, the Surrealists hewed to their 
group habits, frequenting the same cafés, ordering the same drinks, playing the same games. If 
the aim was a freedom to be attained through the psychic and aesthetic revolution of Surrealism, 
then the impulse to seek otherness from the self in a regimented collective “would,” as Caws 
puts it, “seem an odd principle of freedom—and yet” (Surrealist Look 20). 
                                                
8 Louis Aragon’s report in the 1924 essay “Une Vague de rêves” that in his automatic slumber 
Desnos “would become the leader of a religion, the founder of a city, the tribune of a people in 
revolt” supports Katharine Conley’s proposition, at least in the early formative years of the 
movement. See Aragon 6.  
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Caws’ “and yet” registers the power of collaboration to create such an unexpected type of 
freedom. Roland Barthes’ 1968 essay “The Death of the Author” declares the role played by 
Surrealist collaboration in a devaluing of the position of the author in favor of the position of the 
reader (144). As he writes, “A text is made of multiple writings […] but there is one place where 
this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader, […] a text’s unity lies not in its origin but 
in its destination” (148).9 Freedom lies in the liberation of the text from the personality of the 
author and in the investment of this freed multiplicity in the reader, compounding the Kristevan 
notion of intertextuality (those “multiple writings” within the text) in the experience of the 
reader. Max Ernst had expressed a similar view of the impact of Surrealism on the relationship 
between author, text, and audience. In “Inspiration to Order” (1932), he writes, “Since the 
becoming of no work which can be called absolutely surrealist is to be directed consciously by 
the mind […], the active share of him hitherto described as the work’s ‘author’ is suddenly 
abolished almost completely. This ‘author’ disclosed as being a mere spectator of the birth of the 
work […]” (79).10 Dada artists had already rehearsed this dissolution of the artist audience divide 
in their quest to negate the autonomy of art, for as Peter Bürger points out, Tristan Tzara and 
Breton had both issued instructions for writing Dadaist and Surrealist poetry in the form of 
recipes written for their readers, making the avant-garde work of poetry a DIY endeavor for the 
reader (53). The collaborative work that Breton and Soupault undertook at the nascent heart of 
the Surrealist enterprise, thus, opens to the collaboration of their audiences as readers.  
                                                
9 Barthes’ essay builds on the kinds of multiplicity within the work that Umberto Eco proposes in 
his 1962 essay “The Poetics of the Open Work,” an important text in the development of 
phenomenology-inflected reader-response theory. 
 
10 This essay appeared in the English-language magazine This Quarter in a special Surrealist 
issue edited by Breton. It appeared the following year in French in Le Surréalisme au service de 
le Révolution 6 (15 May 1933) as “Comment on force l’inspiration.”  
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In New York City, where the avant-garde influence of Surrealism took hold in the 1940s, 
the poets who formed the New York School – often shortlisted in its first generation as Frank 
O’Hara, John Ashbery, Kenneth Koch, James Schuyler, and Barbara Guest – embraced 
collaboration with the same experimental vigor as their predecessors in Paris.11 O’Hara’s 
collaboration with Grace Hartigan, Oranges (1952), resulted in twelve abstract expressionist 
canvases in which Hartigan has painted in text from a series of prose poems O’Hara wrote for 
the project.12 The Vermont Notebook (1975), with text by John Ashbery and illustrations by Joe 
Brainard (completed in absentia with Ashbery sending text by mail to Brainard who then 
completed the drawings), recalls Éluard and Man Ray’s Les Mains libres (1937) in its form and 
combination of mediums. The writers of the New York School, like Breton and the surrealists 
before them, cherished their relationships to painting and painters.  
 In summer 1961, Koch edited a special issue of Locus Solus, the journal run by Ashbery, 
Koch, Schuyler, and Harry Mathews and named for the Surrealist precursor Raymond Roussel’s 
novel, dedicated solely to collaborative texts. Koch included a selection of work by surrealists, 
including texts by Breton, Éluard, René Char, and Yves Tanguy, as well as poets of the New 
York School and one painter from the second generation of that other New York School. 
Ashbery and Schuyler contributed selections from their collaborative novel, A Nest of Ninnies, 
composed in praesentia; Koch and the painter Jane Freilicher provided a short play entitled “The 
Car” (Freilicher completed a canvas by the same name in 1963); and O’Hara composed a poem, 
                                                
11 For a more detailed account of the influence of French Surrealism on American poetry, see 
Rosenbaum. 
 
12 For a detailed analysis of this collaboration, see Diggory. 
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“Choses Passagères” (1955), with lines made up of French idioms in collaboration with his 
French-English dictionary.13  
O’Hara’s playful take on collaboration, teaming up with a language, informs other poems 
that reimagine the poem as collaborative. In “Why I Am Not a Painter” (1956), O’Hara recounts, 
though only obliquely, the process of composing the “Oranges” collaboration with Hartigan. The 
poem is worth including here in full: 
 I am not a painter, I am a poet. 
 Why? I think I would rather be 
 a painter, but I am not. Well, 
  
 for instance, Mike Goldberg 
 is starting a painting. I drop in. 
 “Sit down and have a drink” he 
 says. I drink; we drink. I look  
 up. “You have SARDINES in it.” 
 “Yes, it needed something there.” 
 “Oh.” I go and the days go by 
 and I drop in again. The painting 
 is going on, and I go, and the days 
 go by. I drop in. The painting is 
 finished. “Where’s SARDINES?” 
 All that’s left is just 
 letters, “It was too much,” Mike says. 
 
 But me? One day I am thinking of 
 a color: orange. I write a line 
 about orange. Pretty soon it is a  
 whole page of words, not lines.  
 Then another page. There should be 
 so much more, not of orange, of  
 words, of how terrible orange is 
 and life. Days go by. It is even in  
 prose, I am a real poet. My poem 
 is finished and I haven’t mentioned 
 orange yet. It’s twelve poems, I call 
 it ORANGES. And one day in a gallery 
 I see Mike’s painting, called SARDINES. (Collected 261-2) 
                                                
13 Andrew Epstein identifies the dictionary that O’Hara used for his collaboration as the 1951 
edition of Cassell’s French-English English-French Dictionary. See Epstein 149.  
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The poem memorializes the collaboration with Hartigan, but her name is absent from the poem. 
Instead, composed in transient proximity to the painter Mike Goldberg at work on his own 
painting, “Why I Am Not a Painter” also sketches the space of a hesitant collaboration between 
these two, O’Hara and Goldberg. Whereas the collaboration with Hartigan falls into the category 
in praesentia in its creation of a composite visual text (painting and text), the encounter between 
O’Hara and Goldberg – one that does result, after all, in the creation of two related works – 
resists classification as a collaborative process and product. O’Hara’s poem and Goldberg’s 
painting mimic each other, one ending where the other began. O’Hara ends with words having 
begun with an image of a color; Goldberg’s efforts culminate in a painted image that covers the 
originary word, “SARDINES.” In the social atmosphere and conversational tone of O’Hara’s 
poem,14 the interaction between the two artists, neither neatly collaboration in praesentia nor in 
absentia, becomes (at least for O’Hara’s poem) crucial to the work’s creation. Though O’Hara’s 
interaction with Goldberg seems too casual to rise to the level of a collaborative intervention, 
O’Hara’s poetics, for which he offers the telephone conversation as a model in his “Personism: A 
Manifesto,” elevates the casual and the social to a critical position in his compositional practice. 
In O’Hara’s poetry, intertextuality arises from the social, with aspirations to collaboration. The 
text of the poem becomes, in the chiasmic exchange of poem and painting that O’Hara depicts, a 
third text of collaboration triangulated between the interactions of O’Hara-Hartigan and O’Hara-
Goldberg.   
                                                
14 Mark Silverberg identifies a concern for “art’s inherent sociality” as crucial to understanding 
the New York School’s use of collaboration. Lytle Shaw classifies the poetics of O’Hara in 
relation to his social milieu as one of “coterie.” See Silverberg 3 and Shaw Frank O’Hara: The 
Poetics of Coterie.  
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 In the visual art world, the legacy of the New York School’s abstract expressionist 
painting gave way to Allan Kaprow’s happenings. Kaprow first theorized his happenings in 
relation to abstract expressionist painting in his 1958 essay “The Legacy of Jackson Pollock,” 
though he likely used the name earlier in the decade for performance events at George Segal’s 
farm, as Judith Rodenbeck notes (8 n 12). Arguing that the scale of Pollock’s canvases made 
them environments, and not just flat picture planes, for his viewers, Kaprow assesses the 
importance of Pollock’s legacy as follows:  
Pollock […] left us at the point where we must become preoccupied with and 
even dazzled by the space and objects of our everyday life, either our bodies, 
clothes, rooms, or, if need be, the vastness of Forty-second Street […] [the present 
generation of artists] will disclose entirely unheard-of happenings and events, 
found in garbage cans, police files, hotel lobbies; seen in store windows and on 
the street; and sensed in dreams and horrible accidents. (7-9) 
 
So, with a nod to both a lingering Surrealist ethos of the aleatory encounter of two realms of 
experience and to the demise of the painter, Kaprow concludes with the accident (here, the car 
accident that claimed Pollock’s life). As Rodenbeck qualifies these performance events, 
“Bypassing the (revolutionary) psychoanalysis of surrealism and the (revolutionary) voluntarism 
of Dada, happenings instead adopted an experimentalist approach to art materials and art making 
and, in turn, to (art) experience that revealed a fundamental split between habit and 
consciousness” (ix). In imaging a future for his generation of artists, Kaprow takes the work of 
art out of the studio, gallery, or museum and places it squarely in the street while preserving, 
following Rodenbeck’s description, the power of the happening to critique the social forms it 
encountered there.  
Like Breton pursuing Nadja through the streets of Paris, the unexpected encounter in a 
hotel lobby or on a street corner or in any other public space will now serve as the model for art 
and will by necessity involve the collaboration – or at least a more active engagement or 
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heightened awareness as audience members – of those who had previously been relegated to the 
comfortable safety or passivity of the audience. Johanna Drucker argues that happenings, thus, 
continued the avant-garde work of negating the autonomy of art, pioneered by the Dadaists, by 
critiquing the terms of originality, authorship, and mastery upon which narratives of modern art 
depended (52). As Drucker notes, an artist, such as Kaprow, may initiate the happening, but to 
call the collective experience of the event that artist’s work is impossible (54). Rather, the 
happening is a work that privileges the relation between its collaborators while resisting any 
claims to mastery or originality.15 As I discuss in chapter three, it is this very tension between 
authorship and artwork that Weiner’s own October 1969 happening, Hannah Weiner’s Open 
House, manipulates, especially in the opening salvo of ownership asserted by its title.16  
Though I have stayed with collaboration on the American side of the Atlantic in what I 
have detailed so far, it seems important to return to Paris to note two performances from the late 
1950s and early 1960s. In 1958, Yves Klein began painting with women as his brushes. And, in 
1964, Carolee Schneemann first staged Meat Joy, with its embodied improvisations and mix of 
performance and ritual, in the French capital. Both performances reoriented the role of 
participants in the work from a theatrical context of actors to a performance context of 
participation. There are also resemblances between the happenings and Meret Oppenheim’s 
                                                
15 Judith Rodenbeck cautions that to privilege the relational, collaborative nature of the early 
happenings is to “glide over the discomfiture, social awkwardness, and even violence of the 
happenings […] and eliminate consideration of the significant material aspects, from props to 
documents, of the works” (11). I account for the power of the material document in my 
discussion of Weiner’s happening in chapter three.  
 
16 Weiner’s complication of the form’s structural non-ownership is appropriately decadent for a 
Happening staged after the initial period of the form’s invention. As Drucker points out, the most 
potent period for the confrontation that Happenings presented to art practice was from 1958 
through the early 1960s. See Drucker 58.  
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Spring Banquet, a clandestine dinner party that she later restaged for the Surrealist EROS 
exhibition in Paris in 1959, which I discuss in part two. Though the restaging places the work 
squarely in the realm of Surrealism with its intermingling of ritual, death, and desire (much like 
in Peter Greenaway’s 1989 film The Cook, the Thief, His Wife & Her Lover, set in a 
theatricalized restaurant), the secretive nature of the original performance, and its unreliable 
photographic and textual documentation, brings it closer to the happenings, and to Weiner’s 
Open House. Rodenbeck points out that Jean-Jacques Lebel, the primary director of French 
happenings, channeled his energy into “violent erotico-political agitation” that dovetailed with 
the protests of May 1968 (13). 
Like Kaprow’s happenings, the engagement of audience members as participants and full 
collaborators in the work was important to the work of the Fluxus group, as well. Marcel 
Duchamp insisted on the audience’s role in completing a work of art in his 1957 lecture, “The 
Creative Act,” in which he champions the spectator’s work of interpretation as complimenting 
the artist’s work of creation. What he calls the “art coefficient” of the work is derived from the 
differential space between those two acts (139).17 As Andreas Huyssen describes the history of 
the group and its fluid membership, Fluxus first began in New York City in a neo-Dada spirit 
with events organized by George Maciunas at his AG Gallery before his move to West Germany 
where Fluxus gained international momentum (142).18 Though, as Kristine Stiles points out, 
Fluxus performances often lacked a direct participatory role for the audience (70), the 
                                                
17 Stiles makes clear the contextual role Duchamp’s essay played in the critical approach to the 
“open work” in the period and in the development reader-response criticism’s active reader in the 
period following. See Stiles 67.  
 




performances that did target a viewer or reader as participant represent an important 
development in modes of avant-garde collaboration.  
Instead of directly participatory performances like the happenings, many Fluxus artists 
explored the power of language to involve both artist and audience in the work. In France, for 
example, Ben Vautrier staged Fluxus works that, as was typical, placed language at the center of 
visual art practice. His events, like the 1962 Ben écrit sur les murs, in which Vautrier filmed 
himself in a street painting those words on a wall, push language toward the condition of 
Austin’s performative. Elsewhere, the influence of John Cage’s work in musical composition 
inspired a new form in the work of George Brecht, who in 1959 introduced the idea of an “event 
score” (Stiles 66).19 Brecht’s scores consisted of pared down language, sometimes with only a 
title and list of words, that he sent on cards through the mail. The instructional mode of many of 
these scores recalls Tristan Tzara’s 1920 instructions for a Dada poem, replacing the aleatory 
cut-up technique of Tzara’s poem with a series of other actions. One of Yoko Ono’s event 
scores, Map Piece (1964) reads simply, “Draw a map to get lost” (Ono n.p.). The poet and artist 
Jackson Mac Low, a friend of Weiner’s and student of Cage’s at the New School along with 
Kaprow and Brecht, created complex scores for both the performance and composition of texts 
based on chance encounters with language and sound. He called these works “doings” that, when 
published in a collection of that title, Mac Low intended to act as a sourcebook of scores for the 
creation of new texts by future artists (Doings 16). The use of language in Fluxus to score a 
performance or to give instructions to an audience made the movement an important arena for 
the participation of women artists. As Kathy O’Dell observes, in the use of language to score a 
performance, “the activation of the body is implicit, if not totally explicit” (“Fluxus” 45), 
                                                
19 For Cage’s approach to composition, see Cage “Composition as Process.”  
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allowing for the union of the bodily (traditionally relegated to the realm of women) and the 
textual (typically relegated to the realm of men) in Fluxus performance.20   
 
Collaboration and Clairvoyance 
 
Duchamp’s “The Creative Act” repeats the Bretonian trope of the artist as a medium in 
the creation of the work and again makes reference to the “séances de rêves éveillés” in which 
the Surrealist collective gathered together, convened to the scene of collaboration. In the early 
sessions of surrealist automatic writing, the first of which took place on September 25, 1922, 
Desnos’s facility for writing, speaking, and drawing while asleep enthralled the other surrealists. 
Often identifying himself as Robespierre in these early automatic séances, Desnos became, as 
Conley puts it, “what Breton had been looking for, a spokesman for the collectively creative 
efforts of surrealism” (Robert Desnos 20). The declaration of different personae in the messages 
received during the sleeps heightens the collaborative nature of this collective work: not only did 
the surrealists collaborate together for these séances, but the medium-poet collaborated with 
different parts of his own self, as well. Surrealist automatism, thus, expanded upon Rimbaud’s 
declaration that “Je est un autre” in proliferating the interior selves of the artist and the physical 
collaborators in the act of creation. Writing of Desnos’s hypnotic sleeps later in Nadja Breton 
qualifies the scene of those sleeps as assuming “la value absolue d’oracle” (36). Simone Breton, 
André’s wife, described Desnos in feminine terms due to his talent for automatic writing, 
comparing him to the Greek sibyls, female oracles who prophesied at holy shrines (Conley 
                                                
20 Despite this importance of the linguistic register to Fluxus activities, Hannah Higgins cautions 
against a focus on the linguistic at the expense of extralinguistic qualities of Fluxus work. See 
Higgins 12 and 148.  
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Robert Desnos 29). The parts of the psyche at work in surrealist automatic writing are irrational 
and non-Cartesian, Conley reminds, and so gendered as feminine.   
Cahun herself deployed a clairvoyant pose in both her photographs and her texts. In 
portraits, she often posed as blind with her eyes closed or covered, like the seer Tireisias gifted 
with second sight. In one portrait, Cahun wears goggles whose lenses have been covered. In her 
writings from and about her imprisonment for resistance on Jersey, Cahun claims the title of 
Cassandra, the clairvoyant Trojan princess-priestess, as her own. In an undated series, Le Chemin 
des chats, taken in the years after the release of Cahun and Moore from Nazi imprisonment, 
Cahun walks along a sea wall built by the occupying German army, blinded by an eye mask and 
guided by her cat on a leash. The photographs in this series include short, visionary texts that 
reference Nike, the ancient Greek goddess of victory. However, it is in the Aveux non aveus that 
Cahun relates this blind second sight directly to the surrealist interest in the hypnagogic image 
(38). And it is in the shifting dreamscape of this “autobiographical” text that Cahun enacts her 
photographic masquerades in prose, becoming one persona and then another, implying a 
cacophonous collaboration of her many selves in the work of autobiography.  
In two foundational documents of Surrealism, “Le Message automatique” and “L’Entrée 
des médiums,” Breton made an explicit link between his movement and a prehistory of 
nineteenth-century spiritualism.21 In “Entrée des médiums,” a section of Les Pas perdus (1922), 
Breton refers to the practice of automatic writing as a “magic dictation” (275). Yet, if those 
nineteenth-century predecessors believed they had made contact with spirits, as Victor Hugo 
                                                
21 For more on French nineteenth-century spiritualism, see Hugo Le Livre des tables, Gérard 
Audinet et. al. Entrée des médiums: Spritisme et art d’Hugo à Breton, Guillaume Cuchet Les 
Voix d’outre-tombe: Tables tournantes, spiritisme et société au XIXe siècle, and Clément 
Cheroux Le troisième oeil: la photogrpahie et l’occulte.  
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believed he had in contacting his daughter, whose death he memorialized in the sonnet “Demain, 
dès l’aube,” Breton’s automatism makes contact with the unconscious. Conley names this 
resurrection of the trope of the medium, denuded of its spiritualism in favor of the Freudian 
vocabulary important to surrealism, the source of “surrealist ghostliness” (Surrealist 1). 
However, in “Le Message automatique,” and in contradiction to the automatic language that he 
had attributed to aspects of his own personality in his two manifestoes, Breton assigns another 
personality, that of a child, to a message he receives from his own mind while drifting off to 
sleep (15). The emergence of this kind of persona from within the artist’s mind recalls the 
visionary pose of Cahun in the passage from the Aveux cited above.  
The attribution of the “automatic message” to the personality of an interior other typifies 
the logic of the Surrealist encounter with the marvelous in everyday and psychic life. But it also 
renovates the field of collaborative possibility, opening the path to O’Hara’s playful 
collaboration with the French language itself in “Choses Passagères.” The collaborative nature of 
the spiritualist séance was already clear to Hugo, who asked his spirit table for permission to 
publish its words before preparing his Livre des tables.22 Of this awareness of a language that 
does not belong to the author, Aragon wrote of Surrealist efforts to reduce sensation and 
experience to their single-word quintessence: “Absolute nominalism was dazzlingly exemplified 
in surrealism and it gradually dawned on us that the mental substance described above was, in 
fact, vocabulary itself. There is no thought outside words […]” (Wave 5). For Aragon, the 
unconscious forces at work within the artist, which he gathers together in the locution “mental 
substance,” are the forces of language itself, of a psychic vocabulary rearranging itself into new 
and unexpected messages. In Jean Cocteau’s film Orphée (1950), the eponymous poet played by 
                                                
22 See Patrice Boivin’s preface in Hugo Le Livre des tables.  
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Jean Marais receives lines of poetry dictated to him over the radio waves of his car radio by his 
young, defunct rival, Cégeste. Though produced after the formative decade of surrealism and 
outside the surrealist movement itself, Cocteau’s film does reveal the influence of a similar 
conception of language and poetic inspiration.  
 In the United States, Cocteau’s influence arrived on the West Coast in the poetry of Jack 
Spicer (1925-1965), whose work begins in the Berkeley Renaissance in the post-war 1940s.23 
Spicer’s 1957 book, After Lorca, is an epistolary collaboration with the title’s deceased Spanish 
poet, complete with an introduction “by” Spicer’s ghostly correspondent. By the time of his 
death, Spicer had developed a theory of poetic “dictation,” echoing Breton’s description of 
automatism, that he outlined in several lectures near the end of his life delivered in Vancouver 
and Berkeley in June and July 1965. In the first of his Vancouver lectures, “Dictation and ‘A 
Textbook of Poetry’,” Spicer traces his thinking back to the influence of Yeats’ spiritualist 
poetry from 1918, when Yeats was visited by what Spicer calls “spooks” through the medium of 
his wife, Georgie (House 24). From Yeats’ example, Spicer concludes that the acknowledged 
source of poetic inspiration must shift from a Romantic model of interior expression to one in 
which “there was something from the Outside coming in” (24). Spicer refuses to define this 
“Outside” in the lecture and goes on to reference Cocteau’s film directly by using the metaphor 
of Orphée’s car radio as an example of the poet “being transmitted into” (26).24  
                                                
23 Spicer claimed 1946, the year in which he met the other members of the Berkeley 
Renaissance, Robert Duncan and Robin Blaser, as the year of his birth, emphasizing the 
importance of the collective endeavor to his life and work afterward. See Peter Gizzi’s 
introduction to Spicer The House that Jack Built: The Collected Lectures of Jack Spicer 14.  
  
24 The influence of Cocteau’s film is evident in Spicer’s poetry, as well, in the dedication of the 
three parts of the 1960 sequence “Homage to Creeley” to three of the characters from the film. 
See Spicer My Vocabulary 249-80.  
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 Spicer delivered the last of his lectures in Berkeley at the 1965 Berkeley Poetry 
Conference which gathered poets from Donald Allen’s New American Poetry anthology (1960), 
and which drew the attendance of other poets from across the country, including Hannah Weiner. 
Though it is unknown if Weiner attended Spicer’s lecture, her own poetic clairvoyance, unique 
as it is, belongs to a common heritage. Both experience the poem as antagonistic to authorial 
control, or as Spicer describes it, “these poems say just exactly the opposite of what he wants 
himself, per se poet, to say” (26).  Jennifer Russo draws the distinction between Spicer’s 
“dictation” and Weiner’s “clairvoyance” as one defined by concern for the source of the 
messages. As she explains, Spicer is more concerned with the playful metaphors (e.g. spooks, 
Martians) that deflate the seriousness of discussions of poetics while Weiner aims to combine the 
popular and the spiritual in her clair-style texts (81). If Spicer’s dictation requires the poet to “try 
to keep as much of yourself out of the poem” (House 32), Weiner’s favored form, the journal, 
makes the mix of autobiographical and clairvoyant material necessary to her own procedure.  
Despite these differences, if a readerly adherence to belief in Weiner’s powers (spiritual 
and poetic) convenes a collective of clairvoyant readers (as I discuss further in chapter three), 
Spicer, too, takes an interest in the power of poetry to forge collective experience. In his third 
Vancouver lecture in 1965, “Poetry in Process and Book of Magazine Verse,” Spicer examples 
this collective work by reversing the format of the lecture. Instead of speaking to his audience, he 
asks that they begin by asking him questions that might make him uncomfortable about a new 
poem that he is writing (102-03). In Peter Gizzi and Kevin Killian’s introduction to Spicer’s 
Collected Poetry, the two write that the triumph of Spicer’s work is not found in “a declared goal 
but the gathering of a community for a potentially endless adventure in reading” (xxi). As for the 
surrealists, the work of writing poetry is the collective work of the revolutionary group, but in 
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Spicer’s work, as in Weiner’s role as both a student of and as a “silent teacher,” this collectivity 
extends to the future (and potentially infinite, to take Gizzi and Killian at their critical word) 
work of readers reading, as well.  
Surrealist automatism, the radio-poems in Orphée, Hugo’s spiritualist texts, Spicer’s 
dictation, Weiner’s clairvoyance, Barthes’s model of the reader: each remind us that death is a 
structural term necessary to the work of collaboration, and not its conditional limit. Cahun, 
Weiner, and their associates, breach a boundary that the other poets and artists in this brief 
history of collaboration and clairvoyance leave intact, however intrepid their experimentation. 
What becomes important throughout the chapters that follow is the incorporation of other selves 
into the self (and even the body) of the artist before that collaboration can be inscribed into an art 
work and projected outward to its audience. For the artists in this study, collaboration cannot be 
reduced to the reception of a message; it is, rather, a negotiation of reception, incorporation, and 
projection, over a period of time marked by absence. Only this constitutive absence can account 
for the performative power of the work to convene future collaborators out of its audiences.  
 
Women Artists, the Avant-Garde, and Collaboration 
 
In this dissertation, my approach to identifying the work and works of collaboration that I 
investigate takes on a necessarily feminist posture. Though the questions I pose are not 
exclusively feminist ones, each of the artists whose works I examine in the following chapters 
engage with the role of the body of private, interior experience in the artwork. These are 
decidedly feminist concerns in the history of modernism. As critic Kathleen Fraser writes, 
modernist women poets reimagine the artistic endeavor in the role of the “the poet as bearer of 
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uncertainty.” The artists in my study each prove this claim. Situating these women historically, 
Fraser asks, “What of female experience and interior talk, could be brought into the poem and 
called legitimate” (98). For Fraser, working in her own critical vocabulary rooted in the bodily 
experience of poetry, this mistrust for the “overbearing voices of the world” which would 
devalue such poetic material, is left as an incomplete equation to be “overheard” by the reader. 
Further, my own situation and experience as critic, with a body and in a specific historical time, 
registers the resonance of these concerns as my focus in identifying a performative mode of 
collaboration turns to the act of reading or viewing the work.  
Griselda Pollock, in her work on the avant-garde, both alone and in collaboration with 
Fred Orton, has asserted an historical model for understanding avant-garde groups that resists 
narratives of progress in the development of modernist art. In an essay on the role of women 
within the avant-garde, Pollock “challeng[es] the linear temporality associated with the avant-
garde as the progressive as well as transgressive agency of modernist culture” to suggest a 
historical model based on discontinuous avant-garde “moments” (“Moments” 796). These 
“moments” coalesce, according to Pollock (and Orton), “at the historical point when a specific 
kind of self-consciousness within a distinctive group emerges to foster identification between 
members of a self-selecting group or a collection of mutually-referencing groups” (800). 
Pollock’s alterative model of the avant-garde speaks to similar critiques of Bürger made by 
Benjamin Buchloch and Hal Foster.25 For Buchloh, Bürger’s argument is reductive in its 
privileging of the destruction of the art institution as the avant-garde’s defining aim (19), and for 
                                                
25 Bürger reassesses his work in Theory of the Avant-Garde, as well as its reception by his critics 
in a 2010 essay. Though I am partial to arguments for the identification of avant-garde activity in 
its neo-avant-garde iterations, Bürger does offer a strong a critique of Foster’s use of a 




both he and Foster, Bürger’s dismissal of the neo-avant-gardes of the later twentieth century fails 
to account for the influence of the historic Avant-Garde in those later iterations. Pollock’s notion 
of “moments” serves as a remedy for the dismissal of other forms of avant-garde activity after 
the historical inter-war period.26  
The time of the recurrence of a performative mode of collaboration in the work of these 
artists, from the Surrealist milieu of Cahun, Oppenheim, and Zürn to the New York milieu of 
Weiner, Mayer, and Piper, is similar to the cyclical time of repetition (the temporal condition of 
Pollock’s moments) that Pollock derives from the work of Julia Kristeva. And, though Weiner, 
Mayer, and Piper remain on the edges of such an avant-garde moment, Pollock identifies a 
specifically feminist avant-garde moment around 1970 in New York City. Weiner seems to refer 
cheekily to this moment in silent teachers remembered sequel when she writes that her 
introduction into the art world in the mid- to late-1960s brought her into contact with “the 
musicians   performers   pop artists   and lesbians and poets of that time” (69), a list of the artists 
who would have been involved with the avant-garde work of Fluxus, conceptualism, and 
performance art as well as a group (“lesbians”) defined by their gender and sexual orientation. 
O’Dell’s reminder in her assessment of the role of women in Fluxus of the historical 
juxtaposition of the bodily as the domain of women and the textual as the domain of men 
emphasizes the feminist stakes of a project such as this one that interrogates the nexus of a 
                                                
26 Mike Sell, similarly to Foster and to Pollock respectively, suggests 1) that the avant-garde 
returns from the future and moves ahead into it simultaneously and that 2) the avant-garde forms 
as a response to the conditions of a crisis (and not in an act of progressive unfolding of an 
identity). Sell thus proposes that scholars ask the question, “What is the avant-garde,” from the 
perspective of a “situation-oriented methodology” like that used by performance scholars to 




performance’s power to work performatively on readers through a text, putting these two 
prejudices on the “collision course” that O’Dell sees in Fluxus (“Fluxus” 45).  
In the course of her argument, Pollock juxtaposes the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) 
curator Alfred Barr’s famous flow chart representing the development of modern art with Aby 
Warburg’s Mnemosyne Atlas, a collage-encyclopedia that combines visual forms with the modes 
of sociality that inform them, a concern that Barr’s chart cannot display. Barr’s erasures in the 
service of the rationalizing of art history suppress the violent and startling social and political 
upheavals of the century, from war, fascism, and the Popular Front to worker’s and women’s 
movements and beyond to the Holocaust and AIDS crisis. A recent work by the artist Andrea 
Geyer entitled Revolt, They Said (2012, ongoing), installed at MoMA in 2015, presents the 
viewer with a complicated mural line drawing, a nexus of connections between women involved 
in the twentieth century history of the museum and the New York art world. The curved lines 
and multi-directional trajectories of Geyer’s map of a female modernism are at odds with the 
sharp angles and orthogonal lines of Barr’s chart. Geyer’s field is also crowded with names, 
resisting the reduction and linear temporality of Barr’s logic in favor of Pollock’s moment-
oriented temporality and socio-political mindfulness. On Geyer’s map, even Planned Parenthood 
has its place, and unexpected names find themselves in proximity. Though not concerned with 
the identification of avant-garde moments per se, the drawing installation reworks Barr’s flow 
chart into a nodal web of women and the organizations or collaborative groups that they started, 
including political and social groupings alongside artistic ones.  
Most broadly, a feminist slant in my critical perspective is evident in the attention I give 
to artists who privilege the place of the body, either the artist’s or the reader-viewer’s, in the 
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work. This subject is well studied by feminist critics,27 and my project follows on the important 
feminist work of recovery, like the kind of archival work Geyer performs in Revolt, They Said, 
that returned several of the six artists in this study to critical attention, in particular Cahun and 
Weiner, but so, too, Oppenheim and Zürn.28 Mayer and Piper, both still living and working, 
prove a happy exception to this trend for the celebration of their work in their own lifetimes, 
despite what other inequalities may have impacted their work over the course of their careers. 
Rosalind Krauss, in Bachelors, a look at the criteria by which we judge art by women artists, 
begins her study with the assertion that “art made by women needs no special pleading” (50). 
Gayatri Spivak, as well, flatly defends a project that takes all (or nearly all) of its examples from 
the work of women artists (Death 70). As she concludes, there is no other justification than 
“because women are not a special case, but can represent the human, with the asymmetries 
attendant upon any such representation” (70). I conceive of this dissertation as a work of 
curation, and not one of a history of these artists. The collaboration that I imagine between 
Cahun and Weiner in a first instance, and the possibility of collaboration with Oppenheim, Zürn, 
Mayer, and Piper in a second instance, is a work of my own convocation and arrangement. And 
part of my argument will arrive at a questioning of the place of the curator-critic in the 
relationship between these artists once such an impossible collaboration has been convened.  
* * * 
                                                
27 For two example texts relevant to this project, see Jennifer Blessing A Rose Is A Rose Is A 
Rose: Gender Performance in Photography and Amelia Jones Body Art: Performing the Subject.  
 
28 François Leperlier brought Cahun’s work to the attention of art historians and the public in 
France in the 1980s. Weiner’s growing reputation is largely attributable to the work of a handful 
of critics, most notably Patrick Durgin.  
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 The three chapters that comprise part one place Cahun and Weiner in dialogic, 
collaborative contact. Chapter one examines the relationship of the reader to two autobiographic 
texts, Cahun’s Aveux non avenus and Weiner’s Clairvoyant Journal. Cahun first proposes 
Narcissus as a model for her own play of mirroring in her text, as well as for her collaborative 
relationship with Moore. Adopting psychoanalytic and phenomenological approaches defined by 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone Weil, and Kathleen Fraser, I offer Narcissus as a model of 
collaboration in the act of looking at, reading, and constructing these texts. I posit that Cahun and 
Weiner expand the notion of the autobiographical to include the reader, imagining both the 
author and reader as partners in the creation of the artwork. 
 Chapter two takes up Narcissus’ complimentary figure, Echo, as a model for the role of 
affect in the relationship between the work and its reader or viewer. I detail the ways in which 
Cahun’s Héroïnes and Weiner’s Code Poems subvert the impersonal formal devices that 
structure these works. I argue that, through Echo-like repetition and citation, Cahun and Weiner 
use visual and literary codes to signal an address to their reader-viewers. Both artists adopt 
unusual forms of address to create a sense of agitation and anxiety in their audiences, drawing 
them into the work through an affective response. 
 The conventions of hospitality and a discursive mode of invitation unite Cahun and 
Weiner’s works in chapter three. I argue, in the tradition of J.L. Austin’s linguistic 
performatives, that photographic self-portraits of Cahun and Weiner form a contract of invitation 
with reader-viewers. Included in literary texts about domestic and political life, these self-images 
“invite” reading or viewing audience’s into the artist’s home. In so doing, these images offer 
reader-viewers a role to play in the creation of new iterations of past performances. I conclude 
that the performative nature of these documents allows Cahun and Weiner to establish political 
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legacies for future audiences that defy gendered norms of domestic, political, and artistic 
activity.  
 In part two, I reciprocate the invitation I received from the performative address of Cahun 
and Weiner’s works by inviting four more artists into the collaborative space I curate in this 
dissertation. Whereas in the chapters of the preceding section I imagined a dialogue between the 
work of Cahun and Weiner, in the chapters that follow I consult the work of these four artists 
associated with either Cahun, Weiner, or their avant-garde moments, each in turn. Meret 
Oppenheim and Unica Zürn arrive from Cahun’s Surrealist Paris and, like Cahun, from its 
geographic and historical fringes; Bernadette Mayer and Adrian Piper, two artists born in the 
boroughs of New York City, return us to Hannah Weiner’s New York of the 1960s and 1970s. 
The chapters of part two interrogate in greater detail the readerly role in the collaborative 
endeavor. The order of the chapters loosely pairs these artists at diagonals across time and space, 
drawing out similarities in the criticism or reading of Oppenheim and Mayer’s works and 
resemblances in the incorporation or rejection of the Other in the work of Zürn and Piper.  
 In a chapter on the paucity of photographic documentation surrounding the multiple 
iterations of Meret Oppenheim’s Spring Banquet, I elaborate on the contemporary viewer or 
critic’s impairment in encountering this documentation of a past performance. To do so, I offer 
two critical frames, one in deploying Barthes’ notion of a clandestine pleasure of reading from 
The Pleasure of the Text and another in retrospectively applying Hito Steyerl’s commentary on 
the “poverty” of the digital image in the contemporary regime of copying and circulating images 
on the Internet to photographs of Oppenheim’s work. A chapter on Bernadette Mayer’s early 
installation Memory situates the viewer similarly, in a work of reconstitution of Mayer’s memory 
as documented in photographs and a recorded text. By considering the multiple iterations of 
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Memory as an installation and later book edition, I reveal the paradoxical place of the reader as a 
collaborative partner in reconstructing Mayer’s memories, cast between lyric expressivity and 
conceptual anti-expressivity. Both chapters engage with the spaces opened by the artists’ uses of 
photography and the limitations of what we can know of the work or the artist through the 
photograph. 
 Returning to the Surrealist milieu, I investigate Unica Zürn’s psychic experiences and 
“madness” through a bifocal lens of friendship and sculptural folds, derived form Cahun’s 
writing in Amor amicitiae and Deleuze’s theory of the Baroque fold. The fold accounts for the 
incorporation of an absent other into Zürn’s texts and very self. Incorporation recurs as a 
subdued but important motif in the work of Adrian Piper. Her own encounters with others 
become the occasion to interrogate the important place she makes for the indexical present – 
what she describes as the experience of the “here and now” – in her early work. In drawing on 
the apparatus of Barthes’ lecture notes on the concept of idiorrhythmy, I focus on the 
antagonisms and absences that mark this indexical presence in the collaborative encounter with 
the other. In concluding, I return to the work of Émile Benveniste to schematize the place of the 
reader, artist, and artwork in a subjectifying field opened by the work of collaboration. I argue 
that though the critic may curate such a collaboration as the one between Cahun and Weiner in 
part one, once such a collaboration has been identified, the critic finds his or her own position 













Chapter One.  
Narcissus’ Veil: The Phenomenology of Collaboration in 
Cahun’s Aveux non avenus and Weiner’s Clairvoyant Journal 
 
 
There is a rock pool on the estate, left wild like English gardens or the uncultivated 
landscape along the rest of the Jersey coast, where they have gone today to take pictures. It is 
the late 1930s on a small island, a British protectorate, off the coast of France in the English 
Channel, where Cahun and Moore have just moved from Paris. While Cahun takes her clothes 
off and stretches out along the edge of the water, Moore sets up her camera, angling the device 
to capture Cahun’s exaggerated pose. As Moore shoots, Cahun pauses briefly, propped on her 
elbows – she has just caught a reflection in the pool, an elongated face, a long thin nose, sharply 
shaped eyebrows. And what color is her hair today? Blonde, not pink like she dyed it when she 
was in her twenties and early thirties, in Paris. It is her own visage in the pool and she stops, 
furtively turning to exchange a glance with Moore before returning to her reflection, fascinated 
for another moment, as she ever is by her own fugitive image. 
She laughs as she steadies her elbow against the mirror, tracing the words across her 
forehead, carefully reversing them to account for the reverse image of her reflection. It is the 
1970s, early in the decade, in New York City. Weiner turns, smiling, to her photographer and 
stares deep into the small black aperture of his camera. The reflection that the lens returns 
seems so foreign, she thinks someone else must be looking back at her. Another person. In the 
lens, she sees herself, but wonders at the distance between that reflection and her experience 
hallucinating words as a conduit for dictated poetic messages. In her reflection, she reads across 
her forehead, I SEE WORDS.  
In this chapter, I sound the depths – or the shallows, as might better serve here as a figure 
of speech – of narcissism, or, in other words, of the deployment by Cahun and Weiner of figures 
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and forms derived from the myth of Narcissus, in particular the mirror that acts as a screen for 
Narcissus’ self-image. I argue that this formal and thematic engagement with narcissism in 
Cahun and Weiner’s texts and images proposes a collaboration of estrangement in which 
distance from a collaborative other founds the shared work of creation. In doing so, I turn to 
phenomenological approaches to the text, informed by Merleau-Ponty (and his psychoanalytic 
influences) and the French mystic and philosopher Simone Weil.  
 In Ovid’s telling, the still water acts as mirror but also, once “troubled” by the tear that 
falls from Narcissus’ cheek, as a veil or screen that hides the desired image. Oscar Wilde’s 1894 
prose-poem prolongation of the myth seizes on the mutability of the figure of the mirror/veil to 
recount what happens once Narcissus has died. Cahun’s early unpublished manuscript “Les Jeux 
uraniens,” or “Amor amicitiae,” includes epigraphs from Wilde’s lover, Lord Alfred Douglas, 
whose name provided one of her early pseudonyms, Daniel Douglas. Wilde himself, an associate 
of Cahun’s uncle Marcel Schwob, was undoubtedly an influence on Cahun’s work. Here is 
Wilde’s poem, entitled “The Disciple”: 
 
 When Narcissus died the pool of his pleasure changed from a cup of sweet 
waters into a cup of salt tears, and the Oreads came weeping through the 
woodland that they might sing to the pool and give it comfort. 
 And when they saw that the pool had changed from a cup of sweet waters 
into a cup of salt tears, they loosened the green tresses of their hair and cried to 
the pool and said, “We do not wonder that you should mourn in this manner for 
Narcissus, so beautiful was he.” 
“But was Narcissus beautiful?” said the pool. 
“Who should know that better than you?” answered the Oreads. “Us did 
he ever pass by, but you he sought for, and would lie on your banks and look 
down at you, and in the mirror of your waters he would mirror his own beauty.” 
And the pool answered, “But I loved Narcissus because, as he lay on my 




I quote the poem in its entirety for it provides this chapter with a set of formal figures that will 
help me to define a poetic narcissism developed by Cahun and Weiner that paradoxically opens 
the narcissistic relation to others, and indeed, to collaborative voices. In Wilde’s telling, the pool 
replaces the absent Narcissus as agent of narcissism. If in Ovid’s telling, the mirror transformed 
into veil, here mirror mirrors mirror, and caught in the funhouse hallway of these visual echos, a 
group of others emerges from the trees: the Oreads. I, him, you, us, we — the pronouns 
proliferate, as in Cahun’s images and texts so often organized around mirrors and mirror images. 
The very transformation of the pool into the speaking subject of the poem multiplies the subjects 
of narcissism, giving voice to the fantasized image in the infinity of reflections between the pool 
and Narcissus’ eyes.  
Between the veiling at work in Ovid’s version as Narcissus’ image is obscured by the 
movement of the water and the exchange of mirror images between the pool and Narcissus in 
Wilde’s version, the narcissism encountered in work by Cahun and Weiner emphasizes the 
formal stakes and transformations of the mediating surface that comes between the subject and 
his or her image. The mutability of the narcissistic surface, in this reading, comes to imply 
another subject on the other side of the veil or mirror who looks back at Narcissus. Narcissus’ 
mirror, thus, becomes an interface for an exchange between subjects rather than a site of 
projection for one subject’s fantasized image.  
 Cahun’s 1930 book Aveux non avenus engages with the terms of narcissistic self-interest 
in it combination of photographic portraits from the 1920s, cut up and arranged in complicated 
photomontages with the help of Moore, and an autobiographical style influenced by Symbolism. 
Encouraged by Adrienne Monnier, avant-garde publisher and lover of Sylvia Beach, to write an 
autobiographical journal, Cahun composed the Aveux only to find rejection from her colleague 
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who had expected a straightforward work in the confessional mode.29 The complicated word play 
of the title, translated alternately into English as “Denials,” “Disavowals,” or “Canceled 
Confessions,” hints at Cahun’s rejection of the transparently autobiographical. As Tirza True 
Latimer writes, “[…] denial offered a backhanded way of affirming the literary and personal 
choices that had marginalized women writers generally, and Cahun specifically, with respect to 
Paris’s literary society” (“Narcissus” 82). In the simultaneous affirmation and subversion of the 
myth of Narcissus, to which I turn below, this valorization of the very choices that marginalized 
women finds its illustration within the Aveux itself. 
 Weiner’s Clairvoyant Journal, composed in her journals throughout 1974 in her 
“clairvoyant” style of words that she hallucinated or received from outside voices (by her own 
description), appeared in print in 1978. In her long statement of poetics, “Mostly about the 
Sentence,” Weiner describes how a new electric typewriter purchased in that year allowed her to 
develop the method of transcription for her “clair-style:” her words appear in lowercase letters 
and the words she received as psychic messages appear in italics and underlined (127). Patrick 
Durgin, in his introduction to a digital edition of Weiner’s journals, points out her interest in 
Magritte’s use of mirror images in his paintings (attested to by her early chapbook The Magritte 
Poems, published in 1970) as well as the phenomenological stakes of Weiner’s translation of a 
mental image to the page (“Avant-Garde” 12-4). To this engagement with phenomenological 
readings of Weiner’s accomplishment, I add the nuance of the French Jewish philosopher and 
mystic Simone Weil’s own idiosyncratic phenomenology, as laid out in the posthumously 
published fragments in Gravity and Grace. Narcissism proves to be a common trope both within 
                                                
29 Tirza True Latimer gives these details in a chapter on Cahun and Moore, see Women 
Together/Women Apart: Portraits of Lesbian Paris 82-3. 
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Cahun’s text as well as in the critical commentary on it, but does not appear in commentary on 
Weiner’s Journal, to that critical corpus’s detriment – an absence that can be filled by a 
phenomenological opening onto the formal structures of the myth of Narcissus. 
Simone Weil enters the coterie of this study through the intensity of her intellectual, 
artistic, and spiritual pursuits. Like Cahun and Weiner’s experiments that took them to the 
extremity of subjectivity, Weil’s sounding of profound moral, philosophical, and mystic depths 
aligns her project with the intellectual adventure Cahun and Weiner undertake. The intensity of 
the lives lived by these three women might also be expressed in a shared compulsion toward 
eating/not-eating. Weil died from a form of self-starvation while in exile from Nazi-occupied 
France in England. Cahun, as Georgiana Colvile notes in her article “Self-Representation as 
Symptom: The Case of Claude Cahun,” suffered from anorexia. And, in The Fast (1970), Weiner 
fastidiously tracks the food she eats and its effect on her somatic state during an early period of 
hallucinations.  
Born to a French Jewish family in 1909, Weil worked on the political left as an activist 
and philosopher before her early death in exile from Nazi-Occupied France in 1943. As with 
Cahun and Weiner, her Jewish milieu was more secular than religious, though mystical 
experience occupies an important place in her thought. Her ruminations on Christian mysticism 
appeared posthumously in the volume Gravity and Grace, wherein she develops an idiosyncratic 
phenomenology around the figure of the screen to describe the co-existence of the divine and the 
profane.  
 In Gravity and Grace, the screen functions variously, as figure of separation between the 
divine and the material worlds but also as metaphor for the self. At first, Weil writes, “Necessity 
is the screen set between God and us so that we can be. It is for us to pierce through the screen so 
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that we cease to be” (33). The work of piercing through this screen, for Weil, is one of 
renunciation of the ego, and this renunciation leads Weil to the formulation of the concept of 
decreation. Weil defines decreation as the making of something created to pass into the 
“uncreated,” unlike the concept of destruction that passes matter from something-ness into 
“nothingness” (32). For poet and critic Anne Carson, the concept, poorly defined by Weil, relates 
to similar work by the thirteenth-century French mystic Marguerite Porete on “a profoundly 
tricky spiritual fact, viz. that I cannot go towards God without bringing myself along” 
(“Decreation” 169). Porete, according to Carson, discovers that one can therefore never be truly 
alone with God and frames this notion in terms of Weil’s focus on perception, specifically the 
idea that the perceiver must “disappear from herself in order to look” (169). All of this occasions 
such a terms as “decreation” in the need for the destruction of the ego in order to dwell with the 
divine.30  
Weil establishes a link between human beings and God who, in her words, “[…] gives 
[creation] to us in order to beg it from us” (32). The physical world of Creation, then, becomes 
an equation, a negotiation, between God and “us.” Later, writing of the physical realm of 
perception, Weil asserts, “Everything which is grasped by our natural faculties is hypothetical. It 
is only supernatural love that establishes anything. Thus we are co-creators” (33). In the 
relationship of co-creators, Weil establishes a collaborative view of the physical world’s 
creation, one based on both the distance and reciprocity of the relationship. A distant intimacy is 
essential to this collaborative mode of creation.  
                                                
30 In a companion poetic sequence to this essay on Weil, Porete, and Sappho, Carson writes a 
libretto based on the three women’s lives and works. In the “Decreation Aria,” Carson’s Weil, 
alone and in an empty place, sings, “I am excess. / Flesh. / Brain. / Breath. / [….] / Undo this 
creature! / Excess. / Flesh. / Brain. / Breath. / Creature. / Undo this creature.” See Carson 
“Decreation (An Opera in Three Parts)” 235.  
   
 44 
 Of Weil and Porete’s work, as well as poems by Sappho, Carson asks, “[H]ow are we to 
square these dark ideas [of decreation] with the brilliant self-assertiveness of the writerly project 
shared by all three of them, the project of telling the world the truth about God, love and 
reality?” (“Decreation” 171). Carson proposes that we cannot square them, that indeed the 
condition of being a writer demands “important acts of subterfuge or contradiction.” Yet, Weil 
tells us how to square them: by subterfuge and contradiction, yes, but also by the relationship 
between co-creators. The collaborative work under discussion in my project founds itself on the 
same contradictions Carson identifies in the writerly projects of Sappho, Porete, and Weil – 
namely, the notion that two creators might fuse their artistic spirits, or efforts, to create a work 
strange to their individual minds, all the while maintaining a distance, an estrangement, from one 
another. The “strange collaboration” of Weiner’s “clair-style” works, upon which Jennifer Russo 
elaborates in her article “Hannah Weiner’s Book in Air: Clairvoyant Journal and Clair-style 
Poems,” becomes in my formulation not only a collaboration of strangers but a collaboration, 
too, from a spatio-temporal distance and with the other. 
In considering the formal performance of narcissism on the page, I assert that the myth of 
Narcissus as told by Wilde and by Ovid in his Metamorphoses (influential texts for Cahun) 
presents a rich formal vocabulary for Cahun and Weiner’s staging of collaboration. This formal 
vocabulary allows these two artists to indulge their fascination with their own selves and 
experiences in autobiographical texts while simultaneously creating artworks that implicate their 
readers as essential partners in the work’s completion or activation. Resisting both the closed 
circuit of narcissistic desire and the total, anti-narcissistic obliteration of the ego as advocated by 
Weil, Cahun and Weiner’s works open a middle space marked by successive transformations of 
the narcissistic mirror – specifically through the recurring, mutable image of the mirror, screen, 
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and veil. Paradoxically, the works of Cahun and Weiner propose a collaborative venture founded 
in estrangement: first, in the Surrealist sense of making strange through the fusion, or 
juxtaposition, of unlike elements, and second, in the sense of distancing, of making a text a 
stranger to the individual voices that created it. Collaboration, then, when viewed through the 
lens of the formal and phenomenological problematics of Narcissus’ myth and its retellings, does 
not only unite, but also separates.  
 
II. Narcissus in Weil and Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenologies  
 
In the catalogue for the Guggenheim’s 1997 exhibit Rrose is a Rrose is a Rrose: Gender 
Performance and Photography, Jennifer Blessing writes, “The recognition of oneself in a 
photograph can serve to define oneself, to create an identifiable and distinct subject. This is the 
narcissistic pleasure of the mirror, in which we reassure ourselves of our existence” (51-3). 
Photograph, mirror, Narcissus’ pool: so many pleasing surfaces. But the photograph does not 
always reassure, nor does it necessarily cohere around a distinct subject as in the smooth 
reflection of a mirrored surface. Blessing’s description of a photograph that solidifies the 
boundaries of the subject stops short of how the photograph might otherwise put the subject into 
play with other subjects. And so, to this first list of surfaces, including mirror, veil, and screen, I 
add the game board, the stage, and the page. 
Jennifer Shaw analyzes Cahun’s use of the figure of Narcissus in expanding on what 
Cahun terms a “neo-narcissisme.” Crucial to understanding the collaborative relationship 
between Cahun and Moore as the ground for other modes of collaboration in the encounter with 
their works, this doubled narcissism produces effects beyond the double authorship of a work 
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like the Aveux or many of Cahun’s “self”-portraits. Shaw, in addition to the contributors to 
Louise Downie’s collection Don’t Kiss Me: The Art of Claude Cahun and Marcel Moore, 
questions the status of Cahun’s portraits as self-portraits, as well, given Moore’s collaborative 
role in the creation of the images (101). As Shaw writes, “I wonder, that is, whether the ‘neo-
narcissism’ Cahun sought might not have been closest to being found when the ‘two narcissisms’ 
were replaced by an ‘exchange’ representing the ‘fusion of desires,’ whose final product could 
be both reciprocal love and a work of art” (101).  
Latimer’s work on Cahun and Moore’s collaboration in her chapter “Narcissus and 
Narcissus” from Women Together/Women Apart: Portraits of Lesbian Paris casts the “self”-
portraits as the work of Cahun (performer) and Moore (photographer/director), thus invoking 
Barthes’ rapprochement of photography and theater (68-9).31 Latimer argues for the necessity of 
a critical frame of “coproduction” in receiving Cahun and Moore’s work, which she relates to 
Cahun’s subversion of narcissism in the Aveux. In the lesbian couple formed by Cahun and 
Moore, Latimer argues, the gaze escapes the codes of power normally associated with its 
gendering (empowerment of the male gaze, objectification of the woman). Latimer concludes, 
“Here the desiring gaze is conceived as mobile and therefore in principle reciprocally 
empowering” (95). Latimer approaches what Shaw describes as a “fusion of desires” in the 
context of the two artists’ material practices around shared authorship. She analyzes a 
monogram, or “duogram,” the two used to unite their names (69). The 1919 emblem 
foreshadows the visual preoccupations of the photomontages in the Aveux, composed as it is of a 
well-heeled foot, a pair of lips, an eye, and a gloved hand, each stacked atop the other. Both 
                                                
31 In “Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein,” Barthes writes, “The scene, the picture, the shot, the cut-out 
rectangle, here we have the very condition that allows us to conceive theatre, painting, cinema, 
literature […]” See Barthes “Diderot” 70. 
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Shaw and Latimer privilege the doubling, or reciprocity of the gaze, at the heart of the 
partnership between Cahun and Moore. Though the notion of the work as representing a 
“reciprocal love” in Shaw’s description brings to mind Freud’s suggestion that narcissism serve 
as a model for homosexual love, like the love between Cahun and Moore, the exchange that puts 
these two narcissisms into relation challenges a reductive reading of the text as simply a mirror 
of Cahun and Moore’s relationship. By engaging with the visual tropes of narcissism, Cahun and 
Moore’s work in the Aveux opens, necessarily for its status as a text, to exchange with others 
beyond the couple. The collaborative ground built on which Cahun and Moore build this 
narcissism opens beyond the couple, adding at least a third active participant (the reader-viewer) 
to the theatrical couple of performer and director. 
 By emphasizing the stakes of any textual exchange, which exceed the stakes of the 
author’s investment in the text, I draw attention to the experience of the reader who encounters 
the phototext of the Aveux, and others like it. Weil’s models of “decreation” and “co-creation” 
allow a reorientation of Russo, Shaw, and Latimer’s observations toward the phenomenological 
stakes of Cahun and Weiner’s choices in form, metaphor, imagery and visual tropes. In Gravity 
and Grace, the screen between the effable and ineffable separates two parties (God and the 
physical world) without fixing the two in an unequal equation: the screen mediates both God’s 
experience of the physical world and our experience of the divine. Like the two sides of this 
equation, Weil’s name doubles the V in “veil” in English, recalling the doubling in her notion of 
“co-creation,” and grants us entrance to a semantic field of covering (voile) and watching over 
and listening out for (veiller) in French – a phenomenology of touch, sight, and sound. 
 Weil’s spiritual phenomenology of touching through screens evokes the work of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty who developed his own phenomenology in the decades following Weil’s work 
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and death. If Weil asserts in Gravity and Grace that there can be only one Narcissus, Merleau-
Ponty complicates the matter by asserting the opposite. In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-
Ponty casts narcissism as a fundamental trope for understanding the experience of vision. But, he 
explains, narcissism works through a second meaning, beyond the common interpretation of the 
condition as an absorption in one’s own image (183). He writes that in narcissism “mon activité 
est identiquement passivité—ce qui est le sens second et plus profond du narcissisme: non pas 
voir dans le dehors […] le contour d’un corps qu’on habite, mais surtout être vu par lui […] de 
sorte que voyant et visible se réciproquent et qu’on ne sait plus qui voit et qui est vu” (183). As 
in Weil’s notion of “co-creation,” the subject is both active and passive, working on an object but 
also being worked upon. The reciprocal nature of this “narcissistic” relationship leads Merleau-
Ponty to propose that the phenomenological field, thus, opens to “d’autres Narcisses” in the 
plural, reminiscent of Cahun’s neo-narcissism of two, and an “intercoporéité” of phenomenal 
experience (185). 
 The veil, or “voile,” recurs throughout the last chapter of Merleau-Ponty’s work, in which 
he outlines the above chiasmic structures of reciprocity, or reversibility, in the experience of 
vision. For Merleau-Ponty, sight envelops objects in a veil of vision, and so in veiling (“voiler”) 
them, unveils (“dévoiler”) them (173). In the chiasmic activity of seeing, the seer becomes 
enveloped in the visible, just as does the object of his or her vision. The experience of the 
“visible” becomes especially strong in the presence of another “seer,” as Merleau-Ponty writes, 
“Dès que nous voyons d’autres voyants, nous n’avons plus seulement devant nous le regard sans 
prunelle […] par d’autres yeux nous sommes à nous-mêmes pleinement visibles; cette lacune où 
se trouvent nos yeux, notre dos, elle est […] comblée par du visible encore, mais dont nous ne 
sommes pas titulaires” (188). Imagining the figure of the veil, or Weil’s screen, in this 
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configuration of phenomenal experience gives a veil that, like Weil’s screen or Narcissus’ 
mirror, separates and unites. Merleau-Ponty refers to the partial union of bodies made possible 
by the “visible” as an “intercorporéité,” in which one enters into the “visible” through contact 
with another’s body. In other words, the subject of phenomenal experience, like Weil’s divine 
partner in co-creation or the collaborators who will come to participate in Cahun and Weiner’s 
works in my analysis, enters into the awareness of “seeing” (as a passivity, as well as an activity) 
through a process of bodily collaboration.  
This experience of inhabiting the visible grows out of a psychoanalytic influence in 
Merleau-Ponty’s work – an influence that can be understood by the place of the mirror in the 
development of narcissism’s psychoanalytic accounts. Havelock Ellis, the sexologist whose work 
Cahun translated in part, wrote of narcissism as an expression of auto-erotism in 1898. Freud 
first grappled with the investment of the subject’s libido in his or her own self in the 1914 essay 
“On Narcissism: An Introduction.” There, he explains the ways in which a “primary” narcissism 
accounts for the investment of the libido in the self in ways similar to the investment of the ego 
in the preservation of the self (550-53). For Freud, this shared narcissism can become disorder in 
a secondary phase but in its primary phase is integral to the formation of the subject. This 
primary narcissism, according to Freud, can guide object choice in love relationships in which 
one loves another for a reflection of the self found in the other – for what he or she finds of him 
or herself in the other (as resemblance or as projection of what he or she could become) as well 
as in which parental affection is based on love for an object which was once part of the self (555-
56).  
Lacan develops further the trope of the mirror, integral to Ovid’s legendary account, in 
order to locate the phase of primary narcissism in the child’s development. In the essay “The 
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Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function” (1949), Lacan proposes that the infant assumes an 
“I” when he or she identifies with his or her mirror image. Notably, the stage precedes the 
mastery of other kinds of tools, as well as that of language, by the infant (95). What is also 
important for Lacan, and for the relation of this mirror stage to the primary narcissism theorized 
by Freud, is that the infant only comes to know his or her body as a “gestalt” that is more an 
ideal image of the body than the body itself. In this image, the infant invests libidinal energy and 
the image, Lacan argues, will direct libidinal energy toward other objects in the future (95).   
The mirror recurs in the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, influenced by Freud’s 
account of the subject and aspects of Lacan’s mirror stage. In his essay “Eye and Mind” (1961), 
Merleau-Ponty situates the seer in the field of what is seen, or the visible. Merleau-Ponty insists 
on the equivalence of the body of the seeing self and the phenomena that make up the visible; 
both are joined together by a shared flesh. The consequence of this imbrication of seer in the 
seen for the embodied self is the recognition that “[i]t sees itself seeing; it touches itself 
touching; it is visible and sensitive for itself” (124). The experience of this self, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, is not transparency but “confusion, narcissism […] a self, then, that is caught up 
in things.” This recognition depends on a “system of exchanges” between what senses and what 
is sensed (125).  
The mirror acts as a “technical object” for Merleau-Ponty; as a tool or sign, he writes, 
“the mirror has sprung up along the open circuit between the seeing and the visible body” (129). 
The mirror allegorizes the work of vision by theatricalizing the reflexivity of the narcissistic 
experience of the seeing body caught in the field of visible things. Merleau-Ponty concludes, in a 
passage reminiscent of Lacan’s descriptions of the infant who encounters his own mirror image, 
“The mirror’s phantom draws my flesh into the outer world, and at the same time the invisible of 
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my body can invest its psychic energy in the other bodies I see” (129-30). Merleau-Ponty’s 
“phantom” remains closely tethered to the material world. Elsewhere, Merleau-Ponty refers to 
this inherence of the imagination in the body as “corporéité.” As Merleau-Ponty reminds earlier 
in the essay, his conception of the imagination is one of embodiment, of the imagination in the 
body “with all its pulp and carnal obverse exposed to view for the first time” (126). Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology is more invested in the presence of the body as flesh, to the point of 
nearly rendering the phantom of the mirror image as flesh itself.  
 In adapting the mirror as a trope of narcissism to a formal concern for surfaces that unite 
and separate in their texts Aveux non avenus and the Clairvoyant Journal, Cahun and Weiner 
refashion traditional interpretations of narcissism to shape a collaborative, phenomenological 
field of reading and writing in their texts. The narcissistic surface becomes the stage of a 
performance open to its audience members as participant collaborators, similar to Merleau-
Ponty’s mirror in which the reflection of one subject-collaborator is met on the other side of the 
mirror not by an image of the self but by another subject-collaborator. As Russo writes of the 
clair-style, “It is a strange collaboration between the writer and the words, which, according to 
[Weiner], she is not writing but that are otherwise willed into being by unknown forces. This 
confederation of voices is clair-style” (86). The “confederation” that Russo identifies in Weiner’s 
clair-style, and which implies a reciprocal collectivity of actors, is not only a collaboration 
between “the writer and the words.” As Weiner points out, her clair-style poems, including those 
that make up the Clairvoyant Journal, are performance documents, a choreography of voices that 
implicate multiple readers in this “strange collaboration” whether as traditional reader or 
performance reader.  
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The equation of screen with mirror in both Cahun’s Aveux and Wilde’s prose poem 
obscures the boundary between subject and object of desire. In the Aveux, the strange 
perspectives of the mirror photomontage even involves the reader-viewer in the construction of 
vision’s lines of sight. In Wilde’s prose poem, the mirror (or pool-as-mirror) is not simply a 
technology of narcissistic desire, reflecting Narcissus’ beautiful image and gaze back upon 
himself. Instead, the pool is also a desiring, narcissistic subject. A relational desire joins pool and 
Narcissus in a model not unlike Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm. The pool-as-mirror represents not a 
closed-circuit of desire, but a circuit interrupted by a sort of screen, here, the mirror that reflects 
back upon both Narcissus and the pool in Wilde’s text.  
 
III. Narcissus’ Hand Mirror in the Aveux non avenus 
 
 The photomontage that precedes the second section of the Aveux, entitled “Moi-Même” 
(1930), juxtaposes fragmented body parts printed and cut from Cahun’s many self-portraits 
(hands, shoulders, knees, legs) with a drawn hand mirror, hand, and eye that occupy the center 
column of the image. Within this central column, collaged fragments of photographs establish a 
play of reflections of Cahun’s face in the fictive space of the mirror and the large glassy eye (Fig. 
1.1). In Shaw’s reading of the image, she notes that though Cahun at first seems to be the “I” of 
the photomontage – that is, that Cahun examines her own image in the hand mirror while holding 
it up to her own eye at the bottom of the composition – further scrutiny undoes such a reading of 
the image. As Shaw notices, if Cahun’s image appears as a reflection in the eye, it cannot be her 
own eye that gazes on the reflection in the mirror. Cahun, then, in Shaw’s logic, must stand 
somewhere outside the frame of the image. Thus, Shaw proposes two figures represented in the 
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photomontage. In her work on Cahun, Mary Ann Caws attributes this second presence to Moore 
and her collaboration in the making of the photomontages (“Doubling” 105). For her part, Shaw, 
not naming Moore, writes, “This play between subject and object, this unresolvable shuttling 
between self and other, is the substance of the photomontage” (87-8).  
 This shuttling is undoubtedly the substance of the photomontage. Though Shaw focuses 
her reading of the image primarily on the play between the reflections in the central column of 
the photomontage, I cannot help but be directed in my reading by the four hands of the 
composition. Converging on the hand mirror in the top, central space of the photomontage, three 
of the hands are responsible for the positioning of the frame of the mirror. The sketched hand 
that seems to belong to the same body as the sketched eye holds the mirror up, though in a 
moment of confusion in the image, the hand reflected in the mirror is depicted in a similar pose, 
as if it held the mirror in which its own reflection appears. The inclusion of legs and arms and 
shoulders in each corner of the dark space above the giant eye evokes a plotting of the physical 
body outside the imaginary space of the photomontage, as if these montaged body parts 
gravitated toward their proper coordinates (shoulders on top to support the upper limits of the 
image, legs on bottom to offer support from below) in order to coalesce a unified, discrete form 
(as in Lacan’s mirror stage or Merleau-Ponty’s visible realm).  
The form that does coalesce in the mirror image of the photomontage does so only in 
obscurity, without making any claim to unity. Recalling Weil and Merleau-Ponty’s use of the 
veil, the hand reflected in the mirror image seems to draw a dark, shadowy veil over Cahun’s 
face. As if to steady the mirror, another larger hand enters the frame of the photomontage from 
the right, one finger lightly resting on the round edge of the mirror. A fourth hand, which enters 
the frame from the top right, interests me most. Caws interprets this hand as gloved, with text 
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printed on the glove, and emphasizes the importance of the fragmented condition of the included 
text as it resists any absolute or coherent representation of the self (105). As Shaw observes, the 
hand is cut out from the pages of the Aveux and points to the center of the mirror.  
 The introduction of text into the photomontage by way of the pointing hand complicates 
the image beyond the slippage between subject and object described by Shaw and inserts a third 
player into the space inhabited by Cahun and Moore, as in Caws’ reading, or by subject and 
object, as in Shaw’s description. Of this hand made of text, Shaw writes, “This hand and the 
other sections of cut-out paper inserted into the photomontage thus invite the reader to refer back 
and forth between image and text” (74). However, rather than simply bridging the space between 
image and text, this hand points something out to the reader, and perhaps points to the reader, as 
well. Thus, the textual hand – a hand that must be read, unlike the other hands that are only to be 
looked at – reaches out to him or to her and even becomes an emblem of the reader within the 
photomontage. In S/Z, Barthes calls the text that operates in this way “scriptible,” or “writerly,” 
explaining that such a text challenges the position of the reader by making him or her a 
“producer” of the text (4). Barthes term “scriptible,” though, does not account for a reader’s 
phenomenological encounter with a text, but rather for the interpretation of layers of semiotic 
codes at work in a text.32 A prosthetic reading of this cut paper hand, however, draws the reader 
into the space of the photomontage, set into relation with Cahun and Moore or subject and 
object, and prepares other prosthetic slippages in looking: is the hand that rises over the 
                                                
32 My reading of Barthes’ notion of the writerly text borrows from the phenomenological bent in 
his criticism. For example in “The Grain of the Voice,” Barthes liberates “signifiance” in music 
criticism by locating the body (the “grain”) “in the voice as it sings, the hand as it writes, the 
limb as it performs.” His list omits the act of reading but begs the question (from me), what of 
the body in the eye as it reads? The somatic effects of music are, of course, also crucial to his 
reading of the story of the castrato Sarrasine in S/Z. See Barthes “The Grain of the Voice” 188 
and S/Z 109-11. 
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curvature of the large eye to hold the hand mirror another prosthetic hand for the reader? The 
sketched hand is properly positioned to allow such a reading and work of fantasy on the part of 
the reader, so does the reader hold the mirror up to Cahun’s face? Shaw notes correctly that the 
hand covered in text operates in a special manner, but this hand does more than invite the reader 
to flip back and forth between image and text. This hand invites the reader into the space of the 
photomontage, and thus, into the space of the text, as well. 
 What does the pointing hand indicate to the reader? A mirror, which is to say a flat, 
reflective surface and central figure in the myth of Narcissus. Cahun’s text in the “Moi-Même” 
section makes the connection between mirror and narcissism for the reader. Cahun writes,  
Self-love. Une main crispée sur un miroir – une bouche, des narines palpitantes – 
entre des paupières pâmées, la fixité folle de prunelles élargies… Dans l’horizon 
brutal d’une lampe éléctrique, en blond, mauve et vert sous les étoiles, voilà tout 
par pudeur! ce que je voudrais éclairer du mystère: le néo-narcissisme d’une 
humanité pratique. (43-4) 
 
The passage nearly describes the photomontage, dramatizing the poet’s self-regard in a mirror 
and playing on the horizon of the large eye in the “horizon brutal” of an electric lamp that sheds 
light on the “mystère: le néo-narcissisme d’une humanité pratique.” Cahun concludes the 
passage cited above by writing, “ En somme, ce qui gêne le plus Narcisse le voyeur, c’est 
l’insuffisance, la discontinuité de son propre regard” (44). In Ovid’s telling of the myth of 
Narcissus, no such “insuffisance” troubles the young voyeur. But, like Merleau-Ponty, Cahun 
identifies a lacuna in the experience of vision, mediated here only by a mirror or another 
participant in “néo-narcissisme.” In Cahun’s reworking of narcissism, the subject is not alone to 
gaze upon herself. Rather, she requires another participant in this “néo-narcissisme” that is 
structured around the photograph.  
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 Of the self-knowledge that comes from narcissistic looking, Cahun acknowledges both 
the cultural framing and work of fantasy that shapes such knowing. She writes, “Je ferme les 
yeux et j’attends la berceuse visuelle. Image hypnagogique. L’interprétation que j’en fais me 
trahit. Tant mieux: on n’a prise sur soi, on n’apprend à se voir que par quelque judas” (38). To 
see the self, Cahun implies, one must close his or her eyes and wait for the hypnagogic image 
that appears between waking and sleeping. But, even in this image, the true image of the self 
escapes the subject; interpretation betrays us, Cahun says. Our only hold over ourselves, our only 
way to focus on our own image, is through a “judas,” or peephole like those on an apartment 
door.  
 Terminating the passage, Cahun’s description of “la berceuse visuelle” and the process of 
seeing the self funnels into the word “judas.” Cahun’s Surrealism, in the passage linked to the 
dream-like “image hypnagogique,” finds a technical analogue in the mechanism of 
photography.33 The “judas” is a type of lens, like that of the camera, that presents an anamorphic 
image of what is seen through its glass. The “judas,” too, recalls the shape of the mirror in the 
photomontage, as well as the large, reflective eye. Like these other surfaces, the “judas” is part of 
an apparatus that captures an image while, as the homophony between judas/Judas suggests, 
betraying the objective veracity of the image seen through the glass. Each of these can 
potentially transform the image it presents to the viewer, either stretching it at the edges (in the 
case of the “judas”), presenting a range of possible distortions (in the case of a photographic 
lens), or flipping it (in the case of the optic lens).  
                                                
33 Here, I point to Rosalind Krauss’ “The Photographic Conditions of Surrealism” to note that 
Cahun specifically chooses the form of the photomontage, which Krauss shows to be the most 
Surrealist of those photographic forms privileged by Breton and company in serving a Surrealist 
theory of visual art and literature. See Krauss 18-28. 
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The mirror of the photomontage, what Shaw calls Cahun’s “magic mirror,” becomes, 
then, emblematic of this intermixing of the fantasized and the mechanical. Shaw, in her analysis, 
asks, “[W]hat is photography if it is not the mirroring of the exterior world with intention?” (89). 
Of course, as the “judas” reveals, this intention is only ever revealed as distorted in the image, re-
routing self-recognition away from its successful realization. Or, as Cahun reminds us, “[O]n n’a 
prise sur soi.” The hand of recognition in the image – the hand covered in text that points out and 
to the reflection in the mirror – is neither the hand of Cahun nor that of Moore. Rather, it belongs 
to the reader as prosthesis for reading this photo-text. If the “judas” of the above passage 
undergoes several displacements that turn it into the camera lens and then into the surface of the 
photograph itself (thus creating a mirror out of the photograph), then does the viewer of the 
photomontage not look into a sort of mirror – that is, not the fictive mirror of the photomontage 
but the photographic image itself that is beheld by the reader-viewer just as the hand mirror is 
(be)held by someone? 
Weil mentions Narcissus once in Gravity and Grace. She writes, “Desire is impossible: it 
destroys its object. Lovers cannot be one, nor can Narcissus be two [….] Because to desire 
something is impossible, we have to desire what is nothing” (94-5). Is this true? Can Narcissus 
only be one, for Cahun insists otherwise, as does Merleau-Ponty in ascribing narcissism to the 
general experience of vision? Or does Weil’s pronouncement represent an unwillingness to 
permit one more contradiction to a collection of fragments that otherwise accept the importance 
of contradiction? Weil’s chiasmic setting of God and human beings on either side of the screen 
resembles the encounter of Pool and Narcissus in Wilde’s “The Disciple” or of Cahun and 
Moore on either side of the camera. In fact, the play of mirrors in the photomontage from the 
Aveux allows a formal analogy between the relationship between God and human beings in 
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Weil’s account of the screen and the relationship between Cahun, Moore, and their reader. In one 
interpretation of the photomontage, Cahun and Moore face each other, engaged in a narcissism 
of two, from either side of the mirror-screen. In another reading, both Cahun and Moore confront 
the reader, who reaches out to touch, or to enter into, the screen of the text through the 
“prosthetic” hands in the composition. As Merleau-Ponty describes it, this kind of intercorporeal 
touching envelops the subject in the visible; here, this prosthetic touching envelops the reader in 
the space of the text.34 
In Cahun’s reformulation, Weil’s decreation (as diagnosed by Carson) comes to 
contribute to a mode of collaboration founded in “neo-narcissism.” Desiring renunciation as a 
strategy for holiness, Weil writes, “We should renounce being something […] We are like 
barrels with no bottom to them so long as we have not understood that we have a base” (33). The 
proposition echoes Cahun’s own from the Aveux: “Sous ce masque un autre. Je n’en finirai 
jamais d’enlever tous ces visages.” Barrels or “visages,” the quest for some kind of attainment 
(of God, for Weil, of the adventure itself, perhaps, for Cahun) continues ad infinitum. Between 
the collaborative co-creators opens an infinite space of creative possibility. Weil believes that the 
screen must be “pierced” to participate in decreation. Cahun expresses the necessity of a 
piercing-through in the Aveux: “Je ne voudrais coudre, piquer, tuer qu’avec l’extrême point…ne 
voyager qu’à la proue de moi-même” (14). Cahun travels, truly avant-garde, at the extreme front 
of her self, the ship’s prow piercing the air, through to the future and future selves and 
collaborators.  
                                                
34 In a recent theory of photography, Kaja Silverman asserts the figure of analogy, or “the 
authorless and untranscendable similarities that structure Being,” instead of the index as that 
which characterizes the photograph. She argues that the analogy entails a “constellation,” or 
relational mode of being, and concludes on a note influenced by Merleau-Ponty and reminiscent 
of Cahun’s neo-narcissism. She writes, “It is only through this interlocking that we ourselves 
exist. Two is the smallest unit of Being.” See Silverman The Miracle of Analogy 11.  
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IV. A Projected Mirror: Weiner’s Cover Portraits 
 
 Tom Ahern’s photographic portrait of Weiner for the cover of the Clairvoyant Journal 
also engages with the formal challenges posed by the surfaces of screen, stage, and page as 
derived from Narcissus’ myth (Fig. 1.2). In the image, Weiner meets the viewer’s gaze, smiling, 
with her own statement of poetics emblazoned across her forehead: “I SEE WORDS.”35 The 
message is undeniable; the succinct statement makes clear the readerly terms and conditions for 
entering into her text. The text of the Journal leaves no doubt that these are words Weiner has 
seen. As she reiterates on the first page of the text, “I SEE words on my forehead  IN THE AIR  
on other people  on the typewriter  on the page  These appear in the text in CAPITALS or italics” 
(1). As Judith Goldman writes, the belief in Weiner’s experience as clairvoyant, or the 
beneficiary of a specific case of extra-sensory perception, is crucial to an engagement with her 
work (“Hannah=hannaH” 122). Part of this belief includes the belief in the transformation of the 
world around Weiner into a series of surfaces to reflect her clairvoyance back to her as words 
received from outside sources. In the image of the Journal’s cover, her own forehead acts as 
screen-surface for her experience, but as she tells us, so too can the air, the page in the 
typewriter, or even other people act as a staging surface for these words.  
 If reflection in the photomontage allegorizes the structure of the photograph, as well as a 
certain desirous way of seeing, in Cahun’s work, reflection in Weiner’s Clairvoyant Journal 
poses a differently complex question for her reader-viewer. Though a photograph dominates the 
cover of the Journal, Weiner’s most innovative work in this text (as in her clair-style generally) 
                                                
35 Weiner’s pose recalls Tristan Tzara’s own forehead emblazoned with “Dada” at a Dada dinner 
(Dîner Dada) circa 1920.   
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occurs at the level of the poetic line. As Kathleen Fraser writes in “Line. On the Line. Lining up. 
Lined with. Between the Lines. Bottom Line,” “The poetic line is a primary defining place, the 
site of watchfulness where we discover how we hear ourselves take in the outside world and tell 
it back to ourselves” (153). Fraser’s description as the line as requiring sight in “watchfulness,” 
as well as hearing (again, the resonance of Weil and “veiller”), maps the complicated play of 
voice and vision in Weiner’s poetics. Weiner’s lines fill the page through a strategy of all-over 
composition that recalls the visual and spatial experimentation of mid-century field poetics in its 
various guises (in Robert Duncan, Frank O’Hara, or Charles Olson’s work, for example).  
Like the distorted lines of perspective in Cahun’s photomontage, Weiner’s cover portrait 
establishes a relationship between herself as subject of the portrait and the statement that her 
portrait makes (“I SEE WORDS”) that cannot be literally true, at least in part. Weiner’s poetry 
demands that its reader accept as truth her claims to “clairvoyance” through her special 
hallucinations of words, as Goldman emphasizes. But, in this portrait, Weiner, as posing subject, 
cannot fulfill the truth claim that the words emblazoned across her forehead make; she cannot 
see the words, at least not without a reflection. This reflection could arrive via the mirror or the 
photograph, as in Cahun’s composition, or here more explicitly than in the Aveux, that reflection 
could be supplied by a work of readerly involvement in the text. Weiner’s portrait replicates for 
the reader, before opening Weiner’s Journal, the experience of seeing words; we as readers see 
words written across Weiner’s forehead as she might see them written across ours. If Weiner 
sees words on other people, as her brief preface to the Journal states, then might we imagine her 
clairvoyance as, in part, a projective mirror?  
In other words, Weiner perceives herself and her own experience not only by reading 
words across her own body but by the projection of her experience onto the bodies of others. 
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Other bodies, and spaces, become legible as they serve as a screen to the language that 
mediatizes all bodies. Charles Bernstein writes in “Making Words Visible/Hannah Weiner,” “We 
all see words. But it is our usual practice to see through them. Weiner has focused her gaze, not 
through, not beyond, but onto” (270). In Bernstein’s description, words become a screen in the 
sense propagated by many practitioners of Language poetry, a screen of linguistic mediation, or a 
screen that reveals the mediation of experience in socially contextualized language. This play of 
transparency and opacity in Weiner’s poetry and photographic portrait intervenes in claims to the 
counterfactual dependency of a photograph. According to Kendall Walton, photographs are 
transparent images in that they exhibit counterfactual dependence on the scene they record. As 
viewers, we see objects in photographs and know this because the photograph would depict 
different objects if the scene in front of the camera had changed while the image was being 
taken. Thus, we see through the photograph to the physical objects included in them 
(“Transparent” 252-53). Though Bernstein’s description of Weiner’s language contradicts a 
similar transparency of language, he does suggest that Weiner’s way of seeing materializes 
language in the way that Walton’s description of transparency in the photographic image 
materializes the object in the photograph as that object.  
However, Weiner here uses the photograph against itself as a technology of transparency. 
Weiner’s self-portrait photograph is like a mirror, but not in the sense that Walton understands a 
mirror to be a tool for seeing objects. Rather, Weiner’s is a magic mirror more akin to Cahun’s 
mirror from the photomontage. Weiner’s performance, or pose, as a clairvoyant in this 
photograph, with the words applied to her forehead, brings the counterfactual dependence of the 
portrait closer to that of painting (or the intentional dependence informed by the artist’s beliefs) 
than to that of everyday seeing. In Walton’s example, a photographer who offers photographs of 
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a dinosaur in a distant rainforest does not convince us of the dinosaur’s existence in the same 
way that an artist who might sketch a dinosaur would be left with the burden of convincing the 
viewer of the animal’s improbable existence. In the case of the artist’s sketches, what the artist 
thought he saw is translated to the artwork; the image records his belief in the scene before him. 
In the case of the photograph, though the photographer may select a particular scene to 
photograph, the mechanical image records the scene as it was, in front of the camera; the 
photograph convinces the viewer that the photographer believes in the dinosaur because it was 
there (“Transparent” 263).36  
In Weiner’s self-portrait, we de not see the object itself (in this instance, a moment of her 
own visionary hallucination). Instead, we see the words that Weiner has written on her forehead. 
We see the belief of the artist, or what Walton calls elsewhere the fiction of the photograph, only 
we cannot consider it a fiction, for as Bernstein points out, Weiner’s poetic clairvoyance, on 
display in this photograph, obliges us to see what she sees through psychic experience. While 
Walton argues for the compatibility of the photograph’s transparency and its ability to induce 
“imagining seeing” as a representation (Marvelous 126-27), the counterfactual dependency in the 
case of Weiner’s portrait makes this compatibility more difficult to reconcile. For, had the scene 
in the photograph been different, the photograph would certainly have been different, as well. 
But this difference would have hinged solely on Weiner’s belief in her own clairvoyance, for it is 
only as a testament to her psychic experience that this scene exists.37 Weiner’s photograph, then, 
                                                
36 Walton reiterates this argument in Marvelous Images 127-28.  
 
37 On this count, Weiner’s portrait perhaps reveals something more like the “pointing to” that 
John Roberts describes in his discussion of photography and violation. Though he places 
photography in its social context, Roberts notes that “photography is the very act of making 
visible, and therefore, is conceptually entangled with what is unconscious, half-hidden, implicit.” 
This last series of descriptive terms reverses Walton’s description of transparency by privileging 
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is not so much a prosthetic tool for seeing objects as Walton describes the photograph as it is 
another prosthetic device for reading, as conceived as collaborating in the narcissism of the 
image in my description of Cahun and Moore’s mirror in the photomontage.  
The notion of the body as a screen for materialization recurs in Weil’s work, as well. In a 
chapter entitled “Self-effacement,” the body itself – Weil’s body – becomes a screen. Weil 
writes, “All the things that I see, hear, breathe, touch, eat; all the beings I meet—I deprive the 
sum total of all that of contact with God, and I deprive God of contact with all that in so far as 
something in me says ‘I’” (41). For Weil, the body, equal to the “I,” no longer pushes on the 
opposite side of the screen from God as co-creator of the perceived world but, rather, now serves 
as screen for the cast image of the physical world (screening God from base materiality and 
imaging the world whose figure is cast upon it). Weil’s account of the screen indulges paradox, 
and though Cahun and Weiner do not seek the same union with the divine, their screens offer a 
similar one.  
Not only does Weiner focus her gaze onto words but she focuses our gaze, as well, onto 
words. She does this by making her body a screen for language. In “Mostly about the Sentence,” 
Weiner writes, “The (my) natural desire for closure was defeated by the more important mind – 
or poetic—form” (123). Weiner admits the defeat of her ego, of her “natural desire” for the 
completed, closed sentence and text, and the triumph of extra-authorial authority over her 
compositional practice. Her body, like Weil’s, is the screen of this practice, the site where she 
registers language as a controlling force experienced on the screen of the body.  
                                                                                                                                                       
what is opaque in social or subjective experience rather than what is transparent in the image. In 
the social context, Roberts gives greater weight to the role of the photographer and selection in 
what is visible in the image than does Walton. See Roberts 2.  
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Weiner predicates her “clairvoyance” on a phenomenological experience that returns to 
narcissism in its formal stakes if not in its thematic ones. Though, as with the doubling in 
Wilde’s version of Narcissus or in Cahun and Moore’s narcissism for two, Weiner’s look in the 
mirror – that is, in the figurative mirror of her psychic experience – reveals another doubling: 
mirror reflects screen. And in the estranging space between the screen of Weiner’s body and the 
mirror that reflects its image, a collaborative text takes shape.  
 
V. Self-Performance and Autobiography on Screen and Surface 
 
Narcissus’ desire for the reflection he sees in the pool is a performance against a 
reflective surface. A balancing act, this performance only completes itself as long as Narcissus 
remains suspended above the pool, between knowing and not knowing his own reflection. As 
soon as Narcissus’ lips touch the water, the image of his beloved disappears in the ripples created 
by his own kiss. As Ovid recounts the scene, “How often in vain he kissed the cheating pool / 
And in the water sank his arms to clasp / The neck he saw, but could not clasp himself! / Not 
knowing what he sees, he adores the sight” (63-4). Narcissus’ performance turns on the moment 
of interruption, that moment when his physical or psychic balance gives way to desire and self-
recognition. For Cahun and Weiner, interruption of the self-image on a screen marks a break in 
performance, or a moment of recognition of performance, during which the drama of knowing 
and not knowing oneself opens the work to its collaborators. As the voice in Weiner’s text 
switches from a clairvoyantly received voice to Weiner’s own, for example, the reader becomes 
aware of his or her own experience of seeing words and receiving poetic messages. The 
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stoppage, or interruption, in the balancing act of self-reflection opens the subjective experience 
of performing the work to the reader-viewer.  
Weiner’s Journal is not only a text to be read but is also a performance score. Durgin 
succinctly describes the wedding of poem, performance, and experience in describing Weiner’s 
poetics as “[…] both the formal and the performative (phenomenological) that would be reunited 
under the rubric ‘clairvoyance’” (2). In other words, the clair-style poetry represents both a 
formal innovation in the arrangement of the poem on the page (not only in the strategic uses of 
capitals, underlining, and italics but also in the size of the page or notebook as a determining 
limit on the shape of the poem) as well as an innovation in the use of a score to direct a 
performance, which speaks to the influence of Fluxus on Weiner’s work before and after the 
psychic break that inaugurates the clair-style around 1970. As in Cahun’s performance portraits, 
Weiner takes up masks, figured as words and images received through psychic experience from 
which she then composes her texts. If Cahun’s texts and self-portraits enact masquerade, 
Weiner’s enact ventriloquism. In considering the structural role of interruption in this kind of 
performance, a return to Fraser’s description of the poetic line’s function as a “site of 
watchfulness” emphasizes the space in which this interruption occurs. Often operating as a 
reflection (in Cahun’s mirror, of Weiner’s psychic experience upon the world), Fraser gives 
interruption a set of coordinates, however approximate they must remain in the fluid terrain of 
the poetic line or text. Cahun’s play of mirrors and lines of sight destabilizes the terrain of 
“watchfulness” in the Aveux. In Weiner’s work, the reception and projection of language, 
emblematized by the “I SEE WORDS” of the Journal’s cover portrait, are coterminous with the 
line itself but nevertheless destabilize the reader through syntactic interruptions and blockages.  
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In a hallucinatory passage typical of her clair-style, Weiner writes, “sit/ on steps of 
Sunday School Union see John Giorno’s face appear on mine, no/ feelings or words with it, then 
smile DARK RED INDIAN FACE and the words/ THAT’S THE CONTACT” (23). Not only is 
Weiner’s experience of perception interrupted by the vision of John Giorno’s face atop her own, 
but so, too, is her line interrupted by the hallucination. The outside voices, indicated by italics 
and capital letters, further estrange the poetic lines from the rules of syntax, grammar, and 
smooth readability. Cahun’s short, sometimes aphoristic, passages have this effect, too: the text 
of the Aveux unfolds in fragments that are equally hallucinatory in the jumps between passages. 
“Watchfulness,” then, as valorized by Fraser’s poetics of the line, registers these fragmentary 
jumps in the spaces in which they occur, whether psychic, textual, or physical. Weiner gives the 
coordinates for the image of Giorno’s face as best she can: his face “appear [sic] on mine” in 
physical and psychic space, in the uninterrupted flow of her original, lowercase words in the 
poetic line, and with “no/ feelings or words with it” in a registering of affective and linguistic 
space. 
In the passage above, Giorno’s face is also a mask for Weiner, and the poetic line is a 
transcription then to be performed by performers speaking through the mask of Weiner’s voices. 
In a December 29, 1977 performance of parts of the Journal broadcast on Public Access Poetry, 
Sharon Mattlin and Margaret (Peggy) de Coursey join Weiner in reading excerpts from her text. 
This specific performance of the Journal reinforces the interplay of voices in the work of 
watchfulness and hearing in the formal conditions of its recording and editing for television (and 
today, for its archiving on YouTube). The recording layers close-up shots of Weiner reading with 
ones of Mattlin and de Coursey as the frame fades from one performer to the next. The fading 
effect blurs the distinction between separate frames and creates the image of a mask as Mattlin’s 
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face appears superimposed on Weiner’s, like the apparition of Giorno’s face in the text. Further 
mimicking the experience of Weiner’s clairvoyance, laughter and vocal reactions from outside 
the frame intervene in the performance.  
As Russo writes, “[Weiner’s] self-abasement is the invalidating of the unitary self as a 
literary source, but it’s also premised on the self as a vessel or scribe-self that rather than being 
abased is elevated” (92). Indeed, the performance of this excerpt of the Journal not only 
downplays Weiner’s role as a unitary author-subject but it also re-elevates her role as director in 
the play of voices. When Weiner demands that Charles Bernstein read his own poem, the frame 
shifts from the three performers of Weiner’s Journal to Bernstein who sits off stage. Bernstein 
begins to read his poem, and as he progresses, Weiner makes humorous and derisive comments, 
eventually instructing him to stop reading. Weiner, then, is not the unitary voice of the text or 
performance, but does direct through the privileged mode of instruction.  
The live performance mediated by the television screen (and now by its archiving behind 
the computer screen on the Internet) allows the viewer to participate in the unfolding of the 
poetic line by carrying out Fraser’s watchfulness and hearing. In the excerpt performed, Weiner 
reads a fragment of text that comments on the structure of the Journal and its performance, “This 
book is mind control.” As a score for a performance such as this one, the book is an example of 
“mind control” in that it provides its performers with words to say – it is a script or performance 
score. Situated between the text as performance score and the text as words to be seen and read, 
the reader-viewer joins in the same acts being performed on the screen going beyond Barthes’ 
model of the “texte scriptible.” The reader-viewer not only participates in writing the text but 
also is surrounded by the space of the text in its performance.  
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Weiner’s Journal, and the performances derived from its text, recall de Man’s claim in 
“Autobiography as De-facement” that autobiography, more than a genre, is “a figure of reading 
or of understanding that occurs, to some degree, in all texts” (921). Not only, following Fraser’s 
theory of the line, does the Journal dramatize the watchfulness for and hearing of experience, but 
it also assumes a second or third (ad infinitum) party to create its autobiographical effect. De 
Man’s theory of autobiography recognizes two parties in the process of reading and a process of 
exchange that casts these two between differentiation and similarity. Reading Weiner’s Journal, 
as I have argued above, one participates in this creation of the autobiographical. In Ovid’s telling 
of the myth of Narcissus, the youth perishes in a closed system of reading in which self-
knowledge, or self-knowing through self-desire, leeches Narcissus of his life force. De Man, 
rejecting a generic reading of autobiography that would root the genre in a specific history, 
argues for a reading of autobiography as linguistic trope. He writes, “The specular moment that 
is part of all understanding reveals the tropological structure that underlies all cognitions, 
including knowledge of self. The interest of autobiography, then, is […] that it demonstrates in a 
striking way the impossibility of closure and of totalization […] of all textual systems made up 
of tropological substitutions” (922). Self-knowledge in a closed system, as Narcissus knows, is 
impossible. Here, by taking up the formal demands of narcissism, Cahun and Weiner’s 
“autobiographical” works depend not only on these linguistic structures but also on the 
collaborative work of the performance of these multimedia works, revealing the ways in which 
the substitutions open the “autobiographical” to the Other. 
Indeed, the publication history of Cahun’s Aveux raises similar questions of genre and 
autobiography. Monnier rebuffed Cahun’s text when it did not conform to her expectations for a 
set of confessions in the vein of Rousseau. As Latimer observes, the title of the Aveux non 
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avenus contains the slippage between avowal and its negation, a negating or destabilizing of 
confession that explains Monnier’s eventual refusal to publish the manuscript (81-2). Latimer 
also points to the pseudonymous signatures of Cahun and Moore attached to the Aveux as an 
authorial strategy for further destabilizing the realism of autobiographical writing (81). I would 
also point to the figure of the clairvoyant across Cahun’s oeuvre, as it appears in the visionary 
passages in Vues et Visions (1919, also a collaboration with Moore) and recurs in the Aveux and 
late writings on her wartime experiences. In the guise of Cassandra in those late Resistance 
memoirs, and claiming her own clairvoyance in a move not unrelated to Weiner’s own claiming 
of the position, Cahun presents herself as a speaker of future truth ignored by her peers, her 
predictions annulled like her “autobiographical” avowals in the Aveux.   
 The visions of the clairvoyant open a system of exchange between the seer and the one 
she addresses. In analyzing two portraits, one of Cahun and one of Moore, and each taken by the 
other, in which they both pose with a mirror (Figs. 1.3 and 1.4), Latimer writes, “The mirror is 
not, in either case, a closed system (self vis-à-vis self-same), nor a space of Lacanian alienation 
(real self vs. ideal self). Triangulated by the external regard of the collaborator and her camera, 
the mirror opens the field of representation to possibilities of transformation and exchange” (95-
6). Indeed, the lines of sight established by Cahun and Moore’s gazes in these portraits short 
circuit any closure. Moore gazes into the mirror, but only in order to meet the gaze of the camera 
positioned over her right shoulder. Cahun turns away from the mirror, her eyes and their 
reflection diverting symmetrically so that her real gaze confronts the camera and her mirrored 
one flees it. Cahun’s gaze breaks the geometrical model posited by Lacan in his theory of the 
gaze in which a screen covers a blind spot in the field of vision: camera meets her eyes in an act 
of reciprocal looking but her eyes in the reflection break away, staring off into a fictive space 
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that leaves one side of the triangle open. And, yet, the mirrors of the photomontage, and even of 
these two pendant portraits, still evoke the circuit of Narcissus’ gaze, of his own refusal to accept 
any alienation from his own reflection and thus his willingness to remain within a closed loop of 
looking. 
 The screen, then, remains useful as a formal element for Cahun and Moore as well as a 
heuristic tool for interpreting their work. In another photomontage from the Aveux, this one 
introducing section VI (subtitled “X.Y.Z.” with an epigraph by Cahun “Ne jamais lâcher l’ombre 
pour la proie.”), a chessboard rises up at an awkward angle, as if acting as a screen itself (Fig. 
1.5). The photomontage includes elements familiar from the mirror photomontage: hands are lain 
across the top of the board; two playing cards at the bottom left depict men in suits exchanging 
gazes; a shadow figures prominently.38 The two hands, one gloved and one not, might be said to 
emblematize Cahun and Moore’s co-presence in the image, but also to evoke the moment of 
slippage between subjecthood and objecthood privileged by Merleau-Ponty when one’s right 
hand grasps one’s left hand.39 Shaw argues for a homology between the shadow and Narcissus’ 
reflection in that both suggest rather than show and that “Cahun privileges the shadow or 
reflection over the real in the epigraph [….] [a]nd she and Moore keep shadow and prey, unreal 
and real, in balance in the photomontage […]” (177). Rosalind Krauss draws a parallel between 
                                                
38 The image contains tropes familiar to followers of Surrealism. One might think of L’Échiquier 
surréaliste (1928) in which Man Ray set portraits of (male) Surrealists in a checkerboard grid, or 
of Magritte’s arrangement of portraits of Surrealist men around a drawing of a nude woman in Je 
ne vois pas la [femme] cachée dans la forêt (1929), whose format strongly suggests a game 
board, as well. 
 
39 Hands are a common motif in Cahun’s photography. In several images from 1929, Cahun 
made studies of doll, mannequin, and human hands in light and shadow. In another series from 
1932, Je tends les bras, outstretched arms emerge from a hollow pillar, hands straining as if to 
find each other in mid-air. For Merleau-Ponty’s description of “intercorporéité,” see Merleau-
Ponty Le Visible et l’invisible 183.  
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the work of Cahun and Marcel Duchamp by mapping their uses of self-portraiture along “a fold 
around which not only identities revolve and reflect like a pair of double helixes but also the 
positions of viewer and viewed become reversible” (Bachelors 42). Like the surface of 
Narcissus’ pool, a desiring screen, the chessboard in this photomontage demands a balancing 
act: Cahun and Moore’s refiguring of Narcissus and his mirror/screen is a performance that 
demands agility and that suspends desire (the search for that which is unreal and Other) above a 
space of legibility (the screen of the chessboard, or in Fraser’s formulation and Weiner’s work, 
the poetic line).  
The shadow of a man’s profile looming over the board, as in Shaw’s analysis, represents 
the unreal, or an index of an otherwise absent, real presence. But, to whom does the shadow 
belong? The shadow playfully doubles the notion of photographic indexicality.40 It points to 
someone outside the frame of the image, as well as to itself as shadow captured by a camera.  
The man’s profile at first seems to indicate a player looming over the chessboard, his cigarette 
smoking. However, the shadowy body beneath the profile is too angular to be that of a human 
man. In fact, the shadow draws attention to another body; a human-chess piece hybrid figure lies 
overturned on the table in the profile’s shadow. This chess piece is composed of a photographic 
element (a man from torso up) and a sketched element (the base of a chess piece). The 
photomontage seems to imply that the shadow and the figure that casts the shadow have been 
disassociated from one another, with the shadow superseding the figure that cast it.  
                                                
40 In her influential essay, “Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America,” Krauss foregrounds 
Duchamp’s use of shadows in the painting Tu m’ (1918) as indexes of his Readymades. She also 
notes that a realistically painted hand points at the center of the work and that the title implicates 
the deicitic, or shifter, pronouns in this play of indexicality. Each of these strategies is also on 
display in Cahun’s Aveux. See Krauss “Notes on the Index” 70-71.  
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Cahun and Moore once again organize the montage to ambiguously establish the number 
of players in the image, but this time, they implicate a possible player (the shadowy figure 
looming over the board) not only in the programming of the action on the board but in the 
movement of the pieces playing out on the board itself (as the hybrid chess piece itself). In a 
Lacanian register, the piece might be thought of as engaging the casual logic of the automaton, 
which Lacan describes as a reversal of causality in which the falling of the shadow on the 
chessboard results in the falling over of the very chess piece that should itself cast the shadow.41  
The doubling, and possible squaring, of players represented by the hands, playing cards, and 
hybrid chess piece and shadow in the photomontage – what Krauss identifies with the figure of 
the fold in Cahun and Duchamp’s work, and which works out as a fold in causality in a Lacanian 
reading of the image – finds its literary expression in the use of the plural pronoun at the start of 
the chapter. 
In a passage entitled “Singulier pluriel,” Cahun uses the first-person plural pronoun 
“nous” to describe a relationship of the narrator to his or her Other. Cahun writes, “Nous. ‘Rien 
ne peut nous séparer’” (115). The less formal or universal third-person singular “on” might better 
conform to a grammatical concept of the singular plural, but Cahun’s use of “nous” makes clear 
her intention to imagine a singularity derived from a plurality. The citation that follows the 
pronoun hints heavily that the context for such a relation is the amorous relationship. The 
typesetting of the section, which includes heart symbols to delimit breaks between passages, 
supports this reading. Following Shaw’s interest in her analysis, this section elaborates Cahun’s 
theory of a “narcissisme à deux,” whose elaboration runs throughout the Aveux. Though Cahun 
certainly pursues such a revision of the Narcissus myth, obviously with herself and Moore as the 
                                                
41 For more on the automaton, see Lacan Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 53-64 
and Hyldgaard 233-34.  
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two parties to this new narcissism, I find a less restricted collaborative plurality in operation in 
the Aveux. In fact, Cahun concludes the above passage with the sentence, “En fin de compte on 
est bien forcé de s’en remettre à l’inconnu, avec un grand X algébrique” (115). The “X 
algébrique” indicates multiplication to the nth degree, rather than a simple addition of single 
digits (i.e. 1+1). And the shift from “nous” to “on” intimates a scene of collaborators undefined, 
and unrestricted, in number.  
 As with the hand that fluctuates between assignation to Cahun and to the reader as 
prosthesis in the mirror photomontage, the looming shadow might also draw the reader-viewer 
into the chessboard image. The shadow would, then, be the index of the one who literally 
watches over the work. And, as Fraser describes the function of watchfulness, this would then 
implicate the reader-viewer once again in the construction not only of the image but of the text, 
as well, as he or she watches over the board. The chessboard serves alternately as a screen and as 
a surface for the staging of the singular plural pronoun “on,” in which the reader now participates 
along with the collaborative authors of the Aveux, Cahun and Moore. And, in fact, the next 
division in section VI, “Velléités,” begins with a direct address to the reader: “Avant de lire cette 
page, prononcez avec moi ce voeu: des mots à double détente” (134). Cahun involves her reader 
directly. In keeping with the title of the work, words have the double effects attributable to 
chance that may come to annul each other. The figure of speech (“à double détente”) conjures, 
too, a violent movement of these words in space as it refers to the technical apparatus of a 
delayed triggering system on a firearm. Words, spoken together in the aleatory space between 
Cahun, Moore, and the reader-collaborator, inaugurate the collaborative encounter. The correct 
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pronunciation of words does not ensure their message once they return to these collaborators 
who wait, watching, to do the work of “hearing.”42  
 
VI. Conclusion  
 
In a book-length collaboration entitled Voiles (1998), Hélène Cixous and Jacques Derrida 
contribute essays that reflect upon the collaborative encounter staged in the book itself. 
However, a division runs through the text, separating the two writers’ voices from each other for, 
as the title suggests, a veil hangs between the essays by the two writers and friends. In the text, a 
nearly-abstract pencil drawing of a veil marks the end of Cixous’ essay and the beginning of 
Derrida’s. As a “prière d’insérer” indicates as preface, the essays are autonomous but grouped 
together under one “genre,” that of memoir, or confession – as if, finally, draped in the folds of 
one veil.43 Cixous sets out her experience with an eye surgery that cured her myopia and its 
ramifications for her sense of seeing and being in the world in an essay entitled “Savoir” and 
Derrida responds to the notion of “savoir,” or (self-)knowing, in his essay, “Un Ver à soie.” Yet, 
there is no dialogue, no final response from Cixous to return Derrida’s essay to the collaborative 
encounter. Indeed, Cixous and Derrida’s work raises the very question of reflexivity – of 
returning, or bending back – in its mise-en-oeuvre of the collaborative encounter. As in the work 
and thought of Cahun, Weiner, and Weil discussed above, the stakes that Voiles then sets for 
collaboration put into play the movement of the veil between reader and writer.  
                                                
42 This is the predicament of Echo, of whom I will say more in the chapter that follows. 
 
43 The “prière d’insérer” also informs the reader that these two essays originally opened issue 
number 2/3 (1997) of Contretemps on the theme of “voiles.” 
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Cixous’ essay mixes the tropes found above in Cahun and Weiner’s works (vision, 
avowal, clairvoyance) with the tropes of both Weil’s philosophical and mystical thought and 
Narcissus’ story (the veil, or screen). Of her obscured vision, Cixous writes, recalling Cahun’s 
self-portrait in which she wears blacked-out goggles, “Elle avait des yeux et elle était aveugle” 
(3). Cixous characterizes the condition of myopia as one in which the shortsighted person dwells 
in another country marked by the magic (“magies”) of seeing and not-seeing (14). Caught 
between clear sight and its obscuring, Cixous recounts in the third person, “Jamais elle ne vit en 
sûreté. Voir était un croire chancelant. Tout était peut-être. Vivre était en état d’alerte” (14). This 
state of alert lead to misprision, as when in childhood Cixous ran to a strange woman mistaking 
her for her mother (14).  
The essay is Cixous’ own avowal, but like Cahun’s, it is an avowal that can only be 
disavowed. Cixous asks, “Les voyants savent-ils qu’ils voient? Les non-voyants savent-ils qu’ils 
voient autrement? Que voyons-nous? Les yeux voient-ils qu’ils voient?” (19). The instability 
between seeing and not-seeing remains after her operation; she is forever marked by the 
experience of her myopia, if only by nostalgia for it after a corrective medical procedure. But, by 
the end of her account, she has chosen, in choosing her operation, to live in the world of the 
living, as she writes, “Car il n’est pas permis aux mortels d’être des deux côtés” (19). Cixous’ 
concerns, then, are the same as Cahun and Weiner’s in their works: what can be seen and what 
cannot (and by whom), they each ask; what can and cannot be avowed? 
In his essay, written in the context of his well-known long-term friendship with Cixous, 
Derrida confronts the limits of his knowledge about his friend’s life and admits surprise that he 
had never known her to be myopic. Subtitled “Points de vues piqués sur l’autre voile,” Derrida’s 
essay positions itself on a shore opposite Cixous’ essay, to borrow her metaphor for the separate 
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worlds of the seeing and not-seeing. “Un Ver à soie,” thus, represents Derrida’s own point of 
view on Cixous’ autobiographical avowals but also announces a different view of the veil that 
separates the two essays and to which Derrida’s subtitle points. The veil that Derrida “sees,” in 
other words, is marked by traces, the “points” or “stitches,” of Cixous’ own lines of inquiry and 
avowal. In English translation, the subtitle recalls both the piercing of Weil’s veil and the 
pointing in Cahun’s photomontages (as well as Cahun’s own play on the stitching of a “voile,” or 
“sail” in the feminine, in her promise to only travel at the extreme point of her being).  
If Cixous approaches the question, do I see myself seeing, Derrida continues a reflexive 
line of inquiry in wondering if a truth can ever be unveiled. Such an unveiling, he argues, would 
represent a belonging to oneself (a “s’avoir” in the reflexive French construction) to such a 
degree that such a self-knowing (“savoir/s’avoir”) is not possible (30). Though, he does propose 
that “Savoir” (both Cixous’s essay of that title and “(self-)knowledge”), while exceeded by the 
reality of the singular event of Cixous’ eye operation, does “operate” on the reader (78).44 Poetic 
writing, according to Derrida, “[…] se destine […] au-delà de toute vérité comme révélation 
onto-logique. Il se destine à ceux et à celles qui sauront lire, bien sûr” (79). This destined 
readership turns the text back upon itself, in a reflexive gesture that makes of the reader a writer, 
a player in the space of the text. Cixous and Derrida’s Voiles, then, offers a textual example of 
collaborators caught in these very mechanics of poetic collaboration. In Cahun and Weiner’s 
works, as in Cixous and Derrida’s collaborative text, the event of the reading is not simply 
layered atop the event of the writing, but moves with the folds and undulations of the veil that 
turn the experiences of reading and writing back upon one another.  
                                                






Chapter Two.  
The Echo Effect/Affect. Collaboration’s Improper Respondents 
 
The television set flickers as Hannah Weiner turns it on. The local news broadcast 
begins, and she transcribes as she listens. She includes her own thoughts at first – details of a 
dinner remembered at her friend Bernadette’s – though the language from the broadcast quickly 
overtakes these thoughts as she writes in the blank book her friend and collaborator, Barbara 
Rosenthal, gave her. She imagines Rosenthal’s photographs of the broadcasts that will 
accompany her text, stills of news anchors, witnesses and bystanders, notable public figures, and 
quotidian crimes and disasters (Fig. 2.1). The antagonism between her thoughts and the 
language she receives as televisual message, an antagonism familiar to her from her days as a 
“clairvoyant” poet, drives her to keep writing, to finish the transcription—or, as she puts it in her 
earlier “clair-style” texts, to “finish the sentence.” As Charles Bernstein writes in his introduction 
to the text, “[In Weeks], parataxis (the serial juxtapositions of sentences) takes on an ominous 
tone in its refusal to draw connections.”45 Thus, Weiner writes, reacting to the agitation of once 
again receiving voices, translating this agitation into the “ominous tone” of parataxis. Weiner’s 
poetics of recording and transcription work against a lyric expression of subjectivity, but affect 
remains in the text through tone – agitated, perhaps ominous – like the witnesses and bystanders 
who speak into so many hovering microphones in the photographs.  
This, too, is not Weiner’s only “blank book” collaboration with Rosenthal. Her friend 
later gives her a notebook with pages cut in a complicated pattern entitled “Homo Futurus,” 
which Weiner will transform into her late text, The Book of Revelations (1989). The title “Homo 
Futurus” must have appealed to Weiner’s sense of clairvoyance, aligning her particular practice 
                                                
45 This introduction later appears as “Weak Links: Introduction to Hannah Weiner’s WEEKS” in 
Bernstein’s expanded commentary on Weiner’s text in Jacket2. See Bernstein.  
 
 79 
of receiving messages through hallucinations, or schizophrenic episodes, with the more 
traditional clairvoyant tradition of Cassandra or Tiresias—or, if you would prefer in poetry, of 
Robert Desnos and Jack Spicer, of Emily Dickinson and Alice Notley. Yet, Weiner turns to 
another figure from Greek myth as a model for the composition of WEEKS. This text effects a 
visual and linguistic echo across the pages of text and image: Weiner’s language, not properly 
Weiner’s at all, repeats what she hears from the television. Rosenthal’s still photographs of 
television screens suggest a source for these “voices” but do not allow us to locate the voices in 
the bodies depicted. Beginning the text with a reference to her friend Bernadette Mayer, 
Weiner’s own voice is caught, too, in this echo chamber of text and image. Her voice sounds 
strange to her, estranged from her, like the voices she recorded in the early 1970s in her 
Clairvoyant Journal. 46 And, indeed, her own repetitions in this text – with a difference – will 
affect her readers in the singularity of each instance. Even in this text premised on the 
impossibility of the lyric, emotion, or affect, the “ominous tone” felt by Bernstein, or the 
agitation necessarily felt by Weiner and so many other “seers” as a condition of their abilities, 
moves us as readers. 
Echo, as she comes to us from Ovid’s account in the Metamorphoses, has just been 
punished by Juno for distracting her while other nymphs slept with her husband, Jove. Of Echo’s 
punishment, Ovid writes, “The event confirmed the threat: when speaking ends, / All she can do 
is double each last word, / And echo back again the voice she’s heard” (62). Out of shame and 
grief for her inability to respond properly to her beloved Narcissus, Echo wastes away until she 
                                                
46 In an essay on the possibilities for video art opened by a feminist reading of the medium and 
its television support, Siona Wilson argues that Echo allows a reorientation away from the 
“primacy of the visual” and opens the closed parenthesis of Narcissus to considerations of sound 
and repetition. For Wilson’s argument and the work of Rosalind Krauss to which she responds, 
see Wilson “Abstract Transmissions” and Krauss “Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism.”  
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only lives as sound without body. For Gayatri Spivak, the doomed nymph opens textual space to 
the work of deconstruction in her inability to properly respond to Narcissus or any interlocutor. 
Echoing Narcissus’ last words, Echo repeats his “Fly from me” not as an interrogative utterance, 
as Narcissus means it, but as an imperative command, thus driving her lover away and opening a 
space of deconstructive différance in the text (“Echo” 24). 
 In the recent discourse around the contested field of “conceptual writing” in American 
poetics, Craig Dworkin and Kenneth Goldsmith have proposed Echo as standing in for the anti-
expressive writer in their anthology of conceptual writing, Against Expression. As Dworkin 
writes in his introduction of the ill-fated nymph as emblematic of the concerns of conceptual 
writing, Echo is “loquacious, patient, rule bound, recontextualizing language in a mode of strict 
citation. Ostensibly a passive victim of the wrath of Juno, Echo in fact becomes a model of 
Oulipian ingenuity” (xlvii). The connection that Dworkin makes between Echo and a literary 
movement, such as Oulipo is useful, as is his emphasis on the role of citation in Echo’s story.47 
Though it is not my claim that either Weiner or Cahun should be thought of as conceptual 
writers, Cahun, in her role as forerunner to Cindy Sherman, whose own work emerged in the 
generation after conceptualism in the visual art world, investigates codes of gender and 
                                                
47 In the field of contemporary American poetry, the category of conceptual writing is an 
embattled one. For the first major theoretical treatise in favor of the category, see Place and 
Fitterman Notes on Conceptualism. Hannah Weiner’s work is included in an anthology of 
conceptual writing by women, see Bergvall et. al. I’ll Drown My Book: Conceptual Writing by 
Women. For a critique of conceptual writing’s terms, see Calvin Bedient “Against 
Conceptualism.” For another critique, that implicates non-expressive conceptual writing and 
lyric expressivity in one another’s structures, see Sina Queyras “Lyric Conceptualism, A 
Manifesto in Progress.”  
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autobiography in ways that place her in the constellation of influences of some contemporary 
practitioners of the kind of writing Dworkin and Goldsmith advocate.48  
 Cahun and Weiner both turn to the figure of Echo, if in ways specific to their different 
styles, in creating texts from systems of code and citation. In the vignettes and monologues that 
comprise Héroïnes, published partially and serially in 1925 and only collected together 
posthumously, Cahun presents retellings of the stories of legendary women. In citing several of 
Ovid’s heroines from his Heroides, Cahun reclaims the women’s voices, giving perspectives 
subversive to the sexual politics of the myths that inspired her. The figure of Echo emerges 
through Cahun’s concurrent staging of the mime, as actor or ventriloquist, of these characters in 
texts influenced by her own work on stage in the late 1920s and early 1930s.  
Weiner’s text, the Code Poems, departs from the dramatic genre that Cahun explores; 
these poems are in dialogue, instead, with the world of 1960s performance art in New York City. 
While still interested in the performance of “citational” voices, Weiner composes poems that are 
both scripts for and records of actual performances. Dispensing with the illusionistic character 
effects of the dramatic monologue form, Weiner reduces her texts to an anti-expressive mode of 
maritime signals, a system of codes transmitted by colored flags and flashing lights by ships at 
sea. The poems were performed in 1968 in Central Park with semaphore and light codes operated 
by participating National Guardsmen.  
 The anti-expressivity that Dworkin and Goldsmith diagnose in the figure of Echo evokes 
                                                
48 The curators and editors of Inverted Odysseys are, perhaps, the first to articulate most 
exhaustively the striking similarities amongst Cahun, Sherman, and Maya Deren’s oeuvres. 
Goldsmith includes Sherman in his own brief history of conceptual writing in his preface to 
Against Expression. See Rice and Goldsmith, respectively. 
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the notion of the “death” of the subject after post-structuralist theory.49 Hal Foster, in one of the 
strongest expressions of this figuration of the subject’s demise as pertains to emotion and the 
expression of subjective experience by the artist, writes of the “expressive fallacy,” or the false 
belief in an expressivity that corresponds to the self-presence of an artistic subject (i.e. an artist) 
as opposed to the rhetorical devices (social, conventional) that give the effect of such 
expressivity.50 Foster’s analysis of “expression” as a rhetorical strategy might give credence to 
the argument that Rei Terada counters in her crucial study, Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the 
“Death” of the Subject, namely, that an attack on expression in poststructuralism is an attack on 
emotion in postructuralist thought. However, as Terada shows in her crucial study, 
poststructuralist theory does not exclude emotion but simply reveals the ways in which 
traditional conceptions of expressivity naturalize emotion in what she calls the “expressive 
hypothesis,” echoing Foucault’s repressive hypothesis of sexuality.51 As she writes, “The claim 
that emotion requires a subject—thus we can see we’re subjects, since we have emotions—
creates the illusion of subjectivity rather than showing evidence of it [….] To object to the 
expressive hypothesis or any other mechanism of the ideology of emotion is not to discredit 
                                                
49 Registering in this “death” is, too, the “death” of the Author, noted by both Barthes and 
Foucault in their well-known essays, respectively, “La Mort de l’Auteur” and “Qu’est-ce qu’un 
auteur?”  
 
50 See Foster “The Expressive Fallacy.” For more on the relationship between the subject and the 
photograph in the context of Cindy Sherman, often considered Cahun’s inheritor, see Douglas 
Crimp “The Photographic Activity of Postmodernism.”  
 
51 If Terada is also thinking of Foster’s “expressive fallacy” in formulating her turn of phrase she 
does not make the connection explicit. See Terada 11. 
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emotion, but to extricate it from expedient mythologies” (11).52 Opening Foster’s line of 
questioning beyond “expression” to emotion itself, Terada seeks to account for how emotion, or 
affect, can survive the subject’s “death.” In the textual spaces of Cahun’s Héroïnes and Weiner’s 
Code Poems, I ask the same question and point to the particular challenges it poses, as well as 
the opportunities it offers, to Cahun and Weiner’s poetics of collaboration. 
In this chapter, I follow this line of questioning opened by Terada and taken up by Sianne 
Ngai in her work on affect in Ugly Feelings, as well as by Brian Massumi in Parables for the 
Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. To repeat one possible definition of emotion given by 
Terada and subsequently cited by Ngai, emotion is “an interpretation of a predicament” (57). 
This definition opposes the work of interpretation to that of expression, and I gravitate toward 
this attempt to define the shifting bounds of “emotion” or “affect” for its use of both the terms 
“interpretation” and “predicament.” We register affect, then, through a work of interpretation, a 
textual activity that will rely on Echo’s difference, or deconstructive différance, for its effects. 
And, this interpretation happens in the context of a “predicament.” This last term does not have 
to imply the collision of human persons in social space, and indeed often will not imply such a 
context, but I can sum up the mode of collaboration I pursue across these chapters as just that – a 
predicament, in which the affective work of collaboration unites and separates participants. 
Whereas Ngai seeks to expand the available aesthetic categories to previously unstudied “ugly” 
affects, I seek here the affective predicament of collaboration, bound up as I find it to be with 
some of those “ugly feelings.” Like Echo, in love but unable to respond properly to her beloved, 
                                                
52 Terada’s reference to “expedient mythologies” points the reader to Derrida’s “White 
Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy” in which he argues that metaphor represents a 
rhetorical instance of metaphysical presence. See Derrida “White Mythology.”  
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the collaborators that I propose for Cahun and Weiner – in fact, the collaboration I propose 
between their works – leaves one dissatisfied with response, or with the tone of response.   
 I begin, thus, with Ngai’s discussion of tone not as “‘a known way of speaking’ or a 
dramatic style of address,” though this focused notion of tone in the context of literary criticism 
does usefully draw out the ironies of Cahun and Weiner’s texts, but rather as what allows a critic 
to describe a work as somber, or joyous, or agitated (Ngai 28). When Bernstein states that he 
reads an “ominous tone” in WEEKS, he does not attribute that tone to an expressive, lyric quality 
or trait in the text. Rather, he assigns this affect to the effects of parataxis, a rhetorical device that 
in Weiner’s text highlights the incongruity of, or difference between, sentences or phrasal units 
in their grammatical spacing. Ngai, Massumi, Terada, and Spivak all point to the importance of 
difference – and, for Terada and Spivak, explicitly deconstructive difference, or différance – to 
the creation and circulation of affect. For Massumi, the gestures of a mime’s performance open a 
virtual space of possibility for new citational gestures that might follow each movement.53 For 
Ngai, a temporal difference, or belatedness, animates an affective state of anxiety that she links 
to feminist theory and politics. In Cahun and Weiner’s works discussed below, différance and 
belatedness will both come to bear on the work of responding to their messages.  
 
 One of Weiner’s Code Poems restages the originary moment of Echo’s grammar that 
Spivak draws out in her reading of the “Fly from me” scene. In the poem, “LWC   FOLLOW 
ME,” Weiner sets into code a conversation between two voices that repeats in cycles once the 
semantic possibilities for the verb “to follow” in the interrogatives of the maritime code system 
                                                
53 Rosalind Krauss invokes Derrida’s notion of “spacing” to discuss the primacy of 
photomontage in Surrealist uses of the photograph. Cahun’s emphasis on photomontage in the 
Aveux non avenus opens the possibility of a photographic intertext between that text and 
Héroïnes which I discuss in this chapter. See Krauss “Photographic Conditions” 18-28.  
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have been exhausted. The poem repeats this cycle six full times, with a “couplet” left hanging at 
the end. One cycle reads: 
  LWC Follow me 
  LWF  Will you lead? 
  LWG Will you follow? 
  LWJ  Shall I follow? 
  LWK I will follow 
 
As the cycle continues, the next instance of the “LWC” for “Follow me” arrives from the 
participant indicated by the rejoinders flush right on the page. Like Echo, who repeats the 
question “Fly from me?” in the imperative mode, the poem volleys between imperative and 
interrogative. Though the verbs used by Ovid (fly) and Weiner (follow) differ (and even seem to 
cancel each other out), the repetition of the verb “to follow” through various grammatical 
positions and moods in the sequence gives some of the uncertainty in Echo’s subject position 
that Spivak points out to both of these interlocutors.  
As Spivak describes her, “Echo in Ovid is staged as the instrument of the possibility of a 
truth not dependent upon intention, a reward uncoupled from, indeed set free from, the recipient” 
(“Echo” 24).54 Earlier in the essay, Spivak refers to this truth as “an occasional truth of a kind” 
(“Echo” 20, emphasis mine). What the adjective “occasional” gives to Spivak’s description of 
Echo is a nuance captured by the situational context of an utterance, a context that includes the 
relational ties confirmed and denied between speaker and recipient of this truth. For, in Spivak’s 
reading, Echo represents the possibility for self-difference: in repeating Narcissus’ phrase, “Fly 
from me,” with a grammatical difference, Echo both maintains the difference between question 
and response – and questioner (Narcissus) and respondent (Echo) – and defers the question as 
she is unable to truly answer as a proper respondent (in echoing Narcissus, she cannot respond to 
                                                
54 Elsewhere in this article, Spivak, miming the speech of vengeful Juno, calls Echo a “talkative 
girl” and the “respondent as such.” See Spivak “Echo” 23. 
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the intention of his question) (“Echo” 26). Spivak concludes, “A difference and a deferment 
together are, strictly speaking – but can one be strict about this? – différance” (“Echo” 26). 
Weiner’s Code Poems open themselves to this deconstructive reading, as well. The variation in 
meaning based on a change in one letter of the signal codes, or on a reordering of the letters, 
makes transparent the structure of the codes as differential. The “Follow me” poem reverses the 
Ovidian “Fly from me” but maintains the structure of grammatical ambivalence, alternating 
between a confused series of imperative and interrogative utterances, scrambling conventions of 
questioner and respondent as Echo’s position always does. 
The visual layout of the “Follow Me” poem on the page reinforces the notion of 
instability in a speaking subject as the lines bounce from right to left, an innovation that also 
imitates how these poems would have been performed, spectators looking from one performer to 
the next for each response. This “call and response” or event score format also gives the text a 
musical feeling, further troubling the relationship between the lyric and the anti-expressive.  
 Composed from set combinations of visual codes, these poems indeed resist expressivity. 
The “Follow Me” poem remains empty of semantic content beyond the manipulation of the code 
itself. In other poems, Weiner pushes experimentation with repetition and the grammar of the 
codes further. In “EDQ   ANY CHANCE OF WAR?” the poem cycles through an inevitability 
of response to a series of questions. As in the story of Echo, in which call and response 
reproduce one another in a loop, each answer in this poem only leads to another question. The 
poem ends with the exchange: 
  KOM How many dead? 
  KON Who is dead? 
  KOU     Dearer, dearest 
  KOV     Too Dear 
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Though the responses of “Dearer, dearest” and “Too dear” seem to signify an end that registers 
the affective state of whoever survives these dead, Weiner’s transcription of the code “KOU” 
and its variable meaning (“dearer” or “dearest”) reinforces the tone of removed objectivity 
inherent to the code system. Yet, at the same time, the repetition of “dear” insinuates a 
movement of feeling through the disembodied voice of the poem. Feeling in these poems is at 
once radically excised from the text in favor of the objective language of the semaphore codes 
and still included in it.  
In other poems, Weiner layers narrative into the text of the poem, usually in the service of 
foregrounding an ironic distance in the use of codes to write poems. These poems include 
exchanges about pirates and light. In one of these two poems, “CHW   Pirates,” the crews of two 
ships seem to speak back and forth, one reporting its attack by a pirate vessel. In turning the 
poem toward the humorous, however, Weiner has one voice describe the pirate with the pronoun 
“she,” conventional for the appellation of sailing vessels, completing the synecdoche in which 
the sailor speaks for, or in the voice of, the entire ship. When the rescuing ship asks how the 
pirate is armed, the foundering party responds, “She has long guns.” The tension between the 
feminine pronoun of the ship and the masculine, phallic imagery of long guns seems out of place 
in the non-maritime context of Weiner’s performances. The exchange turns almost cartoonish as 
the spectator or reader of this conversation appreciates the ironic posturing inherent in the 
gendered double-speak of these codes. To its rescuer, the foundering ship admits to having been 
stripped of its munitions and exclaims, as a Mallarméan ship might, “I am a complete wreck.” If 
the codes, by design, admit no emotion into the act of communication, here, Weiner’s punch line 
introduces emotion back into the code system. “I am a complete wreck,” reads, thus, as a 
 88 
description of the plundered ship but also as a description of the psychological state of the 
injured sailor after the pirate’s attack.  
 The second poem, “QRD   Light,” creates a lulling sonic texture out of the semaphore 
codes by selecting codes resulting in a monosyllabic rhyme scheme based on the title (i.e. light, 
tonight, sight). The lines recall Barbara Guest’s later use of rhyme in the more painterly poem, 
“Wild Gardens Overlooked by Night Lights” (from the 1989 collection Fair Realism), or the 
maritime atmospherics of Mallarmé’s “Salut” and “Un Coup de dés” (1897). While Guest’s 
poem represents the very poetic influences Weiner was fleeing in writing the Code Poems, 
having failed, she felt, at writing New York School-style poems, Mallarmé’s use of chance and 
typography in “Un Coup de dés” seems a suitable ancestor to Weiner’s experiments. Weiner’s 
rejection, in frustration, of a New York School poetics after her short book The Matisse Poems 
finds its expression in her turn to Fluxus and performance art-influenced modes of writing. Thus, 
Weiner’s “Light” poem recalls the work of her friend Jackson Mac Low and his use of chance 
and procedure to compose his own Light Poems between 1964 and 1988. 
Weiner’s strategy for a procedural poetics in this poem brings the reader who encounters 
it on the page back to the fact of its performance. In “Mostly about the Sentence,” Weiner writes, 
“Before the Code poems please I was just short page an ordinary writer no instructions and one 
book was published. The Code Poems were performance pieces using two figures and flags and 
were found material […]” (122). In the composition and staging of the Code Poems, Weiner 
privileges the facts of performance and found materials, implying that these practices made her 
more than just an “ordinary” writer, leading, in fact, to the Fluxus-inspired instructional mode 
that informs her subsequent poetic and art practice. The “Light” poem seems to refer, then, to the 
performance of its script with light work contributed by participating members of the Coast 
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Guard, as explained by Weiner in Code Poems. In the poem, light registers as signifier for its 
poetic, sonic texture but more importantly for Weiner’s experimentation; it implies a kind of 
writing, a literal photo-graphy, but also – by the metonymic conditions of Weiner’s 
performances – the movements of the semaphore flag system, a gestural writing with the body.  
The fact of the performance of these poems further intensifies the juxtaposition of 
expression and an inexpression. In the text of the Code Poems, Weiner includes two illustrations: 
a chart depicting the stances the body should take for each letter of the alphabet and a 
compilation of the flag patterns (Figs. 2.2 and 2.3). These illustrations remind the reader, as does 
Weiner in “Mostly about the Sentence,” that these poems are performance scripts. The 
semaphore flag system requires pronounced gestural movement by the body to pass along a 
message. Arms must move widely to change the position of the patterned flags that form the 
maritime code system. And yet, the message remains within the bounds of the code – like all 
language, Weiner might argue, but particularly constrained in the case of the semaphore 
alphabet. Rather than corresponding to either the cold language of a code or the more expressive 
modes of narrative and lyric, the Code Poems work affectively on their readers and spectators 
through the physical gesture.  
As Massumi argues, punctuated movement, or “jerks,” marks affective power, and makes 
it transmissible and legible.55 Massumi derives his theory of the “jerk” from what he observes in 
the technique of the mime. In Massumi’s example, Ronald Reagan is a political mime who 
perfected the politicization of the mime’s power, and as I discuss later in this chapter, the figure 
                                                
55 Massumi’s terminology, here, relies on the pun of “jerk,” as one of his examples comes from 
Ronald Reagan’s rhetorical style. Though fascinated by Reagan’s affective presence, Massumi 




of the mime as actor resonates especially with Cahun. Massumi bases this theory not on the 
smooth performance that a mime might present to an audience, but on the work of citation and 
imitation that goes into that performance, or how the mime “decomposes” movement into a 
series of constituent “jerks.” Massumi writes, “At each jerk, at each cut into the movement, the 
potential is there for the movement to veer off in another direction, to become a different 
movement” (40). As in the Code Poems, the message of each line, or each riposte, depends upon 
the movement and flag work that comes next to form a combination of three “letters.” Massumi, 
like Bernstein in his WEEKS introduction, privileges the affective potentiality of parataxis for 
readers and spectators. Poems such as “ANY CHANCE OF WAR” foreground this 
recombinatory potential as call and response and form a list of codes distinct only for the 
difference of one letter (i.e. KOM, KON, KOU, and KOV, in the passage cited above). The 
recombinatory possibilities open what Massumi calls a “flash of virtuality” within the 
performance of the poems (41). As Carrie Noland has also argued of physical gesture, “[…] by 
retrieving gestures from the past, or by borrowing gestures from another culture, subjects can 
actually produce new innervations, discover new sensations to feel” (Migrations x). In 
Massumi’s description, Reagan appealed to the United States public through these affective 
means. Weiner’s poems and their performances appeal to the reader and her audiences in the 
same way. 
Weiner’s longest poem in Code Poems retells Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, profiting 
from the coincidence of those two characters’ names and the names of their respective first 
letters in NATO’s military phonetic alphabet.56 The familiar tragedy unfolds in Weiner’s 
performance poem in a vocabulary at once awkwardly formal and dependent on argot, to 
                                                
56 Mercutio in Weiner’s semaphore retelling becomes “Mike,” per the military alphabet, as well.  
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comedic effect, as in the pirate poem. As with the poems described above, Weiner includes the 
entire text of each code’s possible meanings, so that Romeo expresses his pleasure upon learning 
of the party to be thrown by Juliet’s parents with the stilted reply, “Happy to hear it or that.” 
Later in the poem, ready to consummate their relationship, Romeo and Juliet, or R and J as they 
might appear in a performance of these poems, trade a series of double entendres composed of 
the sexual double speak made available by the maritime codes: “to come,” “cock,” “double 
bottom,” “enter stern first,” “screw well.” Weiner’s poem is, then, a bawdy adaptation worthy of 
Shakespeare’s own penchant for these types of puns but is also representative of her particular 
interest in the semiotics of the maritime code system when submitted to her own poetics of 
chance and procedure.  
In the poem, Weiner takes advantage of the felicitous coincidence of the phonetic 
alphabet’s names for R and J to explore the theme of the proper name in Shakespeare’s play. If 
the protagonists of that play suffer from the responsibilities pushed onto them by the familial 
signifiers Capulet and Montague, the Romeo and Juliet of Weiner’s poem have a responsibility 
only to their place in the sign-system of the semaphore codes. As the characters introduce 
themselves, the codes employed by Weiner differ slightly. The flag combinations for “What is 
her name,” “My name is,” and “What is your name?” read as follows: SDQ, SDL, SDT. Each 
differs by degree, with a change in one position marking the transformation (Q, L, and T). 
Interestingly, this exchange concludes with Romeo telling his name to Juliet. Whereas Juliet’s 
introduction reads SDL J, Romeo’s reads SLD R in the text. Whether or not this difference is 
attributable to the gender difference between the two speakers, the order of the signals in these 
two codes with the same meaning exhibits not just a difference but a displacement of the code’s 
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grammar, recalling the deconstructive difference and displacement invoked by Spivak in 
describing Echo’s position in the myth.  
The ironic distance established in these poems by the conditions of their performance as 
well as by the sign system upon which depends their translation on the page might seem to 
foreclose the possibility of emotional effect on the reader-viewer. But, as in Massumi’s 
commentary on Reagan’s political style, an affective work remains to move and draw in the 
reader-viewer. If meaning in these poems depends upon the physical gestures of a body intended 
to perform them with signal flags, the virtual body opened by recombinatory possibility exists 
without a physical body, like Echo repeating a series of overheard enunciations.57 The repetition, 
or citation, of rhetorical and poetical modes of lyric and narrative contributes to this virtuality, as 
a surface layer legible to the reader-viewer but also subverted by Weiner’s exploration of the 
structure of these codes as resistant to those same modes. As with Reagan’s seductive political 
voice and gestures, the patina of traditional poetic modes draws the reader in only to present him 
or her with the informatics of the code. In Weiner’s texts, the affective response is comedic but 
also one of being distanced from the text as its reader – a comedic tone that distances by its 
irony. As Ngai argues, the inspiration of an affect in a reader or viewer can draw the reader-
viewer into aesthetic contemplation by marking the inspiring object as an object for concern, for 
feeling (85). The act of contemplation for Weiner’s audiences (readers and viewers) implies a 
self-conscious mode of reading, as reader-viewers receive the coded messages and (at least in the 
performances) react to the signals without captions or scripts. Affect works in the Code Poems, 
                                                
57 The gestural fragmenting of the body into a virtual form recalls Linda Nochlin’s thesis in The 
Body in Pieces: The Fragment as a Metaphor of Modernity. For Nochlin’s discussion of several 
artists relevant to this study, see her concluding remarks in Nochlin 53-56. 
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then, not only as tone but as a structural feature of the “text” that moves the audience member to 
attempt to read the signals from the paratactic spaces opened between the syntactic units. 
 
Cahun seems to presage – or, in a temporal inversion, even respond to – the geometrical 
gestures of Weiner’s body with a series of portraits circa 1928 in which she poses her body with 
attention to its geometrical arrangement (Fig. 2.4). In the portraits, taken from above, Cahun 
wears a light colored swim cap and tank top and a pair of high-waisted shorts, one half of them 
black, the other half matching the light color of her shirt and cap. Cahun poses on her back on 
top of a white backdrop spread across the ground; she angles her arms, elbows, legs, and knees at 
different degrees away from her body in each of the images. In two of the portraits, she lies flat 
against the white ground. In a third, she lifts herself up with her arms spread out behind her back, 
her face upturned to the camera. As with Weiner’s flag signals, Cahun seems to project a 
message to her viewer, coded in her bodily signals. 
Though I know Cahun cannot answer Weiner, nor can Weiner look over her shoulder to 
respond to Cahun, for me, they seem to send their geometric signals to each other – contorting 
their bodies into a new language of gesture to reach each other across time and space. Derrida 
calls this kind of communication teleiopoesis in Politiques de l’amitié.58 Or, rather, such a 
“poetics at or from a distance” makes possible my strange reception and triangulation of these 
signals from Cahun and Weiner, seemingly aleatory and based on my own idiosyncratic habits as 
a reader but also buttressed by the certainty of the teleiopoetic call once it finds its recipient. For 
Derrida, this call is a citation attributed to Montaigne that reaches him in the voice of Nietzsche, 
“O mes amis, il n’y a nul ami.” Imagine Derrida’s wonder when he realized Montaigne never 
                                                
58 Gaston Bachelard theorizes a not unrelated concept of télépoésie in his Les Airs et les songes. 
Essai sur l’imagination du mouvement. Paris: Editions José Corti, 1943. 
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wrote those words, how much more precious they became for the force of their poetry, for their 
status as citation, or copy, without an original. Now, to return to Cahun’s portraits. 
As Emily Apter argues, geometric patterning in Cahun’s work serves a unisex style that 
reimagines femininity in covering the body in abstract, gender-neutral patterns (142). Apter 
relates this use of geometry to camouflage and mimicry, placing it in the context of World War I 
practices of disorientating camouflage. Apter details the “weaponized visual effects” of dazzle-
painting that made use of innovations in modern art (Cubism, Futurism) to paint the surfaces of 
ships in a pattern of broken lines and contours that would confuse enemy vessels as to the size, 
speed, and location of an oncoming, dazzle-painted ship (141).59 What dazzle-painting 
accomplishes in military camouflage, Echo achieves in the disruptions of grammar 
communicated by her repetitions. Echo’s “Follow me” wavers between interrogative and 
imperative and so fractures grammar to reveal nothing of herself as speaking subject. Does Echo 
recede away from her interlocutor or draw him or her closer? In these portraits, Cahun draws the 
viewer in through a message directed at the viewer through her pose but also maintains a 
distance between her viewer and her posing self by offering no gloss of the encoded meaning.60 
While Weiner draws out to comedic effect the subtle gendering of the semaphore 
alphabet in a poem such as “Romeo and Juliet,” Cahun manipulates visual and literary codes 
associated with the feminine and female characters in Héroïnes, as well as in an earlier work of 
                                                
59 However, Cahun also appreciated the art of mimicry and camouflage in her style choices. 
Cahun puts this interest in a camouflage of simple, practical style to work in her artistic and 
political engagements during the Nazi Occupation of Jersey, as I discuss in chapter 3. See Apter 
142 and Cahun Écrits 443-44. 
 
60 This effect is similar to that of Weiner’s “clairvoyant” portrait on the cover of the Clairvoyant 
Journal. Weiner invites the viewer to look at her with the attention-seeking slogan “I see words” 
written across her forehead but also refuses the gaze with the same gesture, as if hiding behind 
the slogan or deflecting attention away from her body to the immaterial words. See Fig. 1.2. 
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fashion journalism. In “L’étymologie des modes,” a 1914 article published in Le Phare de la 
Loire, Cahun expresses a preference for a no-frills style inspired by British dress. (Notably, the 
article appeared in Le Phare de la Loire accompanied by fashion sketches by Moore.) Cahun 
concludes the article with a tongue in cheek criticism of some foreign and French attitudes 
toward fashion: “Prenez garde [….] Avant de vous laquer les dents et de vous tondre les sourcils, 
songez qu’il est des idiotismes intraduisibles en français” (444). Cahun does not, in this passage, 
assert foreign style of dress as untranslatable to a French style but instead leaves her metaphor of 
untranslatability squarely in the realm of language: foreign styles of dress represent sartorial 
idiomatic expressions that do not translate into the French language.  
Cahun’s metaphor of translation and a national style-language recalls Barthes’ later 
theorizing of the semiotics of fashion in his 1967 Système de la mode. In these “signal” portraits, 
Cahun offers her body, specifically captured in the photograph, as what Barthes terms a “shifter” 
in his text. For Barthes, a structural analysis of the system of fashion reveals three types of 
clothing: the iconic garment of the fashion image; the written garment in the caption or textual 
description in a fashion publication; and the real garment itself as a product of the material 
conditions of its making, or what Barthes calls the technologic garment (13-14). A shifter allows 
the movement from one type of garment to another, or as Barthes puts it, “d’un code à un autre 
code” (16). In his description, these “shifters” include the designer’s sketch, the instructions for 
the couturier, and syntactic devices that relate an image to its written description (as in the 
relationship between Moore’s illustration and Cahun’s text).  
In Cahun’s signal portraits, the codes of the iconic and written garment both seem to 
operate in the poses captured in the photograph. Cahun emphasizes her sartorial choices in the 
poses of the photograph as the garments she wears physically shift with her movements. In one 
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image, the colors of the shorts she wears are bisected down the front, in another, the shorts have 
twisted to appear monochromatic, the light colored fabric now hidden and covering Cahun’s 
backside. Divested of the kind of textual support (the caption) so important to Barthes’ theory of 
the garment (and the photograph), Cahun’s poses in these images recall Weiner’s use of the flags 
in her performances, for which there would have been no “caption” in the form of the poem 
scripts later published in Code Poems at the time of their performance.61 Cahun’s posed body in 
her portraits, when considered in this context, becomes its own form of writing based in a system 
of signals and codes. Barthes’ notion of the “shifter” can be found at work in the relationship 
between Weiner’s performances and poems, as well. In the performance of the poems, the 
gestures of the performers with flags and flashing lights shifts the abstract codes of the signals 
into a language of physical gesture. Weiner’s description and the letter combinations of the 
poem-scripts in the book edition then shift these gestures into conventional writing in the poems. 
Like Weiner’s performed signals, Cahun’s “written” photographic messages address a viewer, 
emphasized in the photographs by her upturned face in one of the images directed toward the 
photographer and the viewer of the image.  
Cahun’s collection Héroïnes can be considered a paratactic grouping of short narratives. 
Conspicuously, Cahun leaves Echo out of this collection of legendary women, perhaps a 
consequence of Cahun’s idiosyncratic selection of women but a choice notable, too, for her 
                                                
61 The Code Poems were not published in a book edition until 1982, after the success of Weiner’s 
later writing in the Clairvoyant Journal and other “clair-style” works. No documentation exists 
to attest to performance scripts circulating during the performances of Weiner’s Code Poems in 
the 1960s, though she did produce scripts in various formats – postcards with morse code and 
other signal systems, longs strips of paper printed with colorful signal flags – that would have 
circulated to promote gallery exhibits or as part of street interventions. This ephemera is 
available in the archive of her papers in the Mandeville Special Collections at UC-San Diego. 
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knowledge of classical mythology.62 The literary ventriloquism of the Héroïnes engages with 
themes of speaking, listening, acting, repeating, and creating. In “La Sadique Judith,” Cahun 
writes in Judith’s voice during her speech to her people after decapitating Holofernes. Cahun 
dedicates “Hélène la Rebelle” to “l’Acteur,” and “Sapho l’Incomprise,” aligns the poet of 
Lesbos’ power with that of the Sirens, asking where one might draw the line between creation 
and destruction. Thus, despite Echo’s absence from the collection, she is necessarily diffused 
throughout the texts that comprise the collection. Indeed, Echo’s absence from the scene of 
Héroïnes suggests her power as Cahun’s muse for these short texts. However, if Echo is the 
unspoken and unspeaking muse, she gives nuance to the figure of the muse as Jennifer Shaw 
describes the role in her study of Cahun’s Aveux non avenus. Whereas in a traditional creative 
partnership the muse must remain silent to allow the artist to master his or her own desire, Shaw 
asserts that Cahun’s reversal of such patriarchal and heterosexist paradigms in the Aveux 
proposes a muse who speaks for herself and her own desires (31).63. While that reading holds for 
the Aveux, the figure of Echo, as I argue exemplified by the texts collected in Héroïnes, 
problematizes Shaw’s reading by suggesting that even in her inability to speak for herself Echo 
still offers a new model for the muse as artist. In addition to an inability, then, Echo comes to 
represent, too, a refusal or non-vouloir to speak in Héroïnes, as will be most evident in the 
chapter devoted to Sappho. This model of the muse as Echo relies on the very notion of the 
textuality of the subject and its affects put forth by Ngai and Terada. 
                                                
62 Leperlier attests to Cahun’s knowledge of mythology in discussing the divergence of Cahun’s 
aesthetic in these texts from her Symbolist precedents, especially the Moralités légendaires by 
Jules Laforgue, see Leperlier 49. 
 
63 Gayle Zachmann argues that “Woman as muse figures for and as Claude Cahun; she is 
vehicle, object, and subject of an exploration of the sites and limits of symbolic construction – 
visual, verbal and social.” See Zachmann “Surreal and Canny Selves” 394. 
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The first text in the series, “Ève la Trop Crédule,” actually sets the scene for two voices, 
that of Eve as well as that of the serpent. Eve speaks, comically, as a contemporary wife, 
concerned with what to buy in order to please her husband and mildly contemptuous of God, 
whom she calls “père” and describes as grumpy (“grognon”). The serpent’s voice comes out in 
the text through the use of language appropriated from English-language advertisements, and, 
though his voice is not set in quotation marks and so could be read simply as found material, Eve 
does debate with him over how many apples to buy. If not quite engaging with the kind of “non-
expressive” codes Weiner deploys in her poems, this appropriative collage aesthetic does 
establish Cahun’s interest in constructing a palimpsest of contemporary scripts of domestic 
commerce and ancient legend, negotiating a thin line between retelling (repetition) and 
reinterpretation.  
The motif of debate and discussion becomes more important in two of the monologues 
that follow, those of Sappho and Judith. In these two installments in the series Cahun draws out a 
tension between speaking and being heard, similar to Echo’s distress upon discovering she can 
only repeat and so must always be misunderstood in the utterance of “Fly from me.” In “La 
Sadique Judith,” sadism drives Judith to kill Holofernes, but not out of a sense of loyalty to her 
own people. Judith charges Holophernes’s ears with special erotic meaning, and later, in the act 
of killing the man she desires, Judith reminds herself, “Prends bien garde à cette bouche, à cette 
nuque, à ces oreilles […]” (132). In this passage that recalls Georges Bataille’s writing on 
mouths and ears,64 the mouth is dangerous for its ability to bite and to suck, aggressive, 
                                                
64 In the short text “Mouth” (originally published in Documents 5 [1930]), Bataille describes that 
orifice as the animal’s “prow,” or proue, just as Cahun’s narrator in the Aveux strives to live 
always at the “proue de moi-même.” In civilized men, Bataille writes, “the violent meaning of 
the mouth is preserved in a latent state.” See Bataille 59.  
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defensive actions but also erotic ones. Ears, we are left to imagine, are dangerous for their erotic 
beauty for Judith, but when she finishes her speech, lamenting the murder by her own hand of 
the man she desired, her people do not hear her complaint. Ears are dangerous, too, as in the 
expression “deaf ears.” Judith’s “frères” only praise her, even as she damns her affiliation with 
them in her curse, “Patrie, prison de l’âme” (132).65  
In “Sapho l’Incomprise,” Cahun juxtaposes creative and destructive acts. Assuming the 
position of the artist at the beginning of the monologue, Sappho reveals the irony that despite the 
pleasure she finds in creating, she is sterile and cannot have children. Instead, she adopts her 
daughter Cléis, preparing an eventual scene of jealous desire when she falls in love with Phaon, 
who does not understand the affection shared between adoptive mother and daughter and so 
deserts Sappho. As with Judith, Cahun situates Sappho in the context of her “peuple,” a beloved 
poet who enjoys the acclaim of her countrymen and women. Humiliated after Phaon’s desertion, 
Sappho considers suicide, but in Cahun’s version of the story instead engages in a complicated 
subterfuge, placing a “poupée de son” at the top of a high cliff in her place. At the correct 
moment, Sappho safely hidden on a boat at the bottom of the cliff, Cléis pushes the mannequin 
to the rocks and sea below. Witnesses, including Atthis, who Sappho reports has “de bonnes 
oreilles,” believe they have heard Sappho’s cry and so that she has truly jumped to her death.  
                                                
65 Here, the motif of a failure to be heard or understood, which I associate with Echo above, 
takes on elements of another legendary woman missing from the Héroïnes but important to 
Cahun’s pose as tragically clairvoyant in later post-WWII writing: Cassandra, whose warnings 
also fell on the deaf ears of her countrymen and women. In Cahun’s memoir Confidences au 
miroir, written in the wake of her imprisonment by the Nazis and in which she compares herself 
to Cassandra, Cahun evokes again the image of the ear and even Echo herself. In a passage in 
which she seems to address both Moore and herself, Cahun concludes, “Absurde: celle que 
j’interroge muée en nymphe Echo.” Does she interrogate herself or Moore? Who is her desired 
respondent? See Cahun “Confidences” 591. 
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At the heart of these retellings, Cahun establishes a split between body and voice. In 
“Sapho,” the voice is disembodied and assigned to a double, not dissimilar to Helen’s eidolon 
that supposedly gave cover to her refuge in Egypt while the Trojan War raged.66 As in the myth 
of Narcissus and Echo, ears deceive, or refuse to hear the nuances of speech. Atthis believes that 
the sound of Sappho’s voice can be localized in the “body” she saw fall from the cliff, and so she 
can attest, albeit mistakenly, to Sappho’s presence in the suicide scene. If Weiner’s performed 
gestures open a virtual space in relationship to the performing body and the performed meaning, 
following Massumi’s theory of the mime, the mannequin, here, represents that same virtuality, 
connected but not wed to the real body of Sappho in the ventriloquism of her voice performed by 
the mannequin, or “poupée de son.” Judith finds that her people do not hear her lament, 
preferring to celebrate the death of Holofernes, and Cahun’s version of the legend even suggests 
the split in Judith’s own experience of events in her inability to reconcile her desire for 
Holofernes with her desire to kill him, a conflict symbolized by her attraction to and repulsion 
for his ear.67  
Leperlier calls these monologues an “autoportrait polymorphe” of Cahun and privileges 
Cahun’s technique of “détournement” of the autobiographical that these texts reveal (L’écart 54-
5). And, while Cahun does experiment with the possibilities of self-portraiture in these texts, she 
also investigates the position of the mime, or actor, repeating lines like Echo who repeats the 
                                                
66 Euripides’ play Helen is one of the sources for this version of Helen’s story. This branch of the 
Trojan legend serves as the basis, too, for H.D’s Helen in Egypt (1952-54, published 1961). 
 
67 Meret Oppenheim, whose work I discuss in chapter four, turned a fascination for Giacometti’s 
ear into the 1959 sculpture, Ear of Giacometti. 
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speech she overhears.68 Leperlier reads the Héroïnes as ultimately valorizing the figure of 
Narcissus, crucial to Cahun’s next major work, the Aveux non avenus and as examined in my 
previous chapter. In an analysis of Cahun’s notion of the Androgyne, a figure developed 
throughout several of the monologues in Héroïnes, Leperlier concludes, “Hors norme, hors la loi, 
expérience des limites, l’androgynie n’est pas seulement la résolution d’une différence, elle est 
aussitôt génératrice d’un nouvel écart, d’un nouvel abîme où s’éprouve la cruelle dissonance du 
corps et de l’esprit” (L’écart 60). At first, in this summation, Leperlier seems to evoke the figure 
of Echo, dissociated from her own voice and ultimately from her own body once her physical 
form dissipates in Ovid’s telling. But, valorizing instead the figure of Narcissus, Leperlier 
concludes, “Impuissant à s’assortir un autre être que lui-même, le sujet est condamné à l’amour 
de soi, c’est-à-dire à la réappropriation de son atypie, de sa monstruosité” (L’écart 60). Though 
Leperlier rightly notes that Cahun dedicates the monologue “Salmacis la suffragette” to herself 
(“Pour Claude”) implying a self-portrait, he does not draw attention to the dedication of “Hélène 
la Rebelle” to the Actor (“Pour l’Acteur”). Cahun, then, includes both Narcissus and Echo in the 
text of the Héroïnes. Yet, as a group of dramatic monologues, the form of this series of texts 
emphasizes both the literary genre of the “mime” and the work of the actor who repeats lines and 
gestures on stage.69  
                                                
68 Here, Cahun switches from the epistolary mode of Ovid’s example to the dramatic mode 
according to her own interest in the figure of the Actor, as well as to the influence of Schwob’s 
Mimes that were also composed as dramatic monologues rather than letters.  
 
69 Indeed, Leperlier’s critical biography of Cahun includes in his chapter on the Héroïnes the 
contemporaneous portraits of Cahun as an actor, posing with masks on and off and in character 
from production by Albert-Birot, taken around 1928. Conley makes the connection between 




The visual element of the “dessins typographiques,” created on a typewriter and which 
conclude most of the vignettes, further complicates the generic classification of Héroïnes. While 
the categorization of the “mime” implies both a literary and performance classification for this 
collection of texts, these typographic drawings operate as concrete poems while also implying a 
“photographic intertext,” to borrow Gayle Zachmann’s useful phrase, with Cahun’s portraits in 
this text. Zachmann has interpreted the mise en page of the Aveux’s cover page as no less than a 
concrete poem, mimicking the crosshairs of a camera’s viewfinder (Fig. 2.5) (“Photographic 
Intertext” 305). In “Ève la Trop Crédule,” the typographical drawing resembles the Tree of Life 
(Fig. 2.6). In “Sapho,” the drawing is partially obscured, with typographic symbols not fully 
legible, as if a fragment from the poet herself (Fig. 2.7). In the drawing included at the 
conclusion of “Marguerite, Soeur Incestueuse,” a more elaborate design depicts a military 
parade, including figures gesturing with flags and their bodies (Fig. 2.8).  
The “photographic intertext” at work in Héroïnes differs from that at work in the Aveux 
non avenus. In Zachmann’s analysis of the photographic intertext of the Aveux, she compares the 
verbal montage of the text to the photomontages included therein, finding that the verbal 
montage figures the hybridization that the dissolution of the verbal/visual boundary implies in 
the text (409).70 Johanna Drucker, in her essay “Visual Performance of the Poetic Text,” 
describes the kind of performative work that a poem can achieve through typographic means. 
She writes, “[A] visual performance of a poetic work on a page or canvas, as a projection or 
                                                
70 Zachmann mentions both Narcissus and Echo in this essay. She writes, “Neither Narcissus nor 
Echo, visual nor verbal, mirror nor text, can completely snare that self in a fixed mirror or static 
image.” In my argument, I do not disagree, but do separate the two figures to examine the 
phenomenal intentionality of the relationship between reader-viewer and text in the previous 
chapter (associated with Narcissus) and a non-intentional relationship between text, or work, and 




sculpture, installation or score, also has the qualities of an enactment [….] These visual means 
perform the work as a poem that can’t be translated into any other form” (131). In Héroïnes, 
Cahun privileges the performance mode, likely due to her concurrent participation in Albert-
Birot’s theatre, introducing a photographic intertext premised on the actor’s pose. The intertext 
for Héroïnes comprises, then, the texts of the monologues, the “dessins typographiques,” and the 
self-portraits in character, as Actor (or mime), and in geometric poses and costume. Indeed, like 
Sapho who arranges for her double, a poupée de son, or mechanically-voiced mannequin, to take 
the plunge to “her” death, Cahun posed beside her own mannequin double in a portrait from 
1938 (Fig. 2.9).71 Sapho’s mechanically enabled ventriloquism enacts an echo-effect, distracting 
attention from her body to her disembodied voice and removing the poet from the activity of 
creation. Yet, though Sapho becomes a destroyer at the end of her monologue, Echo neither 
creates nor destroys. Like Cahun’s texts and images, all depending on their individual 
citationality, Echo echoes the speech of others.  
 
Weiner’s Code Poems and Cahun’s Héroïnes both represent texts imbued with the visual, 
combining the textual and the visual in works marked by their “visuality.”72 In Cahun and 
Weiner’s texts, this visuality finds its equivalent expression in performance. Thus, Massumi’s 
notion of the “jerk” expresses not only a physical gesture, a spasm or reconfiguration of the 
body, but a visual arrangement of the body as image, as well, and one that inscribes itself in the 
                                                
71 The “poupée de son” also evokes Hans Bellmer and Unica Zürn’s works and collaborations, 
especially his mutilated dolls. For more on Zürn, see chapter 6.   
 
72 Here, I build off of Hal Foster’s notion of “visuality” in his introduction to Vision and 
Visuality as well as Krauss’s contention that Surrealist photomontage “pictures” (or, figures) 
writing within the work. See Foster, ed. Vision and Visuality ix-xiv and Krauss “Photographic 
Conditions” 19.  
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textual object. In Barthes’ analysis of the discourse of fashion and its codes, shifters indicate a 
kind of movement or gesture, as well, away from one code and toward another one. Unlike 
Barthes’ shifters, Massumi’s jerks carry an affective charge in their recombinatory potentiality, 
or virtuality. Weiner takes advantage of the shifting quality, or recombinatory potential, of the 
maritime semaphore to shift codes literally from one message to the next but also to shift the 
poems between textual and visual registers of reception. In doing so, Weiner transmits an 
affective experience to her audience as the poems alternate between the near-lyricism of a self-
reflexive meditation on light and the distancing ironies of her Romeo and Juliet poem. As in 
Cahun’s literary ventriloquism or miming of her legendary Héroïnes, Weiner mimes her poems, 
as her body, like Cahun’s, becomes caught in the self-difference of her gestural work as “actor.” 
In Weiner’s Code Poems, the work of acting is subsumed to the position of Echo that the 
poems illustrate. In Cahun’s portraits and texts, the absence of Echo or an explicitly non-
expressive mode of writing illustrates Spivak’s claims less immediately. However, in the texts of 
the Héroïnes Cahun returns several times to the split between body and voice crucial to an 
understanding of Ovid’s telling of the myth as well as to Spivak’s reading of it. While removing 
the voice as immediately present to the speaking body as in “Sapho l’Incomprise,” or even in the 
retelling of Judith’s story, Cahun emphasizes the importance of the bodies in her texts as female 
bodies. As Spivak maintains, Echo must be female to be punished with the loss of her own voice 
and to fit the asymmetric equation with Tiresias’ reward of clairvoyance in Ovid’s telling 
(‘Echo” 26). Weiner and Cahun both draw out the gendering of Echo’s position – Cahun by 
miming the voices of legendary women and Weiner in such playful manipulations of the 
ostensibly “neutral” or “neuter” maritime signals in “Romeo and Juliet.”  
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This gendering, though, does not abandon Echo to her voicelessness. Rather, Spivak 
restores Echo’s power precisely by arguing for her deconstructive power. Spivak writes, 
“Guarding this difference is Echo’s punishment turned into reward, a deconstructive lever for 
future users” (“Echo” 26, emphasis mine). Spivak, thus, suggests that Echo’s different and 
deferred position within the myth of Narcissus gives her the power to speak to future users, in a 
description of the figure of Echo that comes close to affirming Echo’s own rapprochement with 
forward-looking clairvoyance. Tiresias’ clairvoyance is also linked to his time spent as a woman, 
thus aligning him and his clairvoyance with a female power, such as the one I extrapolate from 
Spivak’s reading of Echo as a “lever for future users,” as well as the masculine subject position 
she here imputes to him as a sign of asymmetric reward in Ovid’s text. Unlike the clairvoyance 
of Tiresias, however, Echo’s position as a proxy for deconstruction in the myth suggests that her 
clairvoyance is not just one that predicts in the present tense but that can act in the future tense, 
through the participation of future readers, or respondents. 
The establishment of Echo as a deconstructive agent bears consequences for the 
expression of affect in these texts, as well. Spivak points out that it is precisely the “value-coding 
or gendering of affect” that casts into relief the stakes for transgression and reward in the story of 
Narcissus and Echo; she also makes clear that Echo’s “dubious reward” is found “quite outside 
the borders of the self” (“Echo” 23). Terada argues specifically for an understanding of emotion 
or feeling in their subjectless origins as affect, an argument informed by the critique of the 
subject carried out by Derrida and deconstruction. Terada reads Derrida’s critique of the 
Cartesian tradition in “Cogito and the History of Madness” as proposing self-difference as 
“experience itself.” For Terada, non-subjective experience is the necessary condition for affect 
and mental life, of which she conceives as an incomplete experience marked by the “death” of 
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the subject. As she writes, “Dismissing self-difference therefore forecloses emotion even as it 
posits subjectivity” (24). Echo, of course, has no recourse to subjectivity, condemned as she is to 
self-difference at all moments. 
Both Cahun and Weiner foreground the figure of Echo in the structure of their works 
while revealing the importance of visuality as well as listening to the paradigm of mental 
experience that Echo offers. As Terada notes, Derrida critiques Husserl’s notion of 
“phenomenological voice,” challenging the idea that the voice is a medium that can represent 
self-presence (27). In Cahun’s “Sapho,” the voice is displaced from the living, human body into 
the mechanics of a “poupée de son.” In Weiner’s poems, messages go un-voiced; lines of 
dramatic poetry as in “Romeo and Juliet” only serve as supplement to the performance of the 
visual codes. Weiner and Cahun establish the primacy of vision in their texts but even so, the 
figure of Echo implies a mode of address that escapes the textual or visual in these works. 
In a collection of essays on the act of listening, Jean-Luc Nancy connects this activity to 
self-difference, writing that to listen is to always strain forward toward the self. Self-difference, 
for Nancy, figures as “referral” (9). He writes that to listen is to be on the lookout, but carefully 
draws the distinction between visual surveillance and the “referral” of listening: to be on the 
watch visually establishes a rift in the gaze between subject and object; in listening, the subject 
refers back to itself as sonic vibrations move through the listening body, resulting in a reflexive 
self-consciousness of sonic experience. Nancy writes, “In still other words, the visual is 
tendentially mimetic, and the sonorous tendentially methexic (that is, having to do with 
participation, sharing, or contagion), which does not mean that these tendencies do not intersect” 
(10). If Cahun and Weiner’s texts coalesce around a primary visuality by virtue of being texts 
and images to be read, the incorporation of the figure of Echo into these texts represents just such 
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an intersection of the visual and the auditory.  
 Cahun and Weiner both address messages through their texts, specifically messages that 
have no defined destination. But, the reader-viewer who receives these messages interprets them 
as citation, as mimed performance, somewhere between visuality (text and image) and sonic 
perception (echo). Reader-viewers share in the operation of the text or performance, though this 
methexis does not point to metaphysical self-presence. Instead, Nancy argues for a resonant 
subject, who experiences listening (and listening to his or her own voice), as resonance, as the 
vibration that marks an interval of spacing between utterance, echo, and rebound. Countering the 
intentionality of Husserl’s phenomenological subject, the resonant subject is constantly referred, 
or deferred, to a future subject yet to come (21).73 In other words, listening moves the body, or 
makes the body vibrate, in anticipation of the return of the echo and the possibility for perceptual 
experience not founded on presence. As with Massumi’s “jerks,” interior self-movement signals 
a shift in the self, its displacement or self-difference and deferral in view of possible future 
selves. 
The citationality inherent to the figure of Echo achieves the effect – or, affect – of 
resonance in Cahun and Weiner’s reading and viewing audiences. This is the citationality of the 
actor, or mime, and the signal bearer, both relaying an unintentional message to unknown 
destinations. Thus, does Terada argue for the theatricality of mental life. Through her reading of 
Derrida’s critique of subjective experience, Terada argues for the citational structures, figured in 
my analysis in the person of Echo, that bring “the unexpected bonus of emotion” (40). In taking 
                                                
73 In the same passage, Nancy points to the “intensive spacing of a rebound” that characterizes 
the resonant subject. For my discussion of Weiner and especially Cahun, I again point to 
Rosalind Krauss’ theorizing of “spacing” in Surrealist photomontage for its echo here in Nancy’s 
intersection of the visual and the sonic in the notion of resonance. See above note 9. 
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her conclusion further, Terada contends, “Textuality, in other words – and différance, its 
dynamic force – models Derridean emotion. Throughout his work, Derrida locates emotion in 
relations rather than in subjects” (45). The textual relations that Terada here offers as constitutive 
of an emotional experience in mental life that does not operate under the white mythology or 
alibi of subjective experience find their correlate in Spivak’s reading of Echo as différance.  
As a “lever for future users,” to recall Spivak’s description, Echo incarnates the 
“relations” that Terada identifies in Derrida’s textual notion of affect. In the “Envois” section of 
La Carte Postale, Derrida addresses love notes to an unknown recipient, who is ultimately not 
the recipient as readers intercept them in their free circulation. As Derrida writes there, “À toi 
d’abord: je n’attends qu’une réponse et elle te revient” (8). Terada takes up the example to reveal 
how emotion can emerge from differences internal to the text (Derrida’s play of “I” and “you”) 
and not just from a “source,” or subject (45).74 In the various addresses from Cahun and 
Weiner’s texts, performances, and images, difference – and différance – shows how, following 
Terada, emotion and experience exist after the death of the subject in post-structuralist thought. 
For Cahun and Weiner’s audiences, the relation between reader and text (or spectator and 
performance, etc.) shifts with the terms of address in the code poems (between imperative and 
interrogative modes) and in Héroïnes (between dramatic monologue and photographic intertext 
of Cahun’s self-portraits).  
Though Nancy persists in defining a “subject,” his deferral of that “resonant subject” 
from self-presence and intentionality makes the intersection of sonic and visual perception (as 
                                                
74 Elsewhere in his oeuvre, Derrida connects this free circulation of the letter to the power of 
poetic language and to a possibility for a politico-poetic revision of the terms of democracy 
through his notion of the teleiopoetic utterance. See Derrida “Un Ver à soie” 79 as well as my 
commentary on that text in the conclusion to chapter one, and Politiques de l’amitié 50-64, 
respectively. For more on teleiopoesis, see Spivak Death of a Discipline 27-34. 
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textual visuality) possible, and brings his use of the term itself (“subject”) under question and 
closer to Terada’s understanding of the subject after its “death” in post-structuralist thought. As 
in Nancy’s rumination on listening, the performance modes of Weiner and Cahun’s texts resist, 
too, mimesis (even as Cahun explicitly occupies an authorial position as “mime,” or “acteur”) in 
favor of participation-oriented mathexis, to borrow Nancy’s term. The power of these texts and 
images lies not in what they represent, but in the relational ties they form with the reader-viewer 
– ties which are affective in the context of Cahun and Weiner’s engagement with structures of 
collaboration.  
As described so far in these first two chapters, my reading of Cahun and Weiner’s 
collaborative mode draws on both the figures Narcissus and Echo: in the end Narcissus is 
nothing but material, his body (and perceiving mind) reduced to a flower; Echo is all but 
material, her body turned to dust and carried away by the same winds that carry her rebounding 
voice. Caught in the lapse between these two figures, Cahun and Weiner’s collaborators – 
including myself – experience a specific affective transformation, drawn in as improper 
respondents to a tone that pulls them together while pushing them apart.  
This “Echo effect,” and its accompanying affect, what Spivak calls a deconstructive 
“lever for future users” (i.e. readers), shifts us between text, image, and performance. The 
intertext, thus, provides a graphic inscription of the body – of Cahun’s performing body – in 
these texts. Through a poetics of signaling (as maritime code or as manipulation of familiar 
literary tropes and figures), Cahun and Weiner hail their readers, making them the destination of 
their messages, and so more receivers and participants than traditional readers. 
 
Chapter Three. 
Portrait Performances:  
Cahun Résistante and Hannah Weiner’s Open House 
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In May 1945, Claude Cahun posed after-the-fact for her camera (a performance like her 
other self-portrait photographs, as I will show) in the costume she wore while carrying out acts 
of resistance against the Nazi Occupation on Jersey with her partner Marcel Moore. In October 
1969, Hannah Weiner included a portrait of herself on a flyer for an upcoming happening she 
had organized entitled Hannah Weiner’s Open House. Unlike Cahun’s after-the-fact document, 
Weiner’s performance document comes before the performance. What, then, is to be made of 
performance documents that stage the performance before and after the fact? How does re-
staging, or pre-staging, the performance transform the performance document? 
Peggy Phelan, in her influential conclusion to Unmarked: The Politics of Performance, 
writes, “Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, 
documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once 
it does so, it becomes something other than performance” (159). Phelan’s insistence on the 
present tense of the performance in this passage juxtaposes the performance itself with its 
document. The experience of looking at a photograph of a performance cannot reproduce the 
experience of the performance. For Phelan, “Performance’s being […] becomes itself through 
disappearance.” In Cahun and Weiner’s works analyzed in this chapter, the bodily presence that 
can only be known in the present tense will indeed find its prolongation in the photograph, 
however impoverished a replacement for the present tense presence of the performance. Indeed, I 
argue that these specific photographs enact their own performances.  
Phelan’s theory of performance attempts to reconcile performance’s unique ontology of 
disappearance with the desire to represent and to document. In this chapter, I turn to two 
undocumented performances by Cahun and Weiner. Specifically, I examine two performances 
for which the documentation of the performance arises from a moment out of chronological 
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order with respect to the performance itself: a self-portrait of Cahun (1945) taken after WWII 
that attests to the resistance activities she and Moore carried out against the occupying Nazi 
forces on Jersey and an invitational flyer for Weiner’s happening Hannah Weiner’s Open House 
(1969). Though the performance document, according to Phelan, cannot reproduce the 
performance, it can have a strong effect on its reader or viewer. Phelan continues, “Performance 
occurs over a time which will not be repeated. It can be performed again, but this repetition itself 
marks it as ‘different.’ The document of a performance then is only a spur to memory, an 
encouragement of memory to become present.” The photograph or written description does not 
represent the performance, but can only recall the memory of the performance. Repetition – 
reproduction – of the performance is always repetition with a difference.  
I argue that these photographs not only attempt to represent or document a historically 
situated performance but also carry out performances on their own. The repetition of the 
performance of these photographs does result in instances of repetition with a difference. But, 
unlike the performances described by Phelan that result in a second order document, a 
supplement that can never truly reproduce the performance, these documents produce 
performances. In this sense, I understand these documents to represent instances of the linguistic 
structure that J.L. Austin calls performatives. Philip Auslander argues that performance 
documents are performative in that the photograph itself defines the documented event as a 
performance. In one of his examples, the manipulated photograph of Yves Klein’s Leap into the 
Void (1960) constitutes Klein’s action as a performance, even though the image relies on a 
degree of fiction (7-8). It is in the performative power of the photograph to define an event as a 
performance, just as it is in the performative power of language to seal the marital contract of a 
wedding ceremony. In the examples of Cahun and Weiner’s work given above, the chronological 
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ordering of the event and its documentation has little importance, following Auslander’s 
argument. The documentation performs the performance whether manipulated or straight, or 
recorded before, during, or after the event. 	  
The photographs and documentation that I analyze in this chapter, I contend, work 
performatively, as well. Though, unlike in Auslander’s analysis of the performance photograph, I 
contend that this performativity does not only transform the status of the event into a 
performance but that photographs and performance documentation extend an address to the 
viewer that is also performative. This address to the viewer works performatively on the 
experience of viewing the image, or reading the text, allowing for the repetition, or what Derrida 
in his engagement with Austin calls the citationality, of the performance through its document. 
Thus, the viewer becomes a collaborator in a work of performative collaboration.  
If, as Phelan suggests, performance challenges writing to find ways to become 
performative, and exist in the present tense of performance, I show that the portraits by Cahun 
and Weiner do just this as they pass from the presence of performance into the materiality of 
documentation. Important to this performative endeavor are, in fact, Cahun and Weiner’s written 
texts, especially the resistance tracts composed and distributed by Cahun and Moore during the 
Nazi Occupation and Weiner’s deployment of instructions in pre- and post-clair-style works. 
Invitation as a performative mode – “I invite you in” – opens my argument not only onto the 
construction of a performative collaboration that invites multiple participants into the work as 
collaborators but onto a space doubly marked as domestic/private and political/public. For 
Cahun, her estate La Rocquaise represents at once the domestic and the political, as the site of 
her and Moore’s arrest for their shared Resistance work. For Weiner, summers spent in her 
mother’s home, as well as in other rented houses, set the domestic scene, while her engagements 
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in the 1970s and 1980s with the American Indian Movement, often expressed through the 
delocalized experience of her clairvoyance, provide political context.  
The invitational mode of this performative address to the reader opens the critical frame 
of this chapter so far defined by Austin and theories of performance to Derrida’s specific notion 
of hospitality, which challenges the political and ethical stakes of the custom. Ultimately, the 
spaces into which Cahun and Weiner’s works invite us as viewers, inflected by the gendered 
conditions of invitation and hospitality, engage with similar questions of absence and presence 
raised by a rereading of Phelan’s ontology of performance and Derrida’s theory of iterability and 
performativity. The indeterminacy of absence and presence in these considerations offers a 
model of collaboration specific to the photographic invitations I examine herein. As Phelan 
writes, “For to acknowledge the Other’s (always partial) presence is to acknowledge one’s own 
(always partial) absence” (162). This indeterminacy is not only applicable to the disappearance 
of the performance, as Phelan would have it, but to its performative reiterations, its 
reappearances, as well. 
 
Mime, Mimicry, and the Performative 
 
According to Phelan, the performative utterance theorized by J.L. Austin in How to Do 
Things with Words and taken up again by Derrida in “Signature Event Context” provides a 
horizon of possibility for any document of performance. She asks, how can writing aspire to the 
present tense of performance, and in so doing affirm a shared subjectivity founded in partial 
presences and absences (disappearance) (162). Austin’s performative, by which speech enacts 
the activity names (and as opposed to the constative, which merely uses language to describe), 
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functions independently of a referent. As Derrida writes in “Signature Event Context,” “As 
opposed to the classical assertion, to the constative utterance, the performative does not have its 
referent […] outside of itself or, in any event, before and in front of itself. It does not describe 
something that exists outside language and prior to it. It produces or transforms a situation, it 
effects” (13). The internal structure of the performative, for Derrida, is such that the ability to 
effect a situation is essential to the success of such an utterance, that is, to any meaning that 
might adhere to the utterance.  
For Derrida, a quarrel arises with Austin on the subject of citation. Can the performative 
be cited, he asks, placed into quotation marks? Austin says no; Derrida replies, yes. Derrida 
writes, “For, ultimately, isn’t it true that what Austin excludes as anomaly, exception, ‘non-
serious,’ citation (on stage, in a poem, or a soliloquy) is the determined modification of a general 
citationality—or rather, a general iterability—without which there would not even be a 
‘successful’ performative?” (17). In what follows, I will add the photograph to Derrida’s list of 
literary citation (stage, poem, soliloquy), but here, Derrida refers to the “felicities,” or rules, that 
Austin establishes as crucial to the success of a peformative utterance (one cannot be married 
simply by the utterance “I do” but that “I do” must be spoken in front of one vested with the 
power of the civil authorities, for example). Derrida claims that citationality, or iterability, 
should not be opposed to the contexts of successful performatives, as Austin maintains, but that 
the absence of authorial intention in his concept of “différance" allows a juxtaposition of citation 
and more motivated contexts for performatives that resists a metaphysics of presence (18-19). As 
Derrida writes, “It is simply that those effects [of performative language] do not exclude what is 
generally opposed to them [citation], term by term; on the contrary, they presuppose it, in an 
asymmetrical way, as the general space of their possibility” (19). 
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Cahun makes reference often to the citationality of her performances by self-consciously 
posing as an actor. Several self-portraits taken in the 1920s explore this position and pose in 
ways that evoke what Derrida writes of the mime in La Dissémination. This portrait shares some 
similarity with the portraits from the series “Don’t Kiss Me, I’m in Training.” In those portraits, 
Cahun sits in costume against a dark curtain, her head turned at a defiant angle, reclined with 
uneven shoulders. Her pose as that of an actress or mime is made explicit by pale make-up, dark 
lipstick, and dark heart shapes applied to her cheeks that echo dark round dots evocative of 
nipples that are sewn to her shirt. Across this shirt reads the eponymous phrase: “I am in training. 
Don’t Kiss me.” In another portrait from the period, Cahun poses again against a dark curtain in 
the guise of her character Elle from a Pierre Albert-Birot production of Barbe Bleue (1929). In 
the 1929 self-portrait that captures my interest, however, Cahun sits out of costume, unusual not 
only in the theatrical context of her work from this period but in the context of her complete 
photographic oeuvre (Fig. 3.1). In this portrait, Cahun rests once more against a curtained 
background, slightly reclined, gazing provocatively if calmly at the camera. An actor’s mask 
hangs beside her, the costume abandoned. And, then, another difference: the curtain in this 
portrait does not cover the entire background; it angles slightly downward, revealing at the top of 
the photograph the depth of the space behind the curtain.  
Not only does the portrait simultaneously indulge and deny Cahun’s interest in persona 
portraiture, connecting it thus to the Surrealist images of the Aveux, as well as to the unstable 
conditions of the Aveux’s “canceled confessions,” but it also recalls the Symbolist influence that 
precedes her involvement with surrealist aesthetics. The portrait represents the mime, a 
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Symbolist figure explored by Mallarmé as well as Cahun’s uncle Marcel Schwob.75 Cahun’s 
portrait shows the mime at rest backstage, as unmasked – or seemingly so. In Schwob’s Mimes, 
published between 1891 and 1893 in L’Echo de Paris, the author reworked figures from the then 
newly rediscovered mimes by third century BCE Greek poet Herodas. Schwob’s influence on his 
niece is on display in Cahun’s early text Vues et visions (1914, published under the nom de 
plume Claude Courlis), which Moore illustrated. In this text, Cahun juxtaposes contemporary 
scenes from Le Croisic on the left hand pages with scenes from ancient Rome on the right, 
locating the temporal shift in the divide between the facing pages. But each section’s visual 
layout dissolves the temporal divide marked by the book’s binding. Tirza True Latimer points 
out the importance of Moore’s illustrations in the text, which imitate a theater’s proscenium arch 
in their layout and design, and make more explicit the relationship between literary palimpsest 
and theatrical performance by placing both vignettes on the same “stage” (“Acting Out” 59). Just 
as the palimpsest’s top layers both hide and reveal the layers they cover underneath, the mime’s 
mask both hides and reveals the performer’s face. According to the Littré, the mime is at once a 
dramatic genre and the actors in that genre, or most importantly for my analysis of Cahun’s 
portrait, “un imitateur.” Leperlier notes in his chronology of Cahun’s career that the composition 
of Vues et visions coincided with her first self-portraits.76 Cahun’s focus is double in this early 
moment of her career split between both the literary genre and performance acts of the “mime.” 
                                                
75 Schwob explores the figure of the mime in his Mimes, discussed above. Mallarmé investigates 
the grounds of representation in “Mimique,” a short prose text taken up by Derrida in the 
“Double Séance” section of La Dissémination, discussed below. The mime also appears in its 
more pathetic form of the “pitre,” or clown, in Mallarmé’s sonnet “Le Pitre châtié.” This sonnet 
invokes the figure of Hamlet, tying the clown to theatrical performance and the long poem 
“Igitur,” inspired by Shakespeare’s play. The performer as jester appears, as well, in Rimbaud’s 
“Parade” in Les Illuminations.   
 
76 See Cahun Ecrits 11. 
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Derrida turns to the question of mimesis in the “Double Séance” section of La 
Dissémination. There, he does not draw on Schwob’s work but rather on that of one of his 
Symbolist contemporaries, Stéphane Mallarmé, in order to offer a revision of Plato’s conception 
of mimesis. Derrida’s elaboration of mimesis focuses on Mallarmé’s short prose piece 
“Mimique.” A brief commentary on the mime Paul Margueritte’s production of “Pierrot Assassin 
de sa Femme,” Mallarmé’s text offers Derrida a rich example of a “simulacre,” of a copy of a 
copy, or a citation with no original. Derrida writes of “Mimique”’s reference to the performance 
Mallarmé has witnessed (Margueritte’s one-man show) as well as to the text’s own performance: 
“Le mime produit, c’est-à-dire fait paraître dans la présence, manifeste le sens même de ce que 
présentement il écrit: de ce qu’il performe” (233-4). Not only does the mime perform, but he 
writes. Derrida thus confounds the role of Margueritte and of Mallarmé. Derrida continues, 
“Nous sommes devant, si l’on peut dire, un double qui ne redouble aucun simple, que rien ne 
prévient, rien qui ne soit en tous cas déjà un double” (234). For Derrida, Mallarmé devises a 
form of imitation without recourse to the Platonic definition of mimesis, rooted in an opposition 
of truth and untruth.  
Cahun’s portrait, in the same way, resists the Platonic binary of truth/untruth in its 
staging of Cahun as mime. The portrait presents one mask but suggests a series of unseen masks; 
Cahun’s pose as un-masked suggests the register of truth, but is founded, instead, upon a series 
of masks. In the staging of the photograph, Cahun has removed her mask, placed it to the side. 
Though Cahun has removed the mime’s mask, the space revealed behind the curtain in the 
portrait’s corner recalls the viewer’s attention to the performance of this portrait: one mask taken 
off, the artist poses nonetheless. Recalling a passage of the Aveux written on the photomontage 
accompanying part nine, the portrait also suggests, “Sous ce masque un autre masque. Je n’en 
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finirai pas de soulever tous ces visages” (Aveux 202). The indefinite space partially depicted 
behind the curtain suggests just an infinite possibility – of space and of masks.  
In a psychoanalytic reading of the image, like the one Margaret Iversen proposes of the 
frontispiece to Barthes’ La Chambre claire (a window covered by sheer curtains, light streaming 
in through the fabric), the partially lowered curtain might also suggest that which the image hides 
in plain sight (“What Is” 113-29). Yet, the curtain does not suggest a hidden truth, or the 
possibility of a space of psychoanalytic revelation, but rather a performance space. Cahun’s 
photograph, as well as her performance as mime within the portrait (simultaneously refused and 
affirmed by her unmasked pose), circulates independently of claims to truth-value. It circulates, 
like Mallarmé’s text, as a copy of a copy that does not break the mirror.  
Before moving forward, a brief discussion of Roland Barthes’ work on photography, as 
well as Margaret Olin’s recent commentary on that critical oeuvre, will further enliven the 
critical space between performance, photography, and text. Culminating in the publication of La 
Chambre claire, an essay on photography that simultaneously deals with the loss and 
recuperation of the loved one, Barthes’ investigation into the indexicality of the photographic 
image begins in the earlier essay “The Rhetoric of the Image.” Barthes writes, in that essay, that 
“[t]he type of consciousness the photograph involves is indeed truly unprecedented, since it 
establishes not a consciousness of the being-there of the thing […] but an awareness of its 
having-been-there” (44). As Olin points out, the state of “being-there” is Barthes’ term for the 
index, or the trace of an object’s physical presence left in the image.  
In La Chambre claire, Barthes privileges what he terms the punctum in his rumination on 
the detail of a photograph that “pierces” the viewer. Though the process of identification with the 
image that the punctum describes seems to shift Barthes’ interest away from the indexicality of 
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the image, Olin observes that the theory of the punctum, in fact, expands the concept of the index 
in Barthes’ theory of photography.  In each of the images that illustrated La Chambre claire, 
Barthes attempts to locate this punctum. However, a careful reading, such as the one carried out 
by Olin, reveals that in one crucial image the punctum Barthes claims to have found does not 
actually exist. In a 1926 portrait of an African-American family by James Van Der Zee, Barthes 
claims to be pierced by the gold necklace one of the women wears. Yet, as Olin notices, the 
woman wears pearls, not gold. Olin notes that the separation of the image from its description 
several pages later in Barthes’ text makes it easy for the reader not to notice Barthes’ mistake, 
but she also argues that he has not made a mistake, but rather has described a punctum that exists 
for him in a photograph of his family from another text, Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes. His 
Aunt Alice, in that family portrait, wears the braided gold necklace. The punctum, then, as Olin 
states it, is a spur to memory and to memory’s displacements. 
The ramifications for Barthes’ theory of photography of this complicated play of 
presence and absence of the punctum are serious, and brilliantly elucidated by Olin. She writes, 
“If the punctum is displaced, like an alibi, then the detail that is not there, the ‘That-has-been,’ 
never was. And neither was the indexical power of the photograph. The fact that something was 
before the camera when the photograph was taken is no longer unproblematically the source of 
the photograph’s power” (112). No longer deriving its power from the indexical certification of 
the subject’s once presence, the photograph operates on the viewer, driving the viewer to his or 
her own displacements of memory. Olin calls this power that of a “performative index” (115).77 
                                                
77 Ariella Azoulay understands this kind of performative power as an address to the viewer that 
accounts for the “civil contract” of photography. According to Azoulay, “[…] the photograph – 
every photograph – belongs to no one, that [the spectator] can become not only its addressee but 
also its addresser, one who can produce a meaning for it and disseminate this meaning further.” 
Azoulay advocates for a practice of “watching,” as opposed to “looking,” that would 
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Here, Olin’s reading of the punctum even seems to recall Barthes’ theory of the “scriptible” as a 
text written by the reader, thus making of the punctum a visual technology of the writerly text.78 
Olin’s use of “performative” corresponds more to the performance work of memory than to the 
power of the photograph to work as a citation or Austinian performative. But, in the context of 
my own argument, Olin’s rereading of Barthes’ work on photography sets the ground work for a 
challenge to Phelan’s conception of the ontology of performance. Olin’s reorienting of the 
privileged photographic relationship from that between photo and subject to that shared by photo 
and viewer challenges notions of absence and presence in the performance image. If a 
performance, according to Phelan, becomes itself through its disappearance, what can it mean if 
there was never a presence to do the work of disappearing?  
Olin’s precise locating of the punctum of one photograph in another introduces the figure 
of displacement as a challenge to that of disappearance favored by Phelan. As Rebecca 
Schneider cautions, displacement should not emphasize presence as a unique, singular certifier of 
a metaphysics of performance. Rather, Schneider writes, “As theories of trauma and repetition 
might instruct us, it is not presence that appears in the syncopated time of citational performance 
but precisely (again) the missed encounter – the reverberation of the overlooked, the missed, the 
seemingly forgotten” (101-2). In another context, Schneider could be describing the performative 
index that Olin locates in Barthes’ work, revealed by the punctum that Barthes explicitly 
overlooks in one photograph and fantasizes in another. Returning to Phelan’s turn of phrase – 
that performance “becomes itself through” disappearance – Schneider further suggests that what 
                                                                                                                                                       
accommodate the dimension of time and movement in the still photograph and account for such 
displacements as described by Olin. See Azoulay 14.  
 
78 Barthes’ description of the scriptible, or writerly, as a logic outside of genre or medium, as 
“structuration without structure,” is especially important to my argument here. See Barthes S/Z 5. 
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Phelan describes as the ontology of performance is not without other interpretations. Indeed, 
focusing on Phelan’s use of the preposition “through,” Schneider develops further the 
importance of displacement to the structure of the performance. As she explains, “This phrasing 
rather invites us to think of performance as a medium in which disappearance negotiates, perhaps 
becomes, materiality. That is, disappearance is passed through. As is materiality” (105). A 
movement through one state to another, Schneider’s description of performance does not 
privilege a unique presence, nor its absence, but proposes a resistance to this metaphysical binary 
that is simultaneously a resistance to the binary between the performance and the archive. To 
answer my earlier question about documentation that pre- or post-dates a performance, then, 
Schneider and Olin’s analyses of the performance and the Barthesien photograph, respectively, 
allow me to point toward a performance that moves from its performing to the performative 
citational work continued though its displacement into materiality. 
Specific to my performative reading of Cahun and Weiner’s portraits, though not to the 
entire performative endeavor, is the discursive mode of invitation that connects the particular 
histories of these photographs. Taken in May 1945 after the release of Cahun and Moore from 
Nazi imprisonment in Gloucester Street Prison in St. Hélier, Jersey, Cahun’s portrait presents its 
subject as reinstated in her home, standing defiantly before her open door. As Claire Follain 
recounts in her essay on Cahun and Moore’s resistance activities, the Nazi insignia that she 
playfully – but seriously – grips between her teeth was given to her by a German guard before 
his reassignment soon before the Liberation (93). Weiner’s portrait figures more explicitly in the 
mode of invitation, as the flyer for her happening “Hannah Weiner’s Open House” in October 
1969 literally invites its beholder into a series of artists’ homes, each address given beneath a 
portrait of Weiner at the top of the document. The consequences of this invitational mode in 
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Cahun and Weiner’s written texts reveals the importance of the invitational not only to these two 
photographs but to the collaborative poetics at work throughout their oeuvres.  
 
Performative Portraits and Open Invitation 
 
Cahun’s portrait of May 1945 circulates as a sort of impossible document and 
simultaneously exemplifies and challenges Phelan’s contention that the performance is an un-
documentable event. Taken after the Liberation by the Allies, Cahun’s portrait as résistante 
depicts her in the guise of that persona (Fig. 3.2). Her costume is consistent with one described in 
a post-war text to which Cahun does not attach the photograph as illustration. Cahun’s 1948 
unfinished manuscript “Le Muet dans la mêlée” begins,  
À Jersey on ne peut moins remarquable: pas de chapeau; [….] un imperméable 
par le dessus, un Burberry (donc un grand nombre de poches pour les tracts); un 
foulard noué sur la tête (aux couleurs voyantes, variables); des gants de laine en 
hiver – et le sac à marché (pour alibi). Des paysannes – et aussi des filles et des 
femmes de la bourgeoisie à caractère gentleman farmer – portaient des vêtements 
analogues et semblables; mon aspect et celui de Suzanne ne différaient guère de 
l’aspect de la majorité des habitants de l’île. (427) 
 
Gen Doy writes of the importance of clothing and costume to Cahun’s work, recognizing that 
while a specific style is not identifiable for Cahun, diverse styles that serve as “political and 
strategic disguise” do stand out. Doy asserts, rightly, that even her “style” as Lucy Schwob 
contributes to a constructed persona (83-5). With her hair uncovered but by a scarf and her 
raincoat open above a vest, the image captures Cahun in her “aspect” as a résistante. Absent any 
other photographic documentation of Cahun and Moore’s resistance activities, and absent any 
documentation from the acts themselves other than the surviving tracts, the portrait serves as 
proof of Cahun’s status as résistante. But, the image does not correspond directly to a caption. It 
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represents, rather, its own performance of resistance as a performative document, in Auslander’s 
sense. 
In the description of a typical Jersey costume, Cahun concludes her description by 
deploying a vocabulary that emphasizes imitation and outward appearance: “vêtements 
analogues et semblables,” “mon aspect” (emphasis mine). Cahun implies that like the many 
other costumes she dons as actress or photographer, this outfit represents a costume, and thus, 
her resistance work with Moore a kind of performance. As Gayle Zachmann notes in her article 
“Claude Cahun and the Politics of Culture: Resistance, Journalism, and Performative 
Engagement,” fictional strategies of creating characters and persona function as an “overriding 
epistemological mode” in Cahun’s works (25). Zachmann thus positions Cahun and Moore’s 
resistance against the later Sartrian definition of engagement as one poorly served by poetic 
indeterminacy. Cahun’s post-Occupation writings are “performative,” according to Zachmann, 
because they document the resistance activities of Cahun and Moore as the “Soldat ohne Namen” 
in the indeterminate intersection of fiction, memoir, and journalism. While she rightly establishes 
the importance of poetic indeterminacy and performance to Cahun’s political engagements, 
especially of the Occupation period, Zachmann does not show how Cahun’s post-Occupation 
writings and portraits enact a performance. And notably, Zachmann’s use of “performative” in 
this article does not take into account the relationship between text and photographic image. 
Cahun’s portrait does this same enacting that Zachmann’s account of the performative 
fails to specify. Paradoxically documenting an invisible performance of resistance, the portrait 
replaces the more ephemeral resistance tract as primary proof of Cahun’s legacy. In the photo-
textual relationship that structures Cahun’s resistance legacy, the conventional relationship 
between indexical photograph and supplemental textual caption that describes the image in its 
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specificity is reversed. The description of feminine, country dress on Jersey set in Cahun’s text 
offers a general description of sartorial trends on the island. Though the description does include 
reference to the felicities of clothing design for the distribution of anti-Nazi tracts (the deep, 
multiple pockets of the raincoat where Cahun and Moore could hide the pamphlets), the 
photographic portrait most forcefully grounds both the passage of text and photographic portrait 
in the performance of resistance. The strangeness of Cahun’s gesture attests, too, to the 
ambiguity of resistance work. Cahun and Moore survive the Occupation, but only by historical 
coincidence in that the Liberation arrives before they can be executed. In her gesture with the 
insignia, Cahun treats her resistance with irreverence, toying with the badge in her mouth, 
simultaneously proffering a warning to those who are not like-minded and an invitation to those 
who are into Cahun and Moore’s anonymous circle of résistants at La Rocquaise. The 
photograph, thus, exceeds the specificity of the text, tying the quotidian costume of the women of 
Jersey to the historical triumph of Resistance – or, at least, to the survival of these résistantes.  
The performative power of Cahun’s portrait relies, as well, on the importance place of 
touch – of haptic relationships – in her resistance activity. As Cahun makes clear in “Feuilles 
détachées du scrapbook,” another post-Occupation text, photographs attest to the resistance of 
other inmates in the Nazi prison on Jersey. Cahun’s relationship to these photographs (ID 
photos) is specifically precious and haptic. These photos are to be handled in order to inspire the 
work of memory. Cahun focuses the composition of the May 1945 portrait on a haptic 
relationship (between herself and the insignia clutched intimately in her mouth) just as her text 
makes explicit reference to the most haptic of documents, the Resistance tract, shoved into the 
pockets of her Burberry. As will also become evident in the portrait of Weiner from the “Open 
House,” the appeal of these photographs to the sense of touch as well as to their invitational 
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modes are central to these photographic performances, and to an understanding of the portraits as 
performative photographs of invitation.  
Weiner’s flyer for the “Open House” invited the public into the homes of several artists, 
including Vito Acconci and Bernadette Mayer (Fig. 3.3).79 Weiner presented the happening in 
the context of a series of performance works entitled Street Works and inspired by a special 1969 
issue of Acconci and Mayer’s magazine 0 to 9. In her summary of the Street Works series, 
Weiner presents the “Open House” as part of Street Works IV. Another event had preceded the 
“Open House” in this fourth iteration of Weiner’s Street Works: earlier in the month of October, 
Weiner had given away hot dog wieners bought from a New York City street vendor. Weiner 
writes of this action, “For the opening Oct. 2, I hired a frankfurter wagon to give away free 
‘wieners’. This was a pun on my name. Anything or anybody can have anything or anybody’s 
name” (“Street Works”).80 In her study of Weiner’s performance and poetry, Judith Goldman 
situates the use of the proper name within Weiner’s interest in linguistic codes and the multiple 
layers of mediation presented by the poem, and thus, by language (124). In Street Works IV, and 
more specifically in the “Open House” happening, Weiner fruitfully explores this code of the 
proper name in the confluence of performance, photograph, and invitation. 
Weiner composed the flyer-invitation in three registers: the title, the photograph, and the 
schedule of events (what might count as “caption”) (Fig. 3). Considered alongside the 
invitation’s photograph, the textual registers are at odds: the title seems to dominate the reception 
of the invitation, aligned as Weiner’s name is with Weiner’s portrait. The “caption,” or schedule 
                                                
79 The others, a selected catalogue of Weiner’s coterie, include: Marjorie Strider, Abraham 
Lubelski, Arakawa, and John Perreault. See Fig. 3.3. 
 
80 The homophony of Weiner’s name with her contemporary, John Wieners, associated in his 
poetry with Boston and New York, seems fitting for her stated intentions.  
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of events, troubles this dominance. Reading the list of names below the photograph, the 
reader/viewer confronts the variety of artists involved in the project. Only one of these seven 
artists answers to the name Hannah Weiner or could be associated with the physical appearance 
depicted in the photograph. And yet, the other artists do exist textually on the invitation, as well 
as in the memory of the performances indexed by the invitation as documentary ephemera. A set 
of names challenges the textual, photographic, and performative dominance of “Hannah 
Weiner.” The insertion of Hannah Weiner’s Open House into Street Works IV further 
destabilizes what seems a foregone conclusion. Hannah Weiner’s authority over the performance 
– her position as inviting host – is not hers as such but rather belongs to the code of her proper 
name, “Hannah Weiner.” The dissemination of Weiner’s name, to use Derrida’s terminology, 
thus acts performatively to bring the audience into the happening as collaborators, equally able to 
assume the role of artist-host as that of invited participant. Like Cahun’s portrait as résistante, 
Weiner’s flyer invites and warns away – in a sense dares the beholder to join the fraught 
collaborative endeavor.  
The conditions of invitation at play in Cahun and Weiner’s portraits establish a propitious 
context for a reversal and displacement of binary pairs suggested by Derrida. At the end of his 
reading of Austin’s performative, Derrida writes that if deconstruction is to address the 
oppositions of classical philosophy and metaphysics – speech and writing, presence and absence 
– it cannot hope to simply neutralize the pairs but must proceed by a “double gesture […] a 
double writing—put into practice a reversal of the classical opposition and a general 
displacement of the system” (21). With the door to her home open behind her in the portrait, 
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does Cahun, then, invite the viewer into her domestic space, or warn the viewer away, proffering 
the insignia as warning to those who might trespass?81  
The ambiguity of invitation in the résistante portrait echoes pre-Occupation portraits of 
Cahun. In these other images, Cahun poses in the windows or at the door of La Rocquaise, 
similarly beckoning and warning away (Figs. 3.4 and 3.5). In the first image, her door stands 
open to the viewer, though the interior space is hidden from view by shadow. Cahun, in 
housework clothing, is framed three times – by the picture frame she holds to her face, by the 
doorframe, and by the frame of the photograph itself. These framings capture her as an 
ambivalent host, mistress of the house but also closed in by it. Her gestures contribute to this 
ambivalence: does her flat palm, turned out to the viewer while supporting the frame around her 
face, welcome as in a wave or warn away as in a signal to halt? In the images in which she poses 
in the windowsill, the cross hatching of the window grilles even presage her arrest, which took 
place inside her home, and subsequent imprisonment. Like Cahun and Moore’s resistance tracts, 
these images invite the viewer in (into the home, into the anti-collaboration collaborative work of 
active resistance) while warning the viewer away (this is my home, the images seem to declare to 
the intruder; ignore the Resistance at your own peril, they seem to bully the Kommandantur that 
requisitioned the stables at La Rocquaise). As with Weiner’s flyer-invitation, the beholder 
becomes guest and intruder; the artist, losing control over her authorial authority, becomes host 
and guest in turn. 
Derrida addresses the specific question of invitation and hospitality in his essay 
“Hostipitalité,” whose playful title indicates the imbrication of welcoming gesture (hospitality) 
                                                
81 In fact, the Nazi Kommandantur of Jersey had requisitioned four stables at Cahun and Moore’s 
home, La Rocquaise, a request against which the two would have had no appeal. The requisition 
order of 27 October 1941 names Suzanne Malherbe as proprietor of the estate and reads tersely: 
“4 stables at La Rocquaise are required by the German forces and hereby requisitioned.”  
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and subordinating command (hostility). His analysis of the structure of hospitality turns on the 
polysemous French term “hôte,” which can refer to the inviting host as well as to the invited 
guest. The host (hôte), then, becomes the guest (hôte) of his guest (hôte).82 As it follows, 
Weiner’s authorial agency confronts each of the individual artist-hosts within their own homes; 
upon calmly allowing a group of Nazi soldiers into their home at dinner time, Cahun and Moore 
become subject to the authority of their “guests.”83 If the relation between host and guest troubles 
the listener for its reduction of two distinct meanings to a single morphology, Derrida explains 
the trouble within the term “hospitality” itself. He writes, citing the German term from a text by 
Kant, “Hospitalität, mot d’origine latine, d’une origine troublante et trouble, mot qui porte 
comme sa propre contradiction incorporée en lui-même, mot latin qui se laisse parasiter par son 
contraire, l’hostilité, hôte indésirable qu’il héberge comme la contradiction de soi dans son corps 
propre […]” (18). Cahun writes in “Le Muet” of her lack of violent outrage upon her arrest in 
1944: “[Q]ue lors de notre arrestation – devant témoins jersiais – nous n’avions fait aucune 
résistance; que vis-à-vis d’eux-mêmes [the Nazi officials], ce soir-là et au cours des 
interrogatories, nous n’avions qu’une hostilité froide, exempte de toute violence emotive” (629). 
What does surprise Cahun and Moore, however, is that the arrest takes place in their home, 
rather than on the street during one of their pamphleteering expeditions.  
 Weiner establishes an important poetic ambiguity at the center of her performance work, 
                                                
82 One of Marcel Duchamp’s calembours from 1953 offers a take on these conditions: “A Guest 
+ A Host = A Ghost.”  
  
83 Vercor’s resistance text, the 1942 novella Le Silence de la mer, dramatizes this same 
relationship between occupiers and occupied. In his story, an old Frenchman and his niece react 
to a Nazi officer whom they are forced to quarter.  The niece meets the officer’s kindness, 
cultural refinement, and politesse as he accepts the role of guest with complete silence. The story 
also draws out the complexities of European national identity in the period, identities of which 
Cahun was a strong critic: the German officer exhibits a strong appreciation for and education in 
French culture, and his ancestors were, in fact, French. See Vercors. 
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structured as it is by the photographic image and by a discursive mode of invitation. In the course 
of his essay, Derrida opens a parenthesis in his notes to expand upon the invited guest and the 
(uninvited) visitor, establishing a difference between the invitation of conditional hospitality and 
the visitation of unconditional hospitality. The happening “Hannah Weiner’s Open House” 
resides still in the realm of conditional hospitality, structured by the formal invitation to 
participants and by the presence of an artist-host. But, as I have shown above, the invitation also 
reveals a subversion of the host’s position. The historical conditions of Cahun and Moore’s arrest 
in their own home already reveal the implications of forced visitation. Weiner’s hegemonic 
authority outdoes itself; disabled by its excess, the reproducible proliferation of the name and 
image “Hannah Weiner” destabilizes the position of the welcoming host, opening the possibility 
of the transferability of this position to the list of other participating artists.  
In her description of the “Open House,” Weiner writes, “I invited the public into the 
homes of participating artists. From 3 to 26 people showed up at different places. We sat around 
the kitchen tables, or on the floor and talked and smoked or had a party. I met new friends” 
(“Street Works”). Though still predicated on a conditional hospitality of invitation, the 
hospitality of Open House begins to betray an underlying hostility. Weiner’s “I” is prominent in 
the description of the invitation; she does not hesitate to take on the responsibility of invitation. 
The representation of her physical body marks the invitation, just as her body is marked by 
words in the 1978 cover photograph of the Clairvoyant Journal. 84  
Though we have seen how the host represents a shifting positionality in the context of the 
invitation’s phototextual design, here the positions shift once more. Weiner adds the list of other 
artists to the list of invited guests.  The hosts (the other artists) are now guests in their own 
                                                
84 I analyze the structure of the portrait by Ahern in chapter one. 
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homes. Derrida suggests that “the master in his own home, the host, can only accomplish his task 
as host, that is, hospitality, in becoming invited by the other into his home, in being welcomed by 
him whom he welcomes, in receiving the hospitality he gives” (9). Of course, this reversal of 
positions implies the hostility on the other side of the door of hospitality; the hosts are now 
hostages in their own homes. This hostility exists, in the event of the performance, in tandem 
with a warmer, more welcoming hospitality. According to Weiner, the atmosphere is light and 
festive, and new friendships form. The invitation into the home of another has, however, 
inaugurated a contractual agreement – one sealed, significantly, by the circulation of a 
photographic portrait. 
Kathy O’Dell describes the contractual nature of performance photographs and the sense 
of touch that seals this relationship in the handling of a photograph by a viewer. O’Dell argues 
that the performance photograph of 1970s body art performances (or performances that 
foreground the spectator’s relationship to the artist’s physical body) represents a contract 
between viewer and performer. Once “signed” by the spectator – that is, once the spectator 
agrees to become spectator to these often masochistic performances – this contract, in O’Dell’s 
words, “reroutes the viewer’s attention back in time to the domestic site, the homes, where 
identities are first formulated” (Contract 14). While Cahun and Weiner’s portraits do not 
approach the figuration of the artist’s body with the same thematic or structural violence as the 
“masochistic” performances analyzed by O’Dell, they do both draw attention to the presence of 
the artist’s body in a specific time and place (Cahun post-Occupation/post-imprisonment in the 
door of her own home, Weiner situated in the rotating time slots of each successive visit of her 
happening). Pushed into the realm of the domestic by the contractual relationship organized by 
photographic invitation and hospitality, the reader discovers queer, politicized domestic spaces 
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characterized by the confusion of subject positions described by Derrida in his reading of 
hospitality. 
 
Cahun, Domestic Space, and (Step-)Sisters in the Avunculate 
 
On the threshold of the domestic space of Cahun’s home, the darkened interior of the résistante 
portrait forms a visual analogue to the dark curtain that serves as backdrop in the mime portrait. 
In addition to the resistance portrait, Cahun poses in this location in several distinct portraits, 
each taken at different moments during her residence on Jersey at La Rocquaise, the name of her 
estate that she rebaptized “La Ferme sans nom.” In the first image, Cahun poses in an outfit 
similar to the one that serves as her resistance costume: practical slacks, wool sweater. Another 
portrait from 1939 shows Cahun posing more bombastically, wearing a long, elegant evening 
gown that contrasts with the roughhewn stone of La Rocquaise and the natural growth around the 
house’s entryway (Fig. 3.6). If the darkened interior behind the doorframe does serve as a visual 
analogue to the dark curtain of the mime portrait, then these portraits are performances, too – 
even in the quotidian costume of slacks and wool sweater. Like Cahun’s Burberry trench and 
headscarf in the resistance portrait, her clothing conforms to social, class-based codes of dress. 
Specifically, these portraits evoke gendered codes of domestic performance through the personae 
of a gentlewoman farmer (as in the resistance portrait) and of a society woman out of place in the 
less urban context of Jersey.  
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Cahun’s use of her house in these portraits recalls Gaston Bachelard’s theorizing of 
domestic spaces in The Poetics of Space.85 Bachelard writes, “[A]ll really inhabited space bears 
the essence of the notion of home [la maison] […] we shall see the imagination build ‘walls’ of 
impalpable shadows, comfort itself with the illusion of protection – or, just the contrary tremble 
behind thick walls […]” (5). The importance of opacity in this brief passage – “impalpable 
shadows,” “thick walls” – recalls the darkened threshold behind Cahun in her doorframe 
portraits. Bachelard’s formulation of the “illusion of protection” lurks, as well, in Cahun’s 
images. In a passage from Confidences au miroir, an unfinished autobiographical text written 
after Cahun’s return from Nazi imprisonment, Cahun describes her motivation in renaming La 
Rocquaise upon her acquisition of the property:  
[…] sa coque ancienne et rustre, à la fois contraire à mes goûts, à mes besoins 
asservis, à ma fragilité organique, j’avais dû l’accepter, en le débaptisant (dès 
1937, « La Rocquaise » devint pour moi « La ferme sans nom »). Nous n’avions 
que le choix et tout juste le temps, déplumant l’ancien nid, d’édifier en plein roc 
l’abri précaire… (588) 
 
Cahun’s description reiterates the importance of the house’s walls, here imagined as “sa coque 
ancienne et rustre,” an image at once naturalizing (“coque” as a bean or nut shell) but as also 
relating to the maritime culture of the island (“coque” as ship’s hull). Cahun sets her own 
“fragilité organique” in opposition to the rough-hewn stone of the estate, whose edifice dates 
back to the medieval period and which Leperlier describes as “une magnifique demeure en granit 
jersiais” (Claude Cahun 264). This latter use of “coque” builds upon another image used by 
                                                
85 Bachelard’s chapter on the house begins with an epigraph from Cahun’s theatre director and 
collaborator, Pierre Albert-Birot. The epigraph from the play Les Amusements naturels reads: “A 
la porte de la maison qui viendra frapper? / Une porte ouverte on entre / Une porte fermée un 
antre / Le monde bat de l’autre côté de ma porte.” The first two lines capture my attention, 
especially in relation to Cahun’s doorframe poses and invitiation. See Bachelard Poetics 3. For 
an account of Cahun and Moore’s involvement with Albert-Birot, see Latimer “Acting Out” 63-
5. 
 133 
Cahun to express her shape-shifting personae in the Aveux. There, she wrties, “Je ne voudrais 
coudre, piquer, tuer, qu’avec l’extrême pointe […] Ne voyager qu’à la proue de moi-même” 
(14). The proximity of these metaphors (hull for house, ship’s bow for the self) emphasizes the 
contiguousness of house (or enclosing architectural form) and body throughout Cahun’s work.  
Though the home might offer protection for this fragility, Cahun must rename the estate 
in order to enter her body into its protection. This name, or the absence of a name, “La Ferme 
sans nom,” thus permits Cahun psychic entry into the space. Nathanaël, poet, essayist, and 
translator, explicitly links language and family to architectural tropes in her rumination on 
Leperlier’s volume of Cahun’s Ecrits, Absence Where As (Claude Cahun and the Unopened 
Book); in her words,  
Between la famille and la fa ille [sic], a letter comes to be absent, exposing the 
decline in question [….] The architectural quality of language is such that despite 
the reinforcement of its internal structures, of its inflexibly governed syntax, of 
the peremptory boundaries erected to fend off any resistance or interrogation 
infringing on its enclosure, it is nonetheless susceptible to the external rigors that 
fall upon it, would reshape it. (22) 
 
Like the house that must be renamed, and thus transformed of its hard shell and rough exterior by 
language, so too does language undergo architectural processes of dilapidation and renovation. 
Specifically, the reshaping of “famille” reveals its internal “fa ille,” marked by Nathanaël’s gap 
within the word itself where the letter “m” has been erased.86 By extension, I argue that the body 
inhabiting the house undergoes these effects, as well. As Cahun’s un-naming, naming, and re-
naming shows the body of the artist – her body – is shaped by different named personae, just as 
is the estate on Jersey. 
                                                
86 Nathanaël, whose name takes its inspiration from Gide’s interlocutor in Les Nourritures 
terrestres, creates here a lineage of affiliation with Gide and Cahun, herself influenced by Gide. 
In Les Nourritures terrestres, Gide’s narrator famously exclaims, “Famille je vous hais! foyers 
clos; portes refermées; possessions jalouses du bonheur.” See Gide 69-70. 
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 Others of Cahun’s photographic portraits resonate with Bachelard’s descriptions of 
domestic space, as well. Bachelard privileges the armoire as a secretive space within the house 
later in his work, and I would like to show how Cahun confounds the images of house and 
armoire in her portraits. Of chests and drawers, into which category he places the armoire, 
Bachelard notes not only the importance of secrecy but also the important role of the key in 
marking the threshold of a private, secret space. He writes, “It is not merely a matter of keeping a 
possession well guarded. The lock doesn’t exist that could resist absolute violence, and all locks 
are an invitation to thieves. A lock is a psychological threshold” (81). As I noted above, the 
opacity of the threshold in the doorframe portraits marks a performance space, as well as a 
domestic, psychic space related to Bachelard’s theory of the house. And, like an armoire or 
chest, a house’s door requires a key. If Cahun stands in an empty doorframe – that is, in the place 
of an opened door – does she offer the viewer a key for entry? I have described above the ways 
in which her resistance portrait invites the viewer into the image and performance. Here, I would 
ask in addition, does the Nazi insignia that Cahun clasps in her teeth stand in for a key? The 
insignia certainly offers an interpretive key to the image’s performance of resistance, but does it 
offer, as well, a key to the domestic space behind Cahun’s back? Does it part the curtained 
background of Cahun’s performance portraits? 
 This “key” to the performance as well as to the domestic space of Cahun’s portraits opens 
the door to a domestic, familial space reorganized by Cahun’s portraits.  
In a portrait from 1932, preceding Cahun and Moore’s move to Jersey, Cahun’s body spills out 
of an armoire, its other shelves stocked with domestic goods (Fig. 3.7). The way in which 
Cahun’s body inhabits the armoire recalls Bachelard’s observation of the “passionate liaison of 
our bodies […] with an unforgettable house” (15). Her body is part of the armoire, but also 
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exceeds the space of the armoire, recalling the mismatched encounter of her body with La 
Rocquaise. Reading the armoire in a metonymical relation to the house, Cahun is not a perfect fit 
for the domestic space. In another passage from Confidences au miroir, Cahun writes, “Qui peut 
vivre, créer, sans se détacher des familles, de la meilleure meme?” (605). If an armoire hides a 
domestic secret, Cahun’s body breaches the threshold of that secrecy, announcing, despite its 
depicted lassitude, a desire to transgress a domestic limit, namely the limit of the family 
structure.  
In the collaborations of Cahun’s life and works, Cahun transgresses and reorganizes the 
patriarchal family structure. Leperlier recounts that Cahun, Moore, and their neighbors 
euphemized the unusual domestic arrangement at La Rocquaise as that shared between “two 
sisters” (Claude Cahun 266). The need for euphemism, of course, arose from Cahun and 
Moore’s amorous relationship, but speaks, as well, to the importance of names at the “Ferme 
sans nom.” Once inside the domestic space that Cahun simultaneously displays and hides from 
view in her doorframe portraits, a series of dis/identifications with the name of the Father (and of 
Cahun’s father, Maurice) structure the familial space of domesticity. On the island, Cahun and 
Moore chose to live under their family names, Lucy Schwob and Suzanne Malherbe, and the two 
purchased La Rocquaise with money from Maurice Schwob’s estate, inherited by Cahun upon 
his death. However, just as Cahun devised an androgynous pseudonym for herself, shedding her 
father’s name, she must rename La Rocquaise before inhabiting the house. Yet, despite this 
erasing of the name Schwob from her androgynous persona as Cahun, Maurice’s image enters 
into Cahun’s repertoire, in a portrait of 1920 that bears deliberate resemblance to an earlier 
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portrait of Maurice (Fig. c.1).87 Not a total rejection of the image or the name of the Father (the 
name Cahun comes from Cahun’s paternal grandmother’s name), the play of names in Cahun’s 
life destabilizes patriarchal geometry, without totally obliterating the (Schwob) family bond.  
Eve Sedgwick offers a useful terminology for analyzing such kinship structures in the 
context of literary works. In an essay on Oscar Wilde’s The Importance of Being Earnest, 
Sedgwick reveals the challenge to patriarchal authority that Wilde’s play stages in its use of a 
nascent queer idiom, specifically in the verbal play around aunt/tante as both a familial marker 
and a late-nineteenth-century code word for a homosexual male. Sedgwick’s reading of the play 
reveals the ways in which the relationship of aunt or uncle to niece and nephew trumps the 
patriarchal insistence on the name of the Father. In Sedgwick’s words, echoing Cahun’s artistic 
imperative to distance oneself from the family, “Forget the Name of the Father!” (58). Not only 
do these relations disguise a taxonomy of homosexual life in Wilde’s play but they imagine, as 
well, the possibility of alternate family identifications that cross generational, as well as 
genealogical, lines and which open an analysis of kinship and its tensions to the lateral relations 
that also inform and, in the possibility opened by Wilde and Sedgwick, queer it.  
Cahun and Moore’s relationship as sister-lovers, in addition to Cahun’s dis/identification 
with the persona of her father and his name Schwob (shared by that other prominent literary 
Schwob, her uncle Marcel) responds to the familial possibilities opened up by Sedgwick’s 
avunculate. As Sedgwick writes, “Part of the interest of the avunculate is, as we have seen, that 
its thinkability also renders more thinkable (across and perhaps therefore within generations) the 
                                                
87 For more on these two portraits, see Colvile “Self-representation as symptom” 274. Though 
the observation that Cahun likely based the composition of her portrait on that of her father 
offers rich material for interpretation, I urge caution in approaching the rest of Colvile’s 
argument that interprets Cahun’s portraits as a case of overidentification with the figure of the 
father and, thus, as a symptom of her anorexia.  
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sibling relation” (64). Abigail Solomon-Godeau refers to the step-sisters’ relationship as one of 
“double intimacy,” as step-sisters and lovers, though I assert that what “doubles” their intimacy 
is not the entwining of sisterly and erotic love but rather the coincidence of this unique life 
partnership with artistic collaboration.88 As Solomon-Godeau points out, the doubling of Cahun 
and Moore’s intimacy corresponds to the interest in doubles and mirror images in Cahun’s work. 
So, too, does this doubling testify to other multiplying affiliations between the two; they are 
sister-lovers as well as domestic, artistic, and political partners. This doubling, described by 
Cahun as two becoming one in the Aveux non avenus, represents the impingement of other social 
relations on kinship. Just as Sedgwick points to the usefulness of the diagonal avuncular 
relationship to understanding siblinghood, the feminist psychoanalyst Juliet Mitchell emphasizes 
the importance of tending to these lateral relations in understanding friendship as well as kinship 
and the traditional philosophical division that equates sameness with the masculine and 
difference with the feminine (2-4) In simultaneously shedding their patronyms (Schwob and 
Malherbe) in favor of their androgynous assumed personae (Cahun and Moore), the two reveal a 
unique form of kinship that draws no distinction between spaces of collaborative domestic, 
artistic, and political work and, as discussed in chapter one, collapses the divide between 
difference and sameness.  
 Cahun and Moore’s years on Jersey, from their move from Paris in 1937 to Cahun’s 
death in 1955, offer a rich case study for their collaborations, especially due to the interruption of 
those years by the Nazi occupation. In her detailed historical account of their Resistance work, 
Claire Follain emphasizes the collaborative exigencies not only of distributing anti-Nazi tracts 
                                                
88 The formulation of a “double intimacy,” not easily legible in the context of traditional family 
structures, echoes Susan Suleiman’s description of the marginalization of avant-garde women 
through the image of a “double margin.” See Suleiman.  
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but of composing them, as well (84). If in previous collaborative works, such as the Aveux non 
avenus, Moore’s role was that of collagist or designer, concerned principally with the 
composition of photomontages, in the Resistance tracts that the two wrote and illustrated she 
participates in the writing of the text. Moore knew German and so took on a more active role in 
writing and translating. The Nazis arrested Cahun and Moore for this resistance on 25 July 1944. 
In the first line of “Feuilles détachées du scrapbook,” Cahun writes, “Ce qui n’était qu’un est 
double” (651). The homophonic pun contained in the line (“qu’un” evoking its own double 
“Cahun”) draws attention to Cahun’s regular interlocutor, Moore, as well as to Cahun’s 
heightened sensitivity to names. Cahun sheds her name as that of a singular persona while 
reaffirming her name as that shared by another. Cahun is not “qu’un” (but one); Cahun is rather 
“double” in her collaborative partnership with Moore.  
Cahun has already deployed the trope in her images of mirrors, and in the Aveux non 
avenus, but the insistence on such figures of speech in this document about domestic and 
political life evokes Mitchell’s examination of siblinghood, especially in its explanation of 
sibling narcissism. One sibling, according to Mitchell, inspires both a recognition of sameness 
and of a desire to kill her for having taken one’s place in the family (35-36). There is, however, a 
prohibition against murdering the sibling (what Mitchell calls the law of the mother) and so 
another prohibition, that against sibling incest, reveals how the sibling relationship is one cast 
between love for someone similar to the self and a hate for the one who represents difference 
(39). Here doubling, or even a serial multiplicity, entails at the heart of this queer kinship the 
violent tensions that mark both siblinghood and the work of political resistance. 
 
Cahun and Moore’s Political Performances 
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 In the history of Cahun’s artistic and political engagements, the Nazi Occupation of 
Jersey transforms the domestic domain into a site of political impetus and action. In resisting the 
Nazi Occupation, Cahun and Moore not only responded to a moral conviction against fascist 
oppression, but reacted, as well, to the local realities of such oppression, specifically the 
requisition of part of their estate in 1941. As Follain and Leperlier note, Cahun and Moore took 
advantage of the cemetery that abutted La Rocquaise, watching the funerals of German soldiers 
and leaving tracts in the officer’s cars parked outside their property during the ceremonies 
(Follain 85; Leperlier Claude Cahun 275). La Rocquaise, the “Ferme sans nom,” then, became 
the locus of their secret resistance, which they carried out under the collaborative pen name – the 
nom de guerre – the “Soldat ohne Namen,” or the “Soldier without a Name.” In (as)signing their 
texts to a German soldier, Cahun and Moore hoped to more convincingly argue for – or more 
seductively invite other soldiers to – open sedition against the higher ranks of the Nazi 
administration of Jersey. 
  Cahun and Moore’s artistic practices owe much to their involvement in Parisian theatre 
troupes in the 1920s and 1930s, especially that of Albert-Birot’s Le Plateau. As Tirza True 
Latimer describes, “With Apollinaire, Albert-Birot envisioned a theatre in the round where the 
audience, activated as participants, occupied the center of the dramatic arena” (65). As audience 
members become participants centrally located within the dramatic space, the once passive 
spectator transforms into an active collaborator in the unfolding of the play. Cahun and Moore 
adopt this precept of Albert-Birot’s theatrical practice to their own photographic collaborations. 
The viewer of Cahun’s resistance portrait does not remain a passive spectator, but becomes an 
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active collaborator (here, in the anti-Nazi, anti-Collaborative endeavor) when invited to replicate 
the performance depicted in the portrait or to pass on the resistance tract to others. 
Gayle Zachmann also identifies a unique performative agency in Cahun and Moore’s 
Resistance methods. Zachmann writes, “[T]he diversionary psychological games in the 
resistance practices assume an agency that functions performatively. Cahun conceived the role of 
the resister in the image of a nameless soldier (der Soldat ohne Namen) who would be her voice, 
a voice, and potentially the voice of a collective conscience” (32). Though Zachmann, here, fails 
to recognize that with Moore’s participation, the voice of the Soldat is always already a 
collaborative voice, she does identify the importance of a performative agency in creating a 
“collective conscience.” Zachmann writes of the performative agency of Cahun and Moore’s 
written resistance texts but does not consider the photographic logic that I argue structures the 
agency of their Occupation writings (“Claude Cahun” 30-2). Cahun and Moore do not only 
imagine a collective conscience as a result of their resistance, but a more specific performative 
collaboration in their methods of resistance.  
 If Cahun and Moore’s resistance does build toward a “collective conscience,” they 
cleverly choose the errancy, in Leperlier’s description, of the “Soldat ohne Namen” that 
characterizes their fictional co-conspirator and shared resistance mask. As Leperlier writes, 
“Antithèse exacte du Soldat inconnu – dont on sait ce que Claude Cahun en fait […] –, le Soldat 
sans Nom, le ‘Muet dans la Mêlée’ est par excellence l’Individu errant, jamais à sa place, nulle 
part et partout à la fois, l’inlassable déserteur, plus libre que l’air et contagieux” (279). Leperlier 
refers in this passage to a 1936 photomontage by Cahun in which a soldier squats 
unceremoniously over the flame of the tomb of the unknown soldier in Paris. Anti-nationalist, 
Cahun resists the vocabulary of nationalism in the same way she resists the nomenclature of the 
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patriarchal family. The name of the “Soldat ohne Namen” is not unknown; he does not have a 
name.89 Cahun un-names the soldier in resistance to nationalist narratives, just as, in a Gidean 
gesture, she un-names La Rocquaise in distancing herself from the Family, and just as she un-
names and re-names herself. Through all this work of (un-)naming, Cahun remains the mime, the 
actor of the 1929 portrait, exchanging masks and, more importantly, creating new masks to 
exchange with others. 
Like Cahun’s mime portrait, the performance of resistance captured after the fact in the 
portrait of May1945 is an iterable performance, able to be repeated as proof of its performativity, 
as Austin and Derrida insist. In a move similar to Weiner’s rendering of her subject position as 
transferable to others in the “Open House,” Cahun emphasizes the transferability of her wartime 
experiences to other collaborators in the work of resistance. In Confidences au miroir, she writes, 
“N’est-ce là qu’une confidence personelle? […] Non, ce n’est pas seulement un témoignage 
personnel. C’est un leitmotiv dont les miroirs sont las. Il sert d’indicatif à tous les survivants” 
(573).  Cahun opens the definition of “survivants” to a universalizing vision of those who have 
survived various conditions of human experience, but the primary reference is to those, like her, 
who have survived Nazism. Her autobiographical text is universal, then, in so far as it is 
transferable to others (other résistants, other people of conscience encompassed by Zachmann’s 
“collective conscience”), and is made transferable by Cahun and Moore’s engagement in 
practices of collaborative performativity. Like the black curtain behind Cahun in the mime 
portrait, or the dark entryway of La Rocquaise in the resistance portrait, the named absence of a 
name, the “Soldat ohne Namen,” is a screen not for the nationalist imaginary, but for a 
performance that is, in Leperlier’s description, “plus libre que l’air et contagieux” – that is, a 
                                                
89 Cahun and Moore also referred to the “Soldat ohne Namen” as “Namenlos,” or “Nameless.” 
See Cahun “Confidences” 607. 
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performance of resistance that is contagious, easily spread to and by others, that functions 
performatively through citational transfer.  
In the scheme of photographic invitation, Cahun and Moore’s resistance, though 
undocumented by photographs during the Occupation, is still one of a performed invitation. The 
German texts of their anti-Nazi tracts often included the exhortation “Bitte verbreiten,” which I 
read as the invitation to join in the effort and “Please distribute.” A (secret) contract, 
communicated by clandestine counter-propaganda, structures the performance of resistance. In 
an essay contributed to the catalogue for an exhibition of performance photography, Live Art on 
Camera, O’Dell explores the ways in which a viewer beholds a photograph as well as the ways 
in which a viewer becomes beholden to a photograph. O’Dell proceeds to interrogate the power 
relations that derive from the connotations of “behold”; she asks, “Who is in charge when we 
look at these photographs? Where does the obligation of interpretation lie? To whom are we, as 
viewers, bound by our interpretations?” (30). Like the invitation that initiates host and guest into 
a contractual space of unstable, circulating subject positions, O’Dell observes that photographs 
of performances similarly inaugurate a set of unstable subject positions. The viewer is, thus, 
beholden to the same object that she beholds. 
In both O’Dell’s formulation and in Cahun and Moore’s practice, the imperative to 
interpret, to respond to the demands of beholdenness set out by the image, passes from one 
contractual party to another by hand. Like the photographic prints in the exhibition space 
analyzed by O’Dell, the anti-Nazi tract also circulated by hand, from Cahun and Moore’s touch 
to the touch of a German soldier. The dependence on touch of this contract of invitation allows 
an analogy between performance documents of otherwise different orders: the “first-hand” 
photographs of live performances analyzed by O’Dell, the written tracts by Cahun and Moore, 
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and the portrait of Cahun that restages her resistance performance after the fact. O’Dell 
introduces the importance of the haptic relationship of viewer to photograph in a brief exposition 
of Martin Heidegger’s terms “present-at-hand” (vorhanden) and “ready-to-hand” (zuhanden). In 
O’Dell’s explanation, “[Heidegger] uses the term ‘present-at-hand’ to describe those things right 
in front of us that we consciously pay attention to, while ‘ready-to-hand might encompass those 
very same things but, given our active involvement with or use of them, those things seemingly 
fade away into the activities in which we engage them” (35-6). O’Dell asserts that the 
performance photographs that implicate the viewer by their imperative to behold are not just 
visual works depicting or documenting performance, but are performance works “ready-to-hand” 
themselves. These images demand handling to be seen. The result of this coincidence of the 
visual and the haptic in Cahun’s work is the transference of a performative agency to interpret – 
the agency to enter into the contractual space of the photograph and take up its performance.  
In sections of “Feuilles détachées du scrap-book,” a preparatory manuscript for the later, 
unfinished Le Muet dans la Mêlée, Cahun writes of her experiences with Moore in the Nazi 
prison on Jersey. Like the relationships between host and guest and between familial generations 
in the domestic space, the relationship between prisoner and prison guard do not remain stable in 
Cahun’s recounting of her imprisonment with Moore. Moore orders the guard to open her cell 
and allow her to pass into the cells of other prisoners, to share news or other encouragements, 
and Cahun befriends even other German soldiers, imprisoned for insubordination. Addressing 
Moore, Cahun writes, “Tu avais ordonné à Otto (le geôlier) d’ouvrir la porte de ‘Willy,’ le marin 
norvégien […] Otto ouvrit la porte; il nous laissa parler à Willy” (652). The prisoner (Moore) 
becomes, if momentarily, master of the prison, giving instruction to her jailer. From Moore’s 
audacity, a young German prisoner, a soldier named Kurt Gunther, takes inspiration. Cahun 
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recounts that on the day of his transfer from the prison, Kurt acts as Moore had acted, ordering 
the guard Otto to open the door to Cahun and Moore’s cell so that he might say goodbye. Cahun 
writes of the jailer’s actions, “Otto, par prudence, avait fermé la porte. Il nous garait en se garant 
lui-même” (653). Prisoner and guard find some equality in this moment, each protected from his 
or her transgression of the prison’s regulations by complicit, illicit behavior. 
Cahun memorializes the resistance friendships that she and Moore made in prison 
through a metaphoric slippage between photographic image and handwritten text. The image of 
Kurt remains only in Cahun’s memory once he leaves the prison. But, Cahun describes this 
memory-image as if it were a photograph: “Je le vis face au nord, face au jour tombant de la 
fente poussiéreuse et barrée: notre fenêtre [….] Le plafond, les murs blancs diffusaient une 
lumière par hasard excellente [….] Elles fixèrent l’image avec une précision chimique” (653). 
Not only does her memory function like photographic paper, sensitive to the chemical processes 
of photographic development, but the photographic quality of the memory-image makes Kurt’s 
likeness even more precise, almost as if he were more present for this photographic precision. In 
remembering Kurt’s image, Cahun not only focuses attention on what she does not have (a real 
photograph of Kurt) but also on what she does possess (notes written in pencil by Kurt and 
slipped under her cell door). However, the note passed by hand, written in the hand of Kurt, will 
never coincide with the fantasized photograph. 
In “Feuilles détachées du scrap-book,” Cahun gestures subtly toward the slippage 
between written counter-propaganda tract and photograph in her post-Occupation writings. In an 
associated passage in this text, the lack of a photograph of Kurt calls attention to the photograph 
Cahun does possess of another wartime friend, the Russian Michael Ionrablo. Of the mental 
image Cahun holds of Kurt, she writes, “Je le vois encore aujourd’hui aussi nettement que je vois 
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Michael Ionrablo que j’ai vu bien des fois […] et dont j’ai la photo d’identité près de moi [….] Il 
l’a signée au crayon […]” (653). Cahun continues in this passage to remark upon the specifically 
Russian writing on the back of the photo, a short text in Ionrablo’s native language. And yet, the 
equation between Ionrablo’s photograph and the imagined photograph of Kurt in this passage 
formalizes the metaphoric use of the photographic image, while tying the photograph (as real 
object as well as metaphoric image) to the metonymical relationship of the friend’s hand(writing) 
to the friend’s writing hand, and thus to his now absent body. In Hervé Guibert’s poetic 
theorizing of photography, L’Image fantôme, the ideal photograph, like the photographic image 
of Kurt, is equally a fantasy – a photograph that fails to develop, while remaining no less present 
in the beholder’s mind. 
Cahun grants the personal ID photo of Ionrablo a preciosity that speaks to the present-
ness it signifies for her, unique in the haptic connection it permits to the lost companion in 
resistance. But, she grants it, as well, a transferability that allows her to make connections to 
other fantasized images and other forms of portraiture (such as the unique portraiture of one’s 
handwriting). The photographs circulate, attesting to the noble, anti-Nazi performances of these 
résistants and saboteurs. Cahun’s portrait as résistante wavers, too, between the absence and 
presence of its subject. At once a testament to the present-ness of Cahun in her performance of 
resistance and a memorial to a performance that can never truly be represented, the portrait in the 
doorframe of La Rocquaise instead invites the beholder into the performative work of the image. 
Neither an index of a past performance, nor a total fiction, the image operates between the realms 
of fantasy and materiality, encouraging the slippages between haptic and imagined seizings of 
the document – encouraging, as well, the perpetual circulation of the invitation to resistance, 
 146 
inviting the viewer into the “Ferme sans nom” to participate in the persona of the “Soldat ohne 
Namen.” 
 
Summering with “SIS KIND:” Weiner’s Summer Houses 
 
Unlike Cahun’s writings about the purchase of La Rocquaise, Weiner’s short book 
Nijole’s House establishes a domestic space as not owned by its occupant. The title alerts readers 
to Weiner’s contingent relationship to the space in which she composes her book; the illustration 
of a door on the book’s front cover depicts the entrance to Nijole’s house, and not to Weiner’s 
apartment in New York City. Published in 1981, Nijole’s House is one of three books by Weiner 
from the1980s that primarily deal with Weiner’s relationship to and care for her aging mother 
and aunt. The other books in this series include Spoke (1984) and Page, published posthumously 
in 2002. In Spoke and Page, Weiner again writes from a perspective of dislocation, recounting 
events that passed while spending summers at her mother’s house in Providence, Rhode Island. 
Weiner often spent summers at her mother’s home, as well as other vacations in rented houses in 
upstate New York.90  
As Weiner recounts her experience of composition in Nijole’s House, the state of 
dispossession – of not owning the home – in which she finds herself as a guest in Nijole’s house 
facilitates the composition of her text. She writes: 
  JUST BEHAVE YOURSELF 
 Leave September out of this 
                                                
90 Weiner’s correspondence in the Archive for New Poetry at the Mandeville Special Collections 
(University of California-San Diego) attests to the significance of these stints away from her own 
apartment in New York City. Aside from writing in the journals that she would later edit to 
publish as Little Books/Indians, Nijole’s House, Spoke, and elsewhere, Weiner also engaged in 
written correspondence by letter or postcard with friends in the city. 
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 Nijole’s is wonderful   her house it is 
 that lets us write IT IN period please 
Whereas composition in the later works Spoke and Page begins to diverge from that of Weiner’s 
clair-style period, Weiner’s compositional strategy in Nijole’s House still documents Weiner’s 
experience of “clairvoyance,” her term for her ability to receive messages through visual 
hallucinations.91 As such, the capital words that begin the cited passage arrive as visual messages 
on Weiner’s forehead or page. “JUST BEHAVE YOURSELF,” then, reads as an instruction 
given to Weiner, perhaps to behave herself as guest in another’s home. Thus behaving herself, 
and “leav[ing] September out of this” as the time she will leave her summer rental to return to 
city life, Weiner is permitted by her environment to compose her text. The sense of permission 
granted by the house that “lets us write” seems to arise from Weiner’s subordinate status as 
houseguest, and not as owner. Weiner’s use of “clairvoyance,” thus, departs from the word’s 
etymological relationship to “clear” and notions of clarity. Rather, as Weiner’s texts and 
performances reveal, she uses the term to relate intense psychic experience that often resists 
clarity.  Here, too, Weiner’s simultaneous position within the confines of house and language 
recall Cahun’s portrait in the armoire in which the body of the artist conforms to and exceeds the 
domestic space containing it. Just as naming in Cahun’s work represents the architectural 
scaffolding of language that Nathanaël describes, instruction, here in Weiner’s work, encloses 
Weiner’s body in language, and not only because Weiner emphasizes the appearance of language 
on her own body in her clair-style writings. In entering into Nijole’s house, Weiner enters into 
the conditions of (rental) instruction and of her received words. 
                                                
91 As she reminds the reader in her introduction to Nijole’s House, “All the words in this book 
were seen by Hannah Weiner first on her forehead […] in several word lines, as indicated by the 
line breaks. [….] The words printed in the text as capitals were seen on her forehead as larger 
script VERY BIG WORDS or were seen on the page in big print interrupting the line that she 
was then writing down” (n.p.).  
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 Weiner’s interest in instruction as a discursive mode precedes the development of the 
clair-style. For two examples of this thematic preoccupation in Weiner’s earlier performance 
works, her intervention at the 1970 “Saturday Afternoon Show” and a telegram sent as 
contribution to an exhibit at Oberlin College in the same year attest to the importance of 
instructional language to structure or comprise the artwork. Weiner hosted a series of 
performance interventions by various artists, including Vito Acconci and Adrian Piper, under the 
title the “Saturday Afternoon Show” at Max’s Kansas City. Though little documentation of the 
event remains, John Perreault, one of Weiner’s collaborators, wrote in a review 
contemporaneous with the performances that Weiner read aloud instructions to the waitresses at 
the bar for her contribution (Perreault). The work is the inverse of the clair-style, or 
“clairvoyantly”-received, instructions that would soon follow in Weiner’s poetic innovations: 
Weiner gives instructions rather than receive them. Invited to participate in the Oberlin College 
exhibit, “Art in the Mind,” Weiner was obliged to send a telegram to the exhibit’s curator due to 
the U.S. Postal Service strike of March 1970. Mimicking the technological conventions of an 
earlier period in the history of the telegram, the missive began, “Mail Strike STOP Please 
Reproduce This Telegram STOP.”92 The rest of the message included one instruction for the 
viewer: “I ask the students faculty and staff of Oberlin College and Allen Memorial Art Museum 
for the period of the show April 17 to May 12 1970 to overcome a fear.” Not only does Weiner’s 
telegram recall other instruction-based Fluxus works as Yoko Ono’s 1964 book of instructional 
                                                
92 Indeed, the use of “STOP” seems to have been a formal device chosen by Weiner, and not one 
required for the transcription of the message, as the rest of the telegram is printed in a variable 
typeset that does not require “STOP” to indicate the end of a line. Indeed, in the first line of the 
telegram, “STOP” does not offer a normative punctuation to the reader; the line keeps running 




event scores Grapefruit or the variety of Jackson Mac Low’s event scores, but it also 
foreshadows the syntactical patterns of Weiner’s later clair-style.93 The imperative mode (“stop”) 
punctuates the telegram in a disruption of the message’s information-rich syntax similar to the 
interruption “IT IN” or the verbal reference to a period in the passage from Nijole’s House 
above.  
In the writings that both precede and follow Nijole’s House, of course, Weiner is not the 
pronouncer of instruction, but rather the receiver of instruction. As seen in the text most 
exemplary of her clair-style, the Clairvoyant Journal, these instructions arrive as “seen” words 
received from outside voices and often comment on the process of composition itself. In Nijole’s 
House, instructions intervene at the level of day-to-day reality. Weiner writes, 
 it is much clearer here than DON’T PRETEND 
 in the city    Nijole’s house is ours 
 until Thursday when we must leave 
 with instructions    NO WEEKEND IT SAYS 
 Just keep the kitchen clean 
These are not the instructions of which words to write, but rather the quotidian concerns of 
respecting a rental agreement (not to extend past Thursday) and of cleaning up after oneself. Like 
in Derrida’s dissolving of the distinction between host and guest, Weiner plays a variety of roles 
as narrator of Nijole’s House. She is guest of Nijole but host to Nijole’s clairvoyantly received 
words. Weiner writes, “Hannah we write a very long book in one week / Nijole projects on us 
[…]” Though Nijole may be host to Weiner as landlord of the house, Weiner’s text becomes host 
to Nijole’s messages. The relationship remains a troubled one. Weiner acknowledges the rental 
instructions, and faithfully (if fitfully) records the received messages, but at the end of her stay 
she violates the codes of a polite houseguest: 
                                                
93 Weiner’s major clair-style work, the Clairvoyant Journal, makes reference to Ono’s 
Grapefruit and to Weiner’s friendship with Mac Low. See Clairvoyant Journal 8 and 4. 
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  Hannah Nijole is quite surprised at us 
  because we sit silently on orders 
  sit silently for when 
  when it is time 
  hungry and no beans 
  it is our own house next we 
  live in 
In this passage, silence no longer marks the received instructions but rather Weiner’s 
intransigence in violating the instructions. She indicates that she resists the instruction to record 
received words, and when she moves out of Nijole’s house, she does not replenish the pantry but 
leaves a bare kitchen for her host’s return.  
 In Nijole’s House, gender inflects Weiner’s relationship to both inhabiting and writing in 
domestic space. In the second part of the book, which finds Weiner turning attention to her 
political allegiance to the American Indian Movement, Weiner alludes to her position writing in 
solidarity with the male leaders of the Movement, while also writing in a literary context 
dominated by white men (namely, Language poetry). Weiner refers to these others, often those 
who send her messages, as “the boys.” In Spoke, the “boys” return: “Im like the language boys 
by also by name included should be changed” (8). In this brief passage, Weiner draws out the 
paradox of her own relationship to the kind of writing found in L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, a 
magazine to which she contributed poetry and essays. Edited by Charles Bernstein and Bruce 
Andrews from 1978 to 1982, the journal coalesced a movement in experimental writing that took 
the journal’s name as its own. In 1982 Bernstein edited a Paris Review sampler of work by 
writers associated with the movement, including excerpts from Weiner’s Spoke. Bernstein, in his 
introduction to the section, describes precepts for this kind of writing that concern the ideologies 
and material supports that make all writing legible as communication. Bernstein writes, “It’s as if 
a new scanning of consciousness were possible by introduction of the music of its constituting. 
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And by this means to make audible the thinking field: to get access to the lens (the mixed 
metaphor is again ideology) through which the world’s meanings are formed into audibilities” 
(“Language Sampler: Introduction” 75).  
While Weiner’s work does engage with the ideologies and material supports that allow 
communication in language, Weiner maintains a distance from the group. In the passage from 
Spoke cited above, Weiner is like these boys (Weiner’s friends, Bernstein, Bruce Andrews, Ron 
Silliman), but only like them. She intimates that a name “should be changed,” perhaps the name 
of Language poetry if she is to consider herself properly amongst its practitioners. The repeated 
use of the playfully gendered, but still exclusionary, “boys” for her “silent” collaborators and 
friends points to gender as one complicating factor for Weiner’s complete self-identification with 
the Language group. The moniker, “the language boys,” also implies a distinction drawn on the 
basis of Weiner’s age, as she was twenty-two years Bernstein’ senior. The following passage in 
Spoke makes the gendered tension more explicit: “I’m like the language boys should be  girls 
obey orders of course” (9). Of course, Weiner “obeys orders” as a defining feature of her poetics, 
but this passage does not resist the double reference to a gendered socializing of “girls” (an 
ironic, pointed usage given Weiner’s age at the time of writing Spoke) in a patriarchal world. 
Before turning my attention to the imbrication of the domestic and the political in both Weiner 
and Cahun’s work, I would like to follow Weiner’s relationship to gender, especially in terms of 
family relations, into the domestic spaces of Spoke and Page.  
 Like Cahun’s family geometry, reorganized by shifting parental, avuncular, and sibling 
relations, Weiner’s family dramas, as recorded in Spoke and Page, shift their focus to that of the 
relationship between herself, her mother, and her aunt. In an afterword to the posthumously 
published Page, Charles Bernstein clarifies the biographical context of these works of the same 
 152 
period as Nijole’s House. He confirms the summers Weiner regularly spent in her mother’s home 
in Providence, and informs the reader that Weiner’s mother and aunt Reka died within months of 
each other, her mother passing in September 1984 and Reka in January 1985. But, like the 
conflicting positions of hospitality revealed in Derrida’s uncovering of the particular hostilities 
of hospitality, the maternal and sisterly bonds in Spoke are not always gentle ones. 
 As caregiver to her aging mother, Weiner is subject to certain codes of instruction. Her 
mother acts as one of her “silent teachers.” Weiner writes in the capitals denoting clairvoyantly 
received language: “HELP REKA IN THE KITCHEN     SIS KIND / AND DON’T HOLD 
ONTO YOUR MOTHER FIRST” (32). Unlike the time spent by Weiner in Nijole’s house, the 
months spent at Weiner’s mother’s home require work outside of the composition of Weiner’s 
poetry notebooks. In the collaborative space of domestic caregiving, Weiner’s written work 
opens further to the collaborative voices of clairvoyant writing. She must obey her mother in 
daily life (helping in the kitchen) just as she must obey in composing her poetry (recording the 
mother’s message in capital letters). The relationship between Weiner and the sisters is not an 
altogether easy one: “it’s the old age Reka insane I get caught asylum drinking   I am / 
suffragette   Peggy has nurse an talk     to the hurts Reka idea / mother resents my being here just 
a little bit stupid because of […]” (38). In this short but complicated passage, Weiner hints at 
conflict with her aunt, her own problem with drinking, the intervention of her friend Peggy (de 
Coursey, a performance collaborator), and the complicated emotions of mother for adult 
daughter.  
In the above passage, the syntactical fluidity that situates both Weiner’s “I” and Reka in 
the same line hints, as well, at an equivalence drawn between these two personages. Weiner’s 
family nicknames, in Spoke, supplement Weiner’s habitual use of self-address in her work, either 
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as received voices addressing her as “you” or as her use of her name and plural pronouns to refer 
to herself. “Toots,” used sparingly in Spoke and Page, was a nickname bestowed on Weiner by 
her father; in these two books, her other nickname “Sis” takes precedence. Additionally, the use 
of “sis” places Weiner in relationship to her brother, who also appears periodically throughout 
Spoke, but also within the other sisterly relationship of the book, that one shared between 
Weiner’s mother and Reka. In a similar passage, Weiner writes of a diet plan, recalling her 
interest in appetite and eating in the pre-clair-style work The Fast: 
      (80) 
Weiner’s mise-en-page contributes to the similar positioning of Weiner and Reka as sisters. 
Using the “we” that often replaces “I” in her texts, Weiner goes on to reference Reka in the same 
syntactical phrase. Does Weiner attribute her weight loss to Reka’s philosophy, the dropped 
“philosophy” thus indicating the diet as possessed by “Aunt Reka,” whose name sits atop it on 
the page? Or do both Weiner and Reka lose three pounds to “becomes [sic] thin”? As Sedgwick 
notes, “Part of the interest of the avunculate is […] that its thinkability also renders more 
thinkable (across and perhaps therefore within generations) the sibling relation” (64). Does 
Weiner’s tension with her aunt, as rendered in Spoke, signal a simultaneous initiation into an 
intergenerational sibling relationship (one of rivalry, perhaps) with the mother and the aunt? 
 The text of both Spoke and Page indicates exactly that intergenerational family structure, 
dominated by the avuncular organization under the name of the aunt or the sister. In the 
autobiographical passages of Page, as well, Weiner repeats the phrase “switch sisters,” as if the 
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sibling position were transferrable, like the positions of host and guest on the Open House 
invitation. In a following long passage of Page, Weiner again collapses the role of sister and 
daughter into the moniker “sis.” She begins the description of shared sibling grief for the 
mother’s death: “power simple   another page   say mother died / simple starpiece   one page   
biglittle   holds / the language together […]” (13). The portemanteau “biglittle” refers back to 
“sis,” as Weiner was her little brother’s big sister. The passage concludes: “[…] big listen 
sometime / sis your   I think I am rich constantly / so   always together stupid only   brothers.”  
In Nijole’s House, in a passage following Weiner’s discussion of Reka’s diet plan, 
Weiner worries about her status as an unmarried, middle-aged woman: 
      (81) 
Weiner’s close friend Bernadette (Mayer) leaves “us” behind for marriage. Again, the plural 
pronoun refers to Weiner’s clairvoyant speaking subject but operates ambiguously enough in the 
passage to refer to those other unmarried women, as well: Weiner’s mother and Aunt Reka. The 
domestic space of sisterly relations demands a sacrifice. The sisters (at least Weiner and Reka 
who most prominently occupy that sibling position in Spoke) remain childless and unmarried. 
The passage, characteristically for Weiner’s texts, then transforms into a mix of observations 
about Weiner’s relationship with her mother and comparisons of Weiner and Mayer to 
masculinized political figures (wartime leaders and hunger strikers). As in Cahun’s portraits and 
late autobiographical writings, a political space dominated by men, thus, overlays the domestic 
 155 
space, organized though it is by an avuncular, anti-patriarchal transformation of the terms of 
familial positions inaugurated by invitation and its instructions for host and guest.  
 
Signing the Event: Weiner and Domestic, Political Protest 
 
 The shifting positions of names, voices, and authority also punctuates Weiner’s 
inscription of her political engagements into her literary works. In Spoke, references to and 
appropriation of language from the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, which established the Sioux 
reservations in what was then the Dakota Territories, recur throughout the text and expand the 
play of host and guest from Derrida’s reading of the terms of hospitality to those the colonized 
and colonizer in this political context. Weiner briefly discusses her relationship to this history 
and the American Indian Movement (AIM) in an interview with Charles Bernstein; in her last 
comment in the interview, she reports, “I’ve been with Indians for twenty years. And not only 
with the people who are the medicine people, some of whom’ve become healers, but also with 
some of whom’re in the American Indian Movement. There’s now, well I guess they work too in 
some way or another, and I keep in touch with them fairly frequently by phone” (164). For 
Weiner, Native American healers serve as “silent teachers,” and Native American activists serve 
as compatriots and friends.94 Like Weiner’s relationship to clairvoyant language that arrives free 
of a present speaking subject/body, she defines her relationship to these activists as primarily 
mediated by the telephone, which also separates language from the speaking body. Weiner’s 
engagement with AIM had become a major thematic concern in 1980’s Little Books/Indians, but 
                                                
94 “Silent teachers” is a corollary term to the “seen” voices. Coined later in Weiner’s career, the 
“silent teachers” take up the work of clairvoyance after the voices of the clair-style period cease. 
For Weiner’s own sketch of the main periods of her career, see Weiner “HANNAH WEINER    
SILENT TEACHER” in Silent teachers/ remembered sequel 69. 
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she stages her political sympathies in Spoke, as well, in which an interest in the circulation of the 
author’s signature coincides with her textual appropriation of the Fort Laramie treaty – a legal 
document validated by its signatures. 
In Spoke, however, the treaty (another kind of contract, like invitation or O’Dell’s 
performance photograph) does not include the name of the author, “Hannah,” in its list of 
signatories. In a passage in which she records the names of those who signed the Laramie treaty, 
Weiner’s name appears displaced from the text of the treaty in the fragment, “Hannah they don’t 
laugh at it the above” (53). Mimicking the language of legalistic designation – “the above” to 
refer to those who “signed” the treaty included above in her own text – Weiner also gestures 
toward the distance between her signature and the authorial power of these other, historical 
names. Displacing her own presence further from the collaged text of the treaty, in an entry 
labeled “June 23 Tues,” Weiner instead signs her first name in cursive script beneath a passage 
admonishing herself for her smoking habits and reminding her to call Jimmie Durham, an artist 
and AIM activist. The name signed “Hannah” disrupts the already fractured typesetting of Spoke, 
challenging Weiner’s estrangement of the authorial voice by including a handwritten trace of the 
author’s presence, but only insofar as it attests to the presence of the author in the events of her 
diaristic entry and not in the signing of the Fort Laramie treaty where it might otherwise belong. 
The name, then, acquires an indexical status in Weiner’s texts, especially Spoke, though 
not one that goes unchallenged. In a statement of her poetics, “Mostly about the Sentence,” 
Weiner describes her use of names as a method for destroying or depersonalizing the ego of the 
person named. She writes, “Little Books / Indians is about people, and names names. I often refer 
to myself in the third person, calling myself Sis or Hannah, often misspelled (destroy the ego 
attachment to the name)” (133). The same uses of the names “Sis” and “Hannah” occur in Spoke, 
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as well as in earlier works preceding Little Books / Indians. Though the signature does not attach 
itself properly to the legal document of the treaty in Spoke, Weiner’s signature does appear on a 
reproduction of a letter from the Hopi Nation to the United Nations in 1982.95 This letter makes 
requests for the recognition of the Hopi people at the United Nations. Below the list of signers, 
Weiner adds her own name, written in multiple colors of colored pencil, as “Hannah theselfsame 
Weiner.” Weiner’s earliest hallucinations were pre-linguistic and included physical sensations 
and visions of color fields, as is especially evident in 1970’s The Fast. This signature recalls 
those color visions while also retaining the later style of “seen” words with the imposition of the 
reflexive phrase “theselfsame” between first and last name. But, Weiner’s texts, performances, 
and images challenge any stable self, or “theselfsame.” The signature affixed to the end of the 
Hopi letter attempts a brief stability by offering a trace of the artist’s presence, only to escape it 
by returning to the unstable absence of a speaking subject that the clair-style represents.  
As evidenced in Nathanael’s reading of Cahun’s portraits and texts, language can 
scaffold the body, enclosing it as does an architectural form. Though this scaffold is contingent 
and unable to offer true stability in Weiner’s texts, Weiner stages this scaffolding of her body in 
language on the cover of her Clairvoyant Journal with her portrait taken by Tom Ahern. In the 
photograph, across her forehead, read the words “I SEE WORDS.” As Weiner reiterates of her 
clairvoyant practice in the introduction to Spoke, “All these on my forehead words are seen” (6). 
Here, language literally inscribes itself on the surface of her body. As I have shown in both 
Nijole’s House and Spoke, the inhabiting of specific houses facilitates Weiner’s writing process, 
allowing her a physical space and social context in which to receive the clairvoyant messages 
that contribute to the composition of her texts. Weiner finds herself enclosed both in language 
                                                
95 This letter can be found in Charles Bernstein’s papers in the Mandeville Special Collections at 
UC-San Diego. See Weiner “To the General Assembly of the United Nations.” 
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and in the house, and these two enclosures undergo a metonymical slippage in the structure of 
Weiner’s work as domestic and linguistic space overlap. To recall the example of Nijole’s 
House, Weiner receives two types of instruction: messages from outside sources that determine 
the composition of her text as well as written guidelines from Nijole on how to properly inhabit 
the house as a renter.96 The political language of the Fort Laramie treaty offers another example 
of this “scaffolding,” one that reveals the domestic space as also already a political one. 
In Weiner’s texts, the enclosing forms of language and architecture manifest in the 
political/poetic pun she constructs around the “sentence.” The pun on the word “sentence” as 
poetic unit and/or prison sentence becomes most evident in juxtaposing readings of Spoke and 
Little Books / Indians. Weiner’s compulsion to finish the poetic sentence is contested by the 
interruption of her visions throughout her clair-style work. In Little Books / Indians, as in 
previous works like the Clairvoyant Journal, Weiner instructs herself to stop short, “don’t 
continue with this sentence” (8). In another passage, the “seen” words of the clair-style barrage 
her with instructions to do the opposite and to complete the sentence, as if taunting her: “A 
CONTINUE / SENTENCE / little / completed sentence” (22).97 In Little Books / Indians, 
composed in a series of small composition books, Weiner announces her allegiance to the 
American Indian Movement, shifting the meaning of “sentence” from its poetic to penal context. 
The book follows the fate of one of the movement’s leaders, Leonard Pelletier, who in 1977 was 
sentenced to two life terms in prison without definitive evidence for the 1975 killing of two FBI 
                                                
96 The description of language as interacting with a room recalls Jack Spicer’s description of his 
own poetics, with which Weiner would have been familiar. In Spicer’s statement of poetics, 
aliens send him messages that interact with the “furniture,” or memories and poetic structures 
already in the poet’s mind, of his mind to create the poem. See Spicer. 
 
97 In this clairvoyant passage, the words “completed sentence” are typeset on a diagonal to mimic 
the spatial arrangement in which they appeared to Weiner. 
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agents at the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota.98 The sentence, thus, operates in 
the text as a unit of destabilized poetic composition as well as reference to Pelletier’s prison 
sentence.  
The attribution of clairvoyant voices in Little Books / Indians draws out the stakes of this 
pun. In “Little Book 124,” Weiner channels the voice of AIM leader Russell Means along with 
her own voice: “Cut This Hannah Short / who stands with / w r i t i n g / a / PENALTY / pencil 
in her hand / dont indent there is a penalty / for writing” (37). Means’ voice intervenes in the 
passage to remind Weiner that writing in the voice of AIM members has political consequences, 
or “a / PENALTY.” Later, in “Little Book 137,” Weiner channels the voice of Pelletier who 
projects his words to Weiner from prison: “We learn / Hannah its obvious / isn’t it / DONST 
SPEAK / its our knowledge” (70). The Leonard voice in capital letters seems to mimic the 
Hannah voice from the “124” passage above; typos or spelling errors mark both commands to 
“dont indent” and “DONST SPEAK.” But, while Weiner struggles with writing her sentence, it 
is Pelletier who must live out a contested sentence in prison. The penalty for producing political 
speech, in writing or speaking, as Means’s and Pelletier’s voices point out in this passage, can be 
more severe than a prison of language.  
Notably, in another passage from “137,” the Hannah and Leonard voices overlap at a 
point of somatic experience. Weiner writes, “Leonard is speaking / to us in our / silence dear / 
stupid / ands we listen / Hannahs youre / VERY HUNGRY” (69). With the intrusion of the 
capitalized Leonard voice at the end of the passage, in a syntactic phrasing that maintains the 
integrity of the Hannah voice, the two voices form a collaborative voice. As the voices in the text 
converge on “VERY HUNGRY,” the plural pronoun “we” destabilizes the separation between 
                                                
98 For these details, see Goldman 144. 
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Leonard, “Hannahs” (sic), and other possible interlocutors (including the reader). Leonard might 
be hungry in prison but his voice transfers this bodily experience to Hannah. The mechanism of 
collaboration, here, is somatic and intertextual one: the passage refers to Weiner’s early text, The 
Fast, in which she tracked her experience of not eating during one of her first, prolonged periods 
of hallucination. Clairvoyant language in Weiner’s work reveals the mediation of subjectivity in 
language, proposing a collective or collaborative language that undoes the authority of 
subjectivity, while also showing the body to be mediated by language. Like Cahun’s body, which 
can inhabit La Rocquaise only after she renames the estate, Weiner’s body also needs language 
so that her body can appear, or become legible, in the space of composition. In Nijole’s House 
and Spoke, as discussed above, this language operates through instruction, recalling the portrait 
of Cahun in her windowsill, a portrait in which Cahun simultaneously luxuriates within the 
domestic space (a sun-washed window seat) and foreshadows her imprisonment (the iron cross-
hatching of the window frame).  
From the merging of voices in Weiner’s later texts, as in Little Books/Indians, Judith 
Goldman draws out a principle of “indeterminacy” crucial to a reading of Weiner’s work. In her 
article “Hannah=hannaH: Politics, Ethics, and Clairvoyance in the Work of Hannah Weiner,” 
Goldman remarks on the shift in clairvoyant strategies between the foundational Clairvoyant 
Journal and subsequent works as Spoke and Little Books/Indians. Goldman thus cites Weiner in 
her statement of poetics, “Mostly about the Sentence”: “Since [Clairvoyant Journal] all of my 
books are written for one voice, though dis-continued and interrupted” (Weiner “Mostly” 127, 
qtd in Goldman 146-7). For Goldman, this shift in poetic process marks a departure from the 
imbrication of Weiner’s conscious agency in the text for a process more grounded in a principle 
of automatism, or Weiner’s “clairvoyance.” The performance of these texts illustrates Goldman’s 
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observation, as the Journal was staged with three actors contributing to the reading whereas 
Weiner’s readings of such later works as Little Books/Indians relied more on the traditional 
univocal format of a poetry reading.  
In the merging of voices, then, Weiner asserts what Goldman terms an “indifference to 
difference.” If the formatting of clairvoyant texts no longer works as a performance script for 
multiple voices as it did in the Journal, then, as Goldman writes, “this clairvoyant writing 
produces a third position that declares a certain indifference between opposites” (150). This 
“indifference of difference” can only lead to an indeterminacy of self, and one that, in the 
political context of Little Books/Indians, provides an ethical underpinning to guard against 
appropriation of another’s political position (here, the appropriation of the Native American 
position by a white poet). Goldman’s analysis continues to describe this third “clairvoyant” 
position in terms reminiscent of descriptions of the photograph: “Having established the 
indifference of difference, Weiner links it to clairvoyance, the indeterminate phenomenon of 
seeing words both there and not there” (150). In order to speak, then, as a white woman on 
behalf of members of AIM, such as the imprisoned Pelletier, Weiner depended upon the 
indeterminacy of her text to combat any charge of political appropriation of Pelletier’s language. 
In Weiner’s texts, Pelletier is both “there and not there” just as she – Weiner, the author – is both 
“there and not there.” 
Goldman, thus, assigns clairvoyance the status of primary strategy for conveying 
indeterminacy, but in the pun on “sentence” and the analogy established between the confines of 
language and the house, or domestic space, a previous strategy comes to the fore. The 
photographic invitation, as a performative photograph, in fact, subtends clairvoyance’s reliance 
on the unsettled ontological positions of “there” and “not there.” In the deconstructed terms of 
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hospitality, Weiner is both host to Pelletier’s language and hostage to it; Pelletier is both 
speaking subject, in the text, but equally subject to it. The body of the performer in the 
photograph is indexical trace, evidence of a unique past presence, but also a performative pose to 
be appropriated and reiterated in the space of future performances. In “Mostly about the 
Sentence,” Weiner writes of the role of the reader, or audience, in such a performance, “The 
sentence is unfinished because the mind of the reader or listener supplies the answer (the end) 
either through telepathically reading the other’s mind, or through common knowledge. Or 
perhaps the reader involves himself with his own ending, which is equally valid” (129). 
Curiously in this passage, Weiner does not concede the force of the imperative mode she so often 
employs in her texts. The reader does not simply supply the ending, but is compelled to do so by 
the commands, or instructions, of the text itself. The reader does not operate self-reflexively, 
choosing to involve him or herself, but is compelled by the text to become involved in its 
completion. Like the performative invitation to the “Open House,” clairvoyant texts like Little 
Books / Indians and Spoke are performative texts that invite the reader into a domestic/political 





Like Weiner’s performances and texts, which require a participant to complete the work 
once the invitation to read or look is accepted, Cahun’s texts and portraits from the post-
Occupation period invite the same textual and performative collaboration. In Confidences au 
miroir, Cahun recounts her return to La Rocquaise after her imprisonment with Moore. She 
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writes, “Le rideau tombé sur vos misérables victoires… en vain j’en voudrais soupirer d’aise… 
le rideau se lève sur une liberté de décombres…” (588). Cahun describes her liberty not only as 
marred by the ruins of wartime suffering – a liberty of ruins (“décombres”) forces her to revise 
melancholically her proud resistance victories as “misérables” – but also as beginning a new 
“act.” The curtain falls on the stage of the Occupation, Resistance, and her imprisonment with 
Moore. She addresses herself with an estranging “vous” (“vos misérables victoires”) as Weiner 
addresses herself in the third person. Though, with this “vous,” the plurality of Cahun’s 
collaborations comes to the fore, as well. She memorializes a group of collaborators in her text, 
addressing herself in addition to other résistant(e)s.  Like Weiner’s sentence that remains 
unfinished, left for the reader to complete, Cahun’s “Confidences” also remain unfinished. She 
concludes the text with this passage: “Née-conditionnée Cassandre pouvais-je donc penser 
autrement qu’au futur? Fille du fils au conditionnel antérieur. Née-conditionnée Cassandre on ne 
saurait avoir. Elle a toutes ses griffes” (623). Her last sentence remains unpunctuated, open to the 
future – to future readers, future experiences, future performances. For Cahun and Weiner, 
clairvoyance – here, the clairvoyance of war-doomed Cassandra whose warnings went unheeded 
by the Trojans – is the expression of this openness to collaboration. 
The photographs with which I introduced the contractual structures of invitation into this 
chapter’s analyses do not simply represent constative utterances – that is, they do not simply 
describe a scene or event. Instead, they transform the surface objectivity and indexicality of the 
photograph into a performative utterance, albeit a visual utterance (implying a synesthesia 
appropriate to Weiner's own description of her "seen voices"). In documenting performances 
with photographs that cannot possibly represent the performances they point to indexically, 
Cahun and Weiner emphasize the iterability of their performances. Like linguistic performatives 
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for Derrida, the photographs circulate as citations. And like Cahun's masks or the performances 
of the mime that Derrida analyzes in La Dissemination, these performative photographs can be 
cited by anyone who puts on the mask, or in other words, by anyone who enters into the 
contractual obligations of invitation in order to complete the sentence.99 
Cahun and Weiner’s stagings of their own images – their own bodies – in their 
invitational portraits further emphasizes these portraits’ status as performances. As Phelan 
writes, "In employing the body metonymically, performance is capable of resisting the 
reproduction of metaphor, and the metaphor I'm most keenly interested in resisting is the 
metaphor of gender, a metaphor which upholds the vertical hierarchy of value through systematic 
marking of the positive and negative" (151). For Cahun and Weiner, the invitation destabilizes 
hierarchies of gender in both the domestic and political realms, revealing those spaces as always 
already overlapping. The performative photograph functions as a contract, but as a contract to a 
domestic space, as a contract of invitation that necessarily implicates the ethical demands of 
hospitality and the woman's role therein as agent and stake of hospitality. The contractual 
invitation, however, and however paradoxically, destabilizes hierarchical power. The positions of 
host and guest circulate from participant to participant.  
 If my argument takes on a utopian tone in imagining the possibility for future readers and 
                                                
99 Though I intend my argument to resonate, here, with the position of those who enter into a 
space of readerly responsibility to the reception of Cahun and Weiner’s open-ended works, 
examples of others who put on the “masks” offered by Cahun and Weiner abound. Artist Sarah 
Pucill has recently restaged many of Cahun’s portraits in her 2013 film Magic Mirror. I discuss 
this work briefly in my conclusion. Kate Zambreno’s cover for her 2012 work of feminist 
scholarship and memoir entitled Heroines, which takes its title from Cahun’s own Héroïnes, 
mimics some of the photomontages of Cahun’s Aveux. As for Weiner, multiple readings of the 
Clairvoyant Journal by other poets have underscored the performative power of Weiner’s text. A 
reading by Charles Bernsetin, Susan Bee Bernstein, and their daughter Emma Bernstein during a 
celebration of Weiner’s work at the St. Mark’s Poetry Project on 28 Nov 2007 exemplifies these 
readings. For video of that reading, see http://writing.upenn.edu/pennsound/x/Weiner-PP.html 
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viewers to truly collaborate with Cahun and Weiner, it is because the conditions in which Cahun 
and Weiner’s audiences might replicate these performances stretch the limits of Austin’s original 
description of the contextual “felicities” that validate the performative utterance. As participant 
collaborators to the works, we can activate the performative power of the invitational mode, but 
can we truly participate in Cahun’s anti-Nazi resistance, for example? In Cruising Utopia: The 
Then and There of Queer Futurity, José Esteban Munoz describes the way in which Austin’s 
theory challenges epistemological certainty by comparing the performative utterance to the 
structure of utopia. He writes that both the performative and the utopic represent “a highly 
ephemeral ontological field that can be characterized as doing in futurity” (26). Munoz links this 
phenomenon of a “doing in futurity” to a “horizontal temporality,” that which challenges 
epistemological and ontological certainty and, for Munoz, the straight time of the present (25). In 
other words, the performative, in a utopic gesture, reaches into the past in order to project 
performative action into a future yet to be imagined.100  
 In Cahun and Weiner’s performative photographic portraits and related texts, the 
performative utterance of “I invite you in” collapses a series of hierarchical relations into a 
horizontality that presages what Munoz calls “horizontal temporality.” Within their images, 
texts, and performances, Cahun and Weiner first express this horizontality through the spatial 
arrangement of certain social relations. Through my reading of Derrida’s “hostipitalité,” the 
                                                
100 Lee Edelman’s offers a counterpoint to Munoz’s theory of a queer utopia rooted in a queer 
negativity. Edelman’s work also rejects a linear conception of history as linked to reproductive 
futurism, but unlike Munoz, Edelman suggests that the role of queer theory is to remain outside 
politics and even attempts, such as Munoz’s, to reimagine social forms that only shore up the 
social forms that marginalize the queer. See Edelman 4-7.  For more on the debates around the 
antisocial thesis in queer theory, associated with Edelman, see the conference proceedings from 




destabilizing equivalence of host and guest in Cahun and Weiner’s work emerges as a prime 
example of this collapse into horizontal social hierarchies. Subsequently, the social categories 
and roles attendant to family structures collapse, as well, turning away from the Father and 
toward the avuncular ties of sister-lovers and sister-aunts. With these horizontal realignments, 
Cahun and Weiner stage, too, the horizontal realignment of artist and audience into collaborators, 
though not without the tensions of host/guest and sibling sameness/difference. The collapse of 
social space into horizontal arrangements prepares a collaborative space for the participation of 
readers and viewers in the reiterative, future work of artistic invitation. 
This turn to the utopic possibilities of the performative is not to suggest, of course, that 
the political conditions that shape and inform Cahun and Weiner’s works (Nazi occupation, the 
suppression of Native American rights, as just two examples) sketch a desirable future condition. 
Cahun and Weiner are, thus, simultaneously rooted in their present moments and forward-
looking, as true clairvoyants. The force of the performative, harnessed to create new 
collaborative arrangements between work and audience, projects the possibility of this new 
artistic and social space of collaboration into a future where, like Cassandra’s desperate 
predictions, it may not be heeded. But, the force of the performative opens a space in which 















Chapter Four.  
Hers to Make, Ours to Make:  
On Clandestine Dining with Meret Oppenheim 
 
And perhaps whatever speech and writing that comes after or over a photograph 
or a performance should deal with this epistemological and methodological 
problem: how to listen to (and touch, taste, and smell) a photograph or a 
performance, how to attune oneself to a moan or a shout that animates the 
photograph with an intentionality of the outside. 
 
— Fred Moten, In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition 
 
 
This chapter opens on a photograph of Meret Oppenheim’s Das Frühlingsfest (Spring 
Banquet), a mysterious scene in Bern in March 1959, later restaged at André Breton’s invitation 
in Paris in December of that year (Fig. 4.1).101 As its name suggests, Oppenheim’s Bern Spring 
Banquet included a dinner party to which she invited four friends, as well as a woman who lay 
naked on the dinner table, her face painted gold, and on whom the food was served without 
dishes or silverware.102 Only one photograph documents this event, though more images 
proliferated from its restaging in Paris for Breton’s 1959-1960 exhibition, EROS: Exhibition 
InteRnatiOnale du Surréalisme, at the Galerie Cordier.103  
                                                
101 In Paris, Oppenheim restages the event as Le Festin. I use the German and French names to 
differentiate between the two iterations throughout this chapter.  
 
102 The best description of this event in Bern comes from Oppenheim herself in a text only 
recently published in German (2002) under the title “Das Frühlingsfest” in Meret Oppenheim 
Husch, husch der schönste Vokal entleert sich: Gedichte, Prosa 127-33. As this text is not 
readily available in English nor commonly cited in scholarship on Oppenheim, I maintain my 
focus on the photographs of the dinner party as the main vehicle for reception and interpretation 
of the event(s) in this chapter.  
 
103 Daniel Cordier’s gallery operated under a reciprocal agreement with Arne Ekstrom’s gallery 
at 980 Madison Ave. in Manhattan, starting in 1959. Cordier & Ekstrom exhibited the work of 
artists including Marcel Duchamp and Max Ernst. See 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/19/nyregion/arne-ekstrom-87-director-of-a-prominent-art-
gallery.html?_r=0 .  
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As with Cahun’s Resistance portrait, Oppenheim’s Banquet stages a specifically 
clandestine performance. Unlike in the previous chapters, however, the existing documentation 
of Oppenheim’s performance – one photograph – does not seem to offer a performative 
utterance, or invitation, in the way Cahun and Weiner’s portraits do. Instead, Oppenheim’s 
image emphasizes borders – of medium, of time, of experience – that may remain in place for the 
viewer and the critic. In the epigraph to this chapter, Fred Moten asks his readers and fellow 
spectators to pay careful attention to the “moan” or “shout” that emanates from such photographs 
in such a way that the operation of the photograph or performance seems to correspond to an 
intentionality outside its frame. Such exclamations, however, circulate without the addressing 
their audiences as does the performative, and Moten carefully includes the often-neglected 
senses of touch, taste, and smell in his hermeneutic program for encountering these images that 
resist visual interpretation.  
Moten’s interrogation of a new hermeneutic system for these images and performances 
emphasizes the sense of hearing, while careful not to neglect the senses important to gustatory 
pleasure: touch, smell, taste. As Mélanie Boucher asks in her study of the use of food in 
twentieth-century performance art, “Nous avons appris à nous exprimer sur ce qui est vu et 
entendu, mais comment décrire les sensations du toucher, du goût et des odeurs?” (258). Moten’s 
challenge to his fellow spectators and readers, as well as his advice for deciphering the 
indecipherable “moan or shout,” returns us as his readers to the affective possibilities of these 
texts, of the affective states such texts and images can effect in place of our epistemologically 
sound interpretations of these texts. And, in considering the various dinner parties that result 
from stagings of Oppenheim’s Banquet, the sense of taste will come to stand in for a particular 
operation of pleasure, which I connect to Roland Barthes’ pleasure and bliss (jouissance) in The 
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Pleasure of the Text, in the reading of these performances and their photographic documents. In 
the network of other artworks and cultural phenomena that Spring Banquet evokes, pleasure 
operates on a spectrum, from the nefarious (as with the woman placed on the altar of the Black 
Mass) to the retributive (as with the cannibalism to which an abused wife submits her husband 
during the concluding dinner in Peter Greenaway’s 1989 film The Cook, the Thief, His Wife & 
Her Lover) to the revelatory (Judy Chicago’s 1974-79 feminist installation The Dinner Party) 
and the ecstatic (as with the passionate writhing of the dancers in Carolee Schneemann’s 1964 
Meat Joy).104  
As for Barthes, he aligns pleasure (plaisir, but also jouissance, or bliss) with the realm 
and register of the clandestine in The Pleasure of the Text.105 In doing so, Barthes questions the 
possibilities for criticism through the lens of such a search for pleasure; he writes, “How can we 
take pleasure in a reported pleasure (boredom of all narratives of dreams, of parties)?” Excessive 
explication of, and a denuded relationship to, what is reported, or read, Barthes seems to suggest, 
dulls the pleasure of contact. Barthes offers only “one way” to recover this pleasure: “I must shift 
my position: instead of agreeing to be the confidant of this critical pleasure—a sure way to miss 
                                                
104 More recent dinner parties staged as artworks under the sign of participatory art, social 
engagement, or Nicolas Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics, such as Rirkrit Tiravanija’s 
installations in which he cooks for his audiences, eschew the clandestine effects that the other 
works listed above negotiate, whether through their embrace (e.g. the ultimate deception carried 
out by the wife against her husband in Greenaway’s film) or their remedy (e.g. the work of 
historical recovery, of bringing forgotten historical figures to light, performed by Chicago’s 
installation). For more on Tiravanija’s work in the framework of relational aesthetics, see Bishop 
Installation Art 116-19. 
 
105 Daniel Cordier, the Parisian gallerist who hosted the EROS exhibit, knew well the ruins 
(décombres) of war. During the Nazi Occupation, he had served clandestinely, as the personal 
secretary to the Resistance leader/martyr Jean Moulin. They knew each other by their code 
names alone: Alias Rex (Moulin); Alias Max (another for Moulin); Alias Caracalla (Cordier). 




it—I can make myself its voyeur: I observe clandestinely the pleasure of others” (17). His 
casting of the critic as “voyeur” implies only a partial knowledge available to, or desired by, this 
critic in search of textual pleasure. 
If Cahun’s portrait as résistante projects her clandestine wartime activities into the world 
through the force of performative invitation, Oppenheim’s photo remains in the shadows of the 
clandestine performance. Oppenheim’s biographers regularly refer to the period between 1937 
and the 1950s as years of artistic crisis for Oppenheim, during which she returned to Switzerland 
from Paris.106 As Stephan Kunz writes of the years ending this crisis and surrounding 
Oppenheim’s dinner party, “[…] between 1958 and 1960, a curious mutation took place in her 
work [….] Of central significance is the shift from renditions of the outside world to an inner 
focus: ‘I want to paint something I’ve never seen before.’” (Kunz et. al. 11). Additionally, Renée 
Riese Hubert notes the ways in which Oppenheim’s temperament accounts for her avoidance of 
many artistic partnerships (63).107 Considered with Oppenheim’s preference for solitary work in 
mind, the assertion of her desire to “paint something I’ve never seen before” might be read 
differently in relation to the photograph of the Bern dinner party. Instead of painting something 
                                                
106 Amongst these sources, see Beat Wismer and Annette Schindler’s introduction to Kunz et. al. 
5. Oppenheim herself refers elliptically to a “crisis period” in an interview with Renee Riese 
Hubert in Caws et. al. Surrealism and Women 68-9. 
 
107 Hubert reads this “refusal” in terms of the heterosexual couple, a paradigm she locates in such 
Surrealist objects by Oppenheim as Le Couple (1956), in which Oppenheim fused two matching 
women’s boots together at the toes. While Hubert points to the possible androgynous reading of 
this couple, I question her reading of a matching pair of boots (which might rather represent the 
same) as necessarily implying either a male/female split or its resolution in androgyny. Derrida 
similarly interrogates the assumptions of Heidegger and Meyer Schapiro vis-à-vis Van Gogh’s 




never seen before, Oppenheim hosts a party never seen before, and never able to be seen again 
under the same clandestine conditions. 
Boucher connects the importance of such ephemeral conditions, with no easy system of 
critical or textual transcription, to the common experience or memory of performance art pieces 
as out of focus (“flou”) (258). And, as she points out, the photograph of Oppenheim’s Banquet is 
out of focus, indeed. The photograph, thus, acts as a limit barrier between the knowledge 
available to the viewer of the photograph and the knowledge afforded to those few friends who 
participated in the dinner party. Moten evokes this barrier, too, in asking how the “moan or 
shout” of a photo might be assigned the intentionality of the “outside.” In the reception of 
Oppenheim’s work, this barrier marks a terrain of rumor on which interpretation of the Bern 
staging of the Banquet must depend.  
Here, I focus on what forms of collaboration can be salvaged from such an affirmation of 
the clandestine and a refusal of partnership through a reading of the work as closer to the 
“collective” effort identified by Mary Ann Caws in an earlier, related work by Oppenheim. In a 
culinary appreciation of Oppenheim’s famed Surrealist object, Object (Le Déjeuner en fourrure) 
(1936), Caws recounts how a conversation between Oppenheim, Picasso, and Dora Maar 
inspired the object’s creation. Though Hubert emphasizes Oppenheim’s rejection of artistic 
partners, Caws recasts Oppenheim’s fur-lined teacup, spoon, and saucer as a “collective piece 
[…] from Meret Oppenheim’s presence, along with that of Picasso and Dora Maar, and her 
subsequent construction, and – most interesting still – the interpretation placed on it by all the 
aftercomers to Dora Maar’s photograph” (26). Oppenheim’s fur-covered teacup serves as an 
amuse-bouche for the dinner party that follows two decades later, a photographed sculpture 
whose reputation resides largely in that photograph. In this chapter, I play the role of the 
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“aftercomer” in relation to Oppenheim’s Spring Banquet/Das Frühlingsfest/Le Festin, a position 
which allows me to reveal the ways in which the photograph presents me with “something never 
seen before” and so refuses to extend a photographic invitation into the work.108 
 
The Event and Its Restaging(s) 
 
 Oppenheim’s Banquet, or its blurry ephemera and the rumors of it, pose the same 
challenge to the viewer of the artwork that Barthes faces before a page of criticism. How can we 
take pleasure before this absent artwork, with nothing but a blurry image without caption to 
guide us? The fuzziness of the Bern photo, the lack of light in its exposure, results in an 
excresence-effect in the subject of the portrait: the food seems to sprout, like lumps of moss, 
from the body of the woman (une femme printanière). Thus, this fuzziness signifies doubly: first, 
the regenerative power of the woman’s fecund body as correlate to the vernal regeneration of the 
earth, and second, the very clandestinity of the performance and image taken in secret with little 
available light. 
The multiple iterations of Spring Banquet make difficult a reading of the photograph’s 
status in the case of each restaging. Hubert refers to the work as an “often-photographed 
installation” (“From Déjeuner” 40). However, this assertion reduces the work to its restagings 
and further occludes from view the Bern photograph and the conditions of that first staging. To 
be “often-photographed” might suggest to be clearly-photographed, or well-documented, 
                                                
108 My interest in the participant whom Caws names the “aftercomer” also follows on Andrea 
Oberhuber’s observation that, in contradistinction to the work of her contemporaries like Cahun 
or Leonora Carrington, mirrors and reflective surfaces do not demarcate a performance space of 
self-representation in Oppenheim’s work. See Oberhuber “Figuration de soi et de l’autre chez 
Meret Oppenheim” 13. 
 
 174 
whereas none of these qualifications are the case for Das Frühlingsfest. To assert as much 
reduces the artwork to its restaging in Paris as Le Festin and ignores the mystery surrounding the 
work’s genesis in Bern – a mystery that Oppenheim establishes as structural to the work’s 
restaging and reception. Like Boucher, who describes the Bern Frühlingsfest as “méconnue” 
(210), I have difficulty in locating and knowing the work. 
Oppenheim’s installation for the 1959 opening at Galerie Cordier ushers its guests from 
the private space of her Bern Das Frühlingsfest to the public, glamorous space of Breton’s Paris 
and Le Festin. Unlike the private feast shared by the couples at Das Frühlingsfest, multiple 
photographs document the Paris installation and its guests and participants. These images 
appeared in such international publications as Vogue and included, as well, the work of Denise 
Bellon, another female artist also associated with Breton’s surrealists.  
 One photograph, by Roger Van Hecke, depicts the mob scene in the street outside the 
gallery during the vernissage. Unknown to these guests, prominent artists amongst them: this is 
the end of Surrealism, the last time its artists will show their work together under the banner 
Breton had unfurled in his Manifeste of 1924. Another photograph depicts the attendees inside 
the gallery, gathered around the table (Fig. 4.2). Women are en fourrure, like Oppenheim’s 
teacup and saucer. The men sport tuxes and ties. This photo, by William Klein for Vogue, 
anchors its composition in the correct posture of three famous fashion models within the frame. 
Unlike at Oppenheim’s Bern dinner party, we know more of the sartorial compositions at the 
Paris event than just the naked woman’s outfit. The formal attire of the guests renders the woman 
more naked and exposed in this image, even seemingly dead: the chance encounter of food and a 
beautiful woman on a dissecting-table, to rewrite Lautréamont’s formula for the beauty of the 
aleatory. In the image, Breton, looking dour, appears to reign over the work. To the right of 
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Breton sits a masked male mannequin, part of the installation, and looking closely behind Breton 
and this mannequin (who at first resembles Dalì), a woman peers over the shoulder of one of the 
models. Oppenheim? I wonder for a moment, but it is the poet Joyce Mansour, I think. Looking 
more closely: there, on the table, it is not a woman after all. She is a mannequin! 
 In a third image, another by Van Hecke, a man in suit and tie takes his pick from the 
offerings on the table, his hand raised above the woman’s breast (Fig. 4.3).109 His style of dress 
resembles one of the Paris guests chez Cordier, but as I look, I ask myself if this image captures 
instead one of the friends of the Bern feast? In that moment of questioning, I think the woman on 
the table is a real woman, the gold-faced woman in Bern. If so, the image deceives, at first, and 
closer looking corrects that deceit. And yet—  
Looking more closely still: what hangs on the wall behind the man in this photograph? 
The same circular artwork from Klein’s photograph. And in the top right of Van Hecke’s 
photograph? A corner of the same mirror that serves as backdrop to the fashionable subjects of 
Klein’s photo. This is, then, another image of the Paris Festin, complicating the documentation 
of the installation by revealing a bait and switch in the gallery space: a woman’s real breathing 
body during the opening for a mannequin’s sculpted papier-mâché form during the run of the 
exhibit, as documented in Bellon’s photograph of the installation (Fig. 4.4). Comparing Bellon’s 
photograph of the mannequin to Van Hecke’s photograph of the tuxedoed man, a clue reveals 
itself. The mannequin’s hair is straight, straw-like, and unadorned. The woman off whom the 
man serves himself wears a crown of flowers on her head.  
                                                
109 An image from this series appeared with a review by Adam Saulnier in Démocratie 59 (31 
Dec 1959). Archived by the Association Atelier André Breton, the caption reads in part: “Se 
mettre à table chez les Surréalistes réserve des surprises qui ne sont pas nécessairement 




The installation of Le Festin in Cordier’s gallery undergoes its own transformations 
during the run of the exhibition, from December 1959 to January 1960, some of which resist 
visual interpretation in the kind of hermeneutic challenge that Moten encounters before a 
performance photograph. In a letter from Oppenheim to José Pierre dated 11 October 1959, the 
artist specifies details for the table top, noting what flowers and foods covered the table and 
woman during the Bern dinner and suggesting substitutions to account for the change in season 
from spring to winter. Oppenheim also asks that the gallery not tell viewers that the dinner party 
actually took place, but that it rather represents an idea she had for the exhibit.110 The letter 
emphasizes her subterfuge in the details of the spring dinner in Bern, including “petites fleurs du 
bois (de printemps, évidemment),” and their desired translation to a winter setting, “des petits 
brins de sapin, de fleurs sèches, etc.” These transformations continued at the opening, as attested 
by Van Hecke and Bellon’s photographs, where another living woman took her place on the 
table-top for a special installation of the Banquet, before being replaced by a mannequin for the 
rest of vernissage.111 The difference in flowers and food elements reveals itself poorly in the 
images, especially given the lack of resolution or contrast in their composition. The difference 
between a spring forest flower and a winter branch of evergreen better suits an olfactory 
encounter with the installation. As Moten suggests, we might learn more from straining to hear 
                                                
110 In Oppenheim’s words: “Dis aux autres de ne pas dire que ce dîner a été eu vraiment lieu, 
mais, si on prononce mon nom, à quoi je ne tiens pas, de dire que c’est une idée que j’ai eu [sic] 
pour l’exposition!” For the letter in the Atelier André Breton archives, see 
http://www.andrebreton.fr/work/56600100481600. 
 
111 A series of color photographs by an unknown photographer, archived by the Association 




the moan of the woman on the table, exposed now to a more public crowd than the guest of 
honor in the Bern Fruhlingsfest, in Van Hecke’s photograph. 
Oppenheim confuses the status of the installation, no longer exactly a performance as we 
might classify the Bern dinner, for the exhibition goers in her instructions to Pierre. 112 Her letter 
reduces the Bern dinner to the status of a rumor – and one insinuated by the exhibition’s own 
restaging and installation. One final photograph for (re)consideration attests to the propagation of 
this rumor through a destabilizing of the ontological grounds of the Bern photograph and Paris 
installation. The gallery booklet for the EROS exhibit included the image from Bern on its back 
cover, as if the blurry document from that clandestine performance could stand in for, and in 
advance of, the Paris restaging with mannequin. 
 
The “Houses” of Surrealism 
 
 Amongst the other transformations of the Banquet between Bern and Paris is the space 
the work occupies. The more celebrated iteration in Paris takes on the air of a glamourous ball, 
truly a banquet, but Oppenheim held the first dinner in her home. There, the artist more easily 
controlled the event and its documentation. Having arrived in Paris in the same period as 
Oppenheim and studied at the Sorbonne, École du Louvre, and ateliers, such as the Grande 
Chaumière (where Oppenheim also studied), Louise Bourgeois’ own approaches to the question 
of the clandestine directly interrogate the bounds of domestic life. Bourgeois’ 1974 sculptural 
                                                
112 Oberhuber remarks upon the Banquet, noting that most often art historians, not critics of 
literature, have thought to comment on its status. She refers to the Banquet as installation rather 
than performance (more on this to come), making reference to that second iteration of the 




installation, The Destruction of the Father (Fig. 4.5), follows some of the formal cues of 
Oppenheim’s Bern photograph. Set in a recessed space, its walls covered in black fabric and 
open on one of its six sides, Destruction depicts a mythic dinner party, populated by the round 
protuberances common to Bourgeois’ sculptural vocabulary. Larger protuberances both extend 
from the ceiling and sit around a rectangular surface in the middle of the space. From this plaster 
surface emerge smaller cylindrical, almost phallic forms. In remarks from an interview with 
Donald Kuspit, Bourgeois reveals that the scene developed as an “exorcism” of a fantasy of 
murdering her father on a dinner table with the help of her siblings (Bourgeois 158).113  Viewers 
can peer into the installation but have the sense of spying on a scene whose narrative they cannot 
fully distinguish. Like the photographic documentation of Oppenheim’s Bern dinner party, 
Bourgeois’ Destruction presents the viewer with a shadowy, horizontal scene whose narrative 
remains obscured by the viewer’s partial knowledge of the correspondence between that 
narrative and the work’s sculptural forms.  
Two other series of works by Bourgeois cast into further relief the domestic bounds of 
clandestine space. In paintings from 1946-47, each entitled Femme-maison, Bourgeois depicts 
hybrid female forms with torsos and bodies made of houses (Fig. 4.6). The “house women” in 
these images simultaneously hide from and reveal themselves to the viewer, both retreat into and 
break open the put on display private domestic space. Responding to a question about gender 
identity in a 1979 profile by Eleanor Munro, Bourgeois replies, “The woman I was drawing in 
those days – the femme maison – did not yet have enough poise or objectivity simply to say, ‘Do 
not ask me such a question!’ No. She fled, and hid herself away” (Bourgeois 114). Hiding, 
                                                
113 These remarks, and those by Bourgeois that follow, have been culled from their original 
sources and collected in Bernadac and Obrist Louise Bourgeois: Destruction of the Father, 
Reconstruction of the Father. 
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however, only preserves the head of the woman from view, and the term “femme maison” 
implies not a woman partially covered by a house, but rather a woman partially become a house. 
As in Cahun’s portrait in which she languidly spills out of an armoire, Bourgeois’ paintings 
literalize Bachelard’s formulation of the “passionate liaison” that an inhabitant embarks upon 
with his or her house.114 The play between concealment and revelation heightens the sense of 
implied narrative, and thus the impulse to give narrative to the scene through rumor and 
imagined half-truth. This is the effect for the viewer of Bourgeois’ later series of Cellules from 
the 1990s, comprised of installations often delimited by fences or architectural elements, such as 
provisional walls with half open windows or doors, that prevent access to the installation while 
leaving visible the psychologically-charged tableaux of domestic life and memory inside the 
space of each “cell.” Cellule (Choisy) (1990-93) incorporates the figure of the house as a sort of 
head through a marble sculpture of Bourgeois’ childhood home set beneath a guillotine blade 
(Fig. 4.7). As a stand-in for a head beneath the guillotine, the house is both threatening (as 
metonym of the head of the patriarchal household) and threatened with its own destruction. The 
installation reverses the gendered inflection of the house in its depiction as the house of 
Bourgeois’ childhood memories (associated now with the Father of the 1974 installation). But, 
Cellule (Choisy) also suggests that freedom for the “house women” of the paintings could arrive 
with the separation of the house-head from the body, with the separation of body and the 
structure that encloses it and its head.  
In a poem from 1934, composed while an art student at the Grande Chaumière in 
Montparnasse, Oppenheim writes: 
                                                
114 For more on Bachelard and Cahun’s portrait, see my discussion in chapter three. 
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Für dich – wider dich 
Wirf alle Steine hinter dich 
 Und laß die Wände los. 
 
 An dich – auf dich  
 Für hundert Sänger über sich 
 Die Hufe reißen los. 
 
 ICH weide meine Pilze aus 
 ICH bin der erste Gast im Haus 
 Und laß die Wände los.115 
No title holds the tercets together. They rather stack one upon the other like a pile of stones. Like 
the position of the host usurped by the guest, the structure of these walls will not hold for long. 
The walls of the house provide a measure of privacy, but they are also imprisoning, as they are in 
Cahun and Bourgeois’s work. In a painting of 1938, entitled Steinfrau, Oppenheim depicts a 
woman made of stones lying on a beach, her legs submerged in the water (Fig. 4.8). Like 
Bourgeois’ femme maison figures, this stone woman is made of the materials associated with the 
house. Collapse of the house and its materials in this poem leads not to revelation but to a sort of 
clandestine liberation that tests the bounds of gendered subjectivity.116 
This gendered subjectivity, keyed to private or clandestine sites, finds its expression in 
the very orientation of the table-top woman along the horizontal axis. Rosalind Krauss argues 
that in the work of Cindy Sherman, a reorientation of the picture plan to the horizontal axis 
                                                
115 The English translation in Burckhardt and Curiger’s Beyond the Teacup reads: “For you – 
against you / Throw all the stones behind you / And let the walls loose. // To you – on you / For 
one hundred singers above you / The hoofs run loose. // I delight in my mushrooms / I am the 
first guest in the house / And let the walls loose” (n.p.). For the German text, see Oppenheim 
Husch, husch 31. 
 
116 In fact, the poem shares some details with the Fruhlingsfest. Mushrooms figured amongst the 
foods served on the naked woman’s body. In the poem, the ecstasy of an erotically charged 
dinner party ritual finds its parallel experience in the implied ecstasy of psychedelic mushrooms. 
See Oppenheim’s description “Das Frühlingsfest” in Meret Oppenheim Husch, husch der 
schönste Vokal entleert sich: Gedichte, Prosa 127-33. 
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challenges the phallic verticality of so many philosophical and aesthetic metaphors (e.g. the 
vertical of the mirror, the vertical plane as the painting) (Bachelors 129-33). Such a challenge 
undoes the certainty of what we know in confronting an image, and in Krauss’ description is a 
“desublimatory” move (of the beautiful as a category, of the fetish) on the part of the artist (131). 
As Amelia Jones describes, the work of an artist such as Chris Burden, celebrated for his macho 
wager that his friend would not shoot him dead in Shoot (1971), panders to “normative codes of 
masculine artistic subjectivity,” which she summarizes with the term “martyrdom” (Body Art 
130-1). Closer in time and space to Oppenheim’s milieu, Yves Klein’s Leap into the Void (1960) 
(Fig. 4.9), a doctored photograph in which the artist seems to leap from a second story roof with 
nothing below to catch him, at least implies a masculine heroism or hoped-for apotheosis 
(aligned formally with the vertical axis of the image), as well as a masochistic martyrdom as in 
Burden’s performance should Klein fall into the street.  
Oppenheim’s Bern photograph partakes of none of these masculine codes. It eschews 
authorship and reportage, refusing to signify heroic, artistic martyrdom, ordered instead along a 
horizontal axis, with the woman who stretches out in space as in the arrangement of the bulbous, 
phallic forms in Bourgeois’ Destruction and a later femme maison sculpture (1994) that depicts 
the woman lying on her back (Fig. 4.10). Photographs of Schneemann’s performance, Meat Joy, 
which debuted in Paris in 1964, depict writhing bodies, clad in underwear (some of it designed 
by Weiner), entangled with paper and rope, covered in red, wet paint and raw chicken and fish 
(Fig. 4.11). Instead of the verticality of Klein’s image for his leap, or of Burden’s crucifixion 
imagery in Trans-fixed (1974) (Fig. 4.12), bodies splay out on the floor, on the horizontal, in 
photographs of Schneemann’s work. Any martyrdom, here, makes its sacrifices for the flesh, for 
the bliss, or trauma, found in being in a body, and not for a rising above the flesh through 
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martyrdom or apotheosis. Schneemann’s performance is about being with other bodies, like 
Oppenheim’s despite the clandestine nature of the dinner party, and the concealed identity of 
these other bodies.  
 A similar division separates Oppenheim’s vision of the house from that of André Breton. 
In his 1928 novel Nadja, Breton declares, “I myself shall continue living in my glass house 
where you can always see who comes to call; where everything hanging from the ceilings and 
walls stays where it is as if by magic, where I sleep at night in a glass bed, under glass sheets, 
where who I am will sooner or later appear etched by a diamond” (18). The liberation in which 
Oppenheim’s poem revels does not correspond to the kind of freedom espoused by Breton in his 
description of a transparent house of glass. As metaphor for the goal of his Surrealism, to merge 
the conscious and unconscious selves into a sur-real state, Breton’s fantasy of a self “etched by a 
diamond” ironically refuses the mutability that otherwise marks the surrealist imagination – as if 
a total, fixed transparency would lead to the revolution before any shadowy clandestine work 
could strike a tangible blow for that new reality.  
Oppenheim’s fantasy of a house blown apart by her own “letting” includes remnants of 
her taste for secrecy and singularity (solitariness). Oppenheim’s liberation leaves behind a house 
reduced to a pile of stones, new features on the psychological landscape that we might interpret 
as cairns, markers and protectors of the unfettered self’s dark past, sentinels against forgetting as 
well as the dangers of total revealing. In these stone piles, we find exemplary spaces for hiding 
artifacts or parts of one’s self. In contrast, Breton’s glass house threatens to shatter, and must be 
inhabited with deference and subservience to the tyranny of its transparency.  
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The positions of Breton and Oppenheim in the texts cited above fall on either side of the 
pleasure/bliss (plaisir/jouissance) divide drawn out and destabilized by Barthes.117 For his 
reader, Barthes never settles the question of what punctuation might best intervene between his 
terms pleasure and bliss. A slash divides too neatly; a hyphen homogenizes too thoroughly. 
Advising readers to make of pleasure a material practice, derived from a material text, Barthes 
instructs to “either relate the text to the ‘pleasures’ of life (a dish, a garden, an encounter, a voice, 
a moment, etc.) and to it join the personal catalogue of our sensualities, or force the text to 
breach bliss, that immense subjective loss, thereby identifying this text with the purest moments 
of perversion, with its clandestine sites” (58-9).  
Oppenheim’s work, in both the poem cited above and above all in her clandestine dinner 
party, exemplifies Barthes’ critical practice in art making. Barthes recommends we “breach 
bliss,” an imperative we might figure as to punch a hole into, or to reduce to a local site of 
rubble, the wall that separates us from bliss (jouissance). Barthes’ “clandestine sites” evoke the 
crepuscular half-light of Oppenheim’s Bern photograph, as well as the domestic scene that 
simultaneously presents itself for and resists figuration. Breton’s text suggests we inhabit the 
glass house with the careful particularity of our personal sensualities, refining them through a 
supreme transparency of the unconscious and contact with the materials of daily life (a bed and 
its sheets). Oppenheim’s poem aligns pleasure with an energetic, Dionysian liberation that 
loosens the self, an immense experience in which the walls of the house can no longer contain 
                                                
117 The opposition of Breton and Oppenheim’s notion of the house in these two texts may 
correspond, as well, to the opposition that Hal Foster draws out in the structure of Surrealism 
between that strain represented by Breton and another one represented by Bataille’s base 
materialism. See Foster Bad New Days 19-20. 
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the individual, but which tethers itself still to clandestine sites of perversion, to those stone-piles 
Oppenheim leaves in her wake.  
 
The Poverty of Images 
 
 The critic, scholar, or viewer today, attempting to write about Oppenheim’s image from 
the Bern dinner party, faces a confused and confusing record of the event if he or she consults 
first the hits for a Google image search. As Kaja Silverman writes of Joan Fontcuberta’s 
Googlegram: Nièpce (2005), a composite image assembled from Google image search results 
and resembling Nièpce’s early photograph View from a Window, “When we conduct a Google 
image search, the search engine looks for the images that have been most frequently linked to 
our search word. These links, however, have been forged by other Internet users, and reflect their 
predilections, antipathies, rivalries, and desires, instead of our own” (Miracle 64). However, to 
Silverman’s nuanced examination of intentionality in the world of digital image searches, I 
would add that by virtue of acting as one of those Internet users, the scholar adds his or her own 
predilections to the network of search words. The Google search comes to resemble the work of 
rumor that already animates the space between the Bern and Paris iterations of the dinner party. 
Intentionality, as attested to by Oppenheim’s letter to José Pierre, certainly comes to bear on the 
information viewers received about the work at the gallery exhibition and afterward. 
 For an image whose reception already depends so much on intentionality and the 
discourse of rumor, the gap between an analog photograph, such as the image from Bern, and a 
digital photograph begins to narrow. The competing intentionalities that shape the reception, and 
irretrievability, of an image on Google, have also shaped the reception of the obscure photograph 
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from Bern. Artist and theorist Hito Steyerl, in theorizing what she calls the “poor image,” or the 
image in the age of digital duplication, writes, “Poor images are thus popular images—images 
that can be made and seen by the many. They express all the contradictions of the contemporary 
crowd; its opportunism, narcissism, desire for autonomy and creation, its inability to focus or 
make up its mind, its constant readiness for transgression and simultaneous submission” (41). If 
Oppenheim’s Bern photograph might be classified as “popular,” the argument would hinge on its 
presentation on the back of the EROS catalogue without attribution to Oppenheim (in deference 
to her request in the letter to Pierre), and so to its creation of a temporal rift in 
performance/installation and documentation that inspires rumor and fascination about the event.  
 Steyerl intends her description to stick to images made for the computer screen, jpegs and 
pngs and pdfs, all images that can be resized and cropped and corrupted, but the relationship of 
popular images to the contemporary crowd evokes the images of Spring Banquet, as well. In the 
William Klein photograph, fashion models rub shoulders with Surrealists, each eager for his or 
her appearance in Vogue (by this point, Dali has already designed covers for the magazine). 
Surrealist transgression meets consumerist appropriation. Remember how stiffly so many of the 
artists and models pose in that photograph; what opportunism is theirs?  
 The unstable corpus of images shared by the Bern and Paris banquets has certainly 
entered the realm of the poor image today, circulated without caption through Google searches 
that place all of these photos on the same image results page. Even the power of Google’s 
algorithms do not return the range of images taken in the EROS gallery: the series of color 
photographs by an unknown photographer do not appear when I search on Google, archived only 
(at least for me, and the constraints of my own search terms) on the website of the Association 
Atelier Breton.  
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 Steyerl notes that “the economy of poor images is about more than just downloads: you 
can keep the files, watch them again, even reedit or improve them if you think it necessary. And 
the results circulate” (36). Of course, reediting or improving an image or video means changing 
it. The creation of a reedited or improved file means that what circulates does not simply 
duplicate or repeat, but does so with a difference. Like the museumgoer who leaves the building 
with a clandestine cellphone video in Steyerl’s example of a poor image as video file, those who 
reedit and recirculate do so in secret, their identities obscured by the mediating screen that 
delivers the increasingly impoverished image to new viewers. This increasing “poverty” of the 
image, its degradation in quality and resolution as it passes through successive rounds of 
download, reediting, and recirculation, relates inversely to the power of the spectator (now a 
participant technician) over the image. 
 The photograph from the Bern Frühlingsfest also suffers from poor resolution, or at least 
poor focus and lighting, and holds little commercial value for a Vogue editor in 1959 when 
placed beside the glamorous images taken later at the Paris staging of Le Festin. Have, then, 
photographic images been impoverished for decades before the advent of digital and Internet 
technologies? The Bern image fades in value on the back cover of the EROS gallery pamphlet 
when set against the photographs of the Paris staging. The Bern image has already been reedited 
and recirculated, first as real-life experience for the attendees of the gallery opening and once 
again in the eclipse of its value once Klein and Bellon’s photos take its place as indexical 
documentation of the performance/installation.  
 The performance, once coaxed out of the clandestine private space of personal invitation 
(the Bern setting), can neither control its spectators nor contain its representation. Unmoored 
from epistemological or ontological certainty, the images (even these non-digital photographic 
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images) of the later Paris staging become poor images, with a currency value appropriate to the 
clandestine space in which they traffic their representations. The value of the performance 
photograph rests with this poverty, in its status as copy, fraud, ersatz testimony, but also as 
citation. These photographs evade the present tense, hiding in the rock piles that do the horizons 
of past and future. In the confusion of the evidence they present, these photographs expand upon 
Barthes’ theory of photography. Not only do they attest to Barthes’ “that-has-been” (ça-a-été) of 
the image that proves the existence of the object by its representation in the photograph but so, 
too, to a possible that-will-be, a calling forth of the object in the future out of the confused 
chronologies of the image.118 
 Oppenheim may lament the absence of a friend who would have advised her not to 
acquiesce to Breton’s request.119 We, as viewers and circulators of these images, can only reply 
with our own counsel: the clandestine does not mix well with the (or any) camera. Hers to make: 
a generic choice between ritual (clandestine) and performance (public). As Rebecca Schneider 
puts it in her essay “Solo solo solo,” echoing Moten’s attention to the moan or shout of the 
photograph, “Missing [the performance], you are available to hear it otherwise, through the 
retelling, the recitation of the document, and thus are ‘present’ to it otherwise, in a mode of 
transmission – a re-enactment” (42). Ours to make, then, but from the photographs and not from 
the performance events themselves: a disjointed, clandestine economy of reportage (of images, 
of visual utterances clairvoyant and utopic) and reported pleasure. Research into the 
Frühlingsfest becomes its own re-enactment of the confused epistemological lines of its rumors 
                                                
118 For Barthes’ discussion of the ça-a-été of the photograph, see La Chambre claire 121. 
 
119 Peter Gorsen gives an account, based on his interview with Oppenheim, of her dissatisfaction 
with the restaging of the dinner party for Breton’s exhibit. He notes that the EROS exhibit 







 Though Oppenheim’s work displays a resistance to and critique of artistic partnership as 
detailed by Hubert, the stakes for participation (and, thus, for collaboration) are high in the 
various iterations of Oppenheim’s dinner party. In his efforts to pin down the qualities of bliss, 
Barthes writes, “The asocial character of bliss: it is the abrupt loss of sociality, and yet there 
follows no recurrence to the subject (subjectivity), the person, solitude: everything is lost, 
integrally. Extremity of the clandestine, darkness of the motion-picture theater” (39). The 
clandestine space that Barthes evokes does not negate the presence of multiple participants. The 
clandestine space of bliss exists beyond sociality, refusing a subjective experience of either 
solitude or partnership.  
 In Boucher’s interpretation of the Frühlingsfest, Oppenheim prepares a menu of foods 
that threaten to take the one who eats to a similar “beyond,” as in the narrator’s destruction of the 
house’s walls after consuming mushrooms in the 1934 poem. Boucher writes, “Ces aliments, 
certains très luxueux […] sont également tous rattachés au danger (réel ou figuré) de 
l’empoisonnement, étant en cela des aliments toxiques [….] Ils mettent logiquement l’accent sur 
l’idée de cycle; celui de la naissance, de la mort et du renouvellement […]” (213). Boucher 
describes a ritualistic use of food in the performance, creating a (metaphoric) space of ecstatic 
experience that dissolves binaries like life and death. Boucher concludes, “À la manière d’un 
antidote, ses aliments toxiques donnent symboliquement de la force. Relever l’épreuve de 
l’impureté alimentaire’ servirait donc, dans cette oeuvre, l’élévation personelle et sociale, 
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l’accueil du féminin et la celebration du corps de la femme” (216). Yet, for Barthes, bliss 
represents so extreme a form of pleasure that even the reader or critic accedes to a space of 
asociality, beyond the personal and the social.120 Such a form of pleasure and critical response 
opposes participation and collaboration. To dispute Hubert’s assertion of Oppenheim’s rejection 
of collaboration, I find that Oppenheim’s artistic intervention does not lie in the rejection of 
collaboration but in its manipulation beyond sociality – or, in other words, in the manipulation of 
codes of the “collective” that question the roles of author, artist, participant, spectator, and reader 
in relation to the image and artwork.  
 The gold-faced woman’s figure emanates from the time of its capturing in a photograph 
in Bern (the time of the clandestine performance) as if always already an image. The information 
provided by the image does not suffice in overcoming the gravitational pull of the clandestine. 
Alone, the image would sink back into darkness, without caption into the extremity Barthes 
senses in the dark movie theater, foreclosed to hermeneutic seizure. The restaging of the Banquet 
– that which marks it as a performance and so not as clandestine ritual (or not only so) – pulls the 
image over the event horizon of that black hole. The force of the extraction sends the image into 
its own future iterations, at a delay from the time of past and future iterations of the performance 
but travelling parallel to them.  
 In her concluding, Boucher surmises that Spring Banquet provides “un antidote” that 
resolves the division between “l’élévation personelle et sociale, l’accueil du féminin et du corps 
de la femme” (216). While I agree that Oppenheim’s dinner party, in its first instance in Bern 
                                                
120 Barthes imagines a socio-cultural version of this asociality in his late lecture at the Collège de 
France, his notes for which are published under the title Comment vivre ensemble. In those notes, 
Barthes hypothesizes a living arrangement in which participants can maintain their individual life 
rhythms (avoiding the social influence and pressures of others in a style similar to monastic life) 
while still living with a defined set of others. For more on Barthes’ notion of idiorrhythmy, see 
my discussion of Adrian Piper’s work in chapter seven. 
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and the subsequent documentation, moves toward a resolution of opposites, I do not agree that it 
does so through an “élévation.” The photographic documentation, confused in Boucher’s own 
account and in mine, does not permit it. The condition of performance as a medium marked by 
its future disappearance but also by the mysterious, revivifying powers of the photograph casts 
us into the clandestine – a space organized along the horizontal axis in which this art compels us 
to move through a pitch dark theater, made subjects just as we begin to suspect our own 
fumbling movements to be those of animated objects, automatons. 
 Yet, Barthes remains clear on the question of the subject moving through a clandestine 
space: asociality, “everything is lost.” Even in an automatic fumbling, like the one I’ve just 
described, something remains. The Bern photograph draws me in closer by its dark gravity (so 
little light escaping) than the Klein photo in Paris with its luminous points of celebrity (art stars 
and minor fashion stars). The performance photograph can revivify; it is possible. But, does the 
Bern image revivify? It fascinates, certainly, and transforms into a sort of devotional object, a 
cipher of mysteries, as would befit the indexical relic of a harvest feast and ritual dinner party.  
 What I can see of the performance – the obscured image of a woman on a dinner table, 
what I am able to interpret as viewer and critic – fades the more I learn of the conditions and 
context of the event, as if to enter into the photograph and into the time of the performance 
would lead to black-out, the sound of my surroundings becoming more and more faint as my 
vision dimmed. The restaging of the Banquet gives it new life. Considered together, the Paris and 
Bern versions birth another critical life for the performance in criticism. But the single image 
from Bern, regarded alone, compounds the methodological challenge Fred Moten issues in this 
essay’s epigraph. I approach a limit experience in beholding the Bern photograph, the sounds and 
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textures and tastes made briefly sensible, palpable, before the allure of the secret, unknowable 




Chapter Five.  
Bernadette Mayer’s Collaborative Memory, in Kodachrome 
 
My first day in the Archive for New Poetry at the University of Southern California San 
Diego, the archivist on duty gave me a brief tutorial in how to read loose-leaf documents, 
notebooks, and books as I explored Hannah Weiner’s papers, as well as those of her close friend, 
the poet and artist Bernadette Mayer. I had worked in a university library as an undergraduate, so 
had seen similar procedures before in the workshop where I repaired book spines, but watched 
anyway as she pulled out different size wedges of foam blocks to support the books and dossiers 
as I leafed through them. By the end of the week, alone in the reading room as the roster of other 
researchers working had dwindled from four on Monday to none on Thursday, I had pushed the 
foam blocks and wedges aside in order to make room for a light box, assiduously going through 
binders containing 1,116 photographic slides, swept up in the breadth of the images Mayer had 
taken in July 1971 for her project Memory. In the empty reading room, the images on the light 
box made their own space between the documents I had read that week and the recordings of 
Mayer reading the text of Memory that the archive also houses. 
First displayed as a photographic and sound installation at the 98 Greene Street Loft in 
Soho in February 1972, Memory traces Mayer’s daily life as she recorded it in 35-mm 
Kodachrome film and in an audio taped narration composed from notebooks Mayer kept during 
the same period. Mayer installed the 1,116 photographs in a grid on the wall of the gallery in the 
order in which they were taken, with handwritten notes on cards the size of the photographs 
giving an introduction to the project and marking the transition from one day to the next (Fig. 
5.1).121 In Mayer’s own words, taken from the introductory text:  
                                                
121 Few quality images of the original installation exist. The image included here is from a recent 
(rare) reinstallation of Memory at the Poetry Foundation’s headquarters in Chicago from March 3 
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Memory: This is a series of snapshots in lines or rows reading left to right: one 
month: July 1st – 31st: 36 pictures per day: morning to night of each day. The 
tape in 31 parts uses the pictures as points of focus, one by one, + as taking-off 
points for digression, filling in the spaces between. Tape follows pictures from the 
1st to the 1,116th. It is 6 hours long. (Mayer qtd in Kotz “Why Memory”)  
 
The project later appeared in a 1975 book edition, with the text reedited and revised by Mayer 
and accompanied by only seven of the original photographs retained for the cover design (Fig. 
5.2). As poet-critic Maggie Nelson describes it, Mayer’s Memory marks her entrance into art 
making “not as a fledgling wordsmith, but rather as a performance artist dedicated from the get-
go to the art of interminable catalogue” (104). 
In the period directly preceding the multimedia project Memory, Bernadette Mayer had 
edited the Conceptual/Post-minimalist art magazine 0 to 9, with the artist and her then brother-
in-law Vito Acconci, publishing such artists and writers as Weiner, Sol LeWitt, Adrian Piper, 
Dan Graham, Yvonne Rainer, Robert Smithson, and others. As a teacher at the Poetry Project in 
New York City, Mayer also published the anonymous, collaborative journal Unnatural Acts from 
1972 to 1973. Other important collaborative works by Mayer include The Cave with Clark 
Coolidge composed between 1972 and 1978 and Utopia, a 1984 science-fiction, time-travel epic 
in the tradition of utopian literature including texts by Weiner, Charles Bernstein, her sister, the 
artist Rosemary Mayer, and others.122 Utopia built on the strategy of inviting other author’s to 
contribute texts that Mayer first experimented with in Moving (1971). Memory represents the 
pivot in her career from the work of 0 to 9 to her later position in the New York poetry scene, a 
                                                                                                                                                       
to April 27, 2016. The photographs in this reinstallation were a slightly larger format than the 
original installation, and the space in which it was installed did not allow for speakers. Instead, 
viewers were given iPads with earphones to listen to the recording.  
  
122 For Mayer’s account of the Utopia’s structure, see Mayer “From: A Lecture at the Naropa 
Institute, 1989.”  
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turn to procedures common in the art world of the time that would then be abandoned for a 
career carried out on the page as a poet. Celebrated by the nascent Language poetry movement 
for her poetic experimentation, a still later turn to lyric poetry characterized what critic Ann 
Vickery calls a “fall from grace” in the eyes of the New York avant-garde.123 However, Mayer’s 
continued presence in the New York poetry world and the recent critical reevaluation of the 
totality of her work has challenged the reductive equation of her lyric work with less rigorous 
experimentation.124   
 Memory, however, holds an ambiguous position in the history of art to which Nelson 
assigns it, caught between the worlds of 1960s-70s conceptualism and experimental writing in 
the same decades.125 In the essay “Why Memory Matters,” Liz Kotz presents evidence of both 
the process-based methods of Conceptual art for producing a “neutral” document (one roll of 
film a day, without variation) as well as the subjective details inherent to such an 
autobiographical endeavor that resists the detached formality of other examples of Conceptual 
photography.126 Mayer reproduces the tension between detachment and subjectivity in the large 
                                                
123 Mayer’s “fall from grace” has become part of her own legend, or as Vickery puts it 
“hagiography.” See Vickery 150-1 and Kane 193. Maggie Nelson puts Mayer’s change in status 
in the context of Joan Mitchell, Barbara Guest, and Gertrude Stein’s practices of abstraction as 
well as the more romantic tendencies of the New York School. See Nelson 103-4. 
 
124 For an example of such scholarship, see Gillian White’s chapter on Mayer’s work in Lyric 
Shame: The “Lyric” Subject of Contemporary American Poetry, on which I comment below.  
 
125 In the visual art world, Robert Morris’ Memory Drawings (1963) and Hollis Frampton’s 
photography series Word Pictures (1962-63) and film Zorns Lemma (1970) are important 
forerunners of Memory. For more on Morris’ work, which engages directly with writing and 
recounted narrative, see Tsouri-Schillinger “Between Word and Image.” 
 
126 Mayer’s work also fits within the history of Conceptual photography, influenced by the 
phenomenological encounters with minimalist sculpture, represented by Victor Burgin and 
Douglas Huebler’s work in Kotz’s Words to Be Looked at: Language in 1960s Art. See Kotz 
Words 231. 
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grid formation of her installation, which foregrounded the volume and formal repetition of the 
images while also revealing the rich detail of each individual photograph. Paul Stephens 
identifies an aesthetics of information overload in avant-garde writing of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, in which writers and artists “partake of, as well as parody, the information 
glut that characterizes modernity” (1). The voluminous number of Mayer’s photographs for 
Memory, as well as the tendency of her prose to fill entire pages of the book edition without 
leaving any blank space, testifies directly to the information “glut” that Stephens describes. 
Adrian Piper, writing around the time of Memory’s creation in her essay “Talking to Myself: The 
Ongoing Autobiography of an Art Object,” points to the difficulty artists faced in synthesizing 
media and content in conceptual art (36-7). For Piper, Mayer’s “space-filling poetry” represents 
a rare resolution of that tension (37). As Kotz notes of what seems a productive tension, then, in 
following Piper’s description of the work, “Just as its images are suspended in an irresolvable 
tension between personal affect and neutral system, its presentation straddles monumental scale 
and minute detail.”127 
Gillian White identifies a critique of lyric practice even after Mayer’s “fall from grace” in 
her turn to expressive verse in the period after Memory and Studying Hunger, exemplified by 
Midwinter Day (1978) and The Golden Book of Words (1978). Midwinter Day, written during 
one day on 22 December 1978, finds Mayer again experimenting with duration, if in a more lyric 
and legibly autobiographic mode. The Golden Book of Words represents a more definitive turn 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
127 Liz Kotz’s essay is an important intervention in the contextualization of Mayer’s work in an 
art history context that often overlooks its importance. The recent anthology, It Is Almost That: A 
Collection of Image & Text Work by Women Artists & Writers (2011), edited by Lisa Pearson, 
makes a similar intervention, placing excerpts from Memory alongside work by Weiner, Adrian 
Piper, Louise Bourgeois, and others.  
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toward a traditional collection of discrete lyric poems. Yet, White writes, “[I]n Mayer’s attempts 
to imagine and address an audience outside the dictates of anti-lyric practice, her work explores 
processes of readerly identification and self-projection […]” (158). The experimental tension of 
Mayer’s work – that which Kotz puts in the art historical context as a tension between “personal 
affect and neutral system” – runs through Memory and Mayer’s later work alike. But, unlike the 
quotidian, autobiographic epic of Midwinter Day or the free-standing lyric poems of The Golden 
Book of Words, Memory does not simply imagine or address an audience member. Instead, 
Mayer’s Memory makes the reader an active participant in, and indeed a component part of, this 
multimedia and collaborative performance work.128  
In the Special Collections reading room, the tapes of Memory were bewitching. At the 
beginning of the recording labeled 29 July, Mayer whispered a series of clauses I did not 
remember from the published text: “It's windy out, it's windy out, not then, now, I'm a scientist." 
In its stuttering over temporal indications (“not then, now”), the passage exemplifies Lytle 
Shaw’s description of the imbrication of deixis and temporality in the book edition in his essay 
on the rhetoric of scientific authority in the work of Mayer and her friend and collaborator Clark 
Coolidge. Describing the effect of the absence of images from the published text, Shaw writes, 
“This deictic gesturing purged of description works not merely to distance us from the 
photographs, but to emphasize the complex temporality that Mayer’s project establishes” (158). 
Mayer’s work of composition self-consciously engaged with this “complex temporality.” As 
                                                
128 This structural engagement with collaboration between artist and audience in the work marks 
a difference with other contemporaneous poetic projects associated with memory and 
photography. Mayer’s friend and collaborator Clark Coolidge published his Polaroid in 1975, 
making an analogy between the development of the instant photograph and the development of 
syntax in a poem. Lyn Hejinian’s Writing Is an Aid to Memory appeared in 1978, a precursor to 




Mayer recounts in her “Lecture at the Naropa Institute, 1989,” she composed the book edition of 
Memory using her 1971 notebooks while looking at projected slides of the photographs (98). 
References to the projector recur throughout the text of Memory so that the present tense of the 
text serves more than one present tense of experience: of the photograph, of the memory, and of 
the writing. This series of temporal displacements and relays characterize this multimedia project 
in its current state, dismantled in parts in an archive that, by archive rules, can only be viewed 
piece by piece, photo slides or audio recording, but never both at the same time as in the Greene 
Street installation.  
The lines quoted above do not appear in the book edition of Memory, but their echo 
resounds in Studying Hunger, a volume examining the somatic/affective states of writing, that 
Mayer published in 1975 following the book edition of Memory. There, concurrently to the 
production of Memory, though in a retrospective tone, she writes that the motivation for 
exploring states of consciousness in Memory was “to do this as an emotional science […] to use 
this to find a structure for MEMORY […] to do this without remembering” (7).129 Mayer’s 
“emotional science,” however, confuses the goal of the project to record memory as in a diary 
and to find those structures of memory that she hints may be both rhetorical and 
phenomenological. In the recording for 29 July from the Memory installation, Mayer admits, 
"When you write there's nothing to feel nothing to feel nothing but the smoke in front of the slide 
projector" (175). The experience of writing reduces to the material experience of sitting in 
another sort of photographic installation, that of a slide projector. Mayer characterizes the 
                                                
129 Like the overlap of present tenses in Memory that Shaw describes, the overlap of Mayer’s 
editing of material for Studying Hunger and Memory further complicates the “present tense” of 
Mayer’s work. 
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experience by sensory phenomena (the visual data of smoke in the projector light) but inherent in 
her style of writing in Memory will be the fantasized work of recollection, as well. 
In what follows, I explore the ways in which the book edition of Memory is both a 
product and a displacement of the structure of the installation, and ultimately, of Mayer’s 
durational performance. Not only is Mayer’s poetry “space-filling” as in Piper’s phrase but it is 
also productive of a space and subject of collaboration. In Memory, Mayer heightens the 
collaborative stakes of her artwork by manipulating the physical space of her installation, a 
public site for the display of private memory, in its displacement to the later published text. The 
temporal overlays that Shaw associates with the textual work belong to a series of other, 
interconnected displacements: in time, between image and text, between memory and language, 
and between bodies. Through the use of color in her text and in the photographs that inspire it, as 
well as her transformation of her multimedia installation into what I describe, after philosopher 
Vilém Flusser, as a photographic "apparatus" of a second order, Mayer involves her reader-
viewer in the phenomenological and psychological space of Memory as well as in the artistic 
work of its production. An artwork that is at once an “emotional” science project but whose 
writing leaves “nothing to feel,” Memory acts upon both the artist and her audience, making both 
into writers of a shared, collaborative work of memory/Memory.  
 
In an installation entitled Todo vale. Colores primarios y secundarios llevados al blanco 
(Everything goes. Primary and secondary colors brought up to white) (1968-70) and shown as 
part of the Museum of Modern Art’s landmark 1970 exhibit of Conceptual art, Information, 
 199 
Alejandro Puente explores what he terms the “language” of color (Fig. 5.3).130 Mayer would 
surely have been, at least, aware of this exhibit as it included work by Acconci, her sister’s friend 
Adrian Piper, and her own friend Dan Graham, amongst other 0 to 9 contributors Robert 
Smithson, Yvonne Rainer, and Sol Lewitt, a friend of Weiner’s. Puente’s work includes small 
canvases that recall industrial paint samples, plastic canisters that contain liquid paints of the 
same colors as the canvases, and a grouping of explanatory documents with text, color wheels, 
and other graphic means of systematizing the use of color. The work appeared during a crucial 
period in both Mayer and Weiner’s art practice, in which they, too, turned to the use of color in 
writing: Mayer in Memory and Studying Hunger, and Weiner in The Fast (1970), where she 
tracks a range of sense phenomena during her earliest hallucinations. In his explanatory 
documents, Puente equates color and language as systems of information in three balanced 
sentences that mimic the logic of a syllogism (“color is language”; “language is system”; 
“language is information”). Elsewhere in the work, he writes, “Color is the only element that has 
a grammar and syntactic properties of its own.”  
In the text that comprises the book edition of Memory, Mayer deploys color in a way 
similar to her use of time as a durational challenge to herself and her reader-viewer. In a 
relatively short but exemplary passage (some of Mayer’s color passages extend for half the 
page), Mayer writes,  
[…] photograph: monday—a window of a factory, tuesday—a small white  
  handkerchief with ‘a merry christmas’ embroidered in red across one corner,  
  wednesday—a man’s black striped pants, thursday—a light brown earthenware  
  jar, friday—an earthenware jar like thursday but darker in color, saturday—a  
  saucer with a pattern of brown & gold squares round the edge, sunday—a metal  
  cream pitcher” (19, emphasis mine)  
                                                
130 For a related overview of color in the context of French-language poetry, see Susan Harrow 




Mayer’s use of color adjectives gives rhythm to her prose text, but at times this rhythm impedes 
reading, slows the progression through the text, and compounds the durational challenge of the 
already dense prose. Color, then, has a direct relationship to the embodied experience of reading 
Memory. And, if Mayer’s work examples the concern for informatics amongst writers and artists 
of the 1960s as Paul Stephens argues, color becomes integral to how the artist and the reader-
viewer process, or read, this information culled from daily life. The passage cited above, which 
provides an ekphrastic description of a series of photographs (likely corresponding to 
photographs in the installation), also relates Mayer’s use of color in her text to the saturated 
colors of her Kodachrome film.  
Color plays an important role in the rest of Mayer’s poetry, as well. The poem “Very 
Strong February” is the best example of Mayer’s prompt, included amongst her Experiments, to 
write a poem that includes a color in every line. That poems begins, “A man and a woman 
pretend to be white ice / Three men at the lavender door are closed in by the storm / With strong 
prejudice and money to buy the green pines.” While the “lavender door” represents a more 
nuanced use of color in the specification of a hue of purple, the other colors (“white ice” and 
“green pines”) give expected descriptions of their objects. The color adjectives in the poem share 
in a normative use of color in Memory. It is this attempt to record colors with fidelity to their 
objects that allows to the colors to work as syntactic elements in the grammar of Mayer’s 
language system, to borrow Puente’s vocabulary for talking about color and language.  
Mayer’s attention to color adjectives in Memory speaks to her avowed interest in 
Gertrude Stein’s poetics, as well. In the essay “Poetry and Grammar,” Stein elaborates on the 
parts of speech and their roles in her poetic composition. Stein declares verbs and adverbs as 
more “interesting” than nouns and adjectives, but the latter two grammatical categories connect 
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Stein’s poetics to Mayer’s, despite their status as “not truly interesting.” Stein, in fact, allows a 
special power to nouns in her essay. She writes, “Poetry is doing nothing but using losing 
refusing and pleasing and betraying and caressing nouns. When I said. A rose is a rose is a rose 
is a rose. And then later made that into a ring what did I do I caressed completely caressed and 
addressed a noun” (327). In the mimed “scientificity” of Memory (especially in its book edition), 
prefaced by Mayer’s psychiatrist David Rubinfine with reference to the “data” Mayer includes 
about her past, sensory elements rise to the thing-ness of nouns themselves. Mayer’s use of color 
may modify nouns, but in the objectivity of these colors, Mayer attempts to “caress” them in the 
way Stein caressed her nouns by giving them the attention of her repetitions. The grammatical 
address to nouns in Stein’s poetics merges with Mayer’s interest in sensory perception, tied to 
the material world in its first experiencing and its later archiving as abstract memory, here 
colorized as Kodachrome photograph and as modified noun. In a 1989 lecture at Naropa 
University, Mayer describes Memory as revisiting Stein’s assertion that, in Mayer’s words, “you 
can’t write remembering.” In challenging Stein, Mayer describes herself as having worked “with 
Stein,” suggesting the collaborative ethos at work in Mayer’s process (“From: A Lecture at 
Naropa Institute, 1989” 98-9). 
The influence of the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, particularly in his late work on color, 
appears, too, in Mayer’s emphasis on the exhaustive cataloguing of sensory and memory data. 
Wittgenstein’s writings offer a bridge between a focus on the grammatical and the 
phenomenological in Mayer’s writing.131 As Liz Kotz notes, an ambivalence toward language 
marked the postwar period in visual art (Words 223). In her well-attended workshops at the 
                                                
131 Vickery notes the shared ground that Stein and Wittgenstein’s influence set for Mayer’s 
writing and for the writing of those who would become the Language poets. See Vickery 156. 
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Poetry Project in New York City, Mayer often included Wittgenstein on her reading lists,132 and 
a similar ambivalence to the one Kotz describes appears in writing of the period, as the work 
published in Mayer and Acconci’s 0 to 9 reveals. In Memory, Mayer undercuts a procedural 
constraint designed to capture experience (the documenting of one month in a flow of 
photographs) with a textual apparatus that diverges from the visual “data” of the snapshots, 
organized in a rational grid display. As Stephen Melville writes of Wittgenstein’s importance to 
artists in the period, “[W]hat Wittgenstein seemed to license was a certain practice of self-
reference that could nonetheless count as rigorous, as measuring up to a more certain (albeit 
obscure) standard of objectivity […] more or less on a par with […] modern science” (Melville 
qtd in Kotz Words 303-4 n 17).  
In the Studying Hunger Journals, a collection of the notebooks that Mayer edited to 
produce another durational project, Studying Hunger (1975), Mayer attributes her interest in 
color and the perception of color in different somatic states to Weiner’s influence (3).133 For 
Studying Hunger, Mayer composed a prose text similar to that in Memory, recording the effects 
of hunger on her experience of the world, experimenting with different color pens in her 
preparatory journals to record color hallucinations and other somatic variations in her perception 
of the world around her. In Remarks on Colour, a work unfinished at the time of his death, 
Wittgenstein explores the phenomenon of color and its relationship both to human perception 
and to language. Memory does the same in proposing the memory function as analogous to color, 
caught between perception and language.  
                                                
132 See Kane All Poets Welcome 188. 
 
133 Weiner’s “clair-style” hallucinations of words were preceded by an early period of color 
hallucinations, detailed in The Fast, which I discuss in my chapter on Adrian Piper.  
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The first fragment of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Colour sets the stakes for the way in 
which we express sensory phenomena in language. He begins, “A language-game: Report 
whether a certain body is lighter or darker than another. – But now there’s a related one: State 
the relationship between the lightness of certain shades of colour [….] The form of the 
propositions in both language-games is the same: ‘X is lighter than Y’” (2e). In other words, the 
two language-games produce a similar syntax. But, as Wittgenstein observes, the first game 
produces a contingent, “temporal” relationship between external objects while the second 
produces a “timeless” internal relationship fundamental to the colors themselves. In a passage in 
the book edition of Memory, in which Mayer recounts sharing some of her photo slides with 
friends, Mayer writes, “[…] & pinned it to a sample of hunger eating the colors of a line-up of 
words” (22). The seeming non sequitur breaks the syntax and semantic meaning of what 
precedes the ampersand in the text. Color in the images inspires an irruption of desire – “hunger” 
– in the text: both the line-up of the images in the slide projector and the line-up, or syntax, of 
words in the text stall for a moment as Mayer interjects a hallucinatory, synesthetic clause into 
the flow of conversation she recounts. The technological conditions that create the images – the 
projector in front of which Mayer writes – allegorize this temporal/timeless split, as well. The 
projector’s carousel orders the photographs in a temporal chain but the volume of images and 
their unrelenting flow also make Mayer’s memories seem atemporal, or timeless. 
Despite the ordered syntax of his two language-games, Wittgenstein later confesses, “For 
here (when I consider colours, for example) there is merely an inability to bring the concepts into 
some kind of order. We stand there like the ox in front of the newly-painted stall door” (16e). 
The translation of the sensory experience of color into a system fails for Wittgenstein, and leaves 
him feeling like a proverbial dumb beast. Mayer’s reaction to this difficulty is, if not more 
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optimistic, more playful: if she cannot express an ordered relationship of colors to one another in 
language, then she will eat them, substituting the dumb stare of Wittgenstein’s ox for the 
embodied, instinctual impulses related to hunger. When poet Dorothea Lasky writes about color 
in her essay “What Is Color in Poetry,” she proposes, “Perhaps when we connect color to 
language, to sound, in the space of a poem we reconnect and resist what [André] Breton has 
named the tragic bifurcation of the so-called real and dream worlds that happens to all adults” 
(360). For Lasky, this reconnection that happens by way of the colorized poem creates a shared 
formal space for the experience of reading a poem. Lasky’s description of the color function in 
poetry recalls Mayer’s own expression of hunger in the phrase “eating the colors of a line-up of 
words,” as well as the temporal distortions of both Mayer’s text and Wittgenstein’s two 
language-games. Lasky writes, “Perhaps to name a letter is to name a color, too; is to set a finite 
progression of colors and letters and things that fold upon each other in the voraciously eating 
vortex of time” (360). In Memory, Mayer’s text offers an example of Lasky’s argument that the 
use of color in poetry creates a shared field of reference for readers of a text, but Memory makes 
Lasky’s argument less ecumenical than it reads at first. The shared field is one of desire and 
conflict, internal and external, as reader and writer attempt to reconcile the experience of color 
with the use of language.  
Mayer’s use of color, while creating a space of desire and conflict shared by reader and 
writer, serves neither scientific data nor a romantic notion of poetic expression to the exclusion 
of the other. As Stephens argues, “Mayer refuses to privilege one kind of memory 
(personal/expressive) over another (public/restrained) [….] Mayer’s memory projects refuse 
strict chronology, just as they refuse to assign hierarchical importance to individual memories” 
(126). The durational nature of Mayer’s performance opens her text to both kinds of memory, 
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just as it opens it to expressive and non-expressive modes of writing. The most repetitive color 
passages in the book edition of Memory reproduce what Sianne Ngai has described as 
“stuplimity,” or an affect attributable to texts that challenge the reader with a mixture of boredom 
and the sublime, which might be understood in the vocabulary of Wittgenstein’s two color 
language-games as a mixture of the temporal and the timeless.134 Stephens’ further observation 
that Mayer resists “accumulating data” in a stance that subverts both the chronology and 
hierarchy of memory finds a chromatic analogue in her treatment of color and syntax.  
A passage in the July 11 entry in Memory exemplifies both Mayer’s subversion of 
“accumulating data” as well as her investment in the “stuplime” effects of the use of color. She 
begins the concluding passage of that entry, “there are so many ways of predicting the time there 
are ways of remembering it are there more ways of remembering it: yellow cover, red cigarette 
pack, white ashtray, grey green film, silver cans, yellow bag, blue chairs, golden reels […]” (50). 
The passage continues with this list of objects modified by color adjectives for six more lines of 
prose, including approximately thirty-six more objects in the list and emphasizing the durational 
challenge to both the writer as she who records and remembers the experience of a specific day 
but also to the reader who reads such a dense passage. Ngai, in her argument about the 
“stuplime” as an affective category, points to Stein’s writing as an example of its effects, and this 
passage from Mayer recalls Stein’s description of her poetics as one in which she “caresses” 
nouns, especially in its concluding phrases: “orange light, white light green plant, red & white 
milk: some things are worn or faded” (50).  
                                                
134 Daniel Kane notes the similar affective response to audiences listening to Mayer’s friend 
Clark Coolidge read his book Polaroid (1976) for two hours at the Paula Cooper Gallery. 
Maggie Nelson draws a parallel between the boredom of reading Memory and that found in a 
work, such as Warhol’s Sleep (1963). See Kane All Poets 189 and Nelson Women 104.  
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The passage cited above highlights the multimedia nature of Memory. Though to this 
point I have largely discussed the textual use of color in the 1975 book edition of the project, the 
list of objects modified by colors cited above makes reference to the earlier iteration of the 
project as a photographic and sound installation. The concatenation of objects and their colors 
are one way of remembering the day, just as the photographs or text offer two other “ways of 
remembering it.” Indeed, Mayer makes explicit reference to the color of her photographs 
produced from Kodachrome film, known for its vivid colors. In a passage from her July 9 entry, 
Mayer again recounts a friend’s reaction to her photographs: “[…] this is what I said & she said, 
they’re really clear they’re really bright it’s pretty film & I said, kodachrome […]” (58). Color, a 
phenomenon that Mayer has tied to the composition of her text, and even to her desire to write it, 
now becomes emblematic of the materiality of the photographs from Memory.  
If Mayer ties color to a photographic spur to memory, not dissimilar to Barthes’ punctum, 
in the slide show passage and formulation of “ways of remembering” cited above, she 
acknowledges the same relationship between her text and the photographs included in the 
installation of Memory. Recall that her wall text, cited above, referred to the photographs as 
“taking-off points for digression,” that is, as jumping off points for the work of her or her 
audience members’ fantasy. In another passage from the book edition that discusses a film 
Mayer was working on with Bowes and other friends, Mayer writes, “[…] three filters in a case 
on floor: red, yellow, blue, & a candle […] red with a yellow ball in the middle it looks just like 
the sun & next, pretty accurate color with a tint of green to it like a fluorescent, that blue & 
yellow […]” (80). Mayer’s use of color at this point in the text is complex, especially in relation 
to the emphasis on the vivid colors rendered in Kodachrome. The focused image of cinematic gel 
filters, designed to modulate the color of light during the filming of a movie, evokes a level of 
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detail attributable to a photograph, as if Mayer were referring to a photographic image in creating 
this poetic image from her memory and her Memory notebooks. In evoking the experience of 
looking at a photograph, then, Mayer elides the “pretty accurate” colors of a Kodachrome slide 
with those of the light filters. The photograph becomes a “taking-off point” for her work of 
memory recorded in the text, but the text also becomes more photographic for the reader through 
Mayer’s use of color. Both photograph and text are “ways of remembering,” and both writer and 
reader have a role to play in this act of memory. 
 
For Vilem Flusser, a color photograph represents a higher level of abstraction than a 
black and white image. In Towards a Philosophy of Photography (1983), Flusser asserts the 
claim that black and white images readily reveal their own status as conceptual images since 
objects do not actually exist in the world as black and/or white. As he explains of color 
photographs, then, “Colour photographs are on a higher level of abstraction than black-and-white 
ones […] The ‘more genuine’ the colours of the photograph become, the more untruthful they 
are, the more they conceal their theoretical origin” (44). Flusser’s argument rests on his 
observation that green grass in a photograph develops out of an idealized concept of green that is 
reproduced, in turn, by a chemical process, setting it at a further remove from the real than the 
gray of a black and white image, which does not attempt to mask the technical conditions of the 
image’s making. In a similar argument in “Rhetoric of the Image,” Roland Barthes argues that 
color naturalizes the ideologies that encode a photograph. In an advertisement for pasta, in his 
example, the colors yellow, green, and red evoke “italianicity,” a quality of Italianness that 
seems natural but that requires a specific reading of the signs of this quality in the image and of 
the image as indexical proof (34).  
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When Mayer calls the green produced by blue and yellow light filters “pretty accurate” in 
the 1975 text of Memory, she not only partially elides the gap between text and photographic 
image in the mind of the reader, but she also naturalizes the abstraction described by Flusser as 
“accurate” rather than “highly abstract” or “artificial,” or as “theoretical” in origin. However, as 
Kotz notes in her essay on Memory, the colors of Mayer’s photographs are often “shifted,” either 
too blue or too red as Kotz explains, and so subversive to notions of realism in these images at 
the same time (“Why Memory”). Indeed, Mayer’s project “straddles and disrupts,” in Kotz’s 
words, received notions of Conceptual art history, and as I argue, theories of photography 
roughly contemporary to Memory’s creation.   
Flusser’s theory of the photograph parallels claims that Barthes puts forth in the essay 
“The Photographic Message.” Like Barthes, Flusser refuses the notion of a photograph as purely 
denotative in favor of the connotative richness and instability of these images. In “The 
Photographic Message,” Bathes describes the “photographic paradox” as “the co-existence of 
two messages, the one without a code (the photographic analogue), the other with a code (the 
‘art,’ or the treatment, or the ‘writing,’ or the rhetoric of the photograph” (19). For Flusser, the 
abstraction that “genuine” colors introduce into the photograph reveals the same. In his words, 
“[The other elements of photographs] all represent transcoded concepts that claim to have been 
reflected automatically from the world onto the surface” (44). Like Barthes’ systems of 
denotation and connotation in the image, the photograph as described by Flusser also demands 
that the viewer “decode” it.  
Flusser argues that photographs, as a subset of what he terms “technical images,” are the 
products of apparatuses, of which cameras are a prototype. Recalling Michel Foucault’s theory 
of the apparatuses (dispositifs) that subject individuals to disciplinary power, Flusser’s camera-
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as-apparatus manipulates and reorders information through the cameras program. In Discipline 
and Punish, Foucault tracks the development of the disciplines as a way of organizing power to 
produce knowledge. From amongst various institutions, including mental health institutions, 
prisons, and the academic disciplines, he explores the example of the eighteenth century French 
military and its grooming of a docile body as subject to this disciplinary power.135 The history of 
the disciplines that Foucault traces applies as well to his later History of Sexuality, in which he 
discusses an “apparatus of sexuality.” According to Foucault, in an interview about the History, 
the apparatus is “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid” 
(194). “Discipline” resonates with the scientific and academic disciplines that produce 
specialized fields of knowledge through their specific apparatuses as well as with the corporal 
discipline that produced the ideal French soldier.  
Similarly, Flusser argues that the camera apparatus is programmed to produce certain 
kinds of images. He writes that photographers “are pursuing new possibilities of producing 
information and evaluating the photographic program” (26). Here, Flusser makes the distinction 
between informative and redundant images clear: a camera’s program produces a finite number 
of possible photographs. Those that present a new possibility are informative; those that present 
a known possibility are redundant, and often the result of “taking snapshots” (26). Whereas 
Barthes’ early writings on photography emphasize the levels of cultural codes that can be found 
to decode the photograph, Flusser here emphasizes the information produced by the 
photographic program. Concomitant with the information society described by Stephens, 
                                                
135 See in particular the chapter, “Docile Bodies” in Foucault Discipline and Punish 135-69. 
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Flusser’s theory turns the technical image into information. And, according to Flusser, in a move 
similar to Foucault’s notion of how one becomes “subjected” to a discipline, photographers 
belong on the inside of the photographic apparatus as a functionary, rather than a master, of that 
apparatus (27).  
Flusser’s apparatus represents a special kind of tool, one that makes the human being 
function, rather than vice versa, and one that simulates a bodily organ, as a camera does the 
human eye. Thus, Flusser can state, “[L]anguage is not an apparatus [….] Nevertheless, language 
can nowadays be ‘apparatusized’: ‘Word processors’ can replace writers” (28). Though Mayer’s 
Memory does not go as far as Flusser’s word processor in its exploration of an automatic (or 
automated) text, Mayer does situate the reader-viewer, herself as writer, and language in the 
space of an apparatus. The flow of language in Memory, however, is more in keeping with the 
kind of image flow Mayer offers in the photographic installation of the project. Both language 
and image hew closer to the information-impoverished redundancy of the snapshot, as Flusser 
describes it.  
If the box of the camera provides a space for the activation of a program designed to 
produce information (informative images) in Flusser’s theory, then Mayer’s installation makes 
an analogy between the box of the camera and the box of the gallery. As in Foucault’s definition, 
the apparatus includes architecture and laws, the said and the unsaid, the material and the 
discursive. In Mayer’s project, which creates memory images from photographic ones, the 
architectural space of the Greene Street loft, with the speakers installed for the installation, is 
part of this apparatus, as is the viewer who enters into the space. Information entered into the 
camera’s black box results in a photographic image; information entered into the installation 
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results in a memory.136 Between the images and audio recording of the installation, the viewer 
processes Mayer’s Memory through the mechanisms of his or her own memory.  
As in the text of Memory, the installation stages the spur to memory as the linchpin of the 
project. As Kotz observes of Memory, “Everything is specific, and yet also, in its way, generic, 
selections from a world of experiences and appearances that somehow feel familiar” (“Why 
Memory”). The familiar feeling that Kotz identifies in looking at images from the project recalls 
the affectively charged “ways of remembering” that Mayer associates with colors in the text. 
But, in this case, it is not only Mayer as artist who is induced into a process of memory but the 
viewer, too, who finds something familiar for herself in the images. What’s more, the 
photographs in the installation, as well as one from the cover of the book edition, included 
images of Mayer, implicating other photographers and a collaborative work exceeding the 
authorial control of Mayer’s signature or the gestural control of Mayer’s photographing body 
(Fig. 5.4). In chapter three, I discussed Margaret Olin’s theory of the “performative index,” 
which accounts for the displacement of the photographic spur to memory (Barthes’ punctum) 
from one image to another. In Memory, the work of displacement overlays the photographic 
image and the textual image of the audio recording onto the memory-image that develops in the 
mind of the viewer.137 The Memory installation displaces the work of memory from artist to 
                                                
136 Referring to the use of dialogue and repetition in a later work by Mayer, The Desires of 
Mothers to Please Others in Letters, Vickery offers another possible image for this space: an 
echo chamber. In Memory, the echo chamber takes shape through the rebound of image, text, and 
the work of reading and viewing. See Vickery 161. 
 
137 In a 2016 Poetry Foundation talk, Mayer recounts how as a young artist without money to 
develop film, she and other friends would take imaginary photographs by selecting with a 
camera a frame for the shot and notating the technical conditions they would have chosen to 
actually take the image. See Mayer “Bernadette Mayer in Conversation with Jennifer Karmin 
and Stephanie Anderson.”  
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viewer, making the viewer a producer of a mental image and so subject to the input he or she 
receives from the apparatus of the installation.     
 
Mayer’s project sets her own body, and the bodies of her readers and viewers, at the 
center of an apparatus designed to write memory. The Brazilian Modernist writer Clarice 
Lispector sets the body at the center of a similar endeavor in her visionary, philosophical-
poetical treatise Água Viva, written over several years in the early 1970s at the same time that 
Mayer was working on Memory. In this text, Lispector situates her body and own experience of 
the world in the “instant-now” of time and in relation to the “it” that seems to bind together the 
phenomenal world and the world of language and poetry. Though organized in fragmented 
sections of prose, unlike Mayer’s text that reads in long uninterrupted sections, Lispector 
composed the manuscript for the work according to a stream-of-consciousness ethos not unlike 
Mayer’s in Memory. As Benjamin Moser writes in his introduction to the English translation of 
the work, “Clarice often claimed that she was a simple housewife, and in this formless, plotless 
conversation […] in which she types anything and everything that pops into her mind, that is 
often exactly how she sounds” (viii). Like the autobiography that Mayer offers in Memory, 
Lispector’s is also “plotless” and given to digression.  
The title of the book can refer either to a fountain (literally, living water) or to a jellyfish 
in Brazilian Portuguese, and like the gelatinous image of a jellyfish, the self in Água Viva wavers 
between its maintenance and dissolution in the encounter with the other. The hallucinatory power 
of this identification with the other recalls Weiner and Cahun’s vatic poses. As Lispector writes, 
“You are a form of being I, and I a form of being you: those are the limits of my possibility” 
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(60).138 As in Mayer’s photographic installation, writer and addressee, artist and audience, 
become confused; each can stand in for the other.139 Yet, this elasticity of the “I” marks a limit, 
as well, in Lispector’s passage, able to stretch only to the “you,” and not beyond.  
In relation to the I and the you, Lispector sets another pronoun in play in her work: the 
“it.” Lispector’s “it” remains undefined and fluid throughout the text, set in italics each time it 
appears. Often paired with references to embodiment, both to giving birth and to being born, as 
well as to animal life, Lispector assigns the “it” an impersonal status in a key passage. She 
writes: 
 I’m myself. 
But there’s also the mystery of the impersonal that is the “it”: I have the 
impersonal inside me and isn’t something the personal that sometimes floods me 
can corrupt or rot by the personal that sometimes floods me: but I dry myself in 
the sun and am an impersonal of the dry and germinative pit of a fruit. (23)  
 
The syntax of these sentences, uninterrupted by punctuation where such punctuation would help 
make the meaning clearer for the reader recalls Mayer’s own sentences, simultaneously dense 
and dizzying. The merging of the self with the impersonal makes Lispector a harbinger of both 
life and death, of the “dry” dead fruit pit that is also still “germinative.”  
Água Viva’s fragments culminate in Lispector’s envisioning of a monument known both 
in its materiality and in the memory of it. She writes, “What do I want to write now? I want 
something calm and without fashions. Something like the memory of a tall monument that seems 
taller because it is a memory. But I want to have really touched the monument along the way” 
                                                
138 Hélène Cixous comments at length on the relationship between I and You in her important 
work on Lispector, L’Heure de Clarice Lispector.  
 
139 Vickery locates this confusion of “I” and “you,” already at work in Memory, in the later 
Studying Hunger. See Vickery 163. 
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(87). Like Lispector’s “it,” and like Mayer’s book edition of Memory, this monument exists 
between language and the physical, phenomenal world. Most importantly, this is a monument 
that Lispector wants to make in writing. As Kotz notes of the generation of the text for the book 
edition of Memory, Mayer employed a cut-up technique, cutting transcripts of her installation 
recordings into strips to revise and reorder the text, literally making the language of Memory a 
plastic material (“Why Memory”).140  
Lispector’s troubling of the divide between the I and the you in Água Viva plays out in 
Memory as the divide between writer and reader dissolves. The performative index that Olin 
locates in Barthes’ punctum has already revealed the first instance of a kind of writerly reading 
in Mayer’s work: “reading” the photographs that comprise the installation, Mayer composes her 
memory as a textual artifact. Two additional projects attest to the performative power of 
Memory, one contemporary with the installation and book edition and another from later in 
Mayer’s own body of work. A section of Clark Coolidge’s durational (unfinished) prose 
experiment A Book Beginning What and Ending Away (1973-1981) dedicated through its title to 
“Bernadette” takes up the work of memory. His prose record of his own quotidian memory 
begins with a sentence evocative of both Mayer and Lispector’s texts: “Memory is a voice, a 
voice of nobody” (415).  
As for Mayer’s later work, the poet attempts to rewrite a section of Memory in “Bring It 
Here” (1989), further displays the power of her work from the 1970s to spur not only the work of 
remembering but the work of writing memory even if her new text ultimately fails to 
                                                
140 Lytle Shaw notes the inverse relationship in the period of the 1960s and 1970s between the 
“dematerialization of art” as coined by Lucy Lippard and the turn in poetry to a “materialization 
of language.” Both tendencies, in Shaw’s estimation, work toward a similar desired goal against 
the easy consumption of the artwork, despite their inverse relationship. See Shaw 156. 
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successfully rewrite the memories.141 “Bring it Here” enacts its own displacement. Set at one 
remove from the photographs, now mediated by the record of the book edition, this rewriting 
posits the text of Memory as the spur to memory. Without the photographs to recall the events of 
that July, Mayer relies on the text alone to do the same work her installation originally allowed to 
happen. She writes, “[…] i think now without pictures that what there is to do seems perfunctory 
[…]” (105). Yet, despite this perfunctory state of affairs, she continues and eventually writes a 
photograph back into the text:  
as i said then and can still say now July 25th though it’s already begun begins 
again with Ed without his shirt on what a handsome man is he comma i never said 
that then not only that he is without his shirt sitting in the car and i took a picture 
of him with flowers arranged on the dashboard comma i can’t remember if this 
was before or after one of us smashed the side view mirror […] (105) 
 
An arresting moment, set apart from Mayer’s recollection by the “commas” in her text, sends 
Mayer’s memory work to a detail not captured by the text she is re-reading but locatable finally 
in the now-absent photograph she remembers from the installation. This showing of the 
performative index’s power, even absent the material photograph, is then undercut by a failure to 
remember when the photo was taken (before or after breaking a side view mirror on her car) or 
who broke the mirror.  
This last failure to remember who performed an action, who broke the mirror, indicates a 
moment of displacement, of slippage between the I and the You that Lispector’s own text sets 
into play.142 A first displacement by the performative index proliferates as other “displacements” 
in Mayer’s memory and in the text. In Lispector’s text, memory would be able to be transposed 
                                                
141 The performance of “Bring It Here” recalls the performance of Morris in the multiple 
versions of his Memory Drawings. See note 5.  
142 In another felicitous “displacement,” Mayer’s return to the 25 July entry marks an important 
coincidence with Lispector’s text, in which she writes, “Because at five in the morning, today 
July 25th, I fell into a state of grace.” See Lispector 79.  
 
 216 
into material, language displaced into a monument. Such a monument, like all monuments, 
makes memory public. Caught as it is between the I and the You, the monument marks that limit 
Lispector writes of as the limit of her possibility: an I that can become You, and vice versa, but 
that can go no further. Mayer builds and rebuilds her Memory, in its multiple iterations, on a 
similar shifting ground: between the I and the you, between materiality and language, between 
the image and the word, between phenomenal experience and the fantasy work of desire. Vickery 
concludes that “Memory was […] presented not only as a staging of the past but as a collective 
reenactment” (152). Mayer claims that in Memory she aimed “to create a space in which a person 
could be […] so that you could actually be in memory (“Bernadette Mayer in Conversation”). 
Mayer’s Memory, however, did not stage a reenactment but rather allowed new writings of 
memory, the only reenactment being the performative work of displacement encouraged by the 
encounter of photograph, sound recording, and viewer’s body.  
To return one last time to the place of color in Mayer’s work, poet Lisa Robertson, 
describing pigments of color as “juice” in her essay “How to Colour,” writes, “Such juice is 
always psychotropic. We might say that pigment is that motion spontaneously produced by 
substance in conjunction with light […] This juice has a property, this juice appears to be 
connected to phenomena” (143). Color is a substance both phenomenal and of fantasy, both 
abstract and material, and as Robertson goes on to write, moves us across “affective” surfaces, 
like those of a photograph (143). Color marks our own connection as readers and viewers to the 
general specificity that Kotz highlights in Mayer’s Memory. In the book edition’s July 9 entry, 
Mayer wonders, “What’s the difference who’s in charge: when our experience is increased by 
the addition of observations that were future, down the road & reflections to infinity, but are now 
past […]” (55). Caught ourselves by the memory-making apparatus of Memory, as Mayer is 
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between past and future views of experience, we find ourselves spurred to the work of writing 
and rewriting Mayer’s monument to memory as our own. 
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Chapter Six.  
Incorporating Friendship: 
Collaboration and the Fold in Unica Zürn, Cahun, and Henri Michaux 
 
In “Les jeux à deux,” a short 1967 text appended to the posthumous edition of her prose 
narrative L’Homme-jasmin, Unica Zürn lays out the rules for a series of games based on a nearly 
fabular interpretation of Vincenzo Bellini’s 1831 opera Norma.143 Zürn assigns herself (referred 
to as “elle-même” in the third person narration characteristic of Zürn’s most autobiographical 
texts) and the Homme Blanc (the “White Man,” a hallucinated being who inspires and torments 
Zürn) the roles available to the two partners in this game, those of the title heroine and Flavio. 
The Homme Blanc is one of two significant beings that, by her own account, appear to her 
through psychic means and exert a kind of mind control over her. The Homme Blanc 
corresponds to the influence of Zürn’s partner Hans Bellmer, and the second important figure, 
the Homme Jamsin, or “Jasmine Man,” to her friend Henri Michaux.  
The rules for the “jeux à deux” require that the two participants respect the need for 
distance, concentration, and meditation, three conditions that mark Zürn’s experiences of the 
Homme Blanc and Homme Jasmin, as well. The first of the games, “Le jeu de l’incorporation,” 
delineates the process by which Flavio summons Norma’s bodily presence through psychic 
means. However, unsatisfied by her simple presence, and threatened by the disruption of his 
desire for her, Flavio must “incorporate” Norma by assuming, and consuming, the material 
substances of her being. Of the experience of being incorporated, Zürn writes that Norma “sent 
comme la moelle s’échapper de ses os, son sang s’écouler de ses veines, ses sens l’abandonner” 
                                                
143 An explanatory note to the text recounts how Zürn received a book of the score to Norma 
from Bellmer. She used the book to create an artist’s book with her own drawings and the text of 
“Les jeux à deux” written on sheets of colored paper glued into the scorebook. Zürn often 
created such collaborative artist’s books from gifts of notebooks from friends, especially from 
Michaux during her time in psychiatric hospitals.   
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(215).144 Though sapped of much of her power, and even of her physical form, Norma fights 
back, appearing in multiple apparitions before Flavio so that he has to drain his own physical and 
psychic reserves to be rid of each. The game is a dangerous one for both participants, and though 
it ends with the incorporation of Norma into Flavio (with her “occupation” of his body), both 
partners are now “blancs et légers comme deux nuages” (217). The conclusion of the game 
brings Zürn back to a familiar experience of being inhabited by other bodies who control her 
actions, thoughts, and faculty of artistic creation. And though the atmosphere of these games 
points to the romantic and erotic charge of Zürn and Bellmer’s partnership, incorporation occurs 
in the longer text of L’Homme-jasmin under the sign of friendship, as well, in particular in 
Zürn’s life-chaging encounter with her friend, Michaux.  
Zürn’s text brings to mind Cahun’s emphasis of the duo she formed with Moore as well 
as the extreme duality, unto multiplicity, of the self that Cahun’s work exemplifies. Zürn’s 
concept of incorporation, however, makes explicit a form of psychological distress less evident 
in Cahun’s work. Born in the Berlin suburb of Berlin-Grunewald in 1916, Zürn had worked for 
the German national film company, been married and divorced, had two daughters, and 
published short stories before she met the German surrealist Hans Bellmer in 1953.145 That 
meeting initiated her into the great personal and artistic engagements of her life, living and 
                                                
144 Zürn’s “incorporation” perhaps owes its inspiration in part to Zürn’s experience of pregnancy. 
The narrator of her novel about pregnancy, The Trumpets of Jericho, describes her relationship to 
her unborn child in similar terms. Of this child Zürn’s narrator writes, “He who has sucked all 
the strength from my flesh and bones […]” See Zürn Trumpets 3.  
 
145 Mary Ann Caws gives a concise overview of Zürn’s biography in her essay from the 
exhibition catalogue Unica Zürn: Dark Spring. Renée Riese Hubert’s study of artistic 
partnerships, Magnifying Mirrors: Women, Surrealism, and Partnership, gives an overview of 
Zürn and Bellmer’s collaboration. See Caws 41-6 and Hubert “Self-Recognition and Anatomical 
Junctures: Unica Zürn and Hans Bellmer.”  
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collaborating with Bellmer, most notoriously in the context of his 1930s series La Poupée (Fig. 
6.1). A series of psychological crises confined Zürn to repeated periods of internment in 
psychiatric hospitals in France and Germany throughout the 1960s until her death by suicide (by 
leaping from Bellmer’s sixth-story apartment window) in 1970.  
Zürn’s friend and French translator, Ruth Henry, recalls her first meeting with Zürn at the 
opening of the 1959 EROS exhibit at Galerie Cordier in Paris where Meret Oppenheim staged 
the second version of her Spring Banquet.146 Arriving in Paris in 1953 with Bellmer, Zürn met 
the Surrealists shortly after Cahun’s last visit to Paris before her death in 1954. As Cahun left the 
Paris scene for the last time, Zürn arrived to occupy a position similarly marginal to that of 
Cahun. While both Cahun and Zürn held great allegiance to surrealism and made important 
friendships amongst the Surrealists, the two remained somehow outside the official group – 
Cahun in her self-imposed exile on Jersey, Zürn in her struggles with mental illness and 
psychiatric confinement.  
This historical pas de deux, or jeu à deux, between Cahun and Zürn also joins the Belgian 
Surrealist affiliate Henri Michaux to their games. A close friend of both women, Michaux served 
as inspiration to both, as well. Cahun’s portraits of Michaux, both alone and with her, attest to 
this friendship. Zürn’s use of Michaux’s texts as sources for some of her anagrams, composed by 
automatic means, only begins to explain the importance of Michaux to her life and work. In 
1957, Zürn met Michaux in an encounter that became both the occasion for her mental distress 
and for the narrative, L’Homme-jasmin. Michaux, Zürn believed, was the physical instantiation 
of a being she had first met in a dream vision as a child, a man whom she named the Jasmine 
Man for the flowers that bloomed in the dream garden where they met. The doubling of Michaux 
                                                
146 See Ruth Henry “My Encounter with Unica” in Hubert “Introducing Unica Zürn.” 
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and the Jasmine Man, a sort of husband-muse in Zürn’s description, echoes visual and textual 
tropes of doubling explored by both Michaux and Cahun in related works during the years of 
their friendship, from roughly 1922 until Cahun’s death in 1954. 
Zürn’s innovative automatic anagrams continue the clairvoyant pose from Cahun’s 
writings and photographs and act as a bridge between Cahun and that similar pose taken up by 
Weiner in her “clair-style.” In fact, making clear the assumption of a clairvoyant pose, Zürn 
titled a notebook of drawings from 1963-4, “Oracles and Spectacles.” In these poems, Zürn 
turned language itself into a collaborator, allowing her poems to unfold through the 
recombination of letters in an original phrase or sentence that she used as her titles. Joao Ribas, 
in an essay on Zürn’s drawings, links the facts of Zürn’s mental illness to the performance of 
surrealist, automatist madness. For Ribas, this “performed madness” is crucial to an appreciation 
of Zürn’s works. Her writings and drawings recall Weiner’s poetic innovation of the “clair-style” 
in that they are “not a result of the process of mental deterioration itself but in dialectical tension 
with it” (12). Weiner’s “clair-style” went further in the resolution of this dialectical tension, 
refusing pathology for the unconditional belief in her “clairvoyance” that she demanded from her 
audiences. Yet, the example of Zürn’s “schizophrenia,” what Ribas also calls “the metaphoric 
modernist illness par excellence,” makes her work, with its telepathic structures and merging of 
consciousnesses, an important forerunner to Weiner’s poetics of received, hallucinatory 
messages.  
In the novel Dark Spring, Zürn’s twelve-year-old girl protagonist swallows a portrait she 
had drawn of a photograph of a man who fascinated her. After consuming the portrait and 
becoming one with her vision of this fascinating stranger, the girl jumps from her window, 
committing suicide in a scene that eerily foreshadows its author’s own death. As Mary Ann 
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Caws describes the scene, “Ingestion, then, precedes the final costuming” (64). Crucial to this 
chapter is the act of ingestion, or of incorporation of the other’s image into the body of the artist, 
in a self-reflexive gesture that folds the other and the art object into the artist’s self. As Caws’ 
use of “costuming” in her summation makes clear, this act of incorporation leads to a 
performance that the artist inscribes into her texts.  
In this chapter, I follow a parallel model to those that emphasize the fragmentation of 
Zürn’s work, especially in the anagrams and prose narratives collected in L’Homme-jasmin. In 
my discussion of narcissism in part one, I evoked the parallel that Rosalind Krauss identifies 
between the work of Cahun and Marcel Duchamp and that she illustrates as a concern for the 
fold in their works. In Krauss’s description, the fold brings together performed and reflected 
identities as well as the positions of viewer and viewed in their works (42). Yet, too, the fold 
occurs in Duchamp’s work where he turns his attention to language, to calembours and 
spoonerisms like the confusion of “aux mots exquis” and “esquimaux” in one of his moving 
discs (47). It is this rapprochement between language and sculpture through the figure of the fold 
that I pursue in Zürn’s use of anagrams in her poetics.147 Though incorporation implies its own 
violence and trauma upon the “host” body, my reading privileges the fold over fragmentation in 
order to reveal the ways in which both Cahun and Zürn make the incorporated presence of the 
other essential to their approaches to friendship, collaboration, and the performance of 
clairvoyance.  
                                                
147 Krauss notes that Duchamp’s negotiation of the fold in his Rotoreliefs creates a directional 
reversibility, where, in those works, the patterning on the moving disc seems to reverse itself 
through optical illusion as the disc spins. Through such a paradigm of fold/reversibility, this 
double movement backward and forward echoes the critical parry of my project in this 
dissertation – that a collaboration might be convened that moves with directional reversibility 
through the history of the works, back and forth from Cahun and Weiner or from Zürn and 






 Zürn’s anagrams first appeared in the volume Hexentexte in 1954. In a preface to that 
volume, Bellmer points out the violence of the phonemic, syntactic, and semantic 
recombinations of the poems, as well as the “alien responsibility” that the use of chance creates 
in their composition.148 Renée Riese Hubert, in her study of the collaborative partnership of Zürn 
and Bellmer, analogizes the repetitions of body parts and reconstituted joints of Bellmer’s doll 
sculptures to the repetitions of linguistic elements and the reorganized syntax of Zürn’s anagrams 
(“Self-Repetition” 146). As Hubert notes, Zürn posed nude and bound with rope in Bellmer’s 
1958 doll-inspired portraits of her (Fig. 6.2). Bellmer’s own artistic treatise, Petite Anatomie de 
l’image, draws the comparison between the pliable syntax and morphology of the anagrammatic 
sentence and the multiple possible articulations and disarticulation of the body (45). In this 
analogy, the joint’s dis- and rearticulation comes to represent a formal model for both Bellmer’s 
sculptures and Zürn’s poems. The emphasis is on that fragmentation of the body and the violent, 
forced angles of a new joint, or syntax. Yet, Christina Svendsen, in her translator’s preface to 
Zürn’s novel The Trumpets of Jericho, notes that Bellmer’s presentation of the anagrams 
conveys the self-interest of his analogy between her work and his own (xv).  
In Saussure’s definition of the anagram, presented by Jean Starobinski, the device is a 
linguistic constraint that requires the writer to create a new phrase from all the phonemes present 
in an original phrase or theme, often someone’s name in the Latin tradition that he studies 
                                                




(Starobinski 14-15). Saussure’s image for these anagrams of “les mots sous les mots” (or of 
“words upon words,” in English translation, as if heaped upon one another) evokes diachronic 
layers of text, or of one text hidden beneath another by the various permutations of the 
phonemes. However, as will become evident, the permutations of the anagram in Zürn’s work, 
especially those included in L’Homme-jasmin, evoke layers created by a fold that challenges 
diachronic or synchronic models. Instead, Zürn’s anagrams emphasize a turning back onto the 
self, literally a repli sur soi, in the prose text of L’Homme-jasmin. Yet, even in this “involution,” 
to borrow the term that Ribas uses to describe the structural logic of Zürn’s drawings, Zürn uses 
the anagram itself to incorporate other voices into her text in what she considers a collaborative 
gesture. Indeed, in The Trumpets of Jericho, Zürn begins her visceral, novelistic fable of 
childbirth and artistic creation with the movement of an unborn child (a literally incorporated 
body) within the curtain-like folds of her intestines (Trumpets 1-2).  
Like Hubert who assigns a general importance to the influence of Bellmer on Zürn’s 
development as an artist, Victoria Appelbe argues for Bellmer’s crucial role in inspiring the 
development of Zürn’s anagrams. Appelbe’s exposition rightly makes this point. However, her 
description of the formal qualities of Zürn’s anagrams reveals an imperfect fit of analogies such 
as Hubert’s that compare the joints of Bellmer’s dolls to the “joints” in Zürn’s anagrammatical 
poems. Appelbe writes that the anagrams unveil (dévoile) a latent meaning hidden beneath the 
surface of each anagram’s original phrase. The description recalls Saussure’s exposition of the 
anagram but does not reckon fully with the figural terms for representing the formal processes at 
work in composing the anagrams. The anagrams may unveil, or reveal, a secondary layer of 
language, but Zürn then mines this original layer for its substances – its letters – in order to mix 
them back into each other, to fold them into new arrangements.  
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Less than a violent reorganization of language, or parallel to it, Zürn creates her anagrams 
as an exemplary form in which to practice the psychic fusing of the self and the other through 
what she terms “incorporation.” Zürn folds (incorporates) anagrams into the structure of 
L’Homme-jasmin, so that the folds of her poems serve as a model for the collaborative folds 
(meeting points) of the prose narrative as she describes the experience of others coming to 
inhabit her body and consciousness. Of the anagrams, Annie Monette argues that the constraint 
of the poems’ composition becomes a strategy of liberation from the kind of violence Bellmer 
locates in the poems of Hexentexte and produces a reversal of effect: the constraint no longer 
functions as an imprisonment in language but as an occasion for emancipation from this kind of 
imprisonment (47). Similarly, I propose here that rather than articulated constructions of 
rearranged linguistic elements built on the model of Bellmer’s dolls’ joints, the anagrams 
represent spaces of infinite linguistic folds that elevate a language game or poetic constraint to 
the incorporation of multiple substances and identities into the poem, recalling the experience of 
incorporation dramatized in L’Homme-jasmin and “Les jeux à deux,” as well as by its evocation 
of the scene of ingestion in Dark Spring. As Appelbe puts it, “[S]on oeuvre nie la notion 
d’individu en mêlant les pronoms” (30). Appelbe’s choice of the verb “mêlant” (from mêler, to 
mix) is apt for it contains the sense of folding one substance into another. Whereas other critics 
cited by Appelbe, especially Jean-François Rabain, who was also Zürn’s psychiatrist, emphasize 
the joint as a figure for Zürn’s semantic and morphological manipulations in the anagrams – and 
so, draw a connection to the disarticulated and rearranged joints of Bellmer’s dolls –, Appelbe 
remains ambivalent in her assessment of the anagram’s structural logic, if not in her evaluation 
of Bellmer’s overriding influence on their invention by Zürn.  
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 The figure of the fold links sculptural motifs that run through the work of Cahun, 
Michaux, and Zürn to other formal structures and thematic concerns in their work. For Gilles 
Deleuze, the fold (le pli) serves as an essential figure in his revision of traditional metaphysics. 
In The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, the figure represents a process of transformation, or 
differentiation, of what exists. Instead of the same, Deleuze’s fold emphasizes difference as the 
grounds for his ontology. In doing so, he sets interior and exterior space – or what could be 
called “Différent” – in relation to each other through the fold. As he writes of his reading of 
subjectivation in the work of Michel Foucault,  
[…] le double n’est jamais une projection de l’intérieur, c’est au contraire une 
intériorisation du dehors. Ce n’est pas un dédoublement de l’Un, c’est un 
redoublement de l’Autre. Ce n’est pas une reproduction de Même, c’est une 
répétition du Différent. Ce n’est pas l’émanation d’un JE, c’est la mise en 
immanence d’un toujours autre ou d’un Non-moi. (Foucault 105) 
 
Deleuze makes the fold the model for the immanence of self and other, inside and outside, to one 
another.   
Deleuze points to the privileged place of sculpture, of the sumptuous folds of a baroque 
work like Bernini’s St. Teresa in Ecstasy, in understanding the fold. As he writes, “The Baroque 
refers not to an essence but rather to an operative function, to a trait. It endlessly produces folds. 
It does not invent things [….] the Baroque trait twists and turns its folds, pushing them to 
infinity, fold over fold, one upon the other” (The Fold 3). The fold creates a multiplicity within a 
unity, as Deleuze describes it, on the model of the labyrinth that folds in on itself to create a 
multiplicity of paths. The fold in the Baroque idiom, for Deleuze, benefits from an “unlimited 
freedom,” or, as he puts it, “Folds seem to be rid of their supports – cloth, granite, or cloud – in 
order to enter into an infinite convergence […]” (The Fold 34). Deleuze identifies Michaux’s 
work as an example of the fold’s extension beyond the Baroque period, or as the operative 
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concept that allows the Baroque to extend as a style beyond its historical moment (The Fold 33). 
In Cahun and Zürn’s work, the fold figures a paradoxical distance and incorporation for both 




In an early manuscript entitled alternately “Amor amicitiae” and “Les Jeux Uraniens,” 
Cahun intervenes in, and in so doing disrupts, the philosophical tradition of friendship as 
expressed in the terms amor amicitiae and amor concupiscentiae.149 Often reduced to “love of 
friendship” and “love of desire,” respectively, these terms actually refer to more precise divisions 
within the type of love they describe. As Thomas Aquinas, an important medieval commentator 
on the question of amor, notes in his Summa Theologica, “The movement of love […] has a two-
fold object: the good thing which is wanted for someone […] and the one for whom it is wanted” 
(Aquinas, 1a2ae, Q26, Art. 4 73). Within this double movement of love, amor concupiscentiae 
(love-of-desire) denotes a love that takes its object for other means (e.g. the pleasure, sexual 
gratification) whereas amor amicitiae (love-of-friendship) denotes a love for the object itself. 
Combining the influence of scholasticism and Aristotle’s thought in his own work, Aquinas 
derives some of the distinction between the two terms from the Greek philosopher’s commentary 
in the Nichomachean Ethics. 
Aristotle, in Book VIII of the Nichomachean Ethics, describes three kinds of friendship: 
that based on utility; pleasure; and goodness (204-5). These first two kinds of friendship, 
                                                
149 The alternate title, “Les Jeux Uraniens,” taken from nineteenth century homophile slang, 
plays on the sameness of homosexuality and friendship.  
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according to Aristotle, are less than ideal. They are based on fleeting or contingent states, ones 
that change with the circumstances of friendship (utility) and with the growth of the individuals 
as their natures and desires change (pleasure). The last kind of friendship, based on the equal 
goodness of the partners, forms a stable equation between the friends. Of this kind of friendship, 
Aristotle concludes that it is “permanent” and that “it is those who desire the good of their 
friends for the friends’ sake that are most truly friends, because each loves the other for what he 
is, and not for any incidental quality” (205).   
 The fragments that comprise Cahun’s philosophico-poetic treatise “Amor amicitiae” 
playfully upend the definitions set forth by Aquinas and Aristotle. In her text, an equality 
between friends remains but the definition of what makes the friends “good” has shifted. Instead 
of a system of ethics, Cahun suggests a system of aesthetics that equates friend with friend for 
their status as artist and/or art-object (a kind of breathing artwork that evokes the figures of 
Pygmalion and Galatea). As Cahun writes, “Mieux que l’amour, l’amitié est un art” (489). In this 
declaration, Cahun combines a Romantic ideal of the artist to an Aritotelian ideal of virtue. She 
elaborates, “Elle exige aussi la vocation native, la prédisposition, l’instinct généreux, le 
tempérament impulsive […]” Cahun prioritizes the Romantic tempestuousness of a poet such as 
Shelley, a fragment of whose poetry Cahun includes as epigraph to her text, and continues, “[…] 
mais elle demande encore à ses disciples l’exercice fidèle de son culte et la pratique de la vertu” 
(489). Here, the tempestuous Romantic spirit must be tempered by a competing rappel à l’ordre 
within the personality of the friendship artist. The friend must be loyal to a sacred cult (in the 
context of Cahun’s later Héroïnes, the Sapphic cult comes to mind) and to virtue.  
Addressing herself to the friend at the end of this passage, Cahun reworks the Aristotelian 
equation of good and good in friendship: “Ami, tu poseras pour moi puisque tu veux me servir de 
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modèle; je te mettrai en prose afin de t’aimer comme si je t’avais fait” (489). As Cahun tells us, 
“la beauté” is the object of friendship. One friend acts as model; the other captures that pose in 
an artwork. On either side of the equation, one finds beauty, a kind of aestheticized goodness. 
Here, both partners serve their friend out of the recognition of “beauty,” which for Cahun 
transcends pleasure or utility as does goodness for Aristotle. However, written from a masculine 
subject position, this text also ascribes an erotic valence to friendship, subverting the division 
that Aristotle draws between the good and the pleasurable. And, in fact, Cahun chose “Les Jeux 
Uraniens” as the alternate title for the manuscript of these prose poem fragments, referencing the 
late-nineteenth century sexological category for male homosexuality.  
Though the artist (Cahun) is a poet, the pose of the friend nevertheless evokes sculpture, 
and so the Ovidian story of Pygmalion. The pose and its translation into the self-referential prose 
poems of Cahun’s text leads to a unity of the two friends, artist and model, but one that connects 
their spirits and respects the discrete forms of their bodies. To explore the encounter of friend, 
body, and spirit, Cahun turns to the traditional discourse around friendship to introduce a third 
player onto the scene of “Amor amicitiae.” Taking up the received wisdom that the friend of my 
friend is my friend, Cahun puts this threesome to the test. She begins a new section, “Mon ami et 
son ami, nous serons si tu veux des héros imaginaires” (490). This friend of the friend, this third 
player, is described in sculptural immensity by Cahun’s narrator. The first two sentences capture 
him in a static image, as if on a pedestal, and the description concludes with him returned there, 
the narrator recounting that the friend will fear he is “trop idéal pour avoir une réalité” like 
Pygmalion longing for his marble Galatea.  
As the passage continues, the pronouns fold into one another. Cahun writes, “Moi, je me 
cache en lui et te regarde par-dessus ses paupières […] Que suis-je sinon l’ami de mon ami?” 
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(490). Lui, toi, nous, moi: the reflexive pronoun becomes especially pronounced in the 
culminating moment of this section. The reflexive verb might be said to fold the action back 
upon the subject. The equation mon ami = son ami = moi folds with it, incorporating the moi of 
the narrator into the sculptural form of the friend’s friend. The scenario resembles the narcissistic 
scene of looking, but the play of surfaces is different, here, focused on the sculptural form rather 
than the mirror image. Reflection in the story of Narcissus refuses the intervention of reality, or 
touch: the image in the pool disappears as soon as the water’s surface is troubled.  
In a brief reading of the manuscript in his biography of Cahun, François Leperlier asserts 
that Cahun’s Pygmalion wants to become his artwork so that “Pygmalion et Galatée s’échangent, 
l’un dans l’autre – s’indéfinssent” (37). While this is true, the maintenance of physical 
boundaries between the two remains pronounced. Though the narrator does claim that he and his 
friend resemble one another like “deux mots frères,” the likeness is clearly described as spiritual 
(“par l’esprit”) and not “par la lettre,” or morphology of their forms. Cahun, thus, approaches 
Narcissus but rather reworks the Pygmalion scene to preserve physical difference between those 
who are physically similar (a play, again, on male homosexuality). The reworking of the story of 
Pygmalion privileges the folds of sculptural form and the relation of touch, the experience of 
folding one form into another, more so than the narcissistic mirrors Cahun will later deploy 
elsewhere in her oeuvre. Reading “Amor amicitiae” as determinative of later texts, especially the 
Aveux, subsumes the structures of Cahun’s Pygmalion to the “néo-narcissisme” she eventually 
theorizes rather than allowing the figure of Pygmalion in “Amor” to develop parallel to 
Narcissus.  
Cahun figures the god of friendship as a sculpture in “Amor amicitiae,” a solitary and 
melancholic demiurge on a pedestal (494). The “dieu d’amitié” in this text reveals an intertext of 
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sculpture, photography, and text in Cahun’s oeuvre, generally. In this description, the god has his 
hands outstretched, recalling later photograhs in which Cahun’s body merges with stone pillars 
on the property of her estate on Jersey, leaving only her outstretched arms and hands visible in a 
hybrid human-sculptural form captured in film. In a passage also marked by romantic 
melancholy, the narrator describes the friend’s rumination on time passed and his efforts to “faire 
revivre le temps.” In an ironic register, Cahun’s narrator reports, “Le temps, aux mains de 
l’homme, n’est qu’une machine à travailler; il s’agit de lui donner le plus beau rendement 
possible, la meilleure qualité de force par les moyens les moins coûteux” (492). The passage 
covers much territory in connecting the Romantic and Symbolist worlds of the text’s nineteenth-
century influences to the modernism that Cahun helped to shape. Cahun presents time as a 
material able to be held in the hands. But instead of working the material of time, the artist 
(usurping the melancholic demiurge on his pedestal) works the machine that time has become. 
This machine is efficient, producing objects of “la meilleure qualité” by “les moyens les moins 
coûteux,” and the labor it performs is that of an artistic mechanical reproduction giving “le plus 
beau rendement possible,” like a camera. Working the machine of time implies a working of 
memory, a reflexive work that folds time and experience together to make them as beautiful as 
possible in sculptural and photographic surfaces. 
   
*** 
 
Time, then, can fold in both an encounter with the photograph and with a physical 
(sculptural) form. Deleuze writes that the new object that a geometry of the fold posits, what he 
calls an “objectile,” refers to a state of “continuous variation of matter as a continuous 
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development of form” rather than to a spatial model of a fixed form-matter relationship (19).150 
This question of the temporal status of the object, again, drives a model of collaboration that, in 
this chapter, develops around the figure of Pygmalion and that connects various participants (e.g. 
permutations of Cahun/Michaux/Zürn, or of Zürn/Weiner/Cahun) to collaboration through the 
variation in points of contact that the fold occasions.  
 If the mirror recurs not only as a literary image and trope in Cahun’s writings but as a 
visual structure or trope in her photography, mirroring and the mirror image does not always 
serve the same kind of geometry. As seen in previous chapters, Cahun often posed with mirrors 
in a manner subversive to the trajectory of the reflected image. In a well-known example from 
1928 that I discuss in chapter one, Cahun, in a checkered outfit, looks away from her profile in a 
mirror (Fig. 1.3). Though her eyes avoid the self-meeting of their own gaze in the mirror, the 
portrait captures her profile in three quarters view, so that her eyes do project an imaginary 
meeting point somewhere between Cahun’s real and reflected heads. In chapter one, I discussed 
the ways in which this portrait engages with the intertext of the Aveux non avenus to propose an 
opening to the Other in the structure of narcissism, what Cahun terms her “néo-narcissisme.”  
 I propose, here, however, another image of Cahun, one based again on the structure of a 
mirror image, at least on first examination. In this photomontage, created around 1928, a 
doubled, mirror image of Cahun’s profile emerges against a rocky background from a crease in 
the center of the image (Fig. 6.3). The image evokes the emergence of a face from a clear, 
reflective rock pool, in the image repertoire of Narcissus, though no water actually appears in the 
                                                
150 Deleuze’s term recalls Derrida’s work on the “subjectile” in Antonin Artaud’s drawings. The 
subjectile as Derrida theorizes it following its technical definition as a surface or support for 
painting is at once both of these things, surface and support. The subjectile can become both 
subject and object, neutral support or interested surface. See Derrida “Maddening the Subjectile” 
157-58 and 168-69. 
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image and the portrait is vertically-oriented rather than horizontally as one might expect of an 
image of a pool. Also, significantly different from a double-headed portrait like Cahun’s 1929 
Que me veux-tu? (Fig. 6.4), this photomontage sets the two heads, like those of Janus, looking 
away from one another. Janus, the Roman god of beginnings and passageways, is a fitting 
reference following Deleuze’s implication of time in the fold. The composition of the 
photomontage – the side of the image including Cahun’s body cut out of the picture before 
reversing the image and combining the two photographs into one – suggests that the two excised 
halves of the frame have folded in on themselves at the seam, or crease, of the axis along which 
the two heads touch. The fold at the center of the photomontage permits a touching of Cahun’s 
form to itself that resists the solipsism of a narcissistic image. The figure represented (Cahun’s 
face) projects itself out in multiple directions instead of projecting inward on itself.   
 Cahun’s evocation of sculpture in “Amor amicitiae,” as well as in her photographic 
portraits and self-portraits, tends toward an evolving multiplicity, like the one Deleuze describes 
in the figure of the fold, rather than the kind of involuted unity represented by her parallel 
interest in Narcissus.151 The Janus portrait discussed above and the Que me veux-tu? portrait both 
share a foregrounding of the head as a sculptural bust, a motif that can be found in her 
androgynous 1920 portrait where she poses in profile, drawing out the resemblance to her own 
father (Fig. i.1). The motif recurs, too, in a photograph included in Cahun’s archive from 1936 of 
Sheila Legge and Salvador Dali’s collaboration, The Phantom of Sex Appeal, staged in London’s 
Trafalgar Square during the London International Surrealist Exhibition, co-organized by a 
French committee including André Breton, Paul Éluard, Georges Hugnet, and Man Ray. For this 
                                                
151 Bellmer’s account of the image in his Petite Anatomie insists on the importance of misprision 
in the process of representation, so that an identity between multiple body parts (that is, a foot 
mistaken for a nose, etc.) makes the image the synthesis of these two images realized together. 
See Bellmer Petite 60.  
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Surrealist happening, Legge wandered around the square, wearing a long white dress and arm-
length gloves, her head covered by a hive of paper roses. In the iconic photograph of Legge, she 
appears in a hieratic pose with a pigeon perched on her arm, as if she were a statue herself (Fig. 
6.5).  
 Cahun’s photographic staging of her friendships continues this sculptural motif in her 
photographic oeuvre. Most striking in Cahun’s framing of portraits as sculptural busts is her use 
of the double head, as in Que me veux-tu? Echoing the double, pendant portraits of Cahun and 
Moore posing with the mirror from 1928 the double head appears, as well, in portraits of André 
and Jacqueline Breton and Henri Michaux, amongst Cahun’s most important artistic friendships. 
In a series of portraits from 1935, Cahun poses the Breton couple together in profile, 
manipulating the image in the photomontage to double and invert André and Jacqueline’s heads 
(Fig. 6.6).  
Michaux’s presence in portraits by Cahun, and specifically his sculptural presence, most 
clearly links photograph to sculpture to friendship. In an earlier series of portraits of Michaux, 
taken in 1925 in Paris, Cahun again constructs a photomontage organized around the doubling of 
Michaux’s likeness through the combination of two photographs in one (Fig. 6.7). Another 
portrait, depicts Michaux in a frontal view on the right side of the image. Behind him, along the 
left hand frame, a bronze bust of Cahun by Chana Orloff sits on a side table (Fig. 6.8).152 Where 
Cahun doubles Michaux’s head in the photomontage, here she doubles his bust with her own, 
emphasizing not only a “unity” in friendship but also a multiplicity in the artistic mediums that 
                                                
152 The bust appears, too, as a literary/sculptural form in Zürn’s Trumpets of Jericho, where the 
narrator’s uncle’s head is isolated in textual description. Significantly, there, the description of 
the uncle’s head as a volumetric assemblage of parts (ears, nose, etc.) serves Zürn’s description 
of a Zeus-like male head-pregnancy. See Trumpets 45-7. 
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convey this affective tie: the flat, two dimensional surface of a photograph and – by visual 
metonym that links Michaux’s head to Cahun’s bust – the sculpted, three dimensional surface of 
sculpture. Cahun’s staging of her friendship with Michaux in this subtle double portrait echoes 
the structures of the Pygmalion myth, especially as reworked in “Amor amicitiae.” Cahun turns 
the artist (herself as photographer) back into sculpture (the bust by Orloff) while capturing an 
affectively charged subject (her friend and future literary executor Michaux) in the photograph. 
Cahun, thus, enters into the photograph, as both artist and model-become-“sculpture.” In a prose 
poem from his 1949 collection La Vie dans les plis, entitled “La Statue et moi,” Michaux’s 
narrator attempts to teach a statue how to walk. In facing the difficulty of the task, the narrator, 
like Cahun’s version of Pygmalion in “Amor amicitiae” before him, becomes more like the 
statue, eventually becoming unable to walk himself (La Vie 60-61). 
If Michaux marks one of the points of contact that allows me to fold Cahun’s work into 
his own and subsequently into Zürn’s in this chapter, it is by such doublings as those described 
above that appear in Michaux’s poetry and writing. In a prose poem entitled “Double-Tête,” 
included in the collection of wartime writings Épreuves, exorcismes (1946), Michaux writes of 
the psychological torment that might result from such doubleness, “Il en est bien embarassé de sa 
double-tête et bien mieux s’en tirerait avec une seule. Une pour penser, ça va. Une à l’autre bout 
pour évacuer, c’est moins bien” (Épreuves 101). The two heads do not so much create an echo 
chamber as an open space between their two forms that allows a voice or a thought to escape: in 
one ear and out the other, except now the ears are on different heads. In another of these prose 
poems, “La Vie double,” Michaux writes of another kind of doubling, one in which a 
homunculus, whom he calls “mon ennemi plus fort que moi,” comes to inhabit his body. 
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Recalling the divisions, both political and psychological, of the period of the Nazi Occupation,153 
Michaux concludes, “Voici où en sont les choses, les tristes choses d’à présent, récolte toujours 
bifide d’une vie double pour ne pas m’en être aperçu à temps” (Épreuves 107). The “récolte 
bifide” of “tristes choses” not noticed in time recalls the frustration of “Double-Tête” in its 
description of interior perception lost to an ostensibly exterior experience of space and time. 
Between the two heads, and the two lives, those interior processes of perception and thought that 
should consolidate into one interpretation of experience are turned outward, lost in the spatial 
and temporal gaps that characterize the repeated forms of this doubleness.   
This tension between surface and interior again haunts Michaux in Misérable miracle, his 
1972 account of taking mescaline and other hallucinogens. In this text, Michaux combines 
reflections on his experiences with these drugs as well as drawings completed during his 
experimentation. This double text, composed of writing and drawing (some of it veering toward 
the asemic writing of Michaux’s other artistic explorations), takes on a description of the 
hallucinatory effects of mescaline and hashish (“le chanvre Indien”) on vision. And, though 
Cahun turns to the photograph to stage her friendship with Michaux, Michaux’s metaphors for 
these hallucinations express an initial distrust of photography’s surfaces.  
Michaux’s presentation of photography betrays an anxiety that belies the psychological 
possibilities of the photograph already explored in the work of Cahun and other of his surrealist 
colleagues. Michaux writes, “La photographie, contrairement à ce qu’on a cru […] est cette 
représentation en function de la lumière, spectacle parfait, où vous ne pouvez entrer, quoqu’il 
s’agisse de lieux, d’objets, de personnes. Vous passez devant. Vous passez en revue” (95). 
Michaux writes, in the lines preceding this passage and in a manner recalling Barthes’ notion of 
                                                
153 For an account of Michaux’s activities during World War II, see Nina Parish Henri Michaux: 
Experimentation with Signs 51-2.  
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an objective studium, of the details of a photograph – a desert scene with camel and rider – that 
attract his attention. And, as Barthes is drawn past the general description to the studium to the 
specificity of the punctum, Michaux is drawn to the cracks (“les anfractuosités”) in the desert 
rock along the ground, and he takes pleasure in the sophisticated “doigté optique” with which he 
notices them. Yet, the power of this punctum eludes Michaux at first. These cracks are the detail 
that emphasizes for Michaux the surface effects that he derides in the passage cited above, those 
that condemn us to only passing in front of (“devant”) the spectacle of the photo, never to enter 
into it.  
Michaux, however, soon resolves this initial opposition of photographic surface and 
interior space. Hashish makes the surface of the photograph move, vibrate, and pullulate. He 
remarks of his newfound wonderment before the photograph, “Le Hashisch déphotographiant les 
lieux photographiés, vous pouvez enfin y pénétrer” (96). The stereovision that results from this 
“de-photographing” allows Michaux to revive his faculty of sight. If the cracks in the rock at first 
remained smooth and impenetrable, Michaux can now access them, along with the texture of 
their folds, by a vision that approaches the sense of touch. He reports, “Du regard, intense et 
émerveillé, je tentaculais les palmiers et les roches.” His “tentacles,” long sinuous appendages 
imitating the form of the cracks, supplement the visual surface effects of light conveyed by the 
photograph with a sensuous, psychological experience of the folds beneath the photographic 
surface.  
The cracks in the desert rock in Michaux’s photograph hold the key to his reappraisal of 
photography under the influence of hashish as well as to many of the line drawings he includes 
in the text. Michaux’s hallucinatory experience of psycho-physiological doubleness in his 
description of the “stereovision” of his drug trips finds expression in the tight, vibratory folds of 
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the mescaline drawings, often composed with prominent rifts or furrows (“sillons”) that split the 
compositions in two along their center axes. Such drawings correspond to the textual description 
Michaux gives of his mescaline trips. Three weeks after his first dosage and already somewhat 
habituated to his hallucinations, Michaux reports, “Conscient, seul le sillon était là, le sillon de la 
fracture, net comme au premier jour” (85). The effect of vibration follows, translated into the 
tense compression of lines in the drawings, which might also be thought of as layers or folds: 
“La pullulation, après une apparente éclipse, était revenue, celle des infiniment petits, celle des 
infiniment possibles, celle des infiniment au-delà” (85-6). The cracks in the desert floor, and the 
bundles of lines in these drawings, evoke Deleuze’s description of the fold, as they are, at once, 
interior and exterior. Michaux’s description sets in contrast the two experiences of this 





The negotiation of interior and exterior states and spaces defines, too, Zürn’s first 
encounter with the Jasmine Man, in a dream at age six, as recounted in L’Homme-jasmin. In her 
original encounter with this dominating figure, Zürn wakes into a dream, passing behind a mirror 
in her childhood bedroom and into another domestic space that resembles her own. She tries to 
climb into bed with her mother, but rejects the maternal body before wandering into a garden 
where the Jasmine Man sits impassively, surrounded by blooming jasmine (15-18). As Caroline 
Rupprecht argues, the text itself places at odds the omniscient narrative voice of the text with the 
more unreliable perspective of the unnamed protagonist (133). In terms of the negotiation of 
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exteriority and interiority, then, an “exterior” narrative voice written in the third person confronts 
an “interior” voice more closely aligned with Zürn’s own experiences in psychiatric treatment. 
Zürn reworks the play of interior and exterior space represented by either side of her bedroom 
mirror for the text itself. As in Cahun’s mixing of artist and muse in “Amor amicitiae,” and as 
Rupprecht also argues, the narrative tension between the impersonal third person and the semi-
autobiographical protagonist makes Zürn the artist an artistic creation in turn.  
Most often associated with Bellmer and his influence, especially in the context of studies 
of collaboration, Zürn’s written texts, as in her anagrams, mine a sculptural intertext that the 
description of the childhood Jasmine Man encounter continues. The Jasmine Man sits in a chair 
in a garden. His mute presence and the psychological impact of the encounter with his form 
render the figure as a sculptural one set in a literary text. Further, the rejected maternal body that 
repulses Zürn and pushes her to the encounter in the garden, described in its fleshy, massive 
humidity, recalls the bulbous fleshiness of Bellmer’s dolls or his photographs of Zürn’s bound 
torso and legs and prepares the second, less repulsive sculptural encounter with the Jasmine Man. 
If Zürn’s abandoned attempt to find comfort in the maternal bed and body corresponds to the 
surrealist mode of Bellmer’s dolls and the collaboration they represent, the encounter with the 
Jasmine Man presents a mute sculptural presence in a more realist, if still hallucinatory, mode. 
Instead of the sculptural folds of the corpulent maternal form, the figure of the Jasmine 
Man permits a narratological fold in the text of L’Homme-Jasmin. Years later, in Ermenonville 
in 1957, Zürn recounts the composition of her “Notes d’une anémique” and the description 
included therein of a man who travels within her. Of this man, understood to be the Jasmine Man 
she “married” in that childhood dream, she writes, “Je suis devenue sa maison” (17). Her first 
vision of the Jasmine Man folds upon this later stirring of his presence, a fold in time possible in 
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her text. Between her childhood and this experience in 1957, Zürn has incorporated the Jasmine 
Man into her own body, figured as a house, and so further complicates the play of exterior and 
interior space. And, then, “a few days later,” as the narrative voice recounts, this fold repeats 
itself, indeed completes itself, in the encounter between Zürn and Michaux, the physical double 
of the hallucinated Jasmine Man.  
Ribas’ reading of Zürn’s oeuvre accounts for this kind of incorporation of another being 
into the body of the protagonist as a sign of involution in Zürn’s work. For Ribas, a surfeit of 
involution characterizes Zürn’s work, creating an effect of endless turning into the self, of 
consciousness of consciousness, or of the paranoia often associated with schizophrenia (22). 
Zürn, for her part in L’Homme-Jasmin, expresses her own belief “par experience personnelle” in 
the possibility of one body inhabiting another by “une manière éthérée,” what she calls “un 
thème ancien” (93). In Cahun’s Janus-like photomontage, the artist refuses interiority by 
arranging her photomontage so that her two faces look out in opposite directions from the central 
axis of the composition. The image is not so much a renunciation of other double portraits in 
which the figure turns in on itself as it is an affirmation of the fold’s incorporation of the exterior 
into the interior, and vice versa. As in Michaux’s folds, interior space opens onto a vastness more 
often associated with the exterior. Deleuze describes the involution of the exterior into the 
interior as the configuration of a surface folding over on itself.154  
In fact, in Zürn’s own recounting, the “miraculous” coincidence of the figures of the 
Jasmine Man and Michaux do not represent a turning toward the interior but rather inspire her to 
turn toward an inner opening in order to escape the gravity of the meeting with Michaux. Zürn 
                                                
154 Bellmer’s psycho-syntactical theory of the body accounts for the identity between interior and 
exterior space similarly through the loop formed by the skin, esophagus, digestive tract, and 
anus. His comparison is to that of a “gant retourné.” See Petite 34.  
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makes this escape by obsessing over a numerological system of her own devising in which 
doubles – like the pair Jasmine Man/Henri Michaux – open onto infinity. In her system, the 
numeral nine takes on the highest significance and leads her first to its pairing with the numeral 
six, as its inverted symbol, and then to the numeral eight, a combination of the numerals nine and 
six superimposed on one another that symbolizes infinity when turned on its side (18-9). Zürn 
folds each numeral into the next until arriving at the unreachable limit of infinity. In relation to 
Foucault’s work, Deleuze describes the fold as it formalizes a relationship of “la pensée” to the 
act “penser” in terms of a similar infinite limit or infinite futurity. He writes, “Le dedans 
condense le passé (longue durée), sur des modes qui ne sont nullement continus, mais le 
confrontent à un futur qui vient du dehors, l’échangent et le recréent. Penser, c’est se loger dans 
la strate au présent qui sert de limite” (Foucault 127). The fold permits a transgression of a 
temporal divide between past and present in favor of  “un temps à venir,” of a time to come that 
remains future, and so infinite in its promise. As Deleuze continues, “La pensée pense sa propre 
histoire (passé), mais pour se libérer de ce qu’elle pense (présent), et pouvoir enfin ‘penser 




The figure of the childhood house, the scene for Zürn’s first dreamt encounter with the 
Jasmine Man, recurs for Zürn in a later hallucination, one which she believes Michaux has sent 
to her. Sitting in her apartment in Paris, Zürn sees the initials of the real estate company HLM in 
the street and confuses these letters with Michaux’s initials. The hallucination of her childhood 
home, described as emerald green and transparent, follows. She is grateful for the vision, even 
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after it fades. But as the house disappears from her vision, Zürn recounts the experience of a new 
hallucination. She describes this second vision as follows: “Une grande scène vide, presque 
obscure apparaît, non comme le produit d’une hallucination, mais plutôt comme une image nette 
qui se forme au fond de son être. Pourquoi une scène, pourquoi soudain le puissant rayon de 
lumière qui se porte comme celui d’un projecteur au centre de la scène? Elle fait alors un bond 
au beau milieu de ce rayon et commence à être sa propre spectatrice” (122). In explaining the 
effect of self-regard that the hallucination has on Zürn, the passage comments on its own 
construction, just as Rupprecht argues that the third person narration of L’Homme-Jasmin creates 
the effect of self-spectacle in Zürn’s work (Rupprecht 133).  
Yet, just as the relationship between artist, muse, and art object in Cahun’s Amor 
amicitiae collapses or folds the three terms into one, Zürn’s text confounds the same players: 
Michaux as muse or giver of the hallucination, Zürn as its recipient and scribe, and, finally, Zürn 
as an art or textual object (or, here, as performer) produced by the collaborative experience of the 
hallucination. The incorporation of the Jasmine Man into her body that Zürn describes in “Notes 
d’une anémique” becomes integral to her artistic process. In the accompanying text to the French 
edition of L’Homme-Jasmin, “Notes conernant la dernière (?) crise,” Zürn describes this type of 
collaboration as such. Writing of an experience drawing while under the telepathic control of the 
“Homme Blanc,” a combination of the Jasmine Man, Michaux, and Bellmer all in one, Zürn 
describes the fits and starts of artistic creation that she shares with the Homme Blanc: “Quand 
elle hésite à dessiner un nouveau trait elle peut être certaine qu’il va, par un nouveau signal, 
l’aider à continuer. Cette collaboration est pleine d’harmonie et le résultat de qualité” (174). This 
collaboration, then, represents an aesthetic ideal for Zürn. However, its creation is not without 
strife, and in a fit of anger at the ceaseless demands of the Homme Blanc, she destroys her paper, 
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ripping the image to shreds. The anecdote corresponds to drawings Zürn completed while a 
patient in the episodes recounted in L’Homme-Jasmin. Zürn understands these drawings, 
completed in notebooks and magazines gifted to her by Michaux, as collaborative works, as well. 
In one of these notebooks, Michaux inscribed the back of the front cover with a dedication to 
Zürn that recalls the infinitely folded interior spaces of Misérable Miracle: “Cahier de blanches 
étendues intouchées / lacs où les désespérés / mieux que les autres / peuvent nager en silence / 
s’étendre à l’écart et revivre… / Pour Unica / Henri Michaux” (Pour Unica 62).  
Zürn conceives of this collaborative relationship as one based on a profound, even 
disturbing, friendship of devotion. On this point, in L’Homme-Jasmin, she maintains that her 
obsessive devotion to the Jasmine Man/Henri Michaux, whom a Parisian psychiatrist insists Zürn 
regards as a “saint,” cannot be reduced to love (“amour”). To defend this position, Zürn insists 
that her devotion has nothing to do with love but rather, “[…] avec la frayeur profonde et 
inguérissable qu’elle a éprouvée lors de sa rencontre avec lui, rencontre que la vision de 
l’Homme-Jasmin avait très exactement preparée" (88). Rather than assigning psychic rupture to 
the first vision of the Jasmine Man, Zürn instead locates “la frayeur profonde” in its repetition, in 
the moment of narratological folding, in the encounter with Michaux (“lui”).  
For both Cahun and Zürn, Michaux comes to stand in as a figure for friendship, and so as 
a sort of muse. Yet, the muse also gives articulation to the interior depths that both Cahun and 
Zürn bring to the surface through the model of the fold. The doublings of Cahun’s photography 
of friendship hint at the later doublings of Zürn’s anagrams and narratives that fold space and 
time onto one another in the two encounters with the Jasmine Man. Remarkably, here, the fold 
incorporates other “bodies” into the body of Zürn. The fold comes to account, in other words, for 
the collapsing of the ideal Aristotelian equation of friendship in which good equals good in 
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Cahun and Zürn’s models of artistic creation and collaboration. As well, in its incorporation of 
artist and muse, artist and artwork, into one body, it reworks the surrealist conception of the 
muse as a beautiful, mad woman. Zürn’s realization of this action of folding one “body” into 
another, however involuntary through her experience of mental illness, presages the 
breakthrough of Weiner’s own clair-style in the early 1970s just as Zürn’s text is published 









Chapter Seven. Absence in the Indexical Present:  
Adrian Piper and the Collaborative Work 
 
In the photograph, a young woman sits on a New York City bus, her hands crossed 
politely in her lap and with a bath towel stuffed into and hanging out of her mouth, to comic and 
bewildering effect (Fig. 7.1). Another woman sits turned away from the spectacle, wearing 
sunglasses and a leather jacket with her back against the young woman’s shoulder. I have 
thought – like anyone who has taken a crowded bus or subway in NYC has thought – the same as 
this woman in her sunglasses must be thinking in the image: Thank God I'm wearing these 
sunglasses – as if the lenses could frame a barrier between you and the perceived threat posed by 
the other’s strangeness. At the far right of the photograph’s frame, an older woman peers over at 
the towel and cheeks of the first woman, whose eyes look over to meet her suspicious gaze.  
That first woman is, of course, Adrian Piper, documented in the midst of one of her 
notorious street performances of the early 1970s, part of her Catalysis series. This specific image 
comes from the 1971 performance of Catalysis IV, documented by the artist’s friend Rosemary 
Mayer (the sister of Bernadette and then-wife of Vito Acconci). In each of these street 
interventions, Piper roamed in public, without announcing her actions as a performance or an 
artwork, while altering her appearance or comportment in some way to shock the public 
surrounding her. In Piper’s own description, she aimed to “catalyze” the audience toward a 
destabilizing reaction that could interrupt their quotidian states of business as usual. Her body, in 
these street performances, would be the catalytic agent of change in this interruption (“Talking” 
42-3). And, to these passers-by, she must have seemed herself “distinctly unstable,” as John 
Bowles puts it, fittingly so for a catalytic agent (Adrian Piper 182). 
This chapter turns to Piper’s style of confrontation and rapprochement in her artwork in 
order to push the question of collaboration pursued in the previous chapters to its limits. Piper 
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draws to the fore a thread that unites the work of all of the artists discussed in this dissertation, 
and especially in part two, from Oppenheim’s clandestine dinner party to the ambiguous place of 
the reader-viewer’s own body in the space of Mayer’s installation – namely, that to engage in a 
type of collaboration predicated on absence is to reject the collaborative gesture even in 
inscribing collaboration into the artwork. The photographic documentation by Mayer of 
Catalysis IV makes this tension evident. In the image discussed above, one of five that document 
this intervention from Piper’s wait at the bus stop to her literal rubbing of shoulders with other 
riders, Piper at once repels the woman sitting beside her while drawing in the gaze of the other, 
however freighted with caution and distrust that gaze seems to be. In Catalysis IV, the 
collaborative force of the performance radiates from an equally ambivalent object – that of 
Piper’s body as she styles her appearance to shock while remaining impassive to the reactions of 
those around her.  
Born in New York City in 1948, Piper studied at both the School of the Visual Arts and 
the City College of New York, setting out on her dual track as artist and philosopher before 
completing her PhD in philosophy at Harvard University. First influenced by the apolitical 
formal concerns of minimalism and Conceptual art, a political awakening around 1970 instigated 
by student protests at City College, unrest over the war in Vietnam, and her own burgeoning 
sense of the effects of racism on her life, pushed her to develop a Conceptual style of art that 
could also account for her personal role as artist in the world. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
in such works as The Mythic Being and the installation Cornered (1988), Piper developed a 
critique of race and its discourses through an approach to art making at once highly personal and 
eschewing the personal. Piper diverged from the Conceptual and minimalist practice of artists 
like her friend Sol LeWitt, whose ideas in “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art” represent an 
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important early influence on her work.155 Her works for the Mythic Being series, for example, 
made use of autobiographical details in the form of material from her childhood and adolescent 
journals as well as the construction of the persona of the Being himself, a performance mask 
similar to the personae of Cahun, Zürn, and other women artists from the avant-garde. As 
Maurice Berger argues, Piper’s embrace of both masquerade and autobiography, devalued by her 
Conceptual art peers, places her work ahead of innovations in work by other artists by two 
decades (“Styles” 23).  
Piper’s early life as a New Yorker, especially in the two decades of the 1960s and 1970s, 
connects her to Bernadette Mayer and Hannah Weiner despite the fact that she did not have close 
relationships with either of these women. The street actions of Catalysis belong to the context of 
late-1960s work by many artists, including Weiner, that were published in a special Street Works 
edition of Acconci and Mayer’s 0 to 9, edited by John Perreault. Piper did work closely with 
Rosemary Mayer and though she and Bernadette never worked together, Piper praises the formal 
stakes of Mayer’s poetry in her 1970-73 essay, “Talking to Myself: The Ongoing Autobiography 
of an Art Object” (37). Piper’s use of personal memories to address a public audience, as Cherise 
Smith points out of the artist’s use of her journal entries for The Mythic Being, echoes the 
strategies of Mayer’s mise-en-scène of her Memory (“Re-Member” 50).  
Like Hannah Weiner, whose pre-clairvoyant works were staged in streets, bars, or her 
loft, Piper’s interest in performance included private and public performances and actions carried 
out in those same types of spaces. Indeed, a formative moment for Piper’s questioning of 
subject- and objecthood in her artwork occurred while working as a go-go dancer in a downtown 
                                                
155 LeWitt was, too, a friend of Hannah Weiner’s and his foundational text first appeared in 
Artforum in 1967. See LeWitt.  
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Manhattan club where she would lose her senses of self and of responsibility to a partner while 
dancing alone in a cage above the bar (“Kinds” 89; “Preparatory” 96-7). On May 2, 1970, Piper 
presented an untitled performance in a series of works presented that afternoon, and organized by 
Weiner, at the bar and restaurant Max’s Kansas City, a famous club in the New York art and 
celebrity scene frequented by Andy Warhol, amongst others.156  
In this chapter, I focus, for the most part, on the period between Piper’s disillusionment 
with the “pure” forms of minimalist abstraction and the beginning of her Mythic Being project, 
roughly covering the period 1968 to 1972. Piper’s work from this early period culminates in an 
essay that first appeared in Artforum in 1973, entitled “In Support of Meta-art.” In this essay, 
Piper argues for the importance of putting artistic process on display in the work, so that the art 
object as an end product of artistic activity would not supersede the means of conceptualizing 
and creating the object. As Bruce Altshuler points out, the first-person form of this meta-art 
includes autobiography and expository analysis while also opening out onto the social and 
political contexts of the work (101). Piper’s own art writings belong in this framework of meta-
art, and so must be read both as performative texts, or as parts of the works, and as straight 
documentation of Piper’s activities.  
In this period, in works like Catalysis and the Hypothesis series (1968), Piper began to 
develop two crucial concepts – those of “catalysis” and the “indexical present” – that guide her 
later engagements with racism and xenophobia, and formal innovations in audience participation. 
As discussed above, catalysis refers to the artist as the catalyzing agent of an artwork, often a 
street action unannounced as an art performance. In Piper’s words, “Ideally the work has no 
                                                
156 Max’s Kansas City was the subject of a 2010 exhibition at Loretta Howard Gallery in New 
York City entitled Artists at Max’s Kansas City, 1965-1974: Hetero-Holics and Some Women 
Too. See Tuchman.  
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meaning or independent existence outside its function as a medium of change. It exists only as a 
catalytic agent between myself and the viewer [….] This process/product is in a sense 
internalized in me, because I exist simultaneously as the artist and the work” (“Talking” 42). So, 
in the Catalysis actions, Piper, while wandering the city in clothes doused in a noxious mixture, 
or while taking items out of a purse filled with ketchup at a Macy’s counter, or while walking 
down the street in a shirt covered in wet paint with a placard around her neck announcing “WET 
PAINT,” aims to provoke by confronting her audience of passers-by with an experience that will 
catalyze a change in perception of the everyday space around them (Fig. 7.2). To emphasize the 
dematerializing of the artwork and its reduction to the encounter itself in Piper’s description cited 
above, Piper only photographically documented two of her Catalysis actions, the bus trip with 
which I opened this chapter and the wet paint action described above.  
For Piper, the catalytic agent that sparks these encounters marks the indexical present. 
The indexical present refers to what Piper calls “the concrete, immediate here-and-now” 
(“Xenophobia” 247).157 The concept, according to Piper, originated with some of her earliest 
works, including the artist’s book published by 0 to 9 Press, Here and Now (1968), and the 
collaborative performance Meat into Meat (1968). Performed with her boyfriend at the time, 
David Rosner, Meat into Meat tracked the progression of hamburger patties into cooked 
hamburgers consumed by Rosner in nine photographs. Conceived to document a temporal 
process with the original title Five Unrelated Time Pieces, Meat into Meat instead became a 
performance about Piper’s relationship to Rosner, and so about the indexical present time of the 
performance (“Xenophobia II” 261). An important element of the indexical present, as seen in 
                                                
157 Rosemary Mayer echoes this adherence to the physical presence of the artist and audience to 
each other in an essay on performance from 1973 in which she pays close attention to Piper’s 
works from this period. See Mayer “Performance and Experience.”  
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both Catalysis and Meat into Meat, is the here-and-now conceived of not only as a metaphysical 
moment in time, but as the scene of interaction (often antagonistic) between people. As Piper 
writes in her meta-art description of Meat into Meat, “This was the first confrontational 
performance I had done. Like almost all of those to follow, it involved both testing my personal 
or psychological survival and also defending it at the same time” (“Meat” 10).  
Piper’s definition of the confrontational as requiring both a defensive and offensive 
posture in relating to the other – or in cohabitating with the other in the context of Meat into 
Meat’s domestic scene – calls to mind the terms of Roland Barthes’ investigation into communal 
life in his 1976-77 Collège de France course, How to Live Together. In these lectures, Barthes 
pursues a concept that he terms idiorrhythmy, or what he calls a “fantasy” that becomes 
operative as a concept once he encounters the word in texts about the living habits of certain 
monastic orders. As Barthes puts it most simply, idiorrhythmy refers to a sort of being alone 
together, or a communal living arrangement “[w]here each subject lives according to his own 
rhythm” (6). Throughout his lectures for the course, Barthes interrogates different kinds of 
spaces, drawn from his readings of novels, for their possibilities in facilitating such 
arrangements. Part of the concept of idiorrhythmy, like the confrontational push-and-pull of 
Piper’s early indexical present performances, requires distance and absence from the other, even 
in his or her physical presence. I propose in this chapter a similar kind of idiorrhythmy as the 
unintended, but constitutive, effect of Piper’s confrontational work, especially as seen in the 
early period of her oeuvre. I will also suggest that Barthes’ fantasy is a parallel one to the form of 
collaboration I have pursued over the preceding pages and chapters. Like the photograph, the 
here-and-now encounters of Piper’s indexical present include the separation, distance, and 
absence that her confrontational performances put into play.  
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Loft Performances 1968-1971: Weiner’s The Fast and Piper’s Hypothesis and Food for the 
Spirit 
 
Considered as a performance, Piper’s Meat into Meat plays out in private, for the camera, 
in Piper’s loft, a privileged locus for her work, as Weiner’s loft was for her work from the same 
period. Weiner’s 1968 Open House performance had invited friends and strangers into her home 
for a party-happening, but her earliest “clairvoyant” text, composed at the onset of her first 
psychic experiences in 1971, also takes place in her loft apartment. The Fast, unpublished until 
1992, well after she had gained notoriety as a “clairvoyant” poet with the publication of 
Clairvoyant Journal, documents the onset of Weiner’s psychosomatic phenomena and details her 
efforts to mitigate their effects by avoiding metal, other people, and certain foods over a period 
of twenty-one days. The text functions similarly to Piper’s meta-art texts. Written as Weiner 
transitioned from work more explicitly rooted in the art world to her work as a “clairvoyant” 
poet, The Fast experiments with making transparent the processes of performing “clairvoyant” 
work.158 Weiner’s working notebooks from the project make this more evident. Entitled 
“Between I and,” the notebooks include rudimentary tables drawn to track the location of 
hallucinated “zaps” on Weiner’s body.159 In The Fast, Weiner translates this kind of data into the 
prose narrative of her secluded “fast.”  
                                                
158 Like Meret Oppenheim’s Spring Banquet, a feast evoked by its opposite, the fast in Weiner’s 
title, Weiner’s text deals with a ritualized scene of artistic and biological imperatives.  
 
159 These notebooks are available in Hannah Weiner’s papers in the Mandeville Special 
Collection’s Archive for New Poetry at the University of California-San Diego.  
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Weiner’s tracking of such somatic data as where she felt the physical effects of her 
psychic experience recalls the rationalized presentation of Piper’s spatial and temporal 
experiences in her Hypothesis series (1968-70). Piper created Meat into Meat in the context of 
this series and the other installments, a series of documented “situations,” took place largely 
around her loft. John Bowles points out that instead of engaging the viewer in the work’s 
completion as she had in earlier works, Piper instead works self-reflexively in Hypothesis, 
interrogating her own role as the viewer (Adrian Piper 69).  Piper’s essay about Hypothesis 
announces this break as one with her earlier “pure” conceptual work (“Hypothesis” 19). For the 
nineteen “situations,” Piper took photographs of her field of vision at random intervals and then 
plotted each photographic instance on a graph with two axes representing space and time, 
respectively. She then attached the photographs to the bottom of the graph, drawing lines from 
each space-time point to its correlated photograph. As in Weiner’s attempts to record the 
experience of her hallucinations in the rational form of a scientific table in her notebooks, Piper’s 
Situations also record her experiences in a rational form tracking spatial and temporal 
coordinates of her actions. Yet, unlike her later works and unlike Weiner’s autobiographical 
staging of her psychosomatic experiences in The Fast, Piper abstracts her body and 
autobiographical presence in Hypothesis. As Bowles writes, the appearance of Piper’s name in 
the materials collected in the Hypothesis works “[…] represents nothing more than a 
disembodied point possessing neither volume nor mass” (Adrian Piper 81). Though her stated 
conclusion to the project’s rationalization of subjective data was that “only human objects are 
also subjects” (“Hypothesis” 19), the embodied subjectivity of Piper as artist and object is not yet 
fully realized in the series, but will be as she begins to situate her body more explicitly in her 
work, as in her street actions.  
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In some ways, Hypothesis and The Fast establish inverse formal relationships to the same 
question of self-reflexivity. Though Weiner begins her text with a gesture toward Minimalist and 
Conceptual-inflected record keeping in her working notebooks, she produces an autobiographical 
text that follows a linear narrative without recourse to the supplements of data or photography. 
Indeed, Weiner reveals an anxiety toward photography in The Fast. During a difficult period of 
hallucination, she imagines herself as prone, her photograph being taken. Piper’s project, on the 
other hand, eschews the narrated autobiographical disclosures of Weiner’s project while 
embracing photography.  
Hypothesis does, however, establish a vocabulary of private performances organized 
around the topos of the artist’s loft that Piper shares with Weiner. Both make crucial use of the 
quotidian elements of their lofts. Piper’s Hypothesis: Situation #10 (1968) (Fig. 7.3), for 
instance, captures snapshots of a commercial on her television screen and much of the drama in 
Weiner’s text centers around her ability, or inability, to use her shower, sink, or kitchen utensils 
due to her heightened aversion to metal. In his lectures, Barthes refuses the possibility of 
idiorrhythmy’s emergence in the apartment, where focus on the conjugal drama of the bedroom 
makes unrealizable the fantasy of distance in living together (8). Barthes takes up “distance” as 
one of the operative terms in his lectures. He writes of the aporia of distance that he confronts, in 
which he is unsettled by other bodies, fantasizes a state free from desire and rules for attaining it, 
only to realize that such an extinguishing of desire would lead to the end of his desire to live. As 
he puts it, “If I can never touch anyone else, what’s the point in living?” (73). Yet, still Barthes 
must look elsewhere than the domestic apartment to find his fantasized state of Living-Together. 
Though Piper’s Meat into Meat inscribes Hypothesis in the space of a domestic, conjugal scene 
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with Rosner’s participation, the rest of her situations situate the work in self-reflexive relation to 
herself – like Weiner, in the relation of the artist to herself within her artist’s loft.  
The artist’s loft, then, becomes a special kind of apartment, invested with desires other 
than the banal conjugal ones which threaten Barthes’ delicate balance of distance in Living-
Together. The French minimal and conceptual artist Daniel Buren, in an essay from 1971 entitled 
“Fonction de l’atelier,” notes that the studio holds an important a place in defining the artwork 
outside the framework of the museum or gallery and specifies three conditions that shape the 
studio space as 1) at the origin of the work, 2) a private space, and 3) a fixed location dedicated 
to the creation of moveable artworks. In this essay, Buren also draws a categorical distinction 
between the European artist’s studio, or atelier, and the phenomenon of the American artist’s 
“loft.” The loft serves as the frame and place of origin for work by Piper and Weiner160, and 
Piper’s documentation of her sometimes “private” loft performances is one facet of her 
experimentation with forms of dissemination outside the gallery circuit.161 The dematerialized 
artwork of performance can be transported outside the loft once rematerialized as documentation, 
in photograph or text. Briony Fer highlights the cases of Richard Serra and Eva Hesse as 
examples of the trend in the 1960s in thinking of the studio as a state of mind rather than a fixed, 
physical location (157). As such, the private space of the studio could exist as transportable (like 
the work itself) to the street or the loft apartment.  
                                                
160 The use of the loft studio recalls Brecht’s opposition of the “dramatic laboratory” to the 
finished artwork, in Walter Benjamin’s analysis of the avant-garde dramatist’s work, wherein the 
experimental work of the theatrical space serves to effectuate a distancing effect, echoed in the 
Barthesian “distance” of Living-Together, between work and viewer. See Benjamin 100-01.  
 
161 For more on Piper’s use of alternate media and performance in disseminating her works, 
specifically in the context of The Mythic Being, see Smith Enacting Others 69-74 and “Re-
Member” 51-5.  
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 Whereas Buren focuses his distinction of the loft from the atelier on the material 
differences between the two kinds of spaces (size, quality of light, etc.), the New York artist’s 
loft also evokes a communal context specific to its time and place. This is evident in a 
happening-inspired work like Weiner’s Open House but also in Lucy Lippard’s description of 
the Conceptual art scene at the time as a “studio community” on and around the Bowery where 
artists such as LeWitt, Eva Hesse, and Robert Smithson lived, worked, and socialized (“Escape” 
19).162 In this context, the loft, both private and social in Piper and Weiner’s works, represents a 
site of contested distance. Piper develops her first confrontational performance in the encounter 
documented in Meat into Meat, and The Fast ends with the delicate separation between the 
public and the private in the space of the artist’s loft. At the end of her harrowing fast, Weiner 
recounts how for much of the period of her sequestration her loft door had remained unlocked 
(40). When a girlfriend of an upstairs neighbor peeked in the unlocked door, Weiner recounts 
how she had been unable to ask her for help, due to the negative reactions she had to the energy 
emitted by the woman’s boyfriend. As Weiner writes, “I guess I yelled pretty loud a couple of 
times when it got painful, I told her I was playing a tape” (40). Answering a neighbor’s pained 
cry, the woman enters the unlocked loft – as if responding to an illicit invitation – only to be 
refused entry by Weiner, who offers the subterfuge of a recorded representation of pain as 
responsible for attracting the woman’s attention, and despite her need for help in that moment. 
The loft door both acts as a site of connection and preserves distance, placing Weiner in an 
aporetic quandary similar to the one Barthes describes in his lectures.  
                                                
162 In the context of New York City poetry, an episode of Richard Moore’s public television 
show USA: Poetry featuring Frank O’Hara and the painter Alfred Leslie, recorded on March 5, 
1966 and broadcast on September 1 after O’Hara’s death, sets up a chiasmatic relationship 
between the artist’s loft and the poet’s apartment. O’Hara visits Leslie’s loft studio and Leslie 
sits in on the composition of a poem in O’Hara’s apartment. See Moore. 
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In Food for the Spirit (1971), a private performance documented in notes and 
photographs, Piper poses nude in a mirror in a series of fourteen photographs (Fig. 7.4).163 As the 
portraits progress through the series, the image becomes fainter, Piper’s body and the overall 
composition taken over by shadow in the underexposed photographs. In the summer of 1971, 
while a philosophy student at the City College of New York, Piper sequestered herself to her loft 
in order to devote herself to the study of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, the practice of yoga, 
and fasting. As Piper recounts, “Often, the effects of Kant’s ideas were so strong that I couldn’t 
take it anymore. I would have to stop reading in the middle of a sentence, on the verge of 
hysterics, and go to my mirror to peer at myself to make sure I was still there” (“Food” 55). In 
the quasi-spiritual experience that Piper describes, she devised a procedure “to anchor [her]self 
in the physical world” by taking her photograph in the mirror. Whereas Weiner’s agitated state 
comes on unprovoked with the onset of her visions and sensory phenomena, Piper induces her 
heightened psychic state. Yet, both Piper and Weiner document their private performances of 
mitigating the material conditions of psychic disturbance, and both sets of performance 
documents end in an expression of material exhaustion. Underexposure obscures the subject of 
Piper’s last photographs in the series. Weiner’s text ends with the rushed, exhausted syntactical 
elision of a brief sentence, “And so the fast ended last page” (43).   
Piper and Weiner both set separation from their social lives as the condition for their loft 
performances. Food for the Spirit replicates this condition of distance within the performance in 
exploring the distance of the artist from herself. The distancing effects of the performance speak 
to the radicalness that Amelia Jones locates at the heart of Piper’s nude pose as a black woman, 
that is as a philosopher and metaphysician and as an embodied female subject (Jones 162). 
                                                
163 To underscore the importance of privacy to this work’s history, Piper did not exhibit the work 
publicly until 1987. See Bowles 207.  
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Though Bowles asserts that Piper shows no evidence in Food for the Spirit of having understood 
her experience of Kant’s texts and ideas in terms of blackness at the time, he points to Lorraine 
O’Grady’s assessment of Food for the Spirit in her essay “Olympia’s Maid” as “the catalytic 
moment for the subjective black nude” and so as without precedent for considering blackness in 
the context of such portraiture and performance (Bowles 207; O’Grady 177). Piper’s historicized 
critique of Kant’s universalism and the yogic practice of meditative transcendence come together 
in Food for the Spirit to allow an exploration of the body as containing both subject- and 
objecthood. If in the Catalysis actions, Piper turned her body into a catalytic agent, or object, to 
create the artwork as an interaction between herself and an unwitting public, in Food for the 
Spirit she transforms herself into an object to be considered by herself as simultaneous subject, 
or viewer. However, Bowles argues that the photographs in Food for the Spirit can only fail to 
provide proof of the artist’s bodily existence since the photograph only documents the past 
presence of its object (212). 164 Though I contend elsewhere in part one that the photograph has 
the power to reach into the future as a performative text, as well as to index the past presence of 
an object,165 Bowles asserts that such an understanding of the pastness of the photograph allows 
                                                
164 Yona Backer points to Derrick Adams’s more recent use of iconic performance photographs 
by post-WWII artists in his own performances, for which he poses his body against projections 
of these photographs by artists, such as Piper, David Hammons, Joseph Beuys and others. 
Adams’s use of this photographic documentation challenges the idea that the photographic image 
attests only to the pastness of the event and the absent materiality of the photographed object, 
imposing as it does his own material body and performance on the image. Adams’s intervention 
might be thought of as rematerializing the body in the same way that Piper hoped her self-
portraits would re-ground her study of Kant in the material world. See Yona Backer’s 
“Performance Trace: Staged Actions, Live Art, and Performance Made for the Camera” in 
Cassel Oliver Radical Presence 24. 
  
165 Naomi Beckwith’s reading of perspective and point of view in this series is more in line with 
my interpretation of Cahun’s mirror photomontage in the Aveux non avenus, as I discuss it in 
chapter one. Beckwith points out that the audience takes on the position of the mirror image in 
the perspective of these photographs, suggesting that the viewer nearly performs a drag identity 
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Piper to continue in her transcendental study of Kant while problematizing the historical 
impossibilities it presents to her as a black, female subject (212-13). What’s more, these 
photographic conditions of the private performance bring to the fore an important characteristic 
of the concept of distance, that is the push and pull between absence and presence as its defining 
poles of social experience. Fully understood as a private loft performance, then, Food for the 
Spirit complicates the concept of distance in Living-Together as one inherent to the artist’s 
experience of self as both subject and object framed by the private space of the loft studio.   
 
1970: The Saturday Afternoon Show at Max’s Kansas City 
 
 During one hour on the afternoon of Saturday May 2, 1970, thirteen artists take over the 
nightclub and restaurant Max’s Kansas City at 213 Park Avenue South, a popular hangout for the 
city’s artists, musicians, and politicians. Two of these artists stage performances that 
complement one another. Hannah Weiner climbs up on the bar, issuing orders and instructions to 
the wait staff working the floor. Adrian Piper inserts herself into the flow of foot traffic around 
the bar, attempting to obstruct it by stumbling around deprived of her senses. She covers her eyes 
with a sleep mask, wears long gloves, pants, and long sleeves, and plugs her nose and ears. 
While the performances unfold, patrons sit around at small tables snacking on the free meatballs 
and chicken wings that the bar serves with drinks. If Carolee Schneemann is present as she often 
is in the decade leading up to this 1970 afternoon, she might be waiting for a doggy bag from the 
kitchen, filled with scraps to take home for her dog (Sukenick 200). A busboy might be readying 
                                                                                                                                                       
as Piper. As Beckwith writes, “[…] the viewer is now implicated in a three-dimensional tableau 
rather than simply visually engaged with a two-dimensional image.” See Beckwith “Dark 
Mirrors: Performance Documents as Bodily Evidence” in Cassel Oliver Radical Presence 31.  
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the backroom for the arrival of its regnant patron, Andy Warhol. In a brief description of her 
performance that afternoon, written long after the fact in 1981, Piper describes the scene at 
Max’s Kansas City as follows: “To even walk into Max’s was to be absorbed into the collective 
Art Self-Conscious Consciousness, either as object or as collaborator” (“Untitled” 27). Of 
course, I argue here, as Piper does elsewhere, that both positions might be occupied at the same 
time.  
The untitled intervention at Max’s Kansas City was not Piper’s first performance in a bar. 
As a seventeen year-old, she had performed as a go-go dancer in a glass cage suspended in front 
of the bar at the nightclub Entre Nous. That experience helped Piper imagine her own body as an 
object in the catalytic exchange of an artwork as well as in the negotiation of distance between 
herself and her collaborative audiences. In two essays written in the early 1970s, Piper describes 
her awareness of herself as a “performing object” in her role as a go-go dancer (“Kinds” 89; 
“Preparatory” 91). Indeed, Piper makes her pleasure for the solitary space of the cage clear when 
she writes, “I really love dancing in that cage, mostly because I’m SUPPOSED to be dancing as 
well as I can all alone” (“Preparatory” 96). As Sarah Jane Cervenak sums it up, the pleasure of 
dancing all alone was the result of the cage’s “deregulated space” (121). Though performed in 
the public space of the discothèque, the glass cage afforded Piper the distance to experience this 
objecthood removed from the reach of her audiences.  
Piper’s performance at Max’s elaborates on the themes and formal concerns of the artist’s 
experience as a go-go dancer, while continuing in the vein of the Catalysis performances.166 As 
                                                
166 In the text of a lecture performance published in 1992, Piper explicitly places the Max’s 
Kansas City performance in the Catalysis series. She also incorrectly attributes the organization 
of the afternoon’s events to John Perreault, Weiner’s often collaborator and participant at Max’s 
Kansas City, rather than to Weiner herself. Perreault addresses the frequent erasure of his and 
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she had for the Catalysis series, Rosemary Mayer documented the Max’s performance (Fig. 7.5). 
Unlike the more private, loft-centered performances documented by Hypothesis and Food for the 
Spirit, Piper attempts to maximize the dissonance between the public setting of her untitled 
action, albeit in a context framed by the specific social world of the nightclub, and the self-
closure and rejection of interaction that that action performed. Elaborating on her description of 
the unique social context of Max’s cited above, Piper writes of her decision to deprive herself of 
her senses in this performance: “In doing so I presented myself as a silent, secret, passive object, 
seemingly ready to be absorbed into their consciousness as an object” (“Untitled” 27). The terms 
of Piper’s description slyly echo those used by the critic Michael Fried in his critique of 
minimalist artwork, “Art and Objecthood,” and attest to the influence of minimalist 
“theatricality” on Piper’s own work.167 As in the Catalysis actions, Piper’s body as object should 
have catalyzed a reaction in the viewer that would have served as the artwork.   
However, Piper’s performance at Max’s Kansas City did not elicit the same responses as 
her street actions. In a 1972 interview with Lippard about Catalysis, Piper expresses her belief 
that the separation of audience and performer ruins the piece in play (78). Instead of the 
surprised passers-by she had encountered in the Catalysis performances, the audience at Max’s 
Kansas City was, at least in part, a savvy group of people acquainted with the New York 
nightlife scene and art world, perhaps including other artists. Of the quotidian presence of such 
patrons at the bar, Schneemann recounts, “We’d come in, ten or eleven of us, almost naked, with 
                                                                                                                                                       
Weiner’s performance activities from the art historical record in a retrospective blog post. See 
Piper “Xenophobia and the Indexical Present II: Lecture” 262 and Perreault “Praxis at Max’s.”  
  
167 In this well-known critique of minimalism, Fried juxtaposes modernist “presentness” with 
minimalist “presence,” which he associates with theatre rather than visual art. Piper’s art directly 
engages with the confrontation of an abstract “presentness” and the theatrical “presence” of the 
body and the art object in the encounter of audience and artwork. See Fried.  
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greasepaint and glue and the performance would be sticking to us” (qtd. in Sukenick 233). 
Mayer’s documentation of the performance makes evident the lack of surprise with which 
patrons encountered the sensory-deprived Piper. In 1971, Piper explained her preference for 
performing unannounced as a strategy for breaking down the separation between audience and 
performer; otherwise, these participants remain trapped in a psychological configuration akin to 
“a stage surrounded by rows of chairs” (“Talking” 44). Performing at Andy Warhol’s preferred 
night spot, Piper encounters – or rather does not encounter, for the photographs document no 
physical contact between a stumbling, blindfolded Piper and her audience – an expectant 
audience. Taken on a city bus for Catalysis IV, Mayer’s photographs reveal witnesses either 
shocked by or willfully ignoring Piper’s behavior beside them. Mayer’s photographs for the 
Max’s Kansas City performance, however, show Piper standing isolated beside a table, where 
three young women look up at her as if an intermission at a dinner theatre had just been 
interrupted by the expected return of one of the actors to the stage.  
The failure of Piper’s intervention to catalyze the kind of reactions her street Catalysis 
pieces had instigated finds its inverse corollary in one of Piper’s two My Calling (Cards) (1986-
90), a later performance designed to be carried out in bars and nightclubs. In these performances, 
which Piper describes as “reactive” rather than confrontational, the artist hands out small, 
rectangular calling cards in social situations in which she feels an offense must be pointed out in 
order to “prevent co-optation” (“My Calling” 219). The first card is intended for dinners during 
which a guest, not realizing that Piper is black, makes a racist comment. Following the comment, 
Piper would hand her card to the offending party, printed with a text pointing out her racial 
identification and his or her offensive comment. My Calling (Card) #2 (for Bars and Discos) 
addressed masculine aggression and misogyny. When Piper would find herself alone in a bar, she 
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would hand this second card to men who continued to make unwelcome advances toward her 
after an initial, polite refusal of their company. The text of these cards reads: 
 Dear Friend, 
I am not here to pick anyone up, or to be picked up. I am here alone 
because I want to be here, ALONE.  
  This card is not intended as part of an extended flirtation. 
  Thank you for respecting my privacy. (“My Calling” 221) 
If the cage at Entre Nous provided Piper with the “deregulated space,” as Cervenak terms it, to 
be alone in public, the Calling Card #2 performances attempt to establish a deregulated space by 
deploying an inverted invitation. Piper requests that her male interlocutors cease to speak with 
her by handing them a calling card typically designed to invite conversation or to introduce one 
party into conversation with another. Unlike the Catalysis actions, or the My Calling (Card) #1 
performances, these cards for encounters in bars make explicit the tension between collaboration 
and its rejection in Piper’s work.168 Piper does not hope to catalyze a reaction in My Calling 
(Card) #2 but rather hopes to defuse or short-circuit a reaction.  
 
1972: Philip Zohn Catalysis as Singular Folie-à-deux  
 
 The collaborative tension made so explicit by the My Calling (Card) #2 interventions, 
arising out of the tense encounter between Piper and men who could not accept sexual rejection, 
reveals the role of absence at the heart of Piper’s performance works. Despite her investment in 
the indexical present, and her powerful construction of situations that work to dismantle racism 
and sexism in the here and now in certain works, Piper’s early performance works circle back to 
                                                
168 Further complicating the complex interaction of the desire for and rejection of collaboration, 
Piper has included cards for her viewers to take with them when these works have been 
exhibited. See the illustrated checklist in Berger Adrian Piper: A Retrospective 205. 
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the absence or rejection of a collaborative duo. In no piece is this made more evident, nor given 
more affective weight, than in a 1972 performance entitled Philip Zohn Catalysis.  
 Though its title places it, like the untitled performance at Max’s Kansas City, in the 
context of work in which Piper objectified her body to work as a catalytic agent of change for 
those who encountered her strange behavior, Philip Zohn Catalysis does not actively permit the 
collaboration of any actor physically present other than Piper. For this performance, Piper 
recorded her half of a phone conversation with her best friend Phillip Zohn, who died of AIDS-
related encephalitis in September 1983 eleven years after the piece’s creation in May 1972, and 
then transcribed and performed it as a monologue at dawn on several street corners on the Lower 
East Side of Manhattan, where Zohn was born.169 On the street corner in the early morning air, 
Piper dances between a public and private enactment of her friendship with Zohn. Like her 
earlier Catalysis actions, this one reveals itself to any potential viewer (who might be on the 
street with her so early? grocers opening their stores? cab drivers catching an early breakfast 
after an overnight shift?) without explanation, without the contextualizing framework of the 
labels of “art” or “performance.” But, unlike those actions, this one is a private memorial. At the 
same time, Piper performs, in order to subvert, a kind of “craziness” that the passer-by, the 
grocer, the cab driver, might assign to her identity as a woman of color.  
Piper’s stated interest in creating the piece was to preserve a sense of the uniqueness of 
the friendship she shared with Zohn, specifically in the way they communicated with one 
another. As she writes,  
[…] I wanted to incorporate my relationship to him into my sense of self as a 
separate individual. I didn’t want to become him, because that would have meant 
negating my relationship to him; I wanted my relationship to him to become part 
                                                
169 For an excerpt from the recording, see http://www.adrianpiper.com/vs/sound_zohn.shtml 
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of myself, something that would concretely continue to exist and supplement my 
memories even when we were not in contact. (“Phillip” 57-8).  
 
Piper’s description of her intent for the piece recalls the origins of Unica Zürn’s anagrams, 
whose composition was directed by psychically-received voices and presences which she also 
described as “incorporated” into her own being. In an interview published two months before the 
Zohn Catalysis performance, Piper tells Lippard of her experiments in addressing a monologue 
to passing strangers in the street without doing anything to frame her speech as directed to those 
strangers. Piper refers to this mode of non-address as an effort at incorporating these others into 
her own consciousness (76). However, unlike Zürn’s experience with incorporation, or even 
Weiner’s experience of her own clairvoyance, Piper wills the incorporation of her relationship to 
Zohn into her person.  
If the voices that Zürn and Weiner incorporate and document in their artworks make 
present an absent collaborator, Piper’s strategy makes absent her collaborator. Piper does not 
perform a dialogue, nor a monologue derived from Zohn’s part in their conversation, but rather 
only her part of their phone call. Cherise Smith, discussing a component of The Mythic Being 
series that Piper begins a year after the Zohn Catalysis, identifies the structural role of 
separateness in a set of photographs documenting a staged mugging committed by Piper’s 
Mythic Being persona (Enacting 55). This separateness informs much of Piper’s work in the 
period leading up to The Mythic Being as discussed in this chapter. In preserving the memory of 
her relationship to Zohn, she leaves silent his part in that collaboration, marking a difference and 
separation between the two that the work cannot undo. With Zohn’s death a decade after the 
performance, this silence becomes even more resonant and poignant in its refusal to supplement 
memory with the voice of the lost loved one.  
 265 
 The silence of the lost collaborator – in this case, the friend – makes this Catalysis count 
amongst one of the private performances Piper staged in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Despite 
declaiming her monologue on city street corners, the early morning hour of its performance and 
the absence of dialogue hide part of the work from the audience. City streets are sparsely 
populated at dawn, and the incorporation of Zohn into Piper, or the loss of his voice to 
unrecorded silence, hides part of the work from view. As Fred Moten argues, “Piper talks of 
partitioning herself in order to avoid accommodating people’s needs for an oversimplified other 
[…] Like funk music (in her understanding of it), Piper is modular, syntactical, internally 
differentiated, polyrhythmic, high fantastical” (250-51). Piper’s Zohn Catalysis profits from this 
process of syntactical differentiation in its incorporation of a relationship – that is, of an entire 
syntactic system of an affective order – into her person. Moten asserts that this 
compartmentalization represents a kind of privatization, though he also recognizes that Piper 
often follows this move toward the private with a reopening onto the social (251). 
The absence of Zohn’s rejoinder in the conversation-monologue that Piper performs 
invites audience response in ways similar to her later installation Cornered, which further 
explores this strategy. In Cornered, Piper speaks to audience members in a video message, 
explaining the legal ambiguities of her father’s racial identification, and so revealing her own 
struggles with passing as a light-skinned black woman, before asking the audience members 
(specifically white audience members) to reevaluate the likelihood of their own pure “whiteness” 
in the face of contrary statistics. The piece engages viewers through a play of interpellation and 
the shifting pronouns “I” and “you,” and the setup of the installation, with the television literally 
cornered behind an overturned table, dramatizes the compartmentalization that separates “I” and 
“you,” presumably as preamble to both parties climbing over the table to realize a new social 
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configuration. Walking down the street in the early light, would that grocer or cab driver have 
been startled by the first line of Piper’s Zohn performance? “Oh, were you sleeping?” In their 
own fatigue, would they have tried to answer her before she cut them off, continuing with an 
even stranger question, “I’m fine. Were you in the bathroom?” (“Phillip” 58). 
Barthes expresses ideas of privatization and socialization similar to Moten’s 
interpretation of Piper’s work in grappling with the concept of enclosure in his lectures, where he 
conceives of enclosure as that which defines a territory as well as the identities of those within 
that territory (58). Like Piper, who found freedom in the enclosure of the glass cage as a dancer 
at Entre Nous, Barthes interrogates the distance between the social and the private in specific 
spatial paradigms. Filed under the heading of “Écoute/Hearing,” Barthes asserts in his reflections 
on this theme that sound can delimit a territory as much as other sensory phenomena (79). In this 
logic, Piper’s retreat within the glass disco cage is reinforced not only by the logic of touch (the 
solid barrier between Piper and her audience) but also by a different mode of hearing (as when 
Piper reacts differently than do her onlookers to the songs, lost as she is in the music). The 
apartment, according to Barthes, presents a more “masterable” range of sounds than the house. In 
the apartment, an inhabitant can attribute foreign sounds to a neighbor, and so naturalize them, or 
at least make them seem less threatening. For the house-dweller, all sounds target the owner (80). 
These two domestic enclosures offer different models for Living-Together, one locked in the 
privatized space of ownership, and the other fit into the modular arrangements of renting and 
urban density.  
The Zohn Catalysis, a sound piece in its documentation if not in the strict sense of its first 
performance, challenges the split between the private and the public in taking the performance of 
a cherished friendship onto the city streets. In its open-ended structure, the Zohn Catalysis invites 
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the involvement of passers-by, directing language into the social space of a street encounter, only 
to refuse any rejoinder. Barthes, to circumvent the dominance of romantic models in imagining a 
coupled pair, proposes a couple characterized by a shared alienation, brought together in a 
frenzied, momentary relation that he calls “Folie-à-deux” (67). As Barthes imagines the pairing, 
“Regardless of the motive, the setting, the excuse: it’s clear that the pair find each other 
unsettling, a form of mutual agitation of an erotic (rather than sexual) sort. In such situations, 
there can be no doubt that the group becomes the spectator. For a short while, the pair structures 
the group” (67-8). Though Piper describes finding great understanding in her relationship with 
Zohn, and not agitation, her desire to incorporate that relation into her own body and being 
indulges its own erotics. Piper transfigures the sexual relationship with David Rosner in Meat 
into Meat into the friendship relationship with Zohn, eroticized through her desire to incorporate 
it. The performance of the monologue and its silent, ghostly supplement structures a group 
response in its location in the street, making present passers-by the impossible spectators 
(impossible because they can never hear Zohn’s half of the performance nor come to know him 
after his death) of the conversation.  
Folie-à-deux, the kind of frenzy that Piper creates in Phillip Zohn Catalysis, contests the 
presence of encounter in Piper’s “indexical present,” substituting for it a transitory mode of 
relation based in absence.170 While Piper’s performance of a “mad” or “crazy” black woman 
raving in the streets contributes to a constructed “madness” in her work similar to Zürn’s, a folie 
not unlike the one Barthes describes also emerges from the Phillip Zohn Catalysis. Like Zürn’s 
incorporation and Weiner’s clairvoyance, absence founds this experience of duality within the 
                                                
170 This is similar to John Bowles’ comment on Piper’s use of photography, a medium that 
documents the absence of the no longer present photographed subject, in Food for the Spirit to 
document material presence. See Bowles 212.  
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subject. In a roundtable commentary on whiteness, Piper suggests that racial categories (amongst 
others including gender and class) prevent full access to the indexical present. As she writes, “In 
time, all such aspects may emerge as ornamental corks dancing on the water, decorating rather 
than submerging the indexical reality of who and what we are” (“Whiteless” 65). Piper describes 
the indexical present through its absence in this essay, marking it by its own futurity in a time 
when such categories will be understood for the problematic social constructs they are. That 
time, as Piper recognizes, is not yet the here and now. In the present time of encounter – that 
present time that is ours, in which we continue to work to dismantle such categories – the work 
of collaboration begins with a fraught presence, an absent presence expressed in the “mutual 
alienation” of Barthes’ “Folie-à-deux” and Piper’s catalysis. 
 
2013-2015: Participation and The Probable Trust Registry 
 
 In her most recent work, Piper returns to this mode of collaboration that founds itself in a 
constitutive absence of partners. The Probable Trust Registry (2013) constructs an alienated 
community out of the form of a legal contract. Enacted in several locations since its inception by 
Piper in 2013, including at the 2015 Venice Biennale where Piper won the Gold Lion prize for 
best artist in the festival, The Probable Trust Registry includes an installation of three desks, 
styled as corporate reception areas complete with attendants (Fig. 7.6).171  Piper invited 
participants to sign a contract at one of the three desks, asking them to agree to one of three 
terms: 1) I will always be too expensive to buy, 2) I will always mean what I say, or 3) I will 
always do what I say I am going to do. One of each of these declarations is affixed in gold 
                                                
171 For a brief summary of the project at the time of the award’s announcement, see Kennedy.  
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lettering to the grey walls above each desk. According to the “rules of the game” set out by Piper 
for the performance, the exhibitor mails all of the signed contracts, or “Personal Declarations,” 
for each declaration to all of the respective participants in that declaration, as well as to Piper’s 
Adrian Piper Research Association (APRA) Foundation in Berlin. Signatories can only contact 
each other with the permission granted by contactee to contactor through the intermediation of, 
and release of addresses by, the exhibitor.  
 Piper’s performance instructions classify the work as a “participatory group 
performance.” Instead of the shock of catalysis and its particular brand of collaboration, 
participation requires the supplement of these contractual rules to initiate the audience into the 
work as participants. Here, Piper draws on the work she completed after her early experiments in 
Catalysis or in My Calling (Cards). In Funk Lessons (1982-84), for example, Piper created a 
collaborative, pedagogical environment in which she lectured on the history of Funk music and 
dance for largely white audiences, inviting them to freely respond to her lectures rather than 
passively accept her lesson before involving everyone in a dance lesson. As Piper states her 
intention in “Notes on Funk I-IV,” a retrospective essay on the project, “Dialogue quickly 
replaced pseudoacademic lecture/demonstration, and social union replaced the audience-
performer separation” (196). In these dialogues, Piper replaced the jolt of collaborative 
confrontation from Catalysis with the “social union” of a participatory performance.  
 The arrangement of audiences into different styles of social encounter in Piper’s works 
reveals a split between collaboration and participation, in which neither functions as simply as 
antonym or synonym of the other. Jennifer Drake’s assessment that Cornered “immediately 
brings the audience into the performance as participants, willingly or unwillingly” forecasts the 
manipulation of this tension in Piper’s work that follows (228). However, the formal aspects of 
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the works that are “participatory,” that is the invitation to dialogue during a lesson or a set of 
posted “rules of the game,” grant the audience of these later performances an awareness of their 
own position within the work that Piper withholds, or attempts to withhold, from the audiences 
of Untitled Performance for Max’s Kansas City or Phillip Zohn Catalysis. As critic Chloe Bass 
points out in a review of a 2014 staging of The Probable Trust Registry at Elizabeth Dee Gallery 
in New York City, “trust” can refer to the confidence assigned to one person by others in a group 
as well as to a physical location, a repository for legal documents or other valuable objects 
(Bass). This “trust,” as relational object as well as sited location, at first seems to affirm the 
presence of the participants in the work – both to each other and to the agreement they sign.  
 However, the impossible task demanded by the declarations inscribes absence, once 
more, in the work. Participants will fail, and the social formation of the registry reiterates this 
future absence by way of failure. Each signatory will not always fulfill the reciprocal trust 
demanded by the contracts, and so trust will be met at times with absent trust. Similarly, 
participants, though gathered together by their names listed in the registries, go on to live their 
lives separated from their comrades. The wall of relative anonymity that separates them can only 
be breached through a highly regulated process that mimics the bureaucracy of a corporate HR 
office. In Barthes’ fantasy of idiorrhythmy this kind of separation is vital to the viability of 
Living-Together. He presents the walls of cells in a monastic compound as one possible model 
for the kind of communal solitude he imagines (9-10). Yet, still, Barthes demands the physical 
presence of others in his fantasy of solitude. Piper’s collaborative works, at their most catalytic, 
substitute the presence of the indexical present for the absence that separates each of us in the 
here and now, however unified in working for a different future of more harmonious ways of 
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living together. Just so, the beginnings of the collaborative work in the fraught presence of 










“J’appelle poème une forme de vie qui transforme une forme de langage  
  et, réciproquement, une forme de langage qui transforme une forme de vie.  
  Donc un poème transforme celui qui l’écrit, mais aussi il transforme celui  
  qui le lit.”172 
 
— Henri Meschonnic 
 
“Qualities not in the content of the work can be felt by a reader if the  
  author has power […]” 
 
— Hannah Weiner, “Other Person” 
 
 In the image, a woman, head wrapped in a scarf tied around and beneath her chin, wears 
an overcoat, like a raincoat but more similar to the heavier coat an English country gentlewoman 
might wear while traipsing about her estate, hounds rushing out in front of her. The detail that 
sticks, that returns my attention to the image again and again, that pricks like Barthes’ punctum, 
is in the woman’s teeth and what they clutch. A Nazi insignia. This is an image I have long 
looked at, studied well. But something in this specific image, the one in the browser on my 
computer screen as I write, prevents me from following that punctum into the fantasy of the 
photograph. The play of light and shadow is not right, the colors too saturated. And was not this 
image a black and white photograph when I looked at it before? Am I looking at Cahun?  
In fact, the résistante in this portrait is not Cahun but the artist Sarah Pucill, restaging 
Cahun’s portrait in her own home (Fig. c.1). For a film entitled Confessions to the Mirror (2016), 
based on Cahun’s wartime writings in Confidences au miroir, Pucill restaged late portraits of 
Cahun at La Rocquaise by projecting photographs of the estate, taken by Pucill, onto the interior 
                                                
172 The quotation is poet and theoretician Henri Meschonnic’s from an interview with Esther 
Orner and is cited in Chloe Laplantine’s study of the poetics of Benveniste’s linguistic theory. 
See Laplantine 13 and Meschonnic.  
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walls of her own home. The film still examples the performative iterability of Cahun’s post-war 
performance of her and Moore’s Resistance status, as I discuss in chapter three.  
Confessions to the Mirror is the sequel to Pucill’s first film to deal with Cahun’s legacy, 
Magic Mirror (2013), which restages Cahun and Moore’s earlier photographs and 
photomontages from the 1930s and the text Aveux non avenus. In Magic Mirror, Pucill’s 
animation of the photomontages from Cahun’s text, set to the sound of scissors cutting paper, 
reinscribes the creation of Cahun and Moore’s images in the medium of film. Pucill, for her part, 
writes in the project description for Confessions that “[t]he performance of following the trace of 
Cahun’s and the couples’ life and work is etched into the texture of the film […]” 
(“Confessions”). Pucill, in exploring the performativity (and not just performance) that such an 
“etching” inaugurates, reimagines Susan Gubar’s Sapphic “fantastic collaboration” of the 1920s 
and 1930s with the figure of Cahun now standing in the central place of Sappho.  
Pucill’s engagement with Cahun’s legacy inspires similar questions to the ones that drive 
this dissertation’s framing of collaboration. Who am I looking at when I’m looking at the work? 
Whose message am I receiving? These questions are already inherent to Cahun and Weiner’s 
works, especially as outlined in my discussion of Cahun’s “neo-narcissism” in chapter one, as 
well as in the “clairvoyance” that Weiner theorized for her own poetics. When I look at an image 
of Cahun in the guise of one of her many personae, do I see Cahun the performer or Moore the 
director? Do I see myself – in the image, in the text? Am I seen – by the image, by the text? 
When I collaborate, is collaboration understood in its nominal form (the artwork as product of 
collaboration) or in its verbal one (the process as collaboration)?  
  These questions point to the exchange of collaboration, between two creating subjects 
(artists, writers), as well as between the artists and their audiences. Based on a similar model of 
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exchange, Émile Benveniste’s linguistic theory of enunciation demonstrates the way in which 
subjectivity arises in language. As he explains in “Subjectivity in Language,” the speaker 
assumes the subject position of the pronoun “I” in speaking it in discourse. What’s more, for 
every “I” that emerges in discourse, a complimentary “you” coalesces as its partner pronoun. 
This dialogic relationship in discourse puts the mantles of “I” and “you” into circulation amongst 
their speakers as one speaker addresses a “you,” only to be addressed in turn as the “you.” The 
use of these personal pronouns, and so the emergence of subjectivity, is a performative, citational 
act. Of their use, Benveniste concludes that “[…] it is a fact both original and fundamental that 
these ‘pronomial’ forms do not refer to ‘reality’ or to ‘objective’ positions in space or time but to 
the utterance, unique each time, that contains them, and thus they reflect their proper use” (219). 
Further, Benveniste argues that the repetition of these utterances must correspond to the “present 
instance of discourse” to give the pronouns meaning and to confer subjectivity upon the speaker.  
 In Benveniste’s theory, the present tense of the instance of discourse, and thus of 
subjectivity, is not an assurance of self-presence in the present tense. Kaja Silverman describes 
the discontinuity of the “I”/“you” exchange as characterized by fits of starts and stops, or as she 
writes, “In the space between two discursive events, subjectivity, like the processes which 
sustain it, falls into abeyance” (45). This abeyance, as a suspension of the instance of discourse, 
scrambles the presence of the subject to him or herself as well as to a “you.” What’s more, this 
abeyance opens subjectivity to its relational structure, passing from the “I” to the “you” across 
this space and time of the suspension of its terms. This suspension, this space of abeyance, then, 
becomes the space of relation and conversation, characterized by the temporary silence of the 
pronouns “I” and “you” that makes such a relation possible.  
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The emphasis that Benveniste places on the first and second person pronouns does not 
erase the third person from discourse, despite Benveniste’s contention that the enunciation of 
“he” or “she” cannot confer subjectivity on a speaker since they cannot be spoken by the one to 
whom they refer. All of the artists in this study contest this notion, especially Zürn and Weiner, 
whose autobiographical mode is one organized around the estranging effects of third-person 
narration. And, if the artwork can be imagined as a conversation, or as its own instance of 
discourse, performed for or overheard by the spectator, as Kathleen Fraser imagines the reader’s 
experience of the poem, then can that spectator be thought of as occupying this third person 
position with something akin to the agency of he or she who speaks the “I”? In this schema, the 
spectator becomes the “he” or the “she” tacitly ignored by the work, placed outside the arena of 
an exchange between “I” and “you” while remaining the constant concern of those speakers as 
their audience.173  
In the first part of this dissertation, the imagined collaborative dialogue between Cahun 
and Weiner has this effect on its witness, the critic. As Cahun and Weiner take up the discursive 
positions of “I” and “you” in my approach to reading their works, I am left with the “he,” to 
eavesdrop. The artists and art works that I explore in part two, each reconfigure this relation 
between “I”/“you” and “s/he.” The documentation of Meret Oppenheim’s dinner party refuses 
full access to the critic; Bernadette Mayer’s Memory leaves the spectator suspended in memory 
between a work of imaging and writing that cannot be his or her own; Unica Zürn’s narrates an 
autobiographical self from the third person, leaving the reader at an even further remove from the 
                                                
173 This triangular model of subjectivity recalls somewhat the psychoanalytic model of deferred 
action that Hal Foster suggests for understanding the history of the avant-garde and its neo-
avant-garde repetitions. See Foster The Return of the Real 29. 
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“I” and “you”; and Adrian Piper directly addresses her audiences while, at times, denying them 
recourse to respond to her address.   
 In the semitoitic film theory that she advances, Silverman relates aspects of the filmic 
work to the pronomial persons of Benveniste’s theory of enunciation and discourse. Silverman, 
relaying the tenets of a strain of film theory characteristic of the journal Screen, describes the 
reconfiguration of Benveniste’s dialogic model into a model that accommodates a third term. Out 
of a speaking subject (the production of the film) and a subject of speech (the narrative, or 
discursive element, of the film) a spoken subject emerges.174 In a seeming inversion of Barthes’ 
texte scriptible, the text now writes the subject who is the viewer of the film, contouring the 
viewer’s subjectivity through the effects that the film and its narrative has on the viewer. 
Simultaneously incorporated into and exiled from the film s/he watches, the spoken subject is, in 
a sense, written by the text that plays out across the screen. Extrapolated to the terms of my 
inquiry into a performative mode of collaboration, the collaboration sparked by the comparative 
study of two artists like Cahun and Weiner “speaks” the critic (as “s/he”) who discovers this 
impossible collaboration. Chloe Laplantine argues similarly in asserting that Benveniste’s 
poetics proposes analysis as an activity which does not identify the poem as object but rather 
shows that poetic language (“le langage poétique”) is that which transforms a subject 
(“transforme un sujet”) (17). In the example of an artistic work created in collaboration with a 
deceased artist, specifically that of Sarah Pucill’s films and photographs, the collaboration of 
Cahun and Moore “speaks” Pucill into the triangular relation as this new, third collaborator.  
                                                
174 This triangular relationship echoes the conceptual roots of Benveniste’s notion of discourse in 
Freud’s psychoanalysis, in which a dialogue between analyst and analysand creates a sort of 
third text, or as Benveniste writes, “‘language’ which acts as much as it expresses something.” 
See Benveniste “Remarks on the Function of Language in Freudian Theory” 66.  
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The style of avant-garde collaboration that I draw out of the relation between Cahun and 
Weiner, and identify in the work of Oppenheim, Mayer, Zürn, and Piper, does not assume avant-
garde status for a simple challenge to the authority of the author. Instead, the performative 
possibility of a work like the happening Hannah Weiner’s Open House, which inaugurated an 
endless cycle of circulation of the positions of artist and audience through the document of the 
invitation, refuses to settle the positions of “I” and “you” amongst its “original” participants and 
instead recirculates these positions in the future encounter of critics, scholars, readers, and 
viewers of the work with the performance’s documentation. Collaboration opens beyond the 
relational tie that tethers “I” to “you” and reemerges once a future “s/he” identifies it, becoming, 






























Tom Ahern, portrait of Hannah Weiner, 1978 
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Alejandro Puente, Todo vale. Colores primarios y secundarios llevados al blanco, 1968-70, 


























Claude Cahun, Self-portrait, photomontage, ca. 1928. 
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Adrian Piper, The Probable Trust Registry The Rules of the Game #1-3, 2013, Installation and 







Sarah Pucill, still from Confession to the Mirror, 16mm color, 2016 
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